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HISTORY OF AURANGZIB

BASED ON ORIGINAL SOURCES

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HISTORY OF AURANGZIB

CHAPTER XXXVIII

THE KEYNOTE OF DECCAN HISTORY IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY.

§ 1. *Muslim Powers in the Deccan.*

In the middle of the Fourteenth century the foundation of the Bahmani kingdom created an independent centre of Muslim power in Southern India. The conquest of the western coast-strip (Konkan) by the kings of this line also put them in possession of sea-ports like Dabhol, Chaul, Rajapur and Goa, through which they established direct intercourse with Persia, Arabia, Africa and the Malay Peninsula. Thus, the stream of recruits could flow into the Deccan from the outer Muhammadan world without being intercepted by the rulers of Delhi. At a time when the force of the first Islamic penetration of Northern India was spent, the Muslim advance there was arrested by impact on the northern and eastern natural barriers of our country, and the Delhi monarchy was seized with decay and dissolution,—Indian Islam started on a new career of

expansion in the south and crushed out the great Hindu kingdoms of the Deccan which had hitherto retained their independence.

This process went on throughout the Fifteenth century. Even when, at the end of the first quarter of the next century, the great house of Bahmani fell almost in the same year that Babur sowed the seed of a new and mightier growth of Islamic power in Northern India,—there was no eclipse of Muhammadanism in the South. The heritage of the Bahmanis passed into the worthy hands of Nizam Shah and Adil Shah. Ahmadnagar and Bijapur now became centres which fully kept up the traditions of Islamic dominion and Islamic culture founded by the Sultans of Kulbarga. The greatness of Ahmadnagar filled the 16th century; but the first quarter of the 17th century saw its final extinction. Bijapur, which had begun the race for empire in the Deccan a little later and hitherto stood second, now rushed in to fill the leadership vacated by Ahmadnagar.

But with the commencement of the Seventeenth century a new combatant had entered the southern arena. Forty years of vigorous and successful rule by one undisputed sovereign having settled and strengthened the realm of Northern India from Bengal to Gujrat and Kashmir to Sind, the Mughal Emperor was now free to conquer the Deccan, and this fact dominated the whole history of Southern India

throughout the 17th century. Adil Shah found a rival he had not reckoned with. Long and desolating wars waged against him by Shah Jahan both during his father's lifetime and in his own reign, at last convinced the ruler of Bijapur that he must give up the dream of winning the hegemony of the Deccan, as the heir of the Bahmanis and the Nizam-Shahis, and that he must find an outlet for his ambition eastwards and southwards only, so as not to cross the path of the dreaded Mughals of the north. The last of these wars for deciding the claim to supremacy in the Deccan had been fought in 1636, as we have seen in Chapter 3. By the partition-treaty of 1636, the southern boundary of Mughal Deccan had been clearly marked out, and during the following twenty years Bijapur had risen to the pinnacle of her greatness by stretching her sway from sea to sea across the Indian peninsula, while the capital city had become the mother of arts and letters, of theology and science. But the warrior-kings of an earlier poorer and ruder generation were now followed by successors who preferred the harem and the *darbar* to the tented field and the saddle. The great conquests of the middle Seventeenth century were all achieved by servants of the State and not by its supreme lord and master. The climax of the Adil-Shahi power was also the beginning of its rapid decline and dismemberment.

A number of generals who had conquered kingdoms for their master with their own blood and sweat and had been long accustomed to giving the law to millions, were not likely to obey a child or a sluggard on the throne of a far off capital, nor a veiled woman or a man of their own class acting as the power behind the throne. A feudal State cannot be governed by a *faineant* king nor by a constitutional prime minister. When the king is no longer a hero, the military viceroys of the provinces will obey him as little as the major-generals obeyed Richard Cromwell. Only a superman,—a Henry V. or a Napoleon I.,—can control the feudal barons and hold together the military type* of State, such as all the Islamic monarchies in India were. Therefore, after the death of the last great Adil Shah (in November 1656), the dissolution of the remaining Muslim kingdoms of the Deccan and their absorption into the Mughal empire would have taken place as an inevitable, speedy and almost silent operation of Nature, but for the entrance of a new factor into Deccan politics.

* The State founded by Akbar was an exception to this description to a limited extent only, as even the Mughal empire did not become a truly national and constitutional State, but remained subject to the influence of the Muslim priesthood and the personal discretion of the sovereign,—more in some reigns, less in others.

§ 2. *Marathas in Deccan History.*

These were the Marathas. A small body, no doubt; but they leavened the entire mass of the Deccani population. They dominated Deccan history for the century and a half that followed the accession of Aurangzib and North Indian history for the last fifty years of the 18th century. The Maratha *people* had been there from time out of mind, but since the 13th century they had lived dispersed through many States, as the subjects of aliens in the land of their birth, without any political organization or status of their own. A genius was needed to unite these scattered units into a *nation* and drive them like a solid wedge into the Mughal empire, shivering it to bits. That genius was Shivaji, the contemporary and antagonist of Aurangzib.

European historians like Elphinstone have charged Aurangzib with political blindness because he destroyed Bijapur and Golkonda first, instead of crushing the Maratha power with the help of these two States. (*Hist. of India*, 6th ed., p. 649.) But this criticism misses the cardinal fact of Deccan politics in the 17th century. From the day when the Emperor Akbar launched forth into a policy of conquest south of the Vindhya to the day 94 years later, when Aurangzib rode in triumph into the fallen capital of the last of the Qutb-Shahis, the Sultans of

Bijapur and Golkonda could never for a moment forget that the sleepless aim of the Mughal Emperor was their final extinction and the annexation of all their territories. They had at all times had Maratha auxiliaries,—Shahji Bhonslé was only the most eminent among many such,—and now they found in the genius of Shivaji and the reckless audacity of Shambhuji their only shield in the hour of supreme danger. A union of hearts between Bijapur or Golkonda and the Mughal empire was a psychological impossibility.

These European historians further maintain that it would have been wiser for Aurangzib to have left Bijapur and Golkonda in independence to serve as the police of the Deccan against the growing Maratha lawlessness which finally proved too strong for the Mughals. This view also attaches too much importance to mere appearances and names and is based on ignorance of the true political condition of the Deccan during the period in question. By the time Shivaji had succeeded in forming a national State as a nucleus round which the Maratha chiefs hitherto in Muslim pay might cluster, the kingdoms of Bijapur and Golkonda had arrived at the last stage of decline. Their kings were mere puppets sunk in pleasure, their capitals ran blood during the frequent faction-fights for the office of *wazir*, the administration had utterly broken down, law and order had

disappeared, the provincial governors had become independent, the generals were selling themselves to the highest bidder. In the touching words of the last historian of Bijapur, "No man from *sardar* down to *ryot* ate his bread for a single day in peace; none from the Sultan down to the pauper slept for a single night in happiness." (B. S. 523.) And such Governments were expected by Elphinstone to tame Shambhuji and chastise Shanta Ghorpare more effectually than Aurangzib himself could do !

§ 3. *Relations among the Deccan Powers.*

Briefly put, the grouping of Powers in the Deccan was thus : The dread of Mughal aggression drove the Sultan of Golkonda whole-heartedly, and that of Bijapur distrustfully and intermittently, into the arms of Shivaji. But the Bijapuri ministers could never forget that Shivaji was their rebel subject; they always looked upon him with suspicion and took precautions lest by entering as their ally he should end by making himself their master. Hence, Bijapur's leagues with Shivaji were formed only when Mughal invasion was an insistent fact and the situation of Adil Shah was desperate; and these leagues were soon dissolved by the growing fear that Shivaji was trying to enrich himself by treacherously seizing its forts and lands. Occasionally the Adil-Shahi Government made a show of joining

the Mughals in the war with Shiva, but the aid thus given was insincere and of no military value (except in 1660.) Golkonda's friendship with the Maratha king was stronger and of longer duration, though its full extent remained a secret to the Mughals. It was finally cemented by the influence of the Brahman minister Madanna Pandit and the discovery of the earnest determination of the Mughal Emperor to annex the Deccani Sultanates.

Of the three Deccani Powers, Qutb Shah may be left out of our account, as he never sought a rupture with the Mughals during this period, (his war in 1677 was purely defensive), nor refuse to pay tribute;—but his failure to clear the arrears of tribute, his attempt to retain possession of the Karnatak ceded to the Mughals in 1656, and the armed aid he gave to Bijapur during the Mughal invasion of 1666, were serious breaches of a vassal's duty. Abdullah, who filled the throne of Golkonda from 1626, was a fool (as Aurangzib calls him in the *Adab*) and a voluptuary, and his successor, Abul Hasan, was as bad. Such a State hardly counted in the politics of the Deccan.

The Bijapur Government fell into a hopeless decline* after 1666, when Ali Adil Shah II. gave

* The downward course had begun much earlier, in 1646, when Muhammad Adil Shah was prostrated by a severe and lingering illness.

himself up entirely to wine, while rival nobles began to fight for the wazirship and the control over the capital and the *faineant* king. Matters grew worse when the boy-king Sikandar succeeded in 1672, and the history of Bijapur became in effect the history of its regents. Great disorder prevailed in the administration, the country was eternally unsettled and impoverished, the State gradually became too weak to defend itself from foreign attack, or even to continue its sluggish normal course of existence. This was the opportunity which made Shivaji's rise to independent power possible, and once secure in the possession of a kingdom, a capital and an army, he was strong enough to defy all his enemies together.

Shivaji could never for a moment be sure of the Delhi Government's pacific disposition or fidelity to treaty promises. Hence he lost no chance of robbing Mughal territory in the Deccan. With Bijapur his relations were somewhat different. He could raise his head or expand his dominion only at the expense of Bijapur. But when, about 1662, an understanding with him was effected by the Adil-Shahi ministers, he gave up molesting the heart of the Bijapur kingdom. With the Bijapuri nobles whose fiefs lay close to his dominions and across the path of his natural expansion (e.g., Kolhapur, Kanara and Kopal) he could not be at peace, though

he did not wish to challenge the central Government of Bijapur. The death of Ali II. in 1672 and the faction-fights at the capital that ensued greatly stimulated his raiding and annexing activities at the expense of Adil Shah, though still along the fringe of that kingdom.

§ 4. *Causes of Mughal weakness in the Deccan.*

From January 1658 when Aurangzib left the Deccan to contest his father's throne till March 1682 when he returned to the South to wear out the last quarter century of his life in ceaseless warfare, a period of 24 years intervened, during which there were five viceroys of the Mughal province of Deccan, among whom Prince Shah Alam held the office for 11 years, Bahadur Khan for 6 years, Shaista Khan for 4, Jai Singh for nearly two, and Dilir Khan for one year. During these twenty-four years the Mughals pursued a vigorous forward policy against Bijapur only under Jai Singh (1666), Bahadur Khan (1676—77), and Dilir Khan (1679—80). Military operations against the Marathas were actively carried on by Shaista Khan (1660—62), Jai Singh (1665), Mahabat Khan (1671—72), Bahadur Khan (1673—75), and by Dilir Khan for a short while in 1678—79. A state of war between Shivaji and the Mughals existed for a much longer period, but during most of it the imperial

generals acted languidly, so as to hoodwink their distant master, while maintaining a secret understanding with Shivaji (and, later, with Shambhaji) and accepting bribes from him. From Shivaji's side the attacks on Mughal territory were more frequent, though twice or thrice varied by pretended submission to the Emperor, with a view to outwitting the Mughal viceroy of the Deccan and lulling him into inactivity or friendliness.

Only a few clear successes but no decisive result was achieved by the Mughal arms in the Deccan during these 24 years. The cause of this failure was partly personal and partly political. Shah Alam was a timid unenterprising prince, inclined by nature to peace with his neighbours and the pleasures of the harem or the chase. But even if he had been made of sterner stuff, success would have been beyond his power, because his father suspected him of a design to rebel and often saddled him with a refractory lieutenant like Dilir Khan, whose open defiance of his authority made the viceregal camp in the Deccan as powerless as a country torn by civil war. Shah Alam and Dilir always worked at cross purposes and thus ensured Mughal failure in the Deccan.

Secondly, the imperial officers were heartily sick of the ceaseless war with Shiva, the hardships of campaigning in the Mavals and Konkan or besieging Maratha hill-forts, and in constant dread of his deadly

surprise attacks. The Hindu officers in Mughal pay secretly fraternized with the Deccani champion of Hinduism,—the defender of cows and Brahmans, of *tilak* and *tiki*, (as his laureate Bhushan called him); while several of the Muslim generals were glad to bribe him to let them live in peace. Above all, no Mughal governor of the Deccan was supplied with men and money even half adequate to the task of defeating Bijapur and the Marathas, as the vast military and financial resources that Aurangzib had to employ against these two monarchies during his final campaigns in 1685—89 clearly proved.

The rebellion of Prince Akbar, though it was fostered by the Rajputs and originated, grew to fullness and expired in Northern India,—changed the history of the Deccan and hastened the fate of the Mughal empire as well. His flight to Sharnbhuj raised a danger to the throne of Delhi which could be met only by Aurangzib's personal appearance in the South. But for this alliance between the "Disturber of India" and "the infernal son of the infernal infidel,"—as Aurangzib called the two,—the Emperor would probably have let Deccan affairs follow their wonted course; he would have left Bijapur and Golkonda to be occasionally threatened and fleeced by his generals, who were open to bribes, and his sons, who lacked his own remorseless ambition and tireless energy. At all events, after Jai

Singh's costly failure (in 1666), he could not have been easily induced to risk all the material resources and armed strength of the empire on the speculative Deccan adventure, and without such expenditure Bijapur and Golkonda could never have been forcibly annexed. The Maratha king would have been tolerated by Aurangzib as a necessary evil, or even encouraged as a thorn in the side of the Bijapuris and therefore really an ally of the Mughals, —which was the very policy towards Shiva advocated by the astute Jai Singh. And the monarchy built up by Shivaji's genius would have naturally fallen down when that master-mind was withdrawn, if Bijapur and Golkonda had not been driven by a common danger into the arms of Shambhuji.

But Akbar's flight to the Deccan forced a complete change on the imperial policy in that quarter. The first task of Aurangzib now was to crush the power of Shambhuji and render Akbar impotent for mischief. For this he patched up a hurried peace with the Maharana (June 1681) and left for the Deccan to direct the operations of his armies there in person.

CHAPTER XXXIX

THE RISE OF THE MARATHA POWER.

§ 1. *Maharashtra: the land and its produce.*

The dominating feature of the Deccan land is the Western Ghat or Sahyadri range, forming a towering wall along the entire western edge of the peninsula. Between the Ghats and the Indian Ocean lies a long narrow strip of land of varying breadth, called *Konkan* (between Bombay and Goa) and *Kanara* (south of Goa.) It is an area of certain and heavy rainfall,—from 100 to 120 inches in the year,—with rice for the predominant crop, and dense mango-groves, plantain orchards and coconut-palms adding to the beauty of the landscape and the wealth of the inhabitants. Here the districts of Thana, Kolaba and Ratnagiri (with the State of Savant-vadi),—a total area of over 10,000 miles,—are now predominantly Marathi-speaking.

After crossing the Ghats eastwards we have a belt of land, some 20 miles in breadth, called *Dang* or *Maval* in the north and *Mallad* in the south (*i.e.*, Kanara.) “It is extremely rugged, a series of table-lands cut on every side by deep winding valleys. From the valleys, hills of various heights and forms

arise, terrace above terrace, with steep sides often strewn with black basalt boulders.....Here and there are patches of ancient evergreen forests." (*Bomb. Gaz.*, xviii. pt. 1, pp. 2, 13.)

The Western Ghats have thrown off a large number of short spurs eastwards, every two of which enclose a valley, the bed of some stream rolling east to add its waters to the mighty Godavari or Krishna. Towards the east the spurs sink, the valleys widen out and form *Desh* or the vast rolling black-soil plain of the Central Deccan.

This land, almost locked among the hills and open only in the east, is the cradle of the Maratha kingdom. Originally Maharashtra was formed by the Nasik, Puna and Satara districts, parts of Ahmadnagar and Sholapur, and the western corner of Aurangabad,—a rough total of 28,000 square miles. East of the Ghats the rainfall decreases rapidly, and is uncertain and insufficient for agriculture, while the soil is naturally sterile and broken up by low ranges of bare rocky hills which neither store water for cultivation nor attract the rainfall. "The Deccan, generally speaking, yields to much labour a bare measure of subsistence."

§ 2. *Character of the Marathas.*

The Maratha people had lost their great independent kingdoms, in the central richer and more

level parts of the Deccan, early in the 14th century, and been gradually pushed into the western edge of the plateau by the pressure of Muslim expansion. Here in the small lonely valleys isolated by Nature, their petty chieftains retained a sort of rude local independence, usually forgotten by the kings of Ahmadnagar and Bijapur, or offering a nominal obedience when pressed hard. In their rugged and inhospitable nooks the natives found safety and peace, while the richer plains were the scenes of revolution and rapine.

In such a country no one can afford to lead a sheltered idle life. Every man, and often every woman, in Maharashtra, has to work and work with the hand. Where Nature enforces a Spartan simplicity, there can be no luxury, no learned leisure (except among the priests), no aesthetic development, no polished manners even. But such a country and climate have their compensating advantages. They develop self-reliance, courage, perseverance, a stern simplicity, a rough straightforwardness, a sense of social equality and consequently pride in the dignity of man as man. In the 7th century, the Chinese pilgrim Yuan Chwang noted the Marathas for being "proud-spirited and warlike, grateful for favours and revengeful for wrongs." This racial character was somewhat modified in the course of the next ten centuries, and the remnant of the Maratha population

at last became more cunning and less chivalrous. But the basis of their character remained the same,—activity, self-reliance, self-respect and love of equality. Indeed, in their combination of courage, cleverness and power of endurance,—in their ability to plan and execute surprises and night-attacks, in the skill of their soldiers to extricate themselves from a tight corner or to vary their tactics according to the changing phases of a battle without waiting for guidance from a superior,—the Marathas resemble the Afghans most among all Asiatic races.

Social distinctions were fewer and much less sharp among the 16th century Marathas than among richer and more civilized communities. The rich man was not immeasurably above the poor in such a simple society; and even the poorest man had his value as a soldier or indispensable labourer; at least, he preserved his self-respect, because where few had anything to spare, none was tempted to lead the pampered life of the professional beggars and hangers-on of Delhi or Agra. The same sense of equality was fostered by religion. Their popular saints in the 15th and 16th centuries created a religious revival, which was truly a reformation in its spirit. It taught the sanctity of conduct rather than mere birth, the superiority of a living personal faith to mere ritual, and the oneness of all true believers before God. "This religious revival was

the work of the people, of the masses, and not of the classes. At its head were saints and prophets, poets and philosophers, who sprang chiefly from the lower orders of society,—tailors, carpenters, potters, gardeners, shopkeepers, barbers, and even *mahars* (scavengers),—more often than Brahmans." (Ranade, 10.) They taught in the vernacular and not in the sacred tongue.

The simplicity and uniformity of early Maratha society were also reflected in their language and literature, which were poor, undeveloped, and essentially popular. The spoken tongue of the country was a rough practical speech incapable of expressing the ceremonious courtesy indirectness and delicate shades of meaning of the highly polished Urdu language. The democratic temper of the Maratha people is shown by their having no respectful mode of address; all ranks are *theed* and *thoued*.

The Maratha people's inborn love of independence and isolation was greatly helped by Nature, which provided them with many ready-made and easily defensible forts close at hand, where they could quickly flee for refuge and whence they could offer a tenacious resistance. "The whole of the Ghats often terminate towards the top in a wall of smooth rock, the highest points of which, as well as detached portions on isolated hills, form natural fortresses,.....(with) a level space on the summit

.....In many of them there are springs of the finest water."

Thus a remarkable community of language, creed and life was attained in Maharashtra in the 17th century, even before political unity was conferred by Shivaji. What little was wanting to the solidarity of the people was supplied by his creation of a national State, the long struggle with the invader from Delhi, and the imperial expansion of the race in the 18th century under the Peshwas. Thus in the end a collection of castes and tribes was fused into a nation by their political history.

§ 3. *Marathas as soldiers.*

The backbone of Shivaji's army was composed of the peasantry belonging to the *Maratha* and *Kunbi* castes. "As a class the Marathas [of today] are simple, frank, independent and liberal, courteous, and, when kindly treated, trusting. They are a manly and intelligent race.....No caste supplies the Bombay army with so many recruits as the Ratnagiri Marathas. Others go into the police." "The Deccan Kunbis are steady and hard-working..... a very quiet and orderly class,.....strong, hardy, enduring and muscular."

The Marathas had been noted as soldiers as early as the 7th century, when their king Pulakesin II. repulsed Harsha-varadhan, the conqueror of

Northern India. But with the Muslim conquest of the Deccan and the extinction of the last Hindu kingdom in Maharashtra in the 14th century, the fighting classes among the natives gathered round their own leaders in small bands and hired out their swords to the new rulers of the land. There were Maratha auxiliaries and mercenaries in the service of the Bahmani Sultans, the Nizam-Shahis and the Adil-Shahis from the very beginning. And with the disintegration of the Muhammadan power in the Deccan, the importance of these local troops greatly increased.

The sterile soil of Maharashtra discouraged its sons from the thankless task of tilling it. Strong muscles and stout hearts found greater rewards and a higher position by serving in the armies of the many monarchies of the central plateau. An able partisan leader was sure of high pay, noble rank, and it might be the proud position of a king-maker, at any of these Courts, which were constantly at war with their neighbours, and prepared to bid high for the lances of useful *condottieri* from the Desh country.

Many Maratha families rose to wealth, power and distinction as captains of mercenary troops in the service of the Muslim States in their neighbourhood. Some of them claimed to be Kshatriyas and bore names suggesting their descent from the royal

dynasties of ancient India,—such as the Mauryas (Marathi *More*), Yadavas (Marathi, *Zadon*), Yaudheyas (Marathi, *Jedhe*), Chalukyas, &c.

§ 4. *Shahji Bhonslé : his career.*

One such family, bearing the name of Bhonslés, originally lived in the Patas sub-division of the Puna district, as the headmen (*patil*) of two villages. Towards the end of the 16th century they migrated to the village of Virul or Elur, within sight of the hill-fort of Daulatabad and the caves of Ellora. They followed agriculture and gained much local credit by their sober honest character and religious benefactions. Some buried treasure that they discovered in their fields enabled them to buy arms and horses and develop into captains of mercenaries. The decline of the Nizam-Shahi dynasty and the Mughal invasion of the Deccan at the close of the 16th century gave them the chance of rapid rise. Some of the Bhonslés were won over by the Mughals with high *mansabs* and salary, others changed masters frequently in quest of better pay, during the first quarter of the 17th century.

Such was Shahji Bhonslé, the eldest son of Maloji. Born in 1594, he was married when a child to Jija Bai, the daughter of the high-born Lakhji Yadav Rao, baron of Sindhkhed and one of the greatest Hindu nobles of Ahmadnagar. Shahji first

saw service probably as the commander of the small contingent of his family, during the rule of Malik Ambar, the regent of Nizam Shah. On the death of Malik Ambar in May 1626, the State fell into rapid decay; there were frequent assassinations at Court, among the victims being Lakhji Yadav (1630) and the Sultan himself (1632). During these troubled times, Shahji first followed the Nizam-Shahi Government, then "fought for his own hand," joined the Mughals, deserted them, fought against the Bijapuris, went over to their side afterwards, and finally blossomed into a king-maker. After the loss of Daulatabad, the last capital of the dynasty, he set up a puppet Nizam Shah (1633) in one of the hill-forts of the Sahyadri range. He seized all the Nizam-Shahi dominion from Puna and Chakan to Balaghat and the neighbourhood of Junnar, Ahmadnagar, Sangamner, Trimbak and Nasik, and for three years (1633-36) carried on the government in the Sultan's name, occupying districts and forts and levying troops. During all this time the Bijapur Government backed him, as a very useful obstacle to Mughal progress. Treacherously seizing the fort of Junnar, he made it his capital and lived in great wealth and power, looting Mughal territory on his east and conquering Konkan on his west. But in 1636 a grand campaign was opened by the imperialists against Shahji and his patron of Bijapur,

which we have described in detail in Chapter 3. In the end (Oct. 1636) Shahji had to own complete defeat and give up to the Mughals the shadowy Nizam Shahi and eight of his forts (including Mahuli and Junnar). Even the name of the Nizam-Shahi State was now abolished, Adil Shah acknowledged the overlordship of the Emperor, and Shahji entered the service of Bijapur. By this Government he was recognized in possession of the jagirs in the Puna district.

§ 5. *Birth and childhood of Shivaji.*

Shivaji, the second son of Shahji and Jija Bai, was born in the hill-fort of Shivner, which overlooks the town of Junnar, on 10th April 1627. Soon after his birth he and his mother were neglected by Shahji, who had taken a younger and more beautiful wife, Tuka Bai Mohite, on whom and whose son Vyankaji (the ancestor of the Tanjore Rajahs) he lavished all his affection and wealth. The roving and perilous life that he led during the nine and a half years following Shivaji's birth also made it impossible for him to take sufficient care of his senior wife and her sons, even if he were so inclined.

After entering Bijapur service towards the end of 1636, he went away to the Tungabhadra region and the Mysore plateau, and later on to the Madras coast to conquer fresh territories for his new master

and jagirs for himself. But here his favourite wife and her son accompanied him, while Jija Bai and Shivaji were sent to live at Puna, in charge of his land-steward Dadaji Kond-dev.

Shivaji was, therefore, a stranger to his father for several years after his birth. Her husband's neglect drove the mind of Jija Bai inwards and deepened her natural religious spirit, which she imparted to her son. Shivaji grew up in solitude, a mateless child, without brother, sister or father. The isolation of their life drew mother and son very close together and intensified his love for her till it became almost an adoration for a deity. From a very early age, he was thrown on his own resources, and learnt to carry out his own ideas unaided and to take the initiative without referring to any higher authority. Such education as he received was eminently practical; he became skilled in fighting, riding and other manly accomplishments; but the weight of evidence is in favour of the view that he was unlettered, though he mastered the contents of the great Hindu epics by listening to recitations and story-tellings and thus learnt their political lessons and moral maxims. He loved to distraction religious readings and songs (*kirtan*) and sought the society of Hindu and Muslim saints wherever he went. The want of book-learning, therefore, did not leave his mind a dull and sterile soil, nor impair

his efficiency as a man of action in a world that was mediæval.

The *Mavals* or western belt of the Puna district, stretching along the rugged forest-clad side and foot of the Sahyadri range, were the homes of a sturdy, healthy, and brave race of peasants called *Mavlés*. From them Shivaji drew his earliest comrades, his most devoted followers, and his best soldiers. In the company of Mavlé chieftains of his own age, young Shivaji wandered over the hills and forests of the Sahyadri range, and along the mazes of the river valleys, thus hardening himself to a life of privation and strenuous exertion, as well as getting a first-hand knowledge of the country and its people. During his residence at Puna his plastic mind was profoundly influenced by the readings from the Hindu epics and sacred books given by his guardian and other Brahmans, and still more by the teaching of his mother. The deeply religious, almost ascetic, life that Jija Bai led amidst neglect and solitude imparted by its example, even more than by her precepts, a stoical earnestness mingled with religious fervour to the character of Shivaji. He began to love independence and loathe a life of servile luxury in the pay of some Muslim king. It is, however, extremely doubtful if at this time he conceived any general design of freeing his brother Hindus from the insults and outrages to which they were often subjected by

the dominant Muslim population. An independent sovereignty for himself he certainly coveted; but he never posed as the liberator of the Hindus in general, at all events not till long afterwards.

On the question of his future career he came into conflict with his guardian. Dadaji Kond-dev was, no doubt, an able and honest land-steward, a man of methodical habits, leading a sober blameless and humdrum life, but quite incapable of lofty ideals, daring ambition or far off vision. Shivaji's love of adventure and independence appeared to his guardian as the sign of an untutored and wayward spirit, which would ruin his life's chances. He argued long with Shivaji, advised him to follow the footsteps of his ancestors and rise to wealth and position as an obedient vassal and captain of mercenaries under Adil Shah. The young lad's association with the hill brigands and his projects for robbery and the surprise of forts filled Dadaji with apprehension about his future. He complained to Shahji, but without succeeding in effecting a reform. Worn out by anxiety and age, Dadaji Kond-dev died about the middle of 1647, and Shivaji became his own master at the age of twenty.

§ 6. *Shivaji's early conquest of forts, 1646-1647.*

The death of Dadaji Kond-dev found Shivaji ready for his task. He had already been trained in

martial exercises and civil administration; he had familiarized himself with the troops of his father's western jagir and the people he would have to govern. Initiative and power of command had been freely developed in him without check or interference from his guardian. Administrative orders had for some time before this been issued in his name, as his father's representative.

The year 1646 marks a crisis in the history of Bijapur. The king fell seriously ill, and for some time his life was despaired of. Though he lingered on for ten years more, these years were by popular belief held to be a portion of the life of the saint Shah Hashim Uluvi, given away by that holy man to the king. During this time no serious business was attended to by Muhammad Adil Shah. The expansion of territory in the Karnatak went on under some of the nobles, but at the capital the king was inert, and the administration fell into the hands of the queen Bari Sahiba.

This was Shivaji's opportunity. Even before the death of Dadaji, he had begun his annexations. In 1646 he had sent his captains Baji Pasalkar, Yesaji Kank and Tanaji Malusare with a force of Mavlé infantrymen and occupied Torna fort by tricking its Bijapuri commandant. Here he seized Government treasure amounting to 2 lakhs of *hun*. Five miles east of it, on the crest of the same spur of hills, he

built a new fort named Rajgarh, with three walled redoubts (*machi*) on the successive terraces of the hill-side.

After the death of Dadaji, Shivaji set himself to bring all parts of Shahji's western jagir under his own control, so as to form one compact State ruled by one authority. But this was effected gradually and took years to complete.

Chakan in the north and Baramati and Indapur, in the south-eastern corner of the Puna district, now passed into his hands from his father's officers. And the occupation of Rajgarh, Kondana and Torna from Bijapuri agents gave him a chain of hill-forts in the south.

§ 7. *Adil Shah imprisons Shahji, 1648.*

Shivaji's annexations had reached this point by the middle of 1648, when his career of conquest was suddenly checked by alarming news from the Karnatak. There on 25th July his father was arrested and all his property and contingent attached by the Bijapuri commander-in-chief, Mustafa Khan, then investing Jinji in the South Arcot district.

Shahji was brought in chains to Bijapur, and kept under guard until he submitted to his sovereign.

Shivaji was in a terrible dilemma: he could not submit to Bijapur and thereby sacrifice all his gains and hopes of future greatness; nor, on the other

hand, could he leave his father in danger of torture and starvation. By diplomacy alone could he rescue his father, and diplomacy pointed to only one path as open to a man in his position.

Shivaji, therefore, appealed to Prince Murad Bakhsh,* the Mughal viceroy of the Deccan, entreating him to secure the Emperor's pardon for Shahji's past conduct and protection for him and his sons in future, and offering to come and join the Mughal service on receiving a written assurance of safety. To this Murad replied on 14th March 1649 telling him to send first a trusty agent to report his demands. This was evidently done, and Murad after reporting the case to the Emperor and learning his wishes, wrote to Shivaji on 14th August asking him to come to Court with his father and kinsmen, that he might be created a 5-hazari, while Shahji would get back the rank he had once held in the Mughal peerage. Still later, on 31st October, Murad wrote directly to Shahji to inform him that Shivaji's appeal for his release had been received, and that as the Prince was soon going back to the imperial Court, he would there report the prayers of Shahji to the Emperor and

* Shivaji neither wrote nor sent any envoy to the Emperor at Delhi. All his negotiations about his father were conducted with Murad, as the four original Persian letters of Murad in Parasnis's possession show.

take his orders. Shah Jahan, however, did not put pressure on Adil Shah to release Shahji.

The official history of Muhammad Adil Shah tells us that Shahji was set at liberty, through the mediation of the Bijapuri noble Ahmad Khan and in return for the surrender of three forts (Bangalore, Kondana and Kandarpi) to the Sultan, (at the end of 1649).

As the release of Shahji had been conditional, Shivaji kept comparatively quiet during the six years from 1649 to 1655, instead of giving the Bijapur Government new provocation by fresh annexations. His chief acquisition at this time was the hill-fort of Purandar, gained by treachery.

§ 8. *Conquest of Javli, 1656.*

At the extreme north-western corner of the Satara district lies the village of Javli, which was then the centre of a fairly large principality including nearly the whole of that district.

A Maratha family named Moré had received a grant of the State of Javli from the first Sultan of Bijapur early in the 16th century, and made the claim good by their sword. For eight generations they conquered the petty chieftains around and amassed a vast treasure by plunder. They kept 12,000 infantry, mostly sturdy hillmen of the same class as

the Mavles, and succeeded in getting possession of the entire district and parts of Konkan. The head of the family bore the hereditary title of Chandra Rao.

The State of Javli, by its situation, barred the path of Shivaji's ambition in the south and south-west. As he frankly said to Raghunath Ballal Korde, "Unless Chandra Rao is killed, the kingdom cannot be secured. None but you can do this deed. I send you to him as envoy." The Brahman entered into the conspiracy, and went to Javli, attended by an escort of 125 picked men, and stabbed Chandra Rao to death and wounded his brother Surya Rao during pretended negotiations for a marriage between Shivaji and the late Chandra Rao's daughter. Then they escaped to a hiding place in the forest.

Shivaji had kept himself ready to follow up his agent's crime; according to later accounts he had arrived at Mahabaleshwar with an army on the plea of a pilgrimage. Immediately on hearing of the murder of the Mores, he advanced and assaulted Javli (15 Jan. 1656). The leaderless garrison defended themselves for six hours and were then overcome. The whole kingdom of Javli now passed into Shivaji's possession and he was free to invade South Konkan with ease or extend his dominion southwards into the Kolhapur district.

The annexation of Javli not only opened to Shivaji a door for the conquest of the south and the west, but brought a very important accession to his strength, in the form of many thousands of Mavle infantrymen from among the subjects and former retainers of Chandra Rao. In short, his recruiting ground for these excellent fighters along the Sahyadri range, was now doubled. The Mores had accumulated a vast treasure in eight generations of undisturbed and expanding rule, and the whole of it fell into Shivaji's hands. Two miles west of Javli he built a new fort named Pratapgarh, and here he set up an image of his patron goddess Bhavani, as the more ancient Bhavani of Tuljapur was beyond easy reach to him. In the April following he captured Raigarh, his future capital, from the Mores.

The possession of Supa, Baramati and Indapur rounded off the south-eastern corner of the Puna district, while the occupation of Purandar, Rajgarh, Kondana and Torna secured Shivaji's territory by a strong chain of hill-forts on the south. Another fort in the same direction was Rohira, gained some time afterwards. North-west of Puna he acquired the forts of Tikona, Lohgarh, and Rajmachi,—the last being on the Sahyadri crest, 6 miles north of the Bhor pass and overlooking the Konkan plain on the west.

§ 9. *First war with the Mughals, 1657.*

For many years after his first assertion of independence, Shivaji carefully maintained peace with the Mughals. For one thing, his power was not yet secure, and it would have been the height of folly to provoke both Bijapur and Delhi at the same time. Secondly, from 1653 onwards Mughal Deccan was governed by Prince Aurangzib with singular efficiency and vigour, and his neighbours rightly dreaded giving him any offence. When Aurangzib was involved in war with Golkonda (January-March 1656), Shivaji was too busy organizing his conquests in Javli and the northern Ratnagiri district to raid Mughal territory during that Prince's absence from his charge.

On the death of Muhammad Adil Shah (4 Nov. 1656), Aurangzib began active preparations for the invasion of Bijapur, and tried to seduce as many Adil-Shahi nobles and vassals as he could. Shivaji then wrote a letter to Multafat Khan, the Mughal governor of Ahmadnagar, offering to join the imperialists if his desires were granted. To this a conciliatory reply was given, in accordance with Aurangzib's instructions to "keep the path of correspondence with him open." [*Adab.* 144b.]

Shivaji also wrote directly to Aurangzib. His envoy Sonaji reached the Prince's siege-camp before Bidar (in March 1657) and was assured that the

Mughal Government would grant all the prayers of the Maratha chief, namely (i) a formal recognition of his right to all the Bijapuri forts and villages actually in his possession and (ii) the annexation of the port of Dabhol and the territory appertaining to it. A reply in these terms was also written to Shivaji by Aurangzib on 23rd April, 1657, when about to start for the siege of Kaliani, and Shivaji was urged to prove his devotion by rendering armed help to the Mughal cause.

But long before this date, Shivaji had already decided on the different policy of fighting for his own hand. The vague promises of the Mughal Prince *could not satisfy him*. *Even a less astute man* than he must have known that such promises would amount to nothing in practice when the need of the imperialists would be over. He considered it more profitable to make a diversion in favour of Bijapur by raiding the south-western corner of Mughal Deccan while Aurangzib's forces were concentrated at the siege of Kaliani, beyond his south-eastern frontier. He had cunningly prepared for action by quietly recalling his envoy from Aurangzib's camp, on the pretext of consultation, (about the middle of April); and he launched on war immediately afterwards.

Two Maratha captains, Minaji Bhonslé at the head of 3,000 horse and Kashi, crossed the Bhima

and plundered the Mughal villages in the Chamar-gunda and Raisin sub-divisions respectively. They carried devastation and alarm to the very gates of Ahmadnagar, the chief city of Mughal Deccan. [Kambu, 3b; *Adab.* 148a.]

A Maratha attempt to loot the city (*peth*) which nestled under shelter of the fort of Ahmadnagar was defeated, by a timely sortie of the garrison; but so great was the alarm it caused that Multafat Khan, the *qiladar* of the fort, removed the property of the inhabitants for greater safety within the fort. (*Adab.* 148b.)

While Minaji was raiding the Ahmadnagar district in the east, Shivaji was busy looting the Junnar sub-division in the north. In the dark night of 30th April, he silently scaled the walls of Junnar city with rope-ladders and after slaughtering the guards, carried off 300,000 *hun* in cash, 200 horses, and much costly clothing and jewellery. (Sabh. 8; *Adab.* 153b.) The success of the Maratha raiders was due to the negligence of the local Mughal officers (as the Delhi historian Kambu asserts) and probably also to their military weakness. Aurangzib, on hearing of these disturbances, censured the *thanah-dars* and poured reinforcements into the Ahmadnagar district.

Nasiri Khan, Iraj Khan and some other officers at the head of 3,000 cavalry were ordered there.

Rao Karn, who was coming from Aurangabad to Bidar, was diverted from the way to the same place. Shaista Khan was ordered to detach 1,000 men from his contingent there. But Nasiri Khan's movements were provokingly slow. On 30th April he entered the pargana of Bir and four days later marched towards Ashti.* Thus, there was a great delay in his going to Ahmadnagar and Junnar, expelling the enemy, and ravaging Shivaji's territory, as ordered by Aurangzib.

Meantime, Multafat Khan had issued from the fort of Ahmadnagar and relieved the beleaguered outpost at Chamargunda by defeating Minaji, (28th April.) But the Marathas continued to rove about the pargana for some time longer. However, the retainers of Multafat and Mirza Khan followed up their victory and at last cleared the Chamargunda sub-division.

Shivaji had stayed in the Junnar sub-division for some time, robbing the villages, as the Mughal reinforcements were late in arriving there and he found the field clear. But, at the approach of Rao Karn and Shaista Khan, he fled from the neighbourhood of Junnar city and wandered over the district for some time, as he could

* *Bir* (or *Bid*) is 68 m. e. and *Ashti* is 35 m. s. e. of Ahmadnagar. Chamargunda (or Shrigunda) is 33 m. s. of Ahmadnagar. (*Ind. At.* 39 N. E.) Raisin is 20 m. s. e. of Chamargunda.

not be caught and crushed. But when the pressure became great, he slipped away to the Ahmadnagar district and began to plunder it. By this time (end of May), however, Nasiri Khan had reached the scene. By a forced march he surprised Shivaji's army and nearly encircled it. Many of the Marathas were slain, many wounded, and the rest put to flight, (4 June.) But there was no pursuit, as the Mughal horses were too tired.

Aurangzib's letters to Nasiri Khan and other officers breathed fury and revenge; they must beat the raiders back from the imperial dominions and make reprisals by entering Shivaji's land from all sides, "wasting the villages, slaying the people without pity, and plundering them to the extreme"; Shivaji's possessions, Puna and Chakan, must be utterly ruined, and not the least remissness shown in slaying and enslaving the people; the village headmen and peasants of the imperial territory who had secretly abetted the enemy, must be slain without pity.

Aurangzib's new dispositions for guarding his south-western frontier showed excellent combination and judgment. Kar Talab Khan was posted near Junnar, Abdul Munim at Garh Namuna, and Nasiri Khan and Rao Karn at Panda "opposite Parenda fort," to guard the Chamargunda, Kara and Ashti parganas. These officers stood facing the frontier

and barring every path of the enemy's advance, so that the imperial ryots behind them might enjoy safety. The officers were further bidden to make a dash forward across the frontier, whenever they got an opportunity, ravage as much of the enemy's territory in front of them as they could, and then quickly return to the defence of their respective posts.

After Nasiri Khan's victory over Shivaji in the Ahmadnagar district, he was ordered by Aurangzib to "pursue the Marathas and extirpate them." But this could not be done. The rains now set in with the full violence of the monsoons, and the campaign had to be closed. Shivaji retreated to his own country and the Mughal officers fell back on their appointed stations, watching the frontier. "There was peace in the whole district." (*Adab.* 156a, 149a.)

June, July and August 1657 passed in enforced idleness for the imperial troops. In September the situation was complicated by the illness of Shah Jahan and the preparations for a War of Succession among his sons. Bijapur made peace with the Mughals. But throughout the month of September Aurangzib continued to urge his officers not to relax their vigilance, but hold the s. w. frontier in force, lest Shivaji should renew his raids. About the middle of October he wrote to the governor of Ahmadnagar to take care of the city and keep his

troops in readiness, lest when Nasiri Khan went back, Shivaji finding the field clear should begin to plunder again. (*Adab.* 149b, 157b.)

§ 10. *Shivaji makes peace with the Mughals.*

When in September his liege-lord, the king of Bijapur, made peace, Shivaji found it useless and even ruinous to himself to continue the war with the Mughal empire single-handed. He must try to save his patrimony. So, he wrote to Nasiri Khan offering submission, and the Khan replied in a conciliatory tone. Then Shivaji, as requested, sent a trusty agent to the Khan to state his demands. These were reported to Aurangzib (*Adab.* 156b, 157a); but no definite agreement followed. Shivaji now sent Raghunath Pant to Aurangzib directly. The Prince was just then starting on his march to Northern India (25 Jan., 1658) and wrote to Shivaji in reply, "Though your offences do not deserve pardon, I forgive you as you have repented. You propose that if you are granted all the villages belonging to your home [*i.e.*, Shahji's old jagir] together with the forts and territory of Konkan, after the imperialists have seized the old Nizam-Shahi territory now in the hands of Adil Shah,—you will send Sona Pandit as your envoy to my Court and a contingent of 500 horse under one of your officers to serve me, and you will protect the imperial frontiers.

You are called upon to send Sonaji, and your prayers will be granted."*

But while Aurangzib received Shivaji's submission with outward pleasure, his mind was not really composed about him. He omitted no precaution to maintain peace in that quarter by force, for he felt convinced that the young Maratha chief was a raider whose daring was only equalled by his cunning, and an ambitious adventurer who would place self-interest above fidelity to his plighted word or gratitude for favours received. He wrote to Mir Jumla (December, 1657), "At Nasiri Khan's departure that district has been left vacant. Attend to it, as the son of a dog is waiting for his opportunity." (*Adab.* 92a.) Adil Shah was thus urged by the Prince: "Protect this country. Expel Shiva who has sneaked into the possession of some forts of the land. If you wish to entertain his services, give him jagirs in the Karnatak, far from the imperial dominions, so that he may not disturb them." (*Adab.* 163a.)

Aurangzib, therefore, left the Deccan without granting peace and pardon to Shivaji. The Mughals also repaired and garrisoned the old and ruined fort of Pedgaon, as a convenient outpost for operations

* This letter, dated 24th February 1658, was not actually sent to Shivaji till after the battle of Dharmat (15 April), as a postscript reports Aurangzib's victory there. (Parasnis MS., letter No. 6.)

against Puna. (*Adab*. 157b.) But Shivaji was freed from all fear of the Mughals by the War of Succession which kept Aurangzib busy for the next two years, 1658 and 1659.

§11. *Shivaji invades Konkan.*

In the second half of the year 1657, the northward retreat of Prince Aurangzib, the likelihood of a civil war for the throne of Delhi, and the wrangles among the Bijapuri nobles about responsibility for their ill-success in the recent war with the Mughals (which culminated in the murder of the *wazir* Khan Muhammad),—all combined to remove the only checks on Shivaji's ambition, and he now launched forth on a fresh career of conquest and plunder unhampered by any fear or caution.

Crossing the Western Ghats he burst into Konkan. The northern part of this coast-strip formed the Kalian (modern, Thana) district and was then held by an Arab named Mulla Ahmad of the Nawaiyat (emigrant) clan, one of the leading nobles of Bijapur. The protracted illness of Muhammad Adil Shah had detained this governor at Bijapur for a long time, and during his absence the defence of his jagir had grown slack and inefficient. (*A. N.* 576). A considerable amount of disaffection and disorder seems to have prevailed among the petty chieftains of the district, which was a recent

acquisition from the Nizam-Shahi State and where the authority of the new Government sat loose.

He easily seized the rich towns of Kalian* and Bhivandi (24 Oct. 1657), which were then without walls, and there took much wealth and costly merchandise. The fort of Mahuli, which had once been the last refuge of Shahji, was next captured (8 Jan. 1658.) The Kalian sub-division with some other parts of the Thana district, thus passed into Shivaji's possession, and he got a firm footing in Northern Konkan, which he rapidly improved in the course of the year. His progress southwards into the Kolaba district seems to have been assisted by the petty local chiefs who were eager to throw off Muslim yoke and wrote inviting him to come. (T. S. 13a.) Kalian and Bhivandi were immediately turned into naval bases and dockyards by Shivaji.

By the year 1659 he had extended his dominions in the uplands or *Desh* to the southern limit of the Satara district, and in Konkan from Mahuli to near Mahad. Thus he now became master of the whole of North Konkan except the ports and adjacent lands on the west coast (which belonged

* Shivaji's chivalry to a Muhammadan girl (the daughter-in-law of Mulla Ahmad) captured in the Kalian campaign, T. S. 14a. Tavernier (ii 205) reports the rumour that Shiva discovered buried treasure at Kalian. *Jedhe S.*; T. S. 13a—14a.

to Bijapur, the Siddis, and the Portuguese) and the extreme north of the Thana district, while the country from Mahad southwards was yet to be won.

The greatly expanded Maratha kingdom was now organized on a stronger and more elaborate plan: Moro Trimbak Pinglé was appointed Chancellor (*Peshwa*) in the place of the incompetent Shyamraj Nilkanth Ranjhekar, Nilo Sondev Accountant-General (*majmuadar*) vice Balkrishna Pant, and Netaji Palkar as Master of the Horse (*sar-i-naubat*.) Two new posts, those of *Surnis* (Superintendent of Correspondence) and *Wagnis* (Newswriter) were created and given to Abaji Sondev and Gangaji Mangaji respectively. The cavalry now mustered 10,000, out of whom 7,000 were mounted on Government horses and the rest on their own; the Mavlé infantry numbered 10,000 and their commander was Yesaji Kank. (Sabh. 11.) The forts, old and newly acquired, held by Shivaji in 1659 numbered forty. (*A. N.* 576.) On 14 May, 1657 the newly-founded kingdom was blessed with the birth of an heir to the throne, the ill-fated Shambhuji.

§12. *Afzal Khan's expedition against Shivaji.*

After the Mughal invasion of 1657 had rolled back and Aurangzib had marched away to Northern India, the Bijapur Government gained respite and

some accession of vigour. Freed for the time being from the constant menace of the Mughals on the frontier, the Bijapur Government now began to call its refractory vassals to account. The command of the expedition against Shivaji, however, went abegging at the Bijapur Court, till Afzal Khan accepted it in a spirit of bravado.

Abdullah Bhatari, surnamed Afzal Khan, was a noble of the first rank, who had risen to power and honour under the late Sultan of Bijapur. As a general he was of the highest standing in the kingdom, being the peer of Bahlol Khan and Randaula Khan, and he had fought with conspicuous bravery and skill in the Karnatak expeditions and the more recent war with the Mughals. But the resources of Bijapur had been crippled by that war and the disorder and impoverishment natural in a regency under a veiled woman. Only 10,000 cavalry could be spared to accompany Afzal, while popular report had raised the strength of Shivaji's Mavle infantry to 60,000 men as the result of his conquest of Javli, and he had also enlisted a regiment of valuable Pathan mercenaries from the disbanded soldiery of Bijapur. (*T. S.* 13*b.*) Afzal Khan, therefore, did not prefer an open contest of force with Shivaji. Indeed, he was instructed by the Dowager Queen to effect the capture or murder of Shivaji by

“pretending friendship” with him and offering to secure his pardon from Adil Shah.*

From Bijapur the expedition marched due north to Tuljapur, one of the holiest shrines in Maharashtra and the seat of Bhavani, the guardian goddess of the house of Bhonslé. Here, according to the story current among the Marathas, he ordered the stone image of Bhavani to be broken and pounded into dust in a hand-mill, and committed similar outrages at other Hindu shrines on his way.

In a short time (probably in April), the Khan reached Wai (20 miles north of Satara), of which town and district he had been jagirdar and governor for the last ten or twelve years. At Wai he halted for several months, hatching plots for getting Shivaji seized. That chief had taken up his residence at Pratapgarh, some time before. Afzal sent his land-steward Krishnaji Bhaskar to Shivaji with a very alluring message, saying, “Your father has long been a great friend of mine, and you are, therefore, no stranger to me. Come and see me, and I shall use my influence to make Adil Shah confirm your

* “Against Shivaji the Queen this year sent Abdullah Khan with an army of 10,000 horse and foot, and because she knew with that strength he was not able to resist Shivaji, she counselled him to *pretend friendship* with his enemy, *which he did*. And the other [i.e., Shivaji], whether through intelligence or suspicion it is not known, dissembled his love toward him &c.” (Revington at Rajapur to Company, 10 Dec. 1659, *F. R. Rajapur*.)

possession of Konkan and the forts you now hold. I shall secure for you further distinctions and military equipment from our Government. If you wish to attend the Court, you will be welcomed. Or, if you want to be excused personal attendance there, you will be exempted." (Sabh. 13-14.)

Meantime, the news of Afzal's coming had caused great terror and perplexity among Shivaji's followers, and they naturally shrank from the idea of resistance. At the first council of war which he held, they urged him to make peace, as the enemy was strong and hostilities would only cause a great loss of life to their side.

Shivaji himself was in a terrible dilemma. For a night he pondered on his life's choice and then chose the manlier part. A legend, dating from his lifetime, tells us that the care-worn chieftain's sleep was broken by a vision of the goddess Bhavani who urged him to confront Afzal boldly and promised him victory and her full protection.

Then came Afzal's envoy, Krishnaji Bhaskar, with the invitation to a parley. Shivaji treated him with respect, and at night met him in secrecy and solemnly appealed to him as a Hindu and a priest to tell him of the Khan's real intentions. It was well known that when Afzal was besieging the fort of Sera, he had put to death Kasturi Ranga, the Rajah of the place, who had come to the Khan to

make his submission. Krishnaji yielded so far as to hint that the Khan seemed to harbour some plan of mischief. Shivaji then sent the envoy back with Pantaji Gopinath, his own agent, agreeing to Afzal's proposal of an interview, provided that the Khan gave him a solemn assurance of safety. Pantaji learnt by a liberal use of bribes that Afzal's officers were convinced that "he had so arranged matters that Shivaji would be arrested at the interview, as he was too cunning to be caught by open fight." On his return, Pantaji told it all to Shivaji and urged him to anticipate the treacherous attack on himself by murdering Afzal at a lonely meeting and then surprising his army.

The place chosen for the interview was the crest of an eminence, below the fort of Pratapgarh, and overlooking the valley of the Koyna. On both sides of the forest path leading up the hill-side to the pavilion picked soldiers were posted in ambush at intervals by Shivaji. Here he erected tents and set up a richly decorated canopy with gorgeous carpets and cushions worthy of a royal guest.

Meanwhile Afzal Khan had started from his camp at Par, a village one mile below Partapgarh, with a strong escort of more than a thousand musketeers. Pantaji objected to it, saying that such a display of force would scare away Shivaji from the interview, and that the Khan should, therefore,

take with himself only two body-guards exactly as Shivaji had done. So, he left his troops some distance behind and made his way up the hill-path in a *palki* accompanied by two soldiers and a famous swordsman named Sayyid Banda, as well as the two Brahman envoys, Pantaji and Krishnaji.

Messengers were sent to hurry up Shivaji, who was waiting below the fort. He advanced slowly, then halted on seeing Sayyid Banda, and sent to demand that the man should be removed from the tent. This was done, and at last Shivaji entered the pavilion. On each side four men were present,—the principal, two armed retainers and an envoy. But Shivaji was seemingly unarmed,* like a rebel who had come to surrender, while the Khan had his sword at his side. But concealed in Shivaji's left hand was a set of steel claws (*baghnakh*) fastened to the fingers by a pair of rings, and up his right sleeve lay hidden a thin sharp dagger called the scorpion (*bichwa*). His companions were only two, but both men of extraordinary courage and agility,—Jiv Mahala, an expert swordsman, and Shambhuji Kavji, the murderer of Hanumant Rao Moré. Each of them carried two swords.

* Khafi Khan, ii. 117, states that both Afzal and Shivaji came to the interview unarmed. But *kamar wa kardā*, 'with no sword girt on the waist,' was the customary attitude of the defeated party, so often described in Persian histories.

The attendants stood below. Shivaji mounted the raised platform and bowed to Afzal. The Khan rose from his seat, advanced a few steps, and opened his arms to receive him in his embrace. The short slim Maratha only came up to the shoulders of his opponent. Suddenly Afzal tightened his clasp, and held Shivaji's neck in his left arm with an iron grip, while with his right hand he drew his long straight-bladed dagger and struck at the side of Shivaji. The hidden armour rendered the blow harmless. Shivaji groaned in agony as he felt himself being strangled. But in a moment he recovered from the surprise, passed his left arm round the Khan's waist and tore his bowels open with a blow of the steel claws. Then with the right hand he drove the *bichwa* into Afzal's side. The wounded man relaxed his hold, and Shivaji wrested himself free, jumped down from the platform, and ran towards his own men outside.

The Khan cried out, "Treachery! Murder! Help! Help!" The attendants ran up from both sides. Sayyid Banda faced Shivaji with his long straight sword and cut his turban in twain, making a deep dint in the steel cap beneath. Shivaji quickly took a rapier from Jiv Mahala and began to parry. But Jiv Mahala came round with his other sword, hacked off the right arm of the Sayyid, and then killed him.

Meanwhile the bearers had placed the wounded Khan in his *palkī*, and started for his camp. But Shambhuji Kavji slashed at their legs, made them drop the *palkī*, and then cut off Afzal's head, which he carried in triumph to Shivaji.

Freed from danger, Shivaji and his two comrades then made their way to the summit of Pratapgah, and fired a cannon. This was the signal for which his troops were waiting in their ambush in the valleys below. At once the armies of Moro Trimbak and Netaji Palkar and the thousands of Mavlés rushed on the Bijapuri camp from four sides. Afzal's officers and soldiers alike were panic-stricken at the news of their chief's death and this unexpected attack, in that unknown region, where every bush seemed to be alive with enemies. The carnage in the Bijapuri army was terrible. "All who begged quarters holding grass between their teeth were spared, the rest were put to the sword." 3,000 men were killed, according to the report that reached the English factory at Rajapur a few days later.

The booty taken was immense: all the artillery, waggons, ammunition, treasure, tents and equipage, transport cattle and baggage of an entire army, fell into the victors' hands. Among them were 65 elephants, 4,000 horses, 1200 camels, 2000

bundles of clothing, and 10 *lakhs* of Rupees in cash and jewellery.

Flushed with their victory over Afzal Khan (10 November, 1659) and the destruction of his army, the Marathas poured into South Konkan and the Kolhapur district, capturing the fort of Panhala, defeating another Bijapuri army, and making extensive conquests (Dec., 1659—Feb., 1660). But in the following March, Shivaji was called upon to meet a dangerous attack on his own dominions by a combination of the most powerful of his enemies.

CHAPTER XL

SHIVAJI, 1660-1669.

§ 1. *Shivaji besieged in Panhala.*

Among the administrative changes made by Aurangzib at his second coronation (July, 1659) was the posting of Shaista Khan to the viceroyalty of the Deccan, in the place of Prince Muazzam. Chief among the tasks entrusted to him was the suppression of Shivaji. And in discharging this duty he was fortunate enough to secure the hearty co-operation of Bijapur, which forced the Maratha chief to divide his army into two and therefore to be defeated in both the theatres of war.

Early in 1660, Ali Adil Shah II. was thinking of avenging Afzal by leading an army against Shivaji in his own person. But just then Siddi Jauhar, an Abyssinian slave who had usurped the fief of Karnul and defied the royal authority, wrote to Bijapur offering to make his submission if his position was recognized. The Sultan agreed, gave Jauhar the title of Salabat Khan, and sent him with an army to put down Shiva. Jauhar easily swept away the Maratha resistance in the open, and drove Shivaji into Panhala (2nd March, 1660), which he closely invested with a force of 15,000 men.

The siege dragged on for over six months ; all the paths of ingress and egress were closed to the garrison. Shivaji found himself in a fatal trap. So, he wrote a secret letter to Jauhar, deceitfully begging his protection and offering to make an alliance with him. Next day Shivaji with only two or three followers visited Jauhar at midnight, and was received in *darbar*. After oaths of co-operation had been taken on both sides, Shivaji returned quickly to the fort, and the pretended siege was continued.

But Fazl Khan attacked the Marathas with relentless vigour and by seizing a neighbouring hillock threatened to make Panhala untenable. So, one dark night (13th July) Shivaji slipped out of the fort with half his forces, and made his escape to Vishalgarh, 27 miles to the west. The men he had left in Panhala held it till 22nd September next, when, learning that the Sultan himself was coming to take the fort, they gave it up to the Bijapuris.

A month after Shivaji had been forced to quit Panhala in the extreme south of his dominions, his arms met with another disaster in the extreme north. On 15th August, his fort of Chakan, 18 miles north of Puna, was captured by the Mughals. To explain how it happened, we shall trace the course of the war in that quarter from its commencement.

§ 2. *Shaista Khan occupies Puna.*

Early in 1660, Shaista Khan opened the campaign against Shivaji from the north, after arranging for an attack upon the Maratha dominions by the Bijapuris from the south at the same time. Leaving Ahmadnagar with a vast army on 25th February, the Khan marched southwards along the eastern side of the Puna district, methodically capturing and garrisoning all the strongholds that guarded the approaches to Puna on the east and south.

The Marathas at first retreated before him without risking a battle. By way of Sonwadi (close to the Dhond railway station) and Supa (16 miles s.w. of Dhond), he reached Baramati (18 miles s.e. of Supa) on 5th April. At the last two places were mud-forts which the enemy had evacuated. He next worked his way westwards up the valley of the Nira river, by way of Hol to Shirwal, 26 miles south of Puna, on 18th April. Like a wise general, Shaista Khan left detachments at all these outposts, to guard his line of communication and hold the forts. A flying column sent from Shirwal sacked the villages round Rajgarh (22 miles due west.)

From Shirwal the Mughal army moved along the Nira river 16 miles northwards to Shivapur (near Khed), and thence due eastwards through Garara,

arriving at Saswad (13 miles east of Shivapur and 16 miles south-east of Puna) on 1st May.

Up to this point the Mughal advance had been unopposed, the Marathas only hovering at a distance to cut off supplies and skirmishing with the foraging parties. They made their first stand near the pass leading from Shivapur to Garara. On 30th April a body of 3,000 Maratha cavalry threatened the Mughal rear-guard under Rao Bhao Singh, but were attacked and routed after a long fight.

From Saswad a small Mughal detachment raided the villages at the foot of Purandar fort. They were attacked by 3,000 of the enemy, but held their ground by fighting desperately at close quarters, though they lost 50 in killed and wounded. Reinforcements arrived, routed the enemy, and pursued them to the pass which was commanded by the guns of Purandar. The Mughals, flushed with victory, cleared the pass at a gallop, in the teeth of a hot fire from the fort-walls, and dispersed the enemy assembled beyond it. The victors returned to their camp at Saswad in the evening. Thence, after a four days' halt at Rajwah, they entered Puna on 9th May.

§ 3. *Shaista Khan captures Chakan.*

Shaista Khan had decided to pass the rainy season with his army at Puna, then a small hamlet.

But before his arrival there, the enemy had totally destroyed the grain and fodder in the country round Puna and Chakan and removed all traces of habitation. And now the many rivers between Puna and the Mughal frontier being in flood, no provision reached his camp, and his army had to undergo great hardship from scarcity. He, therefore, decided to remove his camp from Puna to Chakan, 18 miles northwards, as being nearer to Ahmadnagar and the Mughal dominion, whence supplies could more easily reach him.

Leaving Puna on 19th June, the Khan arrived in the vicinity of Chakan on the 21st, reconnoitred the fort and distributed the lines of investment among his officers. The fort of Chakan is a square enclosure with bastioned fronts and towers at the four corners. The walls are high, with a ditch 30 ft. deep and 15 ft. wide all around. The only entrance is in the eastern face, and passes through five or six gateways. Beyond the walls there is an outwork of mud with a ditch, the remnant of a very old fortification.

Shaista Khan, after throwing up defensive earth-works round the positions taken up by the four divisions of his army, began to run trenches towards the fort-walls, construct raised platforms at suitable points, and mount on them large pieces of artillery brought from the Mughal forts in the

Deccan. After 54 days of hard labour a mine was carried from his own position in the north to under the tower at the north-eastern corner, and it was exploded at 3 P.M. on 14th August, 1660. The work and its defenders were blown away; the Mughals rushed to the assault, but found to their surprise that behind the breach the enemy had thrown up a high embankment of earth which they held in force and from the shelter of which they assailed the Mughals with rockets, musket-shots, bombs and stones. The storming party was checked with heavy loss, but clung to the blood-stained ground for the night.

Next morning (15th August) they resumed the attack, scaled the wall, and captured the main fort, putting many of the garrison to the sword and driving the rest into the citadel. In a short time even the last-named work capitulated. But the imperialists had to purchase their victory at a heavy price, losing 268 killed and 600 wounded. The fort now capitulated with honour and the garrison were allowed to return to their master.

§ 4. *Desultory fighting, 1661-63.*

Shivaji's defeat at Chakan and Panhala was followed by a lull in the war during the last three months of the year 1660, which he spent quietly at Rajgarh, in planning how to compensate himself

for these losses in the Desh country by transferring the war to another part of Bijapuri territory, namely Konkan, or the country west of the Sahyadri range, where the government was very weakly exercised by countless petty vassal Rajahs and Bijapuri city-governors.

Shaista Khan, too, on his return to Puna (end of August 1660) after the capture of Chakan, spent the rainy season there in enforced inactivity. Nor was he eager to lay siege to any more Maratha forts, as even the small and comparatively weak castle of Chakan, situated in the plain, had cost him nearly nine hundred men to take it. He employed his time more usefully in inducing Ghalib, the Bijapuri commandant of Parenda, to surrender that fort to Aurangzib for a high price. The terms were approved by the Emperor, and large Mughal forces were detached from Puna to Parenda to take possession of it (20th November), overawe any opposition that might be made at the last moment, and occupy the district around it.

At the beginning of next year (1661), Shaista Khan turned his attention to the Kalian district or North Konkan. Here a small Mughal force, only 3,000 strong, under Ismail, had been operating since April last and had occupied a part of the country, though the important cities and forts (like Kalian) remained unconquered. These gains had been

placed under a faujdar named Salabat Khan Deccani, with a contingent of friendly Marathas.

But local levies could effect little, and it was necessary to complete the Mughal conquest of Konkan and extinguish the last traces of Shivaji's power there by pouring into the country large reinforcements of imperial troops under a high commander. The general chosen for this purpose was Kar Talb Khan, an Uzbek.

Marching from Puna by way of Lohgarh, Kar Talb Khan descended into Konkan by a pass a little to the south of the Bhorghat. While his soldiers, encumbered with artillery and baggage, struggled painfully and in alarm through the dense jungles, steep rocks and narrow broken roads on to Umbarkhind (about 15 miles due east of Pen), Shivaji by secret and rapid marches came up with them and cut off their lines of advance and retreat alike. Kar Talb had to offer battle under these adverse conditions and suffered heavy losses. His army seemed doomed to perish from thirst, without the power to move. In despair he gave up all the property in his camp and paid a large ransom to Shivaji and thus bought a safe retreat for his army (3rd February, 1661.)

The victorious Shivaji now divided his forces; and while one army under Netaji was detached to act

against the Mughals, he himself with the other invaded Bijapuri territory in Konkan, "to avenge the loss of Panhala." The Kalian district having been thus freed from the new enemies, Shivaji left it alone, and marched southwards, easily capturing city after city, till all the coast-strip from Danda-Rajpuri to Kharepatan was commanded by him.

But these successes were chequered by a great defeat. In May 1661 the Mughals wrested Kalian from the Marathas and kept hold of it for nine years more. Maratha activities were resumed in 1662. Shivaji attacked Namdar Khan, at Mira Dongar (6 m. s.w. of Pen) and then raided the rich city of Pen. The Mughal defence was obstinate and the Marathas suffered a heavy loss.

On the whole, throughout the year 1662 and the first quarter of 1663, some Mughal generals (esp. Namdar Khan) showed great activity and success in attacking the Marathas or spoiling their raids by close pursuit. The net result of the operations of these two years was that the Mughals kept their grip on the extreme north of Konkan, while Shivaji remained master of the southern part.

In March 1663, the Mughals gave a long and vigorous chase to Netaji, the Master of the Horse in Shivaji's army. Netaji got away, though not without the loss of 300 horse and himself wounded.

§ 5. *Shivaji's night-attack on Shaista Khan.*

But within a month of meeting with this reverse to his arms, Shivaji dealt a masterly blow at the Mughals,—a blow whose cleverness of design, neatness of execution and completeness of success created in the Mughal Court and camp as much terror of his prowess and supposed magical powers as his *coup* against Afzal Khan had done among the Bijapuris. He surprised and wounded the Mughal viceroy of the Deccan in the heart of his camp, in his very bed-chamber, within the inner ring of his body-guards and female slaves.

Shaista Khan had, as we have seen, seized Puna in May 1660 and retired there after the fall of Chakan in August next. He took up his residence in what was then the best house of the future Maratha capital, the unpretentious home of Shivaji's childhood. His harem was with him, and around his mansion lay the quarters of his guards and attendants, the band-room and offices. Further off, across the road leading southwards to Singh-garh lay the camp of his lieutenant, Maharajah Jaswant Singh and his contingent of 10,000 men.

To surprise him here was an enterprise that required no less agility and cunning than bravery and dash. Shivaji picked out a thousand of his bravest and most expert soldiers and took them with him,

while two supporting divisions of one thousand each (including cavalry and Mavlés) under Netaji Palkar and Moro Pant the *Peshwa*, were directed to take post on the two flanks of the vast Mughal encampment, at a mile's distance from its outer side. Babaji Bapuji and Chimnaji Bapuji, of Khed, accompanied Shivaji as his body-guards and right-hand men in this enterprise.

The Maratha force, lightly equipped, set out from Singh-garh, covered the intervening eleven miles rapidly in the course of the day, and arrived at Puna after nightfall (Sunday, 5th April, 1663.) With 400 picked men Shivaji entered the limits of the camp, replying to the challenge of the Mughal guards that they were Deccani soldiers of the imperial army going to take up their appointed posts. After resting for a few hours in some obscure corner of the camp, the party arrived near the Khan's quarters at midnight. Shivaji knew the ins and outs of the city and every nook and corner of the house where he had passed his bodyhood and youth.

It was the sixth day of *Ramzan*, the month of fasting for Muslims. The servants of the Nawab's household had mostly fallen asleep after their day's abstinence followed by the heavy meal at night. Some cooks who had risen from bed to make a fire and prepare the meal which is taken a little before dawn in the month of *Ramzan*, were despatched by

the Marathas without any noise. The wall dividing this outer kitchen from the body-servants' room within the harem once had a small door in it, but the opening had been closed with brick and mud to complete the seclusion of the harem. The Marathas began to take out the bricks and make an opening there. The noise of their pick-axes and the groans of the dying awoke some of the servants, who reported the suspicious noise to the Khan, but that general only rebuked them for disturbing his sleep for a trifle.

Soon the breach in the wall was large enough for a man to creep through. Shivaji, with his trusty lieutenant Chimnaji Bapuji, was the first to enter the harem, and was followed by 200 of his men. The place was a maze of canvas, screen-wall after screen-wall and enclosure within enclosure. Hacking a way through them with his sword, Shivaji reached the very bed-room of the Khan. The frightened women roused the Nawab, but before he could use his weapons Shivaji was upon him and severed his thumb with one stroke of his sword. It was evidently at this time that the lamps in the room were put out by some wise woman. In the darkness two of the Marathas tumbled into a cistern of water; and the confusion that followed was used by Shaista Khan's slave-girls to carry him away to a place of safety. The Marathas continued their work of

slaughter in the darkness for some time, killing and wounding eight of the Khan's women, probably without knowing their sex.

Meantime the other half of Shivaji's force, the 200 men, evidently under Babaji Bapuji, who had been left outside the harem, had rushed the main guard, slaying the sleepers and the awake and crying in derision, "Is it thus that you keep watch?" They next entered the band-room and ordered the bandsmen, as if from the Khan, to play. The loud noise of the kettle-drums drowned all voices, and the yells of the enemy swelled the confusion. The tumult in the harem, too, now became so great that the Mughal troops became aware that their general was being attacked. Shouting "The enemy have come," they began to take up their arms.

Abul Fath, a son of Shaista Khan, had been the first to hasten to his father's rescue without waiting for others; but the brave youth was slain after he had struck down two or three Marathas. Another Mughal captain who lodged just behind the harem enclosure, finding its gate closed from within by the wily Marathas, let himself down inside by means of a rope-ladder; but he was at once attacked and killed.

Shivaji, finding his enemies fully awakened and arming, delayed no longer, but promptly left the harem, called his men together, and withdrew

from the camp by the direct route, while the Mughals, not knowing where their enemies were, fruitlessly searched all their camp.

This night-attack was a complete success. The retreat from the camp was unmolested and no pursuit was made. During the surprise the Marathas lost only six men killed and forty wounded, while they slew a son and a captain of Shaista Khan, forty of his attendants and six of his wives and slave-girls, besides wounding two other sons, eight other women and Shaista Khan himself.

The daring and cunning of the Maratha hero were rewarded by an immense increase of his prestige. He was taken to be an incarnation of Satan; no place was believed to be proof against his entrance and no feat impossible for him. The whole country talked with astonishment and terror of the almost superhuman deed done by him; and there was bitter humiliation and sorrow in the Emperor's Court and family circle at this disaster to his maternal uncle and the "premier peer" (*amir-ul-umara*) of his empire.

This attack took place on 5th April, 1663. The morning following it, all the imperial officers came to Shaista Khan to condole with him in his loss. Among them was Maharajah Jaswant Singh, who had not raised a finger to defend his chief or to oppose the retreat of his assailant, though he had

slaughter in the darkness for some time, killing and wounding eight of the Khan's women, probably without knowing their sex.

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Abul Fath, a son of Shaista Khan, had been the first to hasten to his father's rescue without waiting for others; but the brave youth was slain after he had struck down two or three Marathas. Another Mughal captain who lodged just behind the harem enclosure, finding its gate closed from within by the wily Marathas, let himself down inside by means of a rope-ladder; but he was at once attacked and killed.

Shivaji, finding his enemies fully awakened and arming, delayed no longer, but promptly left the harem, called his men together, and withdrew

from the camp by the direct route, while the Mughals, not knowing where their enemies were, fruitlessly searched all their camp.

This night-attack was a complete success. The retreat from the camp was unmolested and no pursuit was made. During the surprise the Marathas lost only six men killed and forty wounded, while they slew a son and a captain of Shaista Khan, forty of his attendants and six of his wives and slave-girls, besides wounding two other sons, eight other women and Shaista Khan himself.

The daring and cunning of the Maratha hero were rewarded by an immense increase of his prestige. He was taken to be an incarnation of Satan; no place was believed to be proof against his entrance and no feat impossible for him. The whole country talked with astonishment and terror of the almost superhuman deed done by him; and there was bitter humiliation and sorrow in the Emperor's Court and family circle at this disaster to his maternal uncle and the "premier peer" (*amir-ul-umara*) of his empire.

This attack took place on 5th April, 1663. The morning following it, all the imperial officers came to Shaista Khan to condole with him in his loss. Among them was Maharajah Jaswant Singh, who had not raised a finger to defend his chief or to oppose the retreat of his assailant, though he had

10,000 horse under him and lay encamped across the road taken by Shivaji. Shaista Khan, with the polished sneer of a high-bred Mughal courtier, turned to Jaswant and merely remarked, "When the enemy fell upon me, I imagined that you had already died fighting against them." Indeed, the public, both in the Mughal camp and throughout the Deccan, ascribed Shivaji's exploit to the connivance of Jaswant.

The Mughal viceroy, covered with shame and grief, retired to Aurangabad for greater safety. The Emperor heard of the disaster early in May, when on the way to Kashmir, and ascribed it to the viceroy's negligence and incapacity. As a mark of his displeasure, he transferred Shaista Khan to the government of Bengal, (1 Dec. 1663) which was then regarded as a penal province, or in Aurangzib's own words, "a hell well stocked with bread," without permitting him even to visit the Emperor on his way to his new charge. The Khan left the Deccan about the middle of January 1664, on being relieved by Prince Muazzam.

§ 6. *Surat described.*

While this change of governors was going on at Aurangabad, Shivaji performed a feat of even greater audacity than he had ever displayed before. From 6th to 10th January he looted the city of Surat,

the richest port of the west coast and "the gateway to the holy places of Arabia" for Indian Muslims, who here embarked for the pilgrimage to Mecca.

The *fort* of Surat stood on the south bank of the Tapti, 12 miles from the sea. It was impregnable to a body of light raiders like Shivaji's troopers. But the *city* close to the fort offered a rich and defenceless prize. It had, at that time, no wall to protect it. Its wealth was boundless. The imperial customs alone yielded a revenue of 12 *lakhs* of Rupees a year (in 1666, according to Thevenot, v. 81.)

The city of Surat covered nearly four square miles, including gardens and open spaces, and had a population of 200,000 souls. The streets were narrow and crooked; the houses of the rich were near the riverside and substantially built; but the town was mainly composed of poor men's huts built of wooden posts and bamboo walls and with floors plastered with mud. "In the greater part of the town scarcely two or three brick-houses were to be seen in a street, and in some parts.. not one for many streets together. The whole town was unfortified either by art or nature and its situation was upon a large plain of many miles extent. They had only made against the chief avenues of the town some weak and ill-built gates [more for show than for defence.] In some parts there was a dry ditch

easily passable by a footman, with no wall on the inner side. The rest was left so open that scarcely any sign of a ditch was perceivable."

Early in the morning of Tuesday, 5th January, 1664, Surat was suddenly alarmed by the news that Shivaji had arrived with an army at Gandavi, 28 miles southwards, and was advancing to plunder the town. At once the people were seized with a panic, and began to flee away with their wives and children, mostly across the river, to save their lives. Rich men found shelter in the fort by bribing its commandant. Later in the day a courier brought the intelligence that Shivaji had come still nearer, and at night it was learnt that he had halted only five miles from Surat. Inayet Khan, the governor of the town—who was quite distinct from the commandant of the fort,—had sent out an agent to treat with Shiva for terms of ransom. But when he heard that the Maratha chief had detained the messenger and was approaching with all speed, he himself fled to the fort, leaving the town at the enemy's mercy. He used to draw from the Treasury the pay of 500 soldiers, but had so long appropriated the money without maintaining a proper force. His cowardice also prevented him from organizing a defence or even from dying at his post.

The shame of this cowardice in high and low alike was deepened by the contrast afforded by the

manly spirit of a handful of foreigners. The English and Dutch merchants resolved to defend their own factories at all costs, though these were open houses, not built to stand an attack. The example of the Europeans also heartened a body of Turkish and Armenian merchants to defend their property in their *serai*, close to the English factory.

§ 7. *First loot of Surat, 1664.*

At 11 o'clock in the morning of Wednesday, 6th January, 1664, Shivaji arrived at Surat and pitched his tent in a garden a quarter of a mile outside the Burhanpur or eastern gate. The night before he had sent two messengers with a letter requiring the governor and the three most eminent merchants and richest men in the city, *viz.*, Haji Said Beg, Baharji Borah, and Haji Qasim, to come to him in person immediately and make terms, otherwise he threatened the whole town with fire and sword. No answer had been given to the demand, and the Maratha horsemen, immediately after their arrival on the 6th, entered the defenceless and almost deserted city, and after sacking the houses began to set fire to them. A body of Shivaji's musketeers was set "to play upon the castle, with no expectation to take it, but to keep in and frighten the governor and the rest that had got in, as also [to prevent] the soldiers of the castle from sallying

out upon them whilst the others plundered and fired [the houses.]” The garrison kept up a constant fire, but the fort-guns inflicted more damage on the town than on the assailants. Throughout Wednesday, Thursday, Friday and Saturday, this work of devastation was continued, every day new fires being raised, so that thousands of houses were consumed to ashes and two-thirds of the town destroyed. As the English chaplain wrote, “Thursday and Friday nights were the most terrible nights for fire. The fire turned the night into day, as before the smoke in the day-time had turned day into night, rising so thick that it darkened the sun like a great cloud.”

Near the Dutch factory stood the grand mansion of Baharji Borah, then “reputed the richest merchant in the world,” his property having been estimated at 80 *lakhs* of Rupees. The Marathas plundered it at leisure day and night till Friday evening, when having ransacked it and dug up its floor, they set fire to it. From this house they took away 28 *seers* of large pearls, with many other jewels, rubies, emeralds and “an incredible amount of money.”

Close to the English factory were the lofty residence and extensive warehouses of another very rich merchant, Haji Said Beg, who, too, had fled away to the fort, leaving his property without a defender. All the afternoon and night of Wednesday

and till past the noon of Thursday, the Marathas continued to break open his doors and chests and carry off as much money as they could. Entering one of his warehouses they smashed some casks of quicksilver and spilt a great quantity of it on the floor. But in the afternoon of Thursday the brigands left it in a hurry, on being scared by a sortie which the English had made into the street to drive away a party of 25 Maratha horsemen who seemed intent on setting fire to another house in dangerous proximity to the English factory. In this encounter one Maratha trooper was wounded with a bullet, and two Englishmen with arrow and sword, but slightly.

The English merchants next day put a guard of their own in the house of Said Beg and thus he suffered no further loss. Shivaji was angry with the English at being balked of his prey, and in the afternoon of Friday he sent them a message calling upon them to pay him three *lakhs* of Rupees or else let his men freely loot the Haji's house, and threatening that in case they refused to do either he would come in person, kill every soul in the English factory, and raze their house to the ground. President Oxenden took time to consider the proposal till next morning (Saturday), when he rejected both the demands of Shivaji and boldly defied the Maratha chief to come and do his worst, saying, "We are ready for you and resolved not to go away. But come when you

please; and [as] you have, as you say, resolved to come, I ask you to come one *prahar* sooner than you intend." To this challenge Shivaji gave no reply. He was surfeited with booty and was too wise to run a needless risk by facing artillery concealed behind defences and served by resolute and disciplined men, for the sake of a few *lakhs* more. The plunder of Surat yielded him above a *kror* of Rupees, the city "not having been so rich [as then] in many years before." The looting was unresisted, and extended over fully four days and nights, and he "scorned to carry away anything but gold, silver, pearls, diamonds and such precious ware."

§ 8. *Attempt to murder Shivaji.*

The cowardly governor Inayet Khan, who had run into the fort on Tuesday night, formed an infamous plot from his safe refuge. On Thursday he sent a young follower of his to Shivaji with pretended terms of peace. These were so manifestly unreasonable that Shivaji scornfully asked the envoy, "Your master is now cooped up in his chamber like a woman. Does he think of me too as a woman that he expects me to accept such terms as these?" The young man immediately replied, "We are not women; I have something more to say to you;" and whipping out a concealed dagger he ran full at Shivaji's breast. A Maratha body-guard that stood

before the Rajah with a drawn sword, struck off the assassin's hand with one blow. But so great was the force of the desperado's rush that he did not stop but drove the bloody stump of his arm on Shivaji's person and the two rolled on the ground together. The blood being seen on Shivaji's dress, his followers imagined that he had been murdered, and the cry ran through the camp to kill the prisoners. But the same guardsman clove the assassin's skull; Shivaji rose up from the ground and forbade any massacre. Then he ordered the prisoners to be brought before him and cut off the heads of four and the hands of 24 others from among them at his caprice, but spared the rest.

At ten o'clock in the morning of Sunday the 10th, Shivaji suddenly departed from Surat with his army, on hearing that a Mughal force was coming to the relief of the town. That night he encamped twelve miles off and then retreated by rapid marches to Konkan.

The Emperor showed his sympathy with the afflicted citizens by excusing the custom duties for one year in the case of all the merchants of Surat, and he rewarded the valour of the English and the Dutch traders by granting them a reduction of one per cent from the normal import duties on their merchandise in future.

§ 9. *Shivaji's doings in 1664.*

The year 1664 that lay between the departure of Shaista Khan and the arrival of Jai Singh, was not marked by any Mughal success. The new viceroy, Prince Muazzam, lived at Aurangabad, caring only for pleasure and hunting. His favourite general, Jaswant Singh, was posted at Puna. From this place he marched out and besieged Kondana, (Nov. 1663.) The Rajputs are proverbially inefficient in sieges, and Jaswant, after wasting some months before the fort, delivered a rash and fruitless assault, in which he lost many hundreds of his soldiers, chiefly owing to a gunpowder explosion. Then he quarrelled with his brother-in-law Bhao Singh Hada, evidently on the question of responsibility for the failure, and the two officers abandoned the siege (28th May, 1664) and with their armies retired to Aurangabad to pass the rainy season. The campaign ended with absolutely no gain.

The field being clear, Shivaji ranged at liberty in spite of the height of the rainy season, and plundered Ahmadnagar.

§ 10. *Jai Singh sent against Shivaji.*

The failure of Shaista Khan and the sack of Surat caused bitter mortification to Aurangzib and his Court, and he decided to send his ablest Hindu and Muhammadan generals to the Deccan. Among

the promotions and transfers on his birthday, 30th September, 1664, the Emperor appointed Mirza Rajah Jai Singh to put down Shivaji. Under him were deputed Dilir Khan, Daud Khan Qureshi, Rajah Rai Singh Sisodia, Ihtisham Khan Shaikhzada, Qubad Khan, Rajah Sujan Singh Bundela, Kirat Singh (a son of Jai Singh), Mulla Yahia Nawaiyat (a Bijapuri noble who had come over to the Mughals), and many other officers, with 14,000 troopers.

After making the necessary preparations, and collecting his subordinates, Jai Singh left Upper India and crossed the Narmada at Handia on 9th January, 1665. He pushed rapidly on, never wasting a day by halting, except when strong necessity compelled him, arrived at Puna on 3rd March and took over charge from Maharajah Jaswant Singh, who immediately afterwards (7th) started for Delhi, as commanded by the Emperor.

Jai Singh's career had been one of undimmed brilliancy from the day when he, an orphan of twelve, had received his first appointment in the Mughal army (1617). Since then he had fought under the imperial banner in every part of the empire,—from Balkh in Central Asia to Bijapur in the Deccan, from Qandahar in the west to Mungir in the east. Hardly a year had passed during the long reign of Shah Jahan when this Rajput chieftain had not seen active service somewhere and received

some promotion for conspicuous merit. His marked ability had found recognition in his being given the command of the Van or one of the wings in the Mughal armies led by princes of the blood in campaigns beyond India. Latterly he had commanded in chief. In diplomacy he had attained to a success surpassing even his victories in the field. Wherever there was a difficult or delicate work to be done, the Emperor had only to turn to Jai Singh. A man of infinite tact and patience, an adept in the ceremonious courtesy of the Muslims, a master of Turki and Persian, besides Urdu and the Rajput dialect, he was an ideal leader of the composite army of Afghans and Turks, Rajputs and Hindustanis, that followed the crescent banner of the sovereign of Delhi.

Age and experience had cooled the impetuous ardour of his youth,—he had once led a forlorn hope, at the storming of Mau,—and he now employed stratagem in preference to force, and bribe in preference to war. His foresight and political cunning, his smoothness of tongue and cool calculating policy, were in striking contrast with the impulsive generosity, reckless daring, blunt straightforwardness, and impolitic chivalry which we are apt to associate with the Rajput character.

And now this veteran of a hundred fights donned his armour at the age of sixty to crush a

petty chieftain, who in less than ten years had grown great enough to baffle all the resources of Bijapur and to challenge the prestige of the empire of Delhi.

§ 11. *Jai Singh's preparations and plan of campaign.*

We can learn from Jai Singh's letters how he employed every possible device for dealing with an enemy, how wide awake and full of many-sided activity he was, how he looked far ahead, and how he handled his force so as to cause distraction to the enemy or deal a concentrated blow at a vital point.

In view of his two enemies, Jai Singh very wisely decided to take up a position between both, *i.e.*, in the eastern part of Shivaji's dominion, whence he could also easily threaten Bijapur, instead of pushing the war into the Western Ghats or the Konkan plain further west. He knew that if he could strike fatally at the heart of the Maratha kingdom, the distant limbs would drop down of themselves.

Secondly, he played skilfully upon the hopes and fears of the Sultan of Bijapur, holding forth the chance of reduction of tribute and removal of the Emperor's displeasure, if Adil Shah aided the Mughals and thus clearly proved his want of connection with Shivaji. Thirdly, he arranged to combine against Shivaji all his enemies and distract

his attention by attacks from all possible quarters. As early as January he had sent two Europeans named Francisco de Mello and Diogo de Mello to the western coast with letters to the chief of the Portuguese settlement of Goa inviting him to help the imperialists by attacking Shivaji, who had collected a fleet of his own.

In January he had sent his Brahman emissaries to various Deccani chieftains, to stir them up against Shivaji. Every one who bore a grudge to Shivaji or envied the sudden rise of the Bhonslés, had been approached by the Mughal general's spies. Baji Chandra Rao and his cousin Ambāji Govind Rao Moré,—the family from which Shivaji had wrested Javli,—reached his camp, along with Mankoji Dhangar, and were enlisted in the Mughal army (4th week of March). Similarly, Afzal Khan's son, Fazl Khan, solicited from Jai Singh a command and an opportunity of avenging his slaughtered father on Shivaji. The adhesion of the petty Rajahs of the Koli country north of Kalian was secured through Niccolao Manucci, then chief of Jai Singh's European artillery.

Money and promises of high rank in the Mughal service were lavishly employed on Shivaji's officers to corrupt their loyalty, and with some success.

Above all, Jai Singh concentrated all authority in his own hands, as an indispensable condition of

success in war. The Emperor had at first given him the command of the field-operations only, while all administrative work, like the promotion, punishment and transfer of officers, the payment of the troops, and the regulation of jagirs, was left in the hands of the viceroy at Aurangabad. Jai Singh rightly insisted that in war there should be only one head, and that the 'man on the spot' should be given full authority, or else the work would suffer. The Emperor yielded to the argument and Jai Singh gained absolute civil and military authority alike. The commandants of the Mughal forts at Ahmadnagar and Parenda were also placed under his orders.

§ 12. *Campaign opened, 1665.*

Going southwards from Junnar (which is 55 miles west of Ahmadnagar) and crossing the old Mughal frontier, we have first the valley of the Indrayani, overlooked by the hill-forts of Lohgarh and Tikona in the west and Chakan in the centre. Next comes the valley of the Bhima, in which Puna stands. Further south, across a long range, lies the valley of the slender brook Karha, with the cities of Saswad and Supa in the plain and the forts of Singh-garh on the western hills and Purandar on its southern rocky barrier. Beyond these hills lies the valley of the Nira, with the town of Shirwal on its

bank and the forts of Rajgarh and Torna in the west and Rohira in the south-west.

Puna is almost the same distance (about 28 miles) from Lohgarh in the north-west and Singhgarh in the south. Saswad was admirably situated for attacking Purandar (6 miles south of it), Singhgarh and Rajgarh (18 and 24 miles in the west), and Puna (18 miles north-west of it),—while the widening plain east of it enabled cavalry to make an easy and rapid dash into Bijapur territory, or bar the path of reinforcements coming from that side. Even now five main roads meet at Saswad.

Jai Singh, therefore, with a true general's eye for the ground, made Saswad his base. Puna was strongly garrisoned. An outpost was established opposite Lohgarh to observe and blockade it and guard the road leading north to the Mughal frontier near Junnar. A flying column was organized to ravage the Maratha villages embosomed among the hills to the west and south-west of Saswad. On his eastern side he was quite secure from attack, from the nature of the ground, the position of Saswad close to the boundary line between Shivaji's dominion and Bijapur, and the existence of a Mughal advanced post at Supa.

After arriving at Puna (3rd March), Jai Singh spent some days in settling the country and

establishing outposts, which he regarded as the "first of the pillars supporting the work of this expedition."

Deciding, for the reasons given above, to take up his position at Saswad and besiege Purandar, Jai Singh marched out of Puna on 14th March.

Arriving on the 29th at a place one day's march short of Saswad, he sent on Dilir Khan with the vanguard and the artillery to cross the pass lying in the way, advance four miles up the hill, and then halt.

Next day the Rajah crossed the hill and pushed on to Dilir Khan's camp, leaving Daud Khan below the pass to see to the safe transit of the army up to noon. The rearguard were to bring up the stragglers.

On this very morning (30th March) Dilir Khan went with the Van to select a proper place for encampment. In this reconnaissance he approached fort Purandar. A large body of Maratha musketeers, who occupied an enclosure in the waist of the hill—called *vadi* in the local language,—now came down and attacked the imperialists, who, however, routed them and captured the *vadi*. The houses there were burnt and the Mughal Van very boldly improved their victory by at once pushing on as near Purandar as they could and entrenching just beyond the fire of the fort-guns.

Jai Singh on hearing of it, at once sent up 3,000 of the troops of his command under Rai Singh

Rathor, Kirat Singh, Qubad Khan, Mitrasen, Indraman Bundela and other officers at a gallop. He also despatched an urgent order to Daud Khan to come to him, take charge of the camp, and enable the Rajah to go to supervise the siege. But Daud Khan, on hearing the news, had hastened to join Dilir Khan, without coming to Jai Singh.

The day was far spent; there was no high officer left to guard the camp, and so Jai Singh had to stay there perforce. He had already sent forward a party of pioneers and water-carriers, shot, powder, gun munitions, and entrenching tools for the use of Dilir Khan.

Next morning (31st March), Jai Singh carefully escorted the baggage to a permanent camp serving as a base, between Saswad and Purandar, only 4 miles from the latter. Then he reconnoitred the fort from the position of Daud Khan and Kirat Singh. It was not a single fort, but a fortified mass of hills; hence to surround and closely blockade it was impossible.

§ 13. *Purandar besieged.*

Six miles south of Saswad rises the stupendous mountain mass of Purandar, the highest point of which towers 4,564 feet above sea-level and more than 2,500 feet above the plain at its foot. It is really a double fort, with an independent and very

strong sister enclosure, namd Vajragarh, on a ridge running out east of it. Purandar consists of an upper fort or citadel with precipitous sides all around and a lower fort or *machi*, 300 feet or more below it. The latter is a ledge running round the waist of the hill with many a winding, the entire circuit being four miles. On the north side the ledge widens out into a broad terrace, containing the barracks and offices of the garrison. This terrace is bounded on the east by the high spur named Bhairav Khind, which starts from the base of the steep overhanging north-eastern tower (called *Khad-kala* or the Sky-scraper) of the upper fort, and runs for about a mile eastwards in a narrow ridge, ending in a small tableland (3,618 feet above sea-level), crowned with the fort of Rudramal (now called Vajragarh).

This Vajragarh commands the *machi* or lower fort of Purandar on its northern and most important face, as the garrison has to live here. It was by seizing Vajragarh that Jai Singh in 1665 and the English in 1817 made Purandar untenable for the Marathas. Jai Singh, like a true general, decided to attack Vajragarh first.

Dilir Khan with his nephews and Afghan troops, Hari Bhan and Udai Bhan Gaur, entrenched between Purandar and Rudramal. In front of him were the chief of the artillery, Turktaz Khan, and the party sent by Jai Singh. Kirat Singh with the

3,000 troopers of the Rajah and a few other *mansabdars* made a stockade opposite the north gate of Purandar. On the right were the trenches of Rajah Narsingh Gaur, Karn Rathor, Jagat Singh of Narwar, and Sayyid Maqbul Alam. Behind Purandar and facing its postern gate (*khirki*) was the position of Daud Khan, Rajah Rai Singh Rathor, Md. Salih Tarkhan, Ram Singh [Hada ?], Sher Singh Rathor, Raj Singh Gaur and others. To the right of this position were posted Rasul Beg Rozbhani and his Rozbhani followers. Opposite Rudramal, Chaturbhuj Chauhan with a party of Dilir Khan's followers entrenched, and behind these Mitrasen, Indraman Bundela and some other officers.

Jai Singh removed his quarters from the camp to the foot of the hill to be nearer the besieged fort, while the soldiers pitched their tents along the hillside. He visited the trenches every day, encouraged his men, and supervised the progress of the siege. At first all his efforts were directed to dragging guns to the top of the steep and difficult hill. It took three days to raise a gun, named *Abdullah Khan*, and mount it opposite Rudramal. In $3\frac{1}{2}$ days more a second gun, named *Fath Lashkar*, was taken there. A third, named *Haheli*, was painfully approaching the summit. The incessant bombardment of the Mughals demolished the bases of the tower in front,

and pioneers were sent to its foot to dig a hole underneath.

§ 14. *Capture of Vajragarh.*

At midnight, 13th April, Dilir Khan's division stormed the tower and drove the enemy into an enclosure behind it, leaving on the field seven slain and four wounded. Jai Singh reinforced Dilir Khan with a party of his own Rajputs. Next day, the victorious Mughals pushed on to the inner enclosure and tried to capture it by escalade. The garrison, oppressed by their fire, capitulated in the evening (14th April), left the fort, and were disarmed. But Jai Singh very wisely allowed them to return home in order to tempt the garrison of Purandar, by this example of leniency, to surrender instead of fighting to the last. The heroic leaders of the defence were chivalrously given robes of honour by Dilir Khan and Jai Singh alike. The imperialists lost 80 killed and 109 wounded, as the price of this success.

The possession of Vajragarh was the stepping-stone to the capture of Purandar, or in Jai Singh's own language, "the key that would unlock Purandar." Dilir Khan now turned to the latter fort, while Jai Singh organized raids into the Maratha country, in order, as he wrote to the Emperor, to convince Shivaji and the Sultan of Bijapur that the Mughal army was large enough to be able to spare troops

from the siege, and also to prevent any concentration of forces round Shivaji by creating constant terror and disturbance in various parts of his kingdom.

There was also a secret reason for thus sending away some generals from the siege-camp. He had some disloyal officers under him, whose presence was worse than useless. Daud Khan Qureshi was posted to watch the postern gate (*khirki*) of the fort; but after a few days it became known that a party of Marathas had entered the fort by that gate, without being opposed by him. Dilir Khan severely rebuked Daud Khan for his failure, and a bitter quarrel broke out between the two. Jai Singh then transferred Daud Khan to his own division and posted Purdil Khan and Subh-Karn Bundela opposite the postern. But matters did not improve: "Subh-Karn did not at all give his heart to the work, but preferred above everything else to favour Shiva!" Daud Khan, too, was a source of mischief in his new station. He constantly declared that the capture of Purandar was beyond the range of possibility, and that the siege was a waste of men and money. His intention in talking in this way was, as Jai Singh detected, to discourage the commander-in-chief from heartily supporting the siege-operations, so that Dilir Khan would be left to bear the burden of the fight unaided and would have to retire with failure and disgrace. Jai Singh removed the mischief-maker from the camp

by creating an independent flying column and sending him at its head, to make raids daily, or on alternate days, on different places in the district.

§ 15. *Maratha efforts to raise the siege.*

Meantime the Maratha captains had not been idle, but tried hard to harass the Mughals and raise the siege. Early in April, Netaji Palkar, Shivaji's kinsman and cavalry leader, made a dash on Parenda, but a Mughal detachment from Supa hastened in pursuit, and the Maratha host melted away at the news and offered no fight. Late in May, Qutb-ud-din Khan had to advance up to fort Urouda, to break up a gathering of the enemy of which he had got news. The villages on the way were plundered, and the enemy dispersed wherever they assembled round any of their forts. The hill of Lohgarh was scaled, and a body of Marathas on the top slain or routed, Daud Khan returning with 300 captives and nearly 3,000 cattle. Then, again, a body of 300 Maratha cavalry, who were sheltering at Narkot, were dislodged by a detachment sent by Qubad Khan, the new *thanahdar* of Puna (vice Ihtisham Khan deceased), the victors returning with the captured peasants and cattle.

But the Marathas did not invariably fail. As Jai Singh admits, "sometimes we have failed to

prevent the enemy from accomplishing their hostile designs." Khafi Khan is more explicit: "The surprises of the enemy, their gallant successes, attacks on dark nights, blocking of roads and difficult passes, and burning of jungles, made it very hard for the imperialists to move about. The Mughals lost many men and beasts."

After the capture of Vajragarh in the middle of April, Dilir Khan advanced along the connecting ridge and laid siege to the *machi* or lower fort of Purandar. His trenches approached the tower of Khad-kala at the north-eastern angle of the fort. At first, the garrison made sorties to drive back the besiegers. One night they attacked Kirat Singh, who was quite prepared and repulsed them with slaughter. Another attack was made in a dark night on the trenches of Rasul Beg Rozbhani: he was caught napping, the guns in his trenches were spiked, and 15 of his soldiers wounded. But reinforcements, attracted by the din of battle, poured in from the neighbouring trenches, and the enemy were repulsed with loss. Next day there was a sharp skirmish over the removal of the corpses, in which the Mughals lost 8 men.

But Dilir Khan sat down before Purandar like grim Death, his men "doing in a day what could not be achieved elsewhere in a month."

§ 16. *Outworks of Purandar stormed.*

When, in the course of May, the Mughal trenches reached the foot of the two White Towers, which had been dismantled by bombardment, the garrison began to throw down lighted naphtha oil, leather bags full of gunpowder, bombs and heavy stones which effectually stopped the further advance of the Mughals. Jai Singh ordered a high wooden platform of logs and planks to be made, on which guns were to be mounted and parties of gunners and musketeers placed, to command the enemy's position. His first two attempts were frustrated: on the first occasion the upright posts had been just set up, on the second the cross-pieces had been joined, when the enemy burnt them down. On 30th May, however, the parts of the third tower were joined together in the rear and sent to the appointed place in front of the White Tower, in charge of Rup Singh Rathor and Giridhar Purohit, with orders to set up a defensive wall in front first of all, and then plant the two rows of posts. Next some Rajput marksmen were to climb to the top and keep the enemy down with their bows and matchlocks while the tower was being completed. This was done two hours before sunset.

Then the general's hands were forced by the impetuosity of his men. Before artillery was mounted on the wooden tower and the enemy

opposite crushed, with only two hours of daylight remaining, some Ruhela soldiers, without informing Dilir Khan, tried to storm the White Tower. The enemy crowded on the wall in large numbers and checked them. But reinforcements rapidly arrived: the men of the trenches on both hands scaled the wall with ladders, and ran towards the enemy. Jai Singh's officer Bhupat Singh Puar, a commander of 500, was slain on the right side of the smaller White Tower, with several other Rajputs. On the left side Balkrishna Sakhawat and some Afghans of Dilir Khan carried on the fight. Just then the line of supports, under Achal Singh and Kirat Singh, arrived on the scene of battle from their shelter behind the wooden structure. After an obstinate struggle at close quarters, the Marathas lost heavily, retreated to behind the Black Tower and began to gall the Mughals by discharging bombs, kettles full of gunpowder, rockets, stones &c. Finding further advance impossible, Jai Singh was contented with the capture of the three bastions made that day and ordered his men to dig trenches exactly where they had reached and to hold the White Tower, without attempting to push on to the Black Tower.

In the course of the next two days the wooden structure was completed and two small pieces of cannon were mounted on it. The enemy, unable to reply to this fire from a superior height, evacuated

the Black Tower and another bastion near it and took refuge in a stockade adjoining the wall of the tower. But they could not show their heads. The stockade was untenable, and they retired to the trenches behind it. Thus five towers and one stockade of the lower fort fell into the hands of the Mughals.

Purandar now seemed doomed. And, as if to complete its destruction, the Emperor had at Jai Singh's request despatched a train of very heavy artillery which were now on the way to the fort. The garrison had suffered heavy casualties during two months of incessant fighting. Early in the siege they had lost their gallant commandant Murar Baji Prabhu.

Taking seven hundred select men with himself, Murar Baji made a sortie on Dilir Khan, who was trying to climb the hill with 5,000 Afghans and some more troops of other races. The Marathas dashed forward, mingled with the enemy on all sides, and there was severe fighting at close quarters. Murar Baji with his Mavles slew 500 Pathans besides many *Bahlia* infantrymen, and at the head of sixty desperate followers cut his way to Dilir's camp.

His comrades were slain by the overwhelming body of the Mughals, but Murar Baji rushed straight on towards Dilir. The Khan, in admiration of his matchless courage, called upon him to yield and

promised him his life and a high post under him. Murar indignantly refused, and was going to strike at Dilir when the latter shot him down with an arrow. Three hundred Mavles fell with him, and the rest retreated to the fort. But the garrison, with a courage worthy of the mother of Brasidas the Spartan, continued the struggle, undismayed by their leader's fall and saying, "What though one man Murar Baji is dead? We are as brave as he, and we shall fight with the same courage!"

But at last the steady pressure of Jai Singh bore fruit. Purandar was closely invested, the garrison had been woefully thinned by two months of fighting, and now the capture of five bastions of the lower fort made the stronghold untenable. Its fall was only a question of time. Shivaji found it futile to prolong the resistance. The families of the Maratha officers were sheltered in Purandar, and its capture would mean their captivity and dishonour. He had also failed to prevent the Mughal flying columns from ravaging his country. Failure and ruin stared him in the face wherever he looked.

The Mughal victory of 2nd June, and the impending fall of the lower fort decided Shivaji. He resolved to interview Jai Singh and offer fresh terms for peace with the imperialists.

Shivaji next demanded and secured from Jai Singh an assurance, confirmed with solemn oaths,

that he would be allowed to visit Jai Singh and return home in safety, whether his terms were accepted or not.

§ 17. *Shivaji interviews Jai Singh.*

Raghunath Ballal, the Maratha envoy, returned to his master on 9th June. On the 10th he sent word that Shivaji would come next day. On the 11th, at 9 o'clock in the morning, while Jai Singh was holding court in his tent at the foot of Purandar, Raghunath came in and reported that Shivaji had arrived at hand in a *palki* accompanied by six Brahmans only. Jai Singh immediately sent his secretary Udairaj and Ugrasen Kachhwa to meet him on the way and tell him that if he agreed to surrender all his forts he might come, otherwise he should turn back from the place. Shiva agreed to the terms in general and proceeded forward with the two officers. At the door of the tent he was welcomed by Jai Singh's Paymaster and ushered in. The Rajah advanced a few steps, embraced Shivaji, and seated him by his side, while armed Rajputs stood around to guard against any treacherous movement on the part of the slayer of Afzal Khan!

Jai Singh had got up a little scene to conquer any lingering reluctance that Shivaji might still have had. In anticipation of the Maratha chief's arrival he had sent word to Dilir Khan and Kirat Singh,

whose trenches were the most advanced, to be ready to deliver an assault on Purandar. After Shivaji had entered, Jai Singh gave the signal, the Mughals attacked and captured the remaining part of the Khad-kala defences. The garrison made a sortie to check them, but were driven back with the loss of 80 killed and many wounded. The fighting could be distinctly seen from the interior of the Rajah's tent. Shivaji then offered to surrender the fort in order to prevent the useless slaughter of his men.

§ 18. *Treaty of Purandar, 1665.*

Up to midnight the two sides higgled for the terms of a permanent peace. But Jai Singh knew the strength of his position. As he wrote in his despatches to the Emperor, "I declined to abate a single fort. Gradually, after much discussion, we came to this agreement:—(a) That 23 of his forts, the lands of which yielded 4 *lakhs* of *hun* as annual revenue, should be annexed to the Empire; and (b) that 12 of his forts, including Rajgarh, with an annual revenue of 1 *lakh* of *hun*, should be left to Shiva, on condition of service and loyalty to the imperial throne."

Shivaji, however, begged to be excused from attending the Emperor's Court like other nobles and Rajahs, and proposed to send his son, as his representative, with a contingent of 5,000 horse, (to

be paid by means of a jagir), for regular attendance and service under the Emperor or the Mughal governor of the Deccan. This was exactly the favour shown to the Maharana of Udaipur. As he pleaded with Jai Singh, "By reason of my late unwise and disloyal acts, I have not the face to wait on the Emperor. I shall depute my son to be His Majesty's servant and slave, and he will be created a Commander of Five Thousand with a suitable jagir...As for me sinner, exempt me from holding any *mansab* or serving in the Mughal army. But whenever in your wars in the Deccan, I am given any military duty, I shall promptly perform it."

In addition to the above terms, Shivaji made another and a conditional engagement with the Mughals: "If lands yielding 4 *lakhs* of *hun* a year in the lowlands of Konkan and 5 *lakhs* of *hun* a year in the uplands (Balaghat Bijapuri), are granted to me by the Emperor and I am assured by an imperial *farman* that the possession of these lands will be confirmed in me after the expected Mughal conquest of Bijapur, then I agree to pay to the Emperor 40 *lakhs* of *hun* in 13 yearly instalments." He was expected to wrest these lands from the Bijapuri officers by means of his own troops.

Here we detect the shrewdness of Jai Singh's policy in throwing a bone of perpetual contention between Shivaji and the Sultan of Bijapur. As he

wrote to the Emperor, "This policy will result in a threefold gain : *first*, we get 40 *lakhs* of *hun* or 2 *krores* of Rupees ; *secondly*, Shivaji will be alienated from Bijapur ; *thirdly*, the imperial army will be relieved from the arduous task of campaigning in these two broken and jungly regions, as Shiva will himself undertake the task of expelling the Bijapuri garrisons from them." In return for it, Shiva also agreed to assist the Mughals in the invasion of Bijapur with 2,000 cavalry of his son Shambhuji's *mansab* and 7,000 expert infantry under his own command.

Next day (12th June), according to the agreement, 7,000 men and women, (of whom 4,000 were combatants), left Purandar, and the Mughals entered into possession of it; all the stores, weapons, artillery, and other property found within were attached by the Government. Mughal officers were sent with Shivaji's men to take charge of five other forts to be surrendered by the Marathas.

On the 14th Shivaji was presented by Jai Singh with an elephant and two horses, and sent away to Rajgarh with Kirat Singh, after paying a ceremonial visit to Daud Khan.

Reaching Kondana at noon of the 14th, Shivaji delivered the fort to Kirat Singh and left for Rajgarh, where he arrived on the 15th. On the 17th he sent away Shambhuji from Rajgarh, in charge of Ugrasen

Kachhwa and they arrived in Jai Singh's camp on the 18th.

The Maratha forts surrendered to the Emperor by the treaty of Purandar (A. N. 905) were :—*in the Deccan* : (1) Rudramala or Vajragarh, (2) Purandar, (3) Kondana, (4) Rohira, (5) Lohgarh, (6) Isagarh, (7) Tanki, (8) Tikona, (9) Khad-kala near Kondana ; *in Konkan* : (10) Mahuli, (11) Muranjan, (12) Khirdurg, (13) Bhandardurg, (14) Tulsikhul, (15) Nardurg, (16) Khaigarh or Ankola, (17) Marg-garh or Atra, (18) Kohaj, (19) Basant, (20) Nang, (21) Karnala, (22) Songarh, and (23) Mangarh.

These terms were reported to the Emperor for ratification, together with a letter of submission and prayer for pardon from Shivaji (but really drafted by Jai Singh's secretary Udairaj) and a despatch from Jai Singh recommending the acceptance of the terms and the granting of a robe of honour to Shivaji. They reached Aurangzib at Delhi on 23rd June and he was pleased to accede to them all.

Thus, in less than three months from the date when he opened the campaign, Jai Singh had succeeded in bringing Shivaji down on his knees; he had made this haughty chief cede a large part of his dominions and consent to serve as a dependent vassal of the Emperor. It was a splendid victory. Shivaji loyally carried out his promises : in the war with Bijapur he with his contingent rendered

distinguished service under the Mughal banner and was mentioned in the despatches. (See Chapter 41.)

§ 19. *Shivaji's fears and hopes from a journey to the Mughal Court.*

Jai Singh had undertaken to send Shivaji to the imperial Court. But it was no easy task. In the Treaty of Purandar, Shivaji had expressly stipulated that he was not to be called upon to enter the Mughal military service (*mansab*), nor to attend the imperial Court. There were strong reasons for it. For one thing, he and his countrymen had no faith in Aurangzib's word and believed the Emperor to be capable of any act of treachery and cruelty. Then, again, the Maratha chief had an inborn repugnance to bending his head before a Muslim; he had been brought up in the freedom and solitude of hill and woodland, away from cities and Courts; he had imbibed the orthodox Hindu spirit from his mother and his tutor, from the comrades of his boyhood and the saints whom he adored; and he had risen to independent sovereignty without ever filling any subordinate post as the servant of a higher authority. He was therefore at first averse to visiting the imperial Court.

But Jai Singh plied him with hopes of high reward and "used a thousand devices" (as he repeatedly wrote in his letters), to induce him to go

to Agra. The Maratha chronicles assert that Jai Singh gave Shivaji hopes that after his visit to the Emperor he was likely to be sent back as Viceroy of Mughal Deccan, with sufficient men and money for the conquest of Bijapur and Golkonda. The Emperor never committed himself to any such promise, and the Persian histories and Jai Singh's correspondence are silent about it.

Besides the problematical vicerealty of the Deccan, Shivaji had some humbler but more necessary objects which could be gained only by a personal interview with the Emperor. He had requested that the Emperor should order the Siddi, now an imperial servant, to cede Janjua island to him. According to a modern and unreliable chronicle, (Chit. 107), he had also hopes of gaining the imperial sanction to his plan of exacting *chauth* from Bijapur territory. On these points the replies from Delhi had been evasive; but much better result could be expected from an interview and personal representation.

In spite of these temptations, Shivaji hesitated long. Both he and his friends were as much alarmed at the idea of his going to the Mughal Court as at the prospect of his interview with Afzal Khan. They feared that a visit to Aurangzib would be only rushing into the jaws of an ogre (Ravan). But the

soothsayers whom he consulted assured him of a safe return home.

Jai Singh took the most solemn oaths possible for a Hindu that Shivaji would not be harmed during his visit, while the Rajput Rajah's son and agent at Court, Kumar Ram Singh, similarly pledged his word for the safety of Shivaji during his stay at the capital. In the Maratha council of ministers the majority favoured the journey.

§ 20. *His journey to Agra.*

Shivaji's arrangements for the administration of his kingdom during his expected absence in Northern India, were a masterpiece of forethought and organization. His plan was to make his local representatives absolutely independent of any need for his orders or guidance during his absence. The administration of his territories and forts would go on as efficiently as before, even if he were imprisoned or killed at Agra. His mother Jija Bai was left as Regent.

After making a tour of inspection throughout his small kingdom, and even paying surprise visits to some of his forts, he began his journey to Northern India on the 5th of March, 1666, with his eldest son Shambhuji, seven trusty chief officers, and 4,000 troops. A *lakh* of Rupees from the Deccan treasury was advanced to him by order of the

Emperor for his expenses, and Ghazi Beg, an officer of Jai Singh's army, was deputed to act as his guide. On 9th May he arrived in the outskirts of Agra, where the Emperor was then holding Court.

§ 21. *Shivaji's interview with Aurangzib.*

The 12th of the month was appointed as the day of his audience. It was the 50th lunar birthday of the Emperor. The Hall of Public Audience in Agra Fort was splendidly decorated for the occasion. The courtiers appeared in their most gorgeous robes. All things were ready for weighing the Emperor against gold and silver, which would then be given away in charity. The nobles of the empire and their retainers in thousands stood in marshalled ranks filling that vast hall of pillars and the ground beyond on three sides of it, which was covered with costly canopies.

Into this *Diwan-i-am*, Kumar Ram Singh ushered Shivaji with his son Shambhuji and ten of his officers. On behalf of the Maratha chief, 1,500 gold pieces were laid before the Emperor as present (*nazar*) and Rs. 6,000 as offering (*nisar*). Aurangzib graciously cried out, "Come up, Shivaji Rajah!" Shivaji was led to the foot of the throne and made three *salams*. Then, at a signal from the Emperor, he was conducted back to the place reserved for him among the third-grade nobles, the work of the

darbar proceeded, and Shivaji seemed to have been forgotten.

This was not the kind of reception he had so long been picturing to himself and expecting* as almost a certainty from his many conversations with Jai Singh. Ever since coming to Agra his mind had been ill at ease. First, he had been welcomed on behalf of the Emperor in the environs of the city by Ram Singh and Mukhlis Khan, two petty officers holding the nominal ranks of 2,500 and 1,500 respectively. No costly present, no high title, no kind word even, had followed his bow to the throne. He found himself standing behind several rows of nobles who almost shut him from the Emperor's view. He learnt from Ram Singh that he was among the commanders of 5,000. "What!" he exclaimed, "my little son of seven years was created a 5-hazari without having had to come to the Emperor's presence. My servant Netaji is a 5-hazari. And am I, after rendering all these services and coming all the way to the Court, to get the same low rank?" Then he asked, who the

* This view is supported by the Persian and English accounts. "Shiva cherished some absurd fancies and hopes. So,...after standing for a while, he created a scene, retired to a corner and told Kumar Ram Singh that he was disappointed, making unreasonable and foolish complaints." (A.N. 969). "His spirit could not bear such humiliation as the other Umrahs to wait at a distance with their hands before them, like mutes." (Surat to Karwar.) Also K. K.

noble standing in front of him was. Ram Singh replied that it was Maharajah Jaswant Singh. At this Shivaji cried out, "Jaswant, whose back my soldiers have seen! I to stand behind him? What does it mean?"

Stung to fury by what he considered a public humiliation, Shivaji expostulated with Ram Singh in a high tone, and even wanted to commit suicide rather than outlive such a shame. Ram Singh, alarmed at this unexpected development and the breach of Court etiquette caused by Shivaji's loud voice and violent gestures, tried his best to pacify him, but in vain. Swelling with suppressed anger and fretting within himself in bitterness of mortification, Shivaji fell down in a swoon. There was a stir among the courtiers. The Emperor asked what the matter was. Ram Singh diplomatically replied, "The tiger is a wild beast of the forest. He feels oppressed by heat in a place like this and has been taken ill." He also apologized for the Rajah's rude conduct by saying that he was a Deccani unfamiliar with Courts and polished manners. Aurangzib graciously ordered the sick Rajah to be removed to an ante-room and sprinkled with rose-water, and, on his restoration to his senses, gave him leave to go to his quarters without waiting for the close of the *darbar*.

§ 22. *Shivaji placed under guard by order of Aurangzib.*

On returning from the Court, Shivaji openly taxed the Emperor with breach of faith towards him, and asked to be put to death as a lesser evil. There were men about him who reported his angry words and complaints here and in the darbar hall to Aurangzib, and it only increased the Emperor's dislike and distrust of the Maratha chief. Ram Singh was ordered to lodge him in the Jaipur House outside the city-walls, and be responsible for his custody. Shivaji was forbidden the Court, though Shambhuji was asked to come now and then. Thus, Shivaji's high hopes were finally dashed to pieces and he found himself a prisoner instead.

He took counsel with his devoted followers and with Raghunath Pant Korde, his agent at the imperial Court, as to how he could effect his release. They advised him to play on the Emperor's greed of territory and to promise the conquest of Bijapur and Golkonda* as the price of his restoration to liberty. A petition to this effect was presented by the hand of Raghunath Korde, but the Emperor only answered, "Wait a little and I shall do what you ask for." Shivaji knew the answer was evasive. He then begged for a private interview with the

* Or Qandahar, according to *Dil.* 69.

Emperor in which he promised to make a secret communication very much to the benefit of the latter. The Maratha chronicles say that the prime minister Jafar Khan, warned by a letter from Shaista Khan, dissuaded the Emperor from risking his person in a private interview with a magician like Shivaji. But Aurangzib hardly needed other people's advice in such a matter. He was too wise to meet in a small room with a few guards the man who had slain Afzal Khan almost within sight of his 10,000 soldiers, and wounded Shaista Khan in the very bosom of his harem amidst a ring of 20,000 Mughal troops, and escaped unscathed. Popular report credited Shivaji with being a wizard with "an airy body," able to jump across 40 or 50 yards of space upon the person of his victim. The private audience was refused.

Shivaji next tried to win the prime minister over, and paid him a visit, begging him to use his influence over the Emperor to send him back to the Deccan with adequate resources for extending the Mughal empire there. Jafar Khan, warned by his wife (a sister of Shaista Khan) not to trust himself too long in the company of Shivaji, hurriedly ended the interview, saying "All right; I shall speak to the Emperor and make the arrangements." Shivaji knew that he meant to do nothing.

He was now thrown entirely upon his own

resources. At the same time his position became worse than before. Fulad Khan, the police chief of Agra, by imperial order placed a large guard with artillery round Shivaji's mansion, and he now became a prisoner in appearance as well as reality. "This made the Rajah lose heart; he felt sad and lamented long, clasping Shambhuji to his breast." In this state he passed three months.

§ 23. *Mughal policy during Shivaji's confinement at Agra.*

We now turn to the policy of the imperial Government and the action of Jai Singh during this interval. Aurangzib had intended to present Shivaji with an elephant, a robe of honour, and some jewels at the end of his first audience. But Shivaji's violation of Court etiquette made him change his mind, and as a mark of displeasure he withheld these gifts, at least for the time. The Maratha chief, on his part, complained that the promises made to him on behalf of the Mughal Government had not been kept. Aurangzib, therefore, wrote to Jai Singh asking him to report fully and exactly what promises he had made. The Rajah replied by repeating and explaining the clauses of the Treaty of Purandar, and solemnly asserting that nothing beyond them had been promised.

Jai Singh was placed in a dilemma by this unexpected result of Shivaji's visit to the Court. True, he had sent Shivaji away to Northern India "by a thousand devices" in order to get him out of the Deccan when the military situation there turned against the Mughals; but he had also pledged his honour for the safe return of his ally. He, therefore, tried to persuade the Emperor that he would gain nothing by imprisoning or killing Shivaji, as the Maratha chief's wise arrangements had made his Government independent of his personality; on the contrary the imperial interests in that quarter would be best promoted by turning Shivaji into a friend, at the same time that such a course would convince the public of the sacredness of the imperial officers' words. All the while Jai Singh continued to write to his Court agent, Ram Singh, to see to it that Shivaji's life was safe and the solemn assurances of the Rajput father and son remained inviolate.

§ 24. *Shivaji's escape from Agra.*

Shivaji turned to his own inner resources to effect his liberation. After a few days of captivity, he made a loud profession of submission and fear and entreated courtier after courtier to intercede with the Emperor for his pardon, but with no success. He, however, succeeded in getting permission for

his Maratha escort to return to the Deccan. The Emperor felt that he would then have fewer enemies to watch and Shivaji would be utterly friendless at Agra.

The Maratha civil officers, too, at a hint from their chief, returned home in small parties. Being thus freed from anxiety about his followers, Shivaji set about devising plans for his own escape. He feigned illness and began to send out of his house every evening sweetmeats for Brahmans, religious mendicants and courtiers. These were carried in huge baskets slung from a pole which was borne by two men on their shoulders. The guards searched the baskets for some days and then allowed them to pass out unchallenged. This was the opportunity for which Shivaji had been waiting. In the afternoon of 19th August, he sent word to his guards that he was very ill and had taken to his bed and that they should not disturb him. His half-brother Hiraji Farzand, who looked somewhat like him, lay down on his cot, with a quilt covering all his body except the outstretched right arm adorned with Shivaji's gold wristlet,—while Shivaji and his son crouched down in two baskets, which were safely sent out shortly after sunset through the line of unsuspecting guards, being preceded and followed by baskets of real sweets.

The baskets were deposited at a lonely spot

outside the city; the porters were dismissed; and then Shivaji and his son issued forth and made their way to a village six miles from Agra, where the trusty Niraji Ravji (his Chief Justice) was waiting for them with horses. After a hurried consultation in a jungle the party divided; Shivaji with his son and three officers, Niraji Ravji, Datta Trimbak and Raghu-mitra, a low caste Maratha, smeared themselves with ashes like Hindu ascetics, and hastened towards Mathura, while the others took their own way homewards.

Meanwhile, at Agra, Hiraji lay in bed all that night and well into the afternoon of the next day. The guards who peeped in in the morning were satisfied when they saw Shivaji's gold bracelet on the sleeper's wrist, and a servant sitting on the floor massaging the patient's feet. About 3 P.M. Hiraji quietly walked out of the house with the servant, warning the sentries at the gate, "Make less noise; Shivaji is ill and under treatment." Gradually the guards' suspicion was aroused; the house seemed strangely deserted; no crowd of visitors came to see Shivaji as usual; and there was no sound, no stir in the house. They entered his room and found that the bird had flown! They at once ran with the astounding news to their chief Fulad Khan, who reported it to the Emperor, ascribing Shivaji's flight to witchcraft and saving himself from all blame.

"The Rajah," so he said, "was in his own room. We visited it regularly. But he vanished all of a sudden from our sight. Whether he flew into the sky or disappeared into the earth, is not known, nor what magical trick he has played."

Aurangzib was not the man to be taken in by such a tale. A hue and cry was immediately raised, and fast couriers and sergeants-at-arms were sent off to watch the road to the Deccan through Berar and Khandesh, and to warn the local officers to look out for the fugitives. The Maratha Brahmans and other followers of Shivaji were arrested wherever found, at Agra or near it. But by this time Shivaji had had twenty-four hours' clear start over his pursuers.

The vigorous inquiry made at the capital gradually brought to light the details of the romantic story of the flight. Suspicion naturally fell on Ram Singh, as he had so often tried to avoid the responsibility for Shivaji's presence at Agra, and it was his interest to effect the Maratha chief's safe return home, for which he and his father had pledged their honour. Some of the Maratha Brahmans who were caught admitted, probably under torture, that their master had fled with the connivance of Ram Singh. The Rajput prince was punished, first by being forbidden the Court and then by being deprived of his rank and pay.

§ 25. *Route of Shivaji's flight.*

With consummate cunning Shivaji threw his pursuers off the scent, by following a route exactly opposite to that which leads to Maharashtra. Instead of moving due south-west from Agra, through Malwa and Khandesh or Gujrat, he travelled *eastwards* to Mathura, Allahabad, Benares, and Gaya, and then south-westwards through Gondwana and Golkonda, describing a vast loop round India before returning to Rajgarh.

Arrived at Mathura, he found the boy Shambhuji worn out by fatigue and unable to proceed further. Three Deccani Brahmans,—Krishnaji, Kashi, and Visaji, brothers-in-law of Moro Trimbak (the Peshwa), were living at this holy city. Niraji knew them and confided to them the story of Shivaji's escape and his present plight. They nobly responded to the appeal in the name of their country and faith, and braving all risks of imperial vengeance in the event of detection, they agreed to keep Shambhuji till Shivaji should reach home and write for him. One of the brothers, Krishnaji, even undertook to guide the fugitives as far as Benares.

Shivaji had crammed the hollow core of a *sannyasi's* staff with gems and gold coins. Some more money was concealed in his shoes, and a diamond of great value and several rubies coated

with wax were sewn in the dresses of his servants or carried in their mouths.

At Mathura, which was reached within six hours of leaving Agra, he shaved off his beard and moustaches, smeared himself with ashes, and put on the disguise of *sannyasis*.

After going through many romantic adventures and making many hairbreadth escapes, Shivaji reached Rajgarh on 20th November, 1666.

Shivaji's escape from captivity caused lifelong regret to Aurangzib. As the Emperor wrote in his last will and testament: "The greatest pillar of Government consists in the keeping of information about everything that happens in the kingdom,—while even a minute's negligence results in shame for long years. See, the flight of the wretch Shiva was due to carelessness, but it has involved me in all these distracting campaigns to the end of my days."

§ 26. *State of Mughal Deccan, 1667.*

On returning home from Agra Shivaji found the political situation in the Deccan entirely changed. The Mughal viceroy, Jai Singh, was no longer in a position to repeat his former success over the Marathas. Worn out by age, toil, disappointment and domestic anxieties, discredited in his master's eyes by the failure of his invasion of Bijapur, and

expecting every day to be removed from his post, Mirza Rajah was visibly hastening to his grave. In May 1667 Prince Muazzam, the newly appointed governor, reached Aurangabad and relieved Jai Singh of his charge. The Rajput veteran set out on his homeward journey in extreme misery of mind and sense of public humiliation, and died on the way at Burhanpur on 2nd July.

The return of the weak and indolent Muazzam and the friendly Jaswant to power in the Deccan (May 1667) relieved Shivaji of all fear from the Mughal side. It is true that soon afterwards an able and active general, bearing implacable hatred to the Marathas, joined the Mughal camp. Dilir Khan returned from the Gond country to the side of Prince Muazzam in October 1667, but the coming of this famous warrior brought no accession of strength to the imperialists. The Prince was jealous of Dilir's influence and prestige at his father's Court, resented his insubordinate spirit, and regarded him as a spy on behalf of the Emperor. The proud Ruhela general, on his part, publicly slighted Maharajah Jaswant Singh, the right-hand man and trusted confidant of the Prince. Nor was this the only source of discord in the Mughal army in the Deccan. Rao Karn Rathor, the chief of Bikanir, was an officer in Dilir's contingent. His worthless son Anup Singh, when acting as his father's agent at the

imperial Court, influenced the Emperor to transfer the principality of Bikanir to himself. "At the news of this event, the Rao became even more negligent of his duties and reckless than before,...disobeying the wishes of the Khan. His Rajputs practised gang-robbery in the camp at night, because, his lands having been given to his son, he ceased to get the necessary money for his expenses from his home. It was proved that his soldiers had looted some villages also. Dilir Khan, to save his credit with the Emperor, reported the matter to Court, and the Emperor [in reply] ordered him to arrest the Rao if he [still] acted in that manner. The Court agent of Rao Bhao Singh Hada, learning of the contents of the imperial letter, wrote to his master about it. When Dilir Khan, on the pretext of hunting, approached the camp of Rao Karn and invited him to join in the chase,...the Rao came to him with a few Rajputs. Bhao Singh, on getting news of Dilir Khan having ridden out towards the camp of Rao Karn that morning, arrived there quickly with his own troops and carried off Rao Karn to safety from the midst of Dilir's guards. The two Raos marched together to Aurangabad, 24 miles behind Dilir's army. Dilir Khan did not pull together with Muazzam and Jaswant. He was sent towards Bidar to punish the enemy, but the two Raos remained behind at Aurangabad by order [of the Prince]."

The Prince used to help Rao Karn with money in his distress and enforced idleness at Aurangabad.

Thus, Dilir's enemies found a ready shelter with Muazzam. After sending Dilir Khan away to Bidar, the Prince freely indulged his natural love of hunting and witnessing animal combats, and no attempt was made to crush Shivaji.

But even if the viceroy of the Deccan had been a man of greater spirit and enterprise, it would have been impossible for him for some years from this time to get adequate men and money for an attempt to crush Shivaji. The resources of the empire had to be concentrated elsewhere, to meet more pressing dangers. Within a fortnight of Shivaji's escape from Agra, a large army had to be sent to the Panjab to meet the threat of a Persian invasion, and the anxiety on this point was not removed till December. But immediately afterwards, in March 1667, the Yusufzai rising in Peshawar took place, which taxed the imperial strength for more than a year afterwards.

It was, therefore, the Emperor's interest not to molest Shivaji at such a time.

§ 27. *Shivaji makes peace with the Mughals, 1668.*

The Maratha chief, on his part, was not eager for a war with the imperialists. For three years

after his return home from Agra, he lived very quietly, and avoided giving any fresh provocation to the Mughals. He wanted peace for a time to organize his government, repair and provision his forts, and consolidate and extend his power on the western coast at the expense of Bijapur and the Siddis of Janjira. As early as April 1667 he had sent a letter to the Emperor professing terror of the imperial army which was reported to have been despatched against him, and offering to make his submission again and send a contingent of 400 men under his son to fight under the Mughal banners.

Aurangzib had taken no notice of this letter. Some months later Shivaji made another attempt. He entreated Jaswant Singh to be his intermediary in making peace with the empire. He wrote to the Maharajah, "The Emperor has cast me off. Otherwise I intended to have begged the task of recovering Qandahar with my unaided resources. I fled (from Agra) in fear of my life. Mirza Rajah, my patron, is dead. If through your intercession I am pardoned, I shall send Shambhu to wait on the Prince and serve as a *mansabdar* at the head of my followers wherever ordered."

Jaswant Singh and Prince Muazzam jumped at the offer and recommended Shivaji to the Emperor, who accepted the proposal. The Emperor

recognized Shivaji's title of Rajah (early in 1668), but did not restore to him any of his forts, except Chakan. Thus a peace was made which lasted nearly two years.

CHAPTER XLI

JAI SINGH'S INVASION OF BIJAPUR, 1665-1666.

§ 1. *Causes of war with Bijapur.*

When appointing Jai Singh to the Deccan, Aurangzib had instructed him to punish both Shivaji and the Bijapur king. But the Rajput general had pleaded, "It would not be wise to attack both these fools at the same time;" and so, he had at first directed all his forces against Shivaji alone (*H.A.* 68 *a*). By the treaty of Purandar (June, 1665), the Maratha chief was shorn of two-thirds of his dominions and reduced to the rank of an obedient vassal. It was now the turn of Adil Shah to feel the weight of the Mughal arm.

His faults were many. By the treaty of August 1657, he had bound himself to pay to the Emperor one *krore* of Rupees as indemnity and to cede Parenda fort with its dependent territory and the Nizam-Shahi Konkan; but he had taken advantage of the illness of Shah Jahan and the consequent war of succession to evade the fulfilment of his promise. True, at Aurangzib's grand coronation he had presented $8\frac{1}{2}$ *lakhs* as part of his tribute and in January 1665 he had handed over seven *lakhs* of Rupees in cash and six caskets of jewels to the

Mughal envoy at his Court. But these amounted to only a small fraction of the total indemnity and he still delayed the delivery of the promised fort and territory. In November 1660, the Mughals had, no doubt, gained possession of Parenda, but it was effected in despite of Adil Shah and only by bribing his local governor.

The Bijapur king, when opening his great attack on Shivaji in 1660, had solicited co-operation from the Mughal Government, promising to pay a further subsidy. The Emperor had agreed, and Shaista Khan's attack on Shivaji's forts at the time had made a useful diversion in favour of the Bijapuris, and Adil Shah had in consequence succeeded in recovering Panhala, Pawangarh and many other forts from the Marathas. But Ali Adil Shah II. failed to pay the promised subsidy and even went so far as to claim that it was *he* who had assisted Shaista Khan (by sending an army into Adil-Shahi Konkan against Shivaji) and got from the Khan a promise that ten *lakhs* of his old war indemnity would be excused as the price of this assistance !

During Jai Singh's recent campaign against Shivaji, the Bijapur Sultan had no doubt sent an army under Khawas Khan to co-operate with the Mughals. But Jai Singh's mind was never free from the fear of a treacherous move by these pretended allies, and

he accused the Bijapuri general of fighting against the Marathas in a slack and half-hearted manner. "Adil Khan in his folly played false with me. He outwardly sent an army into Shiva's territory; but as he considered the utter destruction of Shiva to be harmful to his own interests and wished Shiva to stand as a wall between the imperial troops and the Bijapuris,—he made a secret alliance with the Maratha chief and helped him with lands, money, and other requisites. He also induced the king of Golkonda to enter into this policy and send money to that infidel, while he was all the time sending letters breathing loyalty to the Emperor." (*A.N.* 910-913, 397; *H.A.* 66a, 79a, 70a; *B.S.* 399-401).

The truth of the matter is that never since the reign of Akbar did the Mughal Government once abandon the ambition of annexing the Deccan, and the Sultans of Bijapur and Golkonda could never forget this cardinal fact of 17th century Indian politics. They, therefore, naturally looked round for allies, and after 1663 found in Shivaji their only efficient bulwark against the Mughals. It was impossible for them to enter heartily into any plan for "rooting Shiva out."

The aim of the Mughals is clear from Jai Singh's secret despatch to Aurangzib: "The conquest of Bijapur is the preface to the conquest

of all Deccan and Karnatak." The war with Shivaji being over, the vast Mughal army assembled under Jai Singh's command was standing idly, and profitable employment had to be found for it. An invasion of Bijapur offered the best means of doing this. (*H.A.* 90*a*, 74*a*; *A.N.* 913.)

§ 2. *Jai Singh's diplomacy and intrigues before war: desertions from Bijapur.*

Jai Singh's clever diplomacy prepared the ground in advance of the coming struggle. His first task was to detach Shivaji from Bijapur and, indeed, to throw a bone of perpetual contention between the two. With this view, in the treaty of Purandar he offered to Shivaji the Bijapuri coast-strip and uplands of the Western Ghats for a price of 40 *lakhs* of *hun* (or 2 *krores* of Rupees). Shivaji was to wrest these tracts from the control of Bijapur, and the Emperor agreed to confirm him in possession of them for ever. A threefold gain was expected by Jai Singh from this shrewd stroke of policy: first the acquisition of two *krores* of Rupees, secondly the alienation of Shiva from Bijapur, and thirdly, relieving the imperial army of the arduous task of campaigning in these two broken and jungly regions by throwing that work on Shivaji's shoulders. In return, the Maratha chief promised to assist the Mughals in the coming war by furnishing 2,000

cavalry of his son Shambhuji's contingent and 7,000 expert infantry under his personal command.*

Jai Singh also intrigued with many other zamindars of Bijapur and sent to them letters for seducing them from loyalty to their legitimate sovereign and offering them service under the Mughal Emperor. When Adil Shah protested against this conduct, Jai Singh replied that it had always been the practice of Mughal viceroys to grant letters of conciliation to all who solicited their favour. The zamindars of the Karnatak and the Abyssinian mercenaries who had established themselves in the Karnul district (south of the Raichur Doab) in almost open independence of the king of Bijapur,—were invited with tempting offers of reward to join Jai Singh. He also wrote to the Abyssinians of Janjira to unite with him, promising them enrolment in the Mughal peerage and other benefits, though he secretly plotted with his master to contrive their destruction and the annexation of their territory to the empire. (*H.A.* 77*b*, 79*a*.)

* *H.A.* 70 *a*, 81 *a*. This shrewd deal in (as yet unconquered) land is thus described by the Bijapur historian: "Shiva, despairing of help from Bijapur (against the Mughals), made peace with Jai Singh. The two infidels agreed together to invade Adil-Shahi territory. This *nimakh-haram* hereditary servant, the worst of base-born traitors, undertook the work...Adil Shah was perplexed at the union of his neighbouring enemy with his external foe, because a thief who knows the secrets of the house can do a harm, the hundredth part of which no thief from outside can commit." (*B.S.* 404.)

The old policy of seducing the ministers and generals of Bijapur was followed vigorously and with a lavish disregard of expenditure. As he wrote to prepare his master for the financial drain of the war, "As soon as our army enters the kingdom, many Deccanis will have to be enlisted in our service and every one of them will have to be supplied with money according to his rank, to enable him to arm and equip [his followers]. Expenditure of money will be necessary till the conquest of Bijapur, when our costs will be recovered, as I hope." (H.A. 74 b.)

§ 3. *Bijapur King deceived by Jai Singh: Mulla Ahmad joins the Mughals.*

Mulla Yahia, an Arab of the Navaiyat clan settled in Konkan, and now an officer in the Emperor's service, was the intermediary in corrupting Bijapuri officers like Randaula (surnamed Rustam-i-Zaman), Abbas, &c. But the most eminent of these deserters was his elder brother Mulla Ahmad, who had held the second place at the Bijapur Court, being next to the prime minister, Abdul Muhammad. The whole of Konkan had been given to him as *jagir*. Jai Singh set a very high value on Mulla Ahmad's adhesion to the Mughal cause, because, as he wrote to Aurangzib, "During our recent war with Shiva, the Mulla had signally helped us by influencing Adil Shah to break

off his friendship with Shiva, expel Shiva's agent from his Court, and send an army into Konkan to fight the Marathas. All other Bijapuri ministers had refused to urge this pro-Mughal policy on their master." The Mulla had secretly offered to quit Adil Shah's service and guide the Mughal operations against Bijapur, if the Emperor gave him a high post. Indeed, his ambition was to imitate the successful career of another foreign traitor in the Deccan, Mir Jumla of Golkonda, and for this he had been coquetting with the Mughal viceroy of the Deccan since 1661. (*H.A.* 82 a, 65 a.)

Aurangzib agreed to create him a commander of Six Thousand and summoned him to the Presence. The problem now was, how could Mulla Ahmad leave Bijapur with his family without exciting the suspicion and incurring the vengeance of his master. Jai Singh, therefore, cunningly wrote to Adil Shah that as he had been ordered by the Emperor to investigate and settle the questions at issue between the Mughal and Bijapur Governments, the Sultan should send Mulla Ahmad, the chief of his nobles, to him to explain matters personally; and the refusal to send him would be regarded as a proof of Adil Shah's contumacy and provoke an invasion of his country. (*H.A.* 65 b—66 a.)

Ali Adil Shah II., sincerely desirous of peace, sent Mulla Ahmad to Jai Singh to negotiate and

remove all sources of difference between the two Powers. The Mulla thus got with his family beyond the reach of his master, interviewed Jai Singh near Purandar on 29th September, 1665, and was received with high honours. He was at once created a 6-*hazari* in the Mughal peerage, given two and a half *lakhs* of Rupees for his expenses, and two months later sent to Delhi. But he fell ill on the way and died at Ahmadnagar in the third week of December 1665. (*A.N.* 925; *H.A.* 72a, 76b, 80a.)

Before opening the campaign, Jai Singh employed diplomatic trickery, of which he was a passed master, to throw Adil Shah into a sense of false security. To the Bijapuri envoy in his camp he pretended that he had received no order to invade Bijapur but only to settle the long-standing question of tribute unpaid. Besides making this false declaration, he "sent Rama (a man of Mulla Ahmad) and Govind Pandit (Muazzam Khani) to lull Adil Shah to sleep by means of smooth words and false stories of peace. If Adil Shah sends envoys to me, I shall demand an exorbitant tribute in one payment, the cession of fort Sholapur and other Nizam-Shahi mahals, Chincholi and other villages in the Bidar district, together with other hard terms which he cannot possibly accept." (*H.A.* 65 b—66 a.) Indeed, Jai Singh's secret correspondence fully bears out the Bijapur historian's statement,

that "Adil Shah sent envoys to Jai Singh soliciting peace, but the Rajah, proud of his 70,000 troopers and numerous infantry, did not listen to his request, and invaded Bijapur." (B.S. 405.)

In the meantime Jai Singh made himself secure on the Golkonda side. As he wrote to his master, "It is highly expedient to show imperial favours to Qutb Shah now, and to induce him to give up the idea of joining the Bijapuris. Therefore, I have made friendly and conciliatory overtures to him..... If the veil is withdrawn [from our real intention about him] and he despairs of peace with us, then he will be driven to ally himself with Adil Shah." (H.A. 72a.)

§ 4. *Jai Singh's military resources and preparations.*

His diplomatic web having been thus subtly woven, Jai Singh collected the sinews of war. The imperial forces* under his banners numbered about 40,000 troopers, to which must be added local auxiliaries. Shivaji sent him 2,000 troopers whom

* A.N. 988 gives Jai Singh considerably above 31,500 cavalry; Manucci (ii. 141) 50,000 horsemen; Dil. (p. 55) 61,000; B.S. (p. 405) 70,000 cavalry and many *ahsham*; Khafi Khan (ii. 191) 25,000 troopers. The Maratha contingent, H.A. 81a. Jai Singh's praise of the Maratha auxiliaries, H.A. 84b, 76b, 81a; also A.N. 1002.

his son as a 5-hazari was bound by the regulations to supply, and 7,000 expert infantry of his own. The Maratha contingent was commanded by Netaji Palkar, reputed in the Deccan as "a second Shivaji." Jai Singh thought that Shivaji could be more usefully employed in capturing forts and making diversions in other parts of the Bijapur territory than in accompanying the imperial army. He had the highest opinion of Shivaji's skill as a general and wrote to the Emperor, "In this expedition he can render very valuable services.....His attendance in the present campaign is very necessary." Khafi Khan (ii. 192) also bears witness to Shivaji's usefulness, saying "Shiva and Netaji were noted masters and experienced hands in the art of capturing forts."

Before setting out on the campaign, the Rajah asked for 40 to 50 large pieces of cannon to be sent to him from the Deccan fortresses,—at least 30 pieces in addition to the seven already with him, as Bijapur was defended by the famous *Malik-i-maidan* and other artillery of long range and large calibre. The Chief of Imperial Artillery was requested to send him powder, shot and rockets in quantity sufficient for such an important undertaking. Imperial orders on the local officers were also solicited for the supply of provisions regularly during the whole campaign. (*H.A.* 64 b, 74 a.)

He was impatient to begin the war. "Our

army is sitting idle and the enemy are using this respite to strengthen themselves. The delay of a day now is equivalent to the loss of a year." *H.A.*, 74 a.) He knew that his success depended on attacking Bijapur by surprise before Adil Shah had time to make preparations for defence. He learnt from his correspondents at Bijapur that "the enemy's troops are disunited and quarrelling among themselves; the fort of Bijapur has no protective works, no materials or provisions for standing a siege; and as soon as the imperial army arrives in that tract most of the Adil-Shahi chiefs and officers will enter the imperial service, and this fact will bring Adil Shah down on his knees." (*H.A.*, 85 a.)

Such an opportunity must not be allowed to slip away. But Jai Singh could not move one inch without money. He had spent more than 22 *lakhs* during the three months' war with Shivaji and now (in October, 1665) his *mansabdars*' and artillerymen's salary was six months in arrears, and they were starving. Moreover, large sums would be needed in buying deserters from Bijapur as soon as the campaign opened. So, he pressed the Emperor to send him money quickly. (*H.A.* 74 b.)

§ 5. *Jai Singh starts against Bijapur.*

He had at first decided to start on 20th October. But "the treasure ordered from the provincial

treasury of Malwa had not yet arrived, and there was no sign of its having even started." (H.A. 74.) At last on 12th November, twenty *lakhs* of Rupees reached him. Another ten *lakhs* was placed with the *diwan* of the Deccan at his call. Jai Singh immediately paid the salary due to his troops and started on the 19th from the foot of fort Purandar, and advanced rapidly without waiting for the arrival of the big guns and siege materials from Parenda. (H.A. 81 b—82 a, 85 a.)

The imperial vanguard, consisting of 7,500 troopers, was led by the renowned warrior Dilir Khan with all the artillery of the army. In the Centre, 12,000 strong, rode Jai Singh himself, while the Right and Left wings were commanded by Daud Khan and Rajah Rai Singh Sisodia respectively, each at the head of 6,000 cavalry. Shivaji's contingent, 9,000 strong, formed the left of the Centre. In addition to the line of front skirmishers (*qarawwal*), the advanced reserve (*iltimsh*) and rearguard, there were two divisions for protecting the two flanks, who marched at a long distance parallel to the main army. (A.N. 988.)* Two days after the start,

* The campaign against Bijapur is given fully in A.N. 988—1021. The original despatches are H.A. 85a—93b (Jai Singh to Aurang-zib), repeated in 213b—215a and 231a—233a (letters of Udiraj). The Bijapur historian's narrative (B.S. 406-427) is incomplete, one-sided and meagre in several points. I cannot make anything of the vague references to this campaign (?) in *Tarikh-i-Ali II*. (Probably the

Abdul Muhammad Miana, an Afghan noble of Bijapur who had been disappointed at his cousin being preferred to the headship of his clan, came over to the Mughals. But the main body of Afghans in the Adil-Shahi service, with their chief Abdul Karim Bahlol Khan, remained loyal, and Jai Singh's gain was slight. (*A.N.* 989; *H.A.* 82 b—83 a, 84 a.)

During the first month of the campaign Jai Singh's march was an uninterrupted triumph. From Purandar to Mangalvide, a fort 52 miles north of Bijapur, the invaders advanced without meeting with any opposition. The Bijapuri forts on the way were either evacuated in terror or surrendered at call to Shivaji's men who had been detached from Jai Singh's army to capture them; Phaltan, 35 miles s. e. of Purandar was entered on 7th December. Thathora 13 miles south-west of Phaltan on the 8th, Khatav about a week later, and Mangalvide itself about the 18th. The invaders marched on, and then on 24th December had their first contact with the

(I.O.L. M.S. is corrupt or fragmentary.) First battle: *H.A.* 86b—87a, not in *B.S.* Second battle: *H.A.* 87, *B.S.* 409. Third battle: *A.N.* 998—999 only. Fourth battle: *H.A.* 93b, *B.S.* 410, *Dil.* 57. Fifth battle: *H.A.* 88, not in *B.S.* K.K. ii. 196 (full.) *Storia*, ii. 141 and *Dil.* 55—57, too short. For the events after 27th January 1666, Jai Singh's letter-book and *B.S.* are entirely silent, and our only source of information is the *Alamgir-namah*. For the date of the first battle *H.A.* differs from *A.N.* by one day.

enemy, because the Bijapuri king had wisely concentrated all his forces near his capital and suffered the Mughals to penetrate unmolested thus far from their own frontier. In the night of the 24th, the Bijapuri scouts, in the favourite fashion of the Deccanis, fired rockets into the Mughal camp.

§ 6. *First battle, 25th Dec., 1665.*

Next day, a detachment under Dilir Khan and Shivaji marched ten miles from the imperial camp and fought a Bijapuri army of 12,000 men under the famous generals Sharza Khan and Khawas Khan and their Maratha allies, Jadav Rao of Kalian and Vyan-kaji the half-brother of Shivaji. The Deccanis evaded the charges of the heavy cavalry of Delhi, but harassed them by their "cossack" tactics, forming four divisions and fighting loosely. After a long contest, Dilir Khan's tireless energy and courage broke the enemy by repeated charges, and they retired in the evening leaving one general and 15 captains dead on the field, and many flags, horses and weapons in the Mughal hands. But as soon as the victors began their return march, the elusive enemy reappeared and galled them severely from the two wings and rear. The Mughal rearguard, under Netaji bore the brunt of the attack and was pressed so hard and so incessantly that Jai Singh had to reinforce it strongly. The enemy were at last shaken

off, after Jadav Rao had been shot dead. The Mughal loss, also, was heavy.

A day earlier a capable general on the imperial side had been killed. Jai Singh had deposited his heavy baggage and other property in the fort of Mangalvide and placed a garrison there under Udit Singh Bhadauria as *qiladar* and Sarfaraz Khan as *faujdar* of the environs. At dawn, 24th December, Sharza Khan with 6,000 cavalry came to the fort by forced marches. Sarfaraz Khan, disobeying Jai Singh's instructions, sallied out to fight him and was slain. The remnant of his force fled back to the fort, and when the pursuing Bijapuris came within range of the fort guns, they were scattered with a volley from the walls.

After a two days' stay, Jai Singh resumed his march on 27th December, and next day in the afternoon, when approaching the halting place, he heard of the enemy's presence in force a mile off. Leaving his camp under proper guard, he marched up and offered them battle. The Deccani horsemen, as usual, tried to envelop the Mughals, breaking into several loose bodies, each of which attacked its immediate opponent at the first sign of any weakness or disorder in the ranks of the latter. They began with a distant fire of rockets and matchlocks. But the Mughals, as was their wont, were eager to come to close grips, and charged gallantly with sword and

spear, while the Deccanis gave way but kept up a Parthian fight for the six miles they were chased.

§ 7. *Jai Singh stopped near Bijapur.*

Next day, 29th December, Jai Singh arrived within 12 miles of Bijapur.* This was destined to be the furthest point of his advance, for here the first stage of the war ended and the second stage began, in which the Mughals were outnumbered and outmanœuvred by the Bijapuris, totally lost the initiative, and lived like a besieged camp as long as they continued in hostile territory. By this time Ali Adil Shah II.'s military preparations had been completed, all his vassals from far and near had gathered under his banners, a wise plan of combined defence and reprisal had been sketched, and his capital and its environs had been rendered impregnable to attack.

The fort of Bijapur was now in a strong posture of defence. Its walls had been repaired, and large quantities of provisions and material laid in, and its regular garrison strengthened by 30,000 Karnataki infantry,—renowned for their fighting quality. In addition to this, the country round, for a radius of six miles, had been remorselessly laid waste ; the

* In *Dil.* 56 and 199, the place is called *Makhanah*, which may be either *Makhanapur*, 10 m. n. of Bijapur, or, more probably, *N a (g) than*, 8 m. n. n. e. of the city.

two large tanks of Nauraspur and Shahpur, each of which could have supplied the needs of an entire army, had been drained dry; all the wells in the environs had been filled up with earth; every building had been razed to the ground and every tree cut down, so that "not a green branch or shade-giving wall was left standing" to afford shelter to the invaders. At the same time a picked force under the noted generals Sharza Khan and Siddi Masaud had been sent off to invade the imperial dominions and create a diversion in Jai Singh's rear, while the main Bijapuri army hovered round that general's camp.

Jai Singh at once recognized that the chance of taking Bijapur by a *coup de main* was gone. And he was not prepared for a regular siege, as, in his eagerness "to grasp the golden chance [of attacking Bijapur while undefended and torn by domestic factions], he had not summoned big artillery and siege material from Parenda fort but had arrived near Mangalvide by rapid marches." And now his position was critical. Twenty thousand Bijapuris faced him in the open, while they could easily draw reinforcements from their capital. There was also a rumour, which soon proved to be true, that a large army was coming from Golkonda to the help of Adil Shah. "On account of the devastation of the environs of the fort, Jai Singh's army was faced not

only with thirst, but also with starvation, as the pack-oxen of the grain-carriers (*banjaras*) accompanying the army could not get enough fodder and drink on the way." His council of war advised a retreat.

§ 8. *Mughals begin to retreat, 5 Jan., 1666.*

Therefore, when within 12 miles of Bijapur, Jai Singh decided to turn back in order to expel the enemy's raiding parties from the imperial territory. After a seven days' halt, which was marked by another running fight between the patrols on the two sides, the Mughal general began his retreat on 5th January, 1666, the Bijapuris hanging on his rear.* He reached Sultanpur (on the Sina), 16 miles south of Parenda on the 27th and halted there for 24 days. His intention was to rest between the forts of Sholapur and Parenda, leave his heavy baggage behind, and advance against Bijapur a second time with a lightly-equipped and mobile division.

The news of his return march had an immediate

* Jai Singh's retreat from Bijapur: starts 5th Jan. 1666—in five marches reaches the bank of the Bhima—battle of 11th Jan. (*A.N.* 1000), halt for 4 or 5 days near Mangalvide—marches towards Parenda about 16th Jan.—battle of Lohri on the bank of the Bhima on 22nd. Jan.—arrives at Sultanpur, 27th January. (*H.A.* 233, 214b—215a.) I cannot find *Lohri* in the Atlas, but there is a *Laha* 23 m. s. of Parenda. Or, it may be *Bhosri*, 9 m. due west of Sultanpur. (Sh. 39 S. E.)

effect: the Bijapuri division under Sharza Khan evacuated the imperial territory and joined the army under Abdul Muhammad (the *wazir*) which was following Jai Singh. But in this month of January, four great misfortunes befell the Mughals. First, when about the 12th, a brave Afghan captain named Sikandar (the brother of Fath Jang Khan) was conveying provisions material and munitions to the army of Jai Singh, a superior Bijapuri force under Sharza Khan slipped round Jai Singh and after covering 5 days' march in two days, surprised him at a place (Degaon, according to *Dilkasha*, 57) eight miles south of Parenda. To the enemy's invitation to desert to them, this loyal officer replied, "The only place where I can meet you is the battle field." Hopelessly outnumbered, he disdained to flee, dismounted, and fought with bow and sword, and then "with daggers and finally with his bare fists," till he was cut down. His son and some clansmen were picked up wounded and held as prisoners at Sholapur, and all his rich convoy was plundered. Jai Singh ascribed this disaster to the disloyal negligence of the commandant of Parenda.

§ 9. *Doings of Shivaji and Netaji.*

Then, on the 16th, Shiva who had at his own request been detached to make a diversion in the west by attacking fort Panhala, met with a dismal

failure. Five days after parting from Jai Singh* on the bank of the Bhima, he had reached Panhala and assaulted it three hours before dawn. But the garrison were on the alert and a thousand Marathas fell down, killed or wounded. When the rising sun lit up the scene, Shivaji found it madness to continue the struggle, and retired baffled to his own fort of Khelna (Vishalgarh), 27 miles westwards. But his troops continued to ravage that quarter and succeeded in drawing and detaining there 6,000 Bijapuris under Siddi Masaud and Randaula Khan. (*H.A.* 84 b.—85 a.)

About the 20th came the evil news that Netaji, Shivaji's chief officer, who was dissatisfied with his master probably at the inadequate recognition of his valuable services and gallant feats of arms, had deserted to Bijapur for a bribe of four *lakhs* of *hun* and led raiding parties into Mughal territory. Jai Singh could not afford to lose such a man, and so he lured

* "The unexpected failure before the fort of Bijapur gave rise to dissensions in the Mughal camp. The party hostile to Jai Singh, which was led by Dilir Khan, ascribed his ill-success to the lukewarmness or treachery of Shivaji, and demanded that he should be imprisoned as a punishment. Jai Singh saw the danger in which Shivaji stood among the defeated and sullen Mughal soldiery. To send him out of the reach of his enemies, he gladly accepted the proposal that the Maratha contingent should make a diversion in the western provinces of Bijapur." Dilir's design to murder Shivaji is attested by Manucci (ii. 137) and the English Factory Records. (*My Shivaji and His Times*, 3rd. ed., p. 136.)

him back (20th March) with many persuasive letters and the acceptance of all his high demands, *viz.*, the rank of a 5-*hazari*, *jagir* in the settled and lucrative old territory of the empire (as distinct from the unsettled, ill-conquered and ever-ravaged new annexations in the Deccan), and Rs. 38,000 in cash. (*H.A.* 94 *a.*) For this offence the Maratha general had soon to make a severe atonement; he was suddenly arrested at Dharur (October 1666), sent to Delhi in chains, and there forced to embrace Islam as the only means of saving his life (February 1667.) [*A.N.* 987, 1009, 1021, 1033.]

The fourth misfortune of the Mughals was the sending of 12,000 cavalry and 40,000 infantry by the Sultan of Golkonda under his trusty eunuch Raza Quli (surnamed Neknam Khan) to assist Adil Shah. Arrived near Bijapur, they were welcomed by the wazir and passed in review before Ali, who received their salute from the Ali Burj. The two armies fraternized amidst grand rejoicings (about 31st January), and then they moved on Jai Singh from two sides, in order to crush him between them. (*A.N.* 1006; *B.S.* 413-414.)

§ 10. *Jai Singh hard-pressed.*

Jai Singh's position was now extremely dangerous. Even before this doubling of the enemy's forces, his retreat from the environs of Bijapur had

been molested and he had been able to move on only after fighting two battles on 11th and 22nd January, besides almost daily skirmishes by his foraging parties. The battle of Lohri, 22nd January, was very sanguinary, the imperialists losing 190 men slain and 250 wounded, besides many horses, while the enemy's casualties exceeded 400 slain and 1,000 wounded. (Cf. K.K. ii. 197.) The Right and Left wings of the Mughal army, under Daud Khan and Dilir Khan respectively, were attacked in succession by the mobile enemy in full force and had to be heavily reinforced, so that the Centre (under Jai Singh) was depleted. The enemy seized this opportunity to make an onset on the Rajah's person. But his Rajputs, under Harnath Chauhan and other leading officers of his own contingent, who formed his Van, after saluting him, gallantly dashed into the enemy's ranks, and desperately resisted them at close quarters. Harnath fell after receiving 21 wounds; and so also did most of his comrades; several other Rajputs were wounded. "The dead formed heaps on the field of encounter." The battle raged for six hours from 3 P.M. "The Deccanis tried their utmost, but at last fled with heavy loss." Thanks to the steadiness and co-operation of all divisions of his army, Jai Singh repulsed the enemy, chased them for four miles, and reached his own camp after 10 P.M.

After fighting five such battles in less than a month (25 Dec.—22 Jan.), Jai Singh's army was clearly no longer fit for further exertions. So, he rested his men at Sultanpur for 24 days (27 Jan.—19 Feb.) But during this period the imperial dominions enjoyed no security. The Bijapur-Golkonda army, divided into four corps,—under Sharza, Khawas, Bahlol and Abdul Muhammad,—finding the field clear, raided in various directions. They attacked the forts of Khatav, Mangalvide and Kaliani, though unsuccessfully. The Mughals were demoralized. When (3 Feb.) on hearing of the siege of Mangalvide Jai Singh ordered Daud Khan and Qutb-ud-din Khan Kheshgi with his Right and Rear divisions to go to its relief, "these generals wasted some days in vain discussions, and when strongly pressed, they flatly refused to go unless the Left Wing under Rajah Rai Singh was sent with them. Jai Singh had no help but to consent to it." (Jai Singh to Aurangzib, *H.A.* 93 a.) At the approach of these three generals, the Bijapuris at once raised the siege (about 12th Feb.), and the Mughal detachment, after throwing money and provisions into the fort, returned to Jai Singh's camp (19th.)

The raiding parties of Bijapur, under Bahlol Khan and Netaji, in the lately annexed Bidar-Kaliani districts (at the n. e. corner of the old Bijapur

kingdom) could no longer be ignored. And, therefore, on 20th Feb. Jai Singh issued from his camp at Sultanpur and marched due east into the disturbed area.

§ 11. *Jai Singh's campaign in the Bhima-Manjira region, Feb—June, 1666.*

The third stage of the war now began, which was to end with his retreat to Bhum, 18 m. n. e. of Parenda, early in June next. During these three months and a half Jai Singh moved about* in the small quadrilateral formed by the Bhima on the west

* Jai Singh's movements: Marches out of Sultanpur (20 Feb. 1666)—small fort of Dhoki taken by a detachment—encamps at Tuljapur (3 March), six days' halt—starts from Tuljapur (10 Mar.)—arrives six miles from Naldurg (14th)—marches towards Gunjoti, which was taken by an advanced division (15th)—reaches Gunjoti (16th)—marches 15 miles to two miles of Nilang (17th)—halt, Nilang capitulates—two severe battles (about 29th)—march from Nilang towards Ausa, (31st)—halt, severe battle (2 April)—marches to Latur [*A.N.* reads *Satsur*]. 23 m. n. w. of Nilang (4th)—halt for 8 days—marches to Audon (? Sheradon, 12 m. n. of Dhoki) (13th)—long halt on the bank of the Taina, (16th)—march resumed along the river, (29th)—encamps near Thair fort (4 m. s. of Dhoki) (4th May), battle—3 days' halt—march resumed (8th)—reaches bank of the Manjira, 20 m. from Dharur (9th)—marches 11 m. towards Dharashev (16th)—crosses the river Sin (? Sina) and halts at Sahri in Parenda district (21st)—encamps on the bank of the Bhima (22nd)—return march begins (31st)—crosses the river (Sina?) and halts 16 m. from Parenda (2 June)—reaches Bhum; halts there till 27 Sep.—march towards Bir begins (28 Sep.),—halt near Bir till 20th Oct.—leaves environs of Bir (17 Nov.)—reaches Aurangabad (26th), [*Alamgirnamah*, 1007—21.]

and the Manjira on the east, the cities of Dharur in the north and Tuljapur in the south. In the course of this campaign, he fought four more bloody but fruitless battle like those described before; each time the Bijapuris were repulsed in the field and driven some distance off, but they were not crushed, and continued as before to hover round the Mughal camp, cut off stragglers and weak foraging parties, and stop the arrival of supplies. During this period, the forts of Dhoki (44 m. e. of Parenda), Gunjoti (20 m. e. of Naldurg), and Nilang (23 m. further north), were captured by the Mughals,—no very important gains, and Netaji returned to the Mughal side. A new plan of war was adopted in the middle of May: "As the elusive enemy could not be caught in one body, nor crushed once for all, but they scattered like quicksilver, and the imperialists who were encumbered with a camp and heavy baggage could not pursue them for any long distance,—therefore, Jai Singh decided to make his army more light and mobile, so as to be capable of following the enemy till a crushing blow could be inflicted. He took with himself only small tents and light kit and urged his officers to do the same and send all the baggage of the soldiers and camp-followers to Dharur (31 m. n. of Dhoki), where a strong garrison was left to guard them." (*A.N.*, 1018.)

On 16th May this light division started from the bank of the Manjira near Dharur, marched due south by Dharashev (13 m. s. of Dhoki), and after crossing the Sina encamped on the bank of the Bhima (probably at Sonda.) But at this point the imperial army completely broke down and the campaign had to be abandoned. "The soldiers were exhausted by privation, long marches, and heavy loss of horses and transport animals. The rainy season was near, and the Emperor wrote to Jai Singh to return to Aurangabad, canton there for the monsoons, and send a part of his army to the jagirs of his officers, where they could live in (greater) comfort." (*A.N.* 1020.) So, a retreat was decided upon.

Mangalvide was too far from the Mughal frontier and too isolated a post to be held easily; nor was it sufficiently strong to be defended in the absence of a protecting field army. Jai Singh, therefore, detached (24th May) Dilir Khan to remove the guns and material from the fort, distribute the grain and other property, burn whatever could not be carried away, and dismantle the fortifications. This was done, and the party rejoined him on the 30th. Phaltan had been deemed untenable and its Mughal garrison withdrawn as early as February last. It was then presented to Mahadji Nimbalkar, a son-in-law of Shivaji, and an officer of the imperialists. (*A.N.* 1020-21, 1007.) So, not a

single place remained to the Mughals out of the gains of the first campaign.

The return march northwards began on 31st May. Reaching Bhum (about 10th June), Jai Singh halted there for $3\frac{1}{2}$ months, and then, on 28th September, started for the environs of Bir (37 m. n. of Bhum) where he stayed till 17th November, finally reaching Aurangabad on the 26th of that month. By the end of May when the Mughals began this final retreat, the Bijapuris too were exhausted. Their provisions had run short, their weapons were worn out, their country had been reduced to a wilderness, and their soldiers were at death's door. The Sultan of Golkonda also recalled his troops. Both the combatants were sick of the war, and longed for peace; and negotiations were reopened. The Bijapuris retired within their own frontiers when the Mughals did the same. (A.N. 1019.)

§ 12. *Money loss of the Bijapur invasion.*

Jai Singh's invasion of Bijapur was a military failure. Not an inch of territory, not a stone of a fortress, not a pice of indemnity was gained by it. As a financial speculation it was even more disastrous. Only the most complete success could have justified such a costly adventure immediately after the war with Shivaji had thrown the pay of the

Mughal army into arrears for six months. In addition to the thirty *lakhs* of Rupees from the imperial treasury, Jai Singh had spent more than a *krore* out of his own pocket. (*Dil.* 56.) His own letters prove that his avowed weapon for the conquest of Bijapur was gold, and he expected to win the kingdom by buying every Bijapuri captain at his own price. As he wrote to the Emperor, "It is necessary to detach three races from the enemy, *viz.* the Afghans, who form more than half the army of Bijapur, the Abyssinians (about 2000 brave troops), and the Mahdavi sect, foremost in raising tumult, more than 3000 horse. When these have joined us, the Bijapuri generals will be broken-winged and unable to carry out any exploit. Many of them should be given cash rewards and many jagirs in our old territory." (*H.A.* 90 *b.*) And, again, "As soon as our army enters this kingdom, many Deccanis will have to be enlisted in our service and every one of them will require money...Till the conquest of Bijapur, the spending of money according to expediency is very necessary." (*H.A.* 74 *b.*)

At first Aurangzib had objected to such lavish expenditure on mere speculation and doubted whether the enterprise would not end in utter loss like the Balkh and Qandahar adventures of his father's reign. Jai Singh replied that Bijapur was not like those desert lands; after its conquest all the

cost of the war would be recovered from the soil. Haji Shafi Khan, the *diwan* of the Deccan, used to object and delay in granting jagirs to the Bijapuri deserters; but Jai Singh complained to the Emperor against this obstructionist subordinate and had him removed from the province. (*H.A.* 91 *a* and *Dil.* 62.)

Profuse as Jai Singh's payments were, they were exceeded by the engagements he made on behalf of his master. Every petty Muslim captain or Maratha chieftain, who offered to desert from Bijapur, was promised a title and a high *mansab* in the Mughal service, besides a large cash bounty for equipping his retainers. (*Dil.* 62.) The number of the traitors thus recommended was so large, that the keeping of Jai Singh's promises would have drained the imperial treasury more thoroughly than the failure of a campaign. Aurangzib in anger rejected all the Rajah's recommendations after granting the first few.

§ 13. *Emperor's displeasure with Jai Singh for his failure.*

As early as the beginning of January, 1666, when Jai Singh retreated for the first time, Aurangzib had censured him for his failure and asked him to show what he had gained with the vast army and treasure given to him. When Jai Singh's second campaign produced no better result, he felt that he

had fallen under his master's wrath, and that if this failure were not relieved, his lifelong devotion to the Mughal throne would be forgotten and he would be dismissed with every mark of ignominy. The unhappy general tried hard to retain the command of the Deccan army, so as to get another chance of retrieving his fame. He was troubled by Court news of the Emperor's angry remarks on him and of a talk about sending Prince Muazzam to the South to supersede him in the viceroyalty. He then besought his son and friends at Court to exert themselves to save him; he offered the prime minister a bribe of Rs. 30,000 for inducing the Emperor to let him continue as *subahdar*. But it was all in vain. (B.S. 415; H.A. 89 b—93 a, Jai Singh's explanation to Emperor; 195 a—196 b, Jai Singh to Ram Singh at Court.)

The escape of Shivaji from Agra (August 1666) added to Jai Singh's troubles; he was held to be in some way responsible for the conduct of his son Ram Singh, who was more than suspected of having connived at Shivaji's flight. After Jai Singh's final retirement to Bir (October), he received orders to return to Aurangabad and on the 23rd March following (1667) he was recalled to Court and the viceroyalty of the Deccan was given to Prince Muazzam, assisted by Jaswant Singh. (A.N. 1037.)

§ 14. *Misery and death of Jai Singh, 1667.*

The Rajput veteran of a hundred fights made over charge to his successor at Aurangabad in May 1667, and bent his way towards Northern India in humiliation and disappointment. His brilliant career which had been passed under three Emperors and in which he had won laurels from Qandahar to Mungir and Balkh to Maharashtra, was clouded by a single ill-success at its close. Not a pice of the *krore* of Rupees of his own money that he had spent in the Bijapur war would be repaid by his master. Broken-hearted from disgrace and disappointment, and labouring under disease and old age, Jai Singh sank in death on reaching Burhanpur, on 2nd July, 1667. Like Walsingham of Elizabeth's Court, he died a bankrupt after serving too faithfully an exacting but thankless master.

§ 15. *Vindication of Jai Singh.*

Aurangzib refused to forgive Jai Singh the one failure of his life. But the Rajah had never a fair chance in this war. His army was hopelessly inadequate for the conquest of so large and rich a kingdom; his war material and food supply were sufficient for a month or two only, and he had no siege-guns. At the same time the power of the Bijapur State was unimpaired in contrast with its exhausted condition when Aurangzib himself

captured its capital 19 years later. Its king was still able and energetic; its nobility laid aside their factious quarrels for the time being; and, in addition, Qutb Shah and many neighbouring zamindars joined Adil Shah against Jai Singh, as they "knew that the Mughal conquest of Bijapur would be the prelude to the conquest of all Deccan and Karnatak." (H.A. 90 a.) As Jai Singh rightly observed to Aurangzib, "Your Majesty knows how small Shivaji's territory is and yet how very long our troops had to fight against him (before achieving success.) Surely, a war against such a kingdom as Bijapur requires very great effort and organization (of resources.)"

Small as Jai Singh's army was relatively to the task laid upon it, he was badly served by his subordinates. The couriers on whom he depended for news about the enemy's movements were "liars, pro-Deccanis and greedy of gain. The Bijapuris bribed them into betraying to them all information about the imperial army. In the Mughal camp itself they acted as the enemy's spies." (H.A. 89b.) Many of his officers were unreliable, and refused or delayed in carrying out his orders.*

* For example, Daud Khan used openly to condemn the war with Adil Shah as contrary to the *Quran*, wishing thereby to discourage the Muslim soldiery under Jai Singh. (H.A. 190b.) The qiladar of Parenda negligently dispersed the *banjaras* collected

(*Ibid.*, 93, 73b—74a.) And the imperial officers at the base did not keep his army regularly supplied with grain.

Success under these conditions was not humanly possible. Jai Singh died, overwhelmed with loss, disappointment and public disgrace. But the best defence of his reputation as a general and diplomatist is the 18 months' siege and the employment of the entire resources of the empire under the very eyes of Aurangzib by which alone Bijapur was captured in 1686.

Immediately after the death of Jai Singh, his secretary and favourite manager, Udairaj,—to whom we owe the valuable letter-book, *Haft Anjuman*,—went to the governor of Burhanpur and turned Muhammadan, to save himself from the persecution of the Rajah's followers. From this they suspected that he had brought about Jai Singh's death by poison.* Kumar Kirat Singh wished to avenge his father's death by dragging the renegade out of the governor's house and killing him with insult, but he found it impossible to molest a Muslim. (*Dil.* 63-64).

by order of Jai Singh and the latter had very great difficulty in assembling again the 12,000 *banjaras* that he needed during his march. (93b.)

* Manucci tells the bazar gossip that Aurangzib caused poison to be given to Jai Singh on the road (ii. 152), while Tod makes Kirat Singh the murderer of his father!

CHAPTER XLII

DECLINE OF THE ADIL-SHAHIS, 1667—1684.

§ 1. *Military aristocracy governing Bijapur provinces.*

Military revolt was the curse of the Bijapur sultanate. It had itself originated in the assertion of independence by a foreign general of the decadent Bahmani empire, and the decline of its own royal power was attended by the same dismemberment of the kingdom into a number of military fiefs. The State was not national; it did not try to strike its roots in the soil. The government was a pure military occupation and its power was upheld by a number of mercenary generals among whom all offices of power and trust were divided. The chief races who formed the dominant aristocracy were the Afghans (with their fiefs in the western parts, from Kōpal to Bankapur), the Abyssinians (ruling over the eastern province, *viz.*, the Karnul district and a part of the Raichur Doab), the Sayyids who headed the Mahdavi sect, and the Arab Mullas of the Navaiyat clan of Konkan. The Hindus, both public servants and vassal Rajahs, were a depressed class, and the highest among them, such as Shahji

Bhonslé and Venkatadri, had no secure standing or protection from outrage when oppressed by the Muslim nobles.

The official body that had made the State its own* was, therefore, alien in origin; but it had settled in the soil with no idea of returning to its original homes, and it had practically converted itself into a hereditary feudal baronage. Each of these races mainly married within its own tribe and thus could not become assimilated to the native population. The disintegration of the Bijapur monarchy, therefore, presented a scene different from the disruption of the Roman empire, when, in the words of Vinogradoff, "*The disruptive forces of local interests and local separation came to assert themselves; society fell back to a great extent on the lines of local life and of aristocratic organization.*" (*Cambridge Med. Hist.*, i. 563.)

In the Deccan there were provincial separation and aristocratic organization of society; but the line of cleavage was personal, not territorial; its root-cause was not an assertion of local life and local

* Dr. Fryer noticed it as early as 1675: "So miserable is that State where the other members grow too powerful for the head, as in this constituted government of Deccan [*i.e.*, Bijapur], where the king's munificence to the grandees has instated them in absolute authority over their provinces, that they are potent enough to engage one another, and countermand the king's commands unless suitable to their humours." (ii. 46—47)

aspirations, but the ambition of the local viceroy. The people played no part in the change; they obeyed the independent rebel Nawab as their fathers had obeyed the Nawab's predecessor, *viz.*, the viceroy loyal to the central Government. Nor did the independent provincial Government take a peculiar colour from the locality; it merely bore the stamp of the race of its new ruler. There is no reason to suppose that, if Siddi Masaud had made himself Nawab of Ikkeri in Kanara instead of Karnul in Telugu-land, his form of administration and Court-life would have been different. It was essentially a foreign product planted in the soil without any regard for the past history and present character of the natives of the locality.

This alien aristocracy of office naturally formed no integral part of the State. Its aim was purely personal gain, and so long as the pay and pension of its members were secure they did not care who was the sovereign of the country of which they were nominally a part. No doubt, the different members of this dominant class occasionally united under the banners of the central Government; but it was always from hope of personal gain or fear of personal loss, as, for instance, when a rich neighbouring Hindu principality was to be raided, or when a Mughal invasion which threatened them all with removal from office had to be resisted. But

such men could always be bought by the enemy for a price; they had no patriotism because they had no *patria*; they were truly political Bedouins, "orphans of the heart,"* nomads who lived in India but were not of it.

The State founded on the loyalty of such public servants is an edifice built on sand. At each foreign conquest the people merely changed masters. The old rulers had contented themselves with discharging police functions, preserving internal peace when they could, and the newcomers did the same thing on being settled in the conquered land. The life of the people was untouched by the political change, and they, therefore, could not be expected to rally round the crown in its hour of need, as the citizens of a national State are sure to do.

The decline of the Adil-Shahi monarchy merely illustrates this well-known principle of political philosophy, and it is now the historian's mournful duty to depict the sickening scenes which attended the dissolution of a State that had once been the queen of Southern India.

* "In pure knowledge, there can be neither native nor foreign. Emotion, on the other hand, is entirely a matter of locality..... Every man's heart has its own country.....The unity of Humanity is never even dimly perceived by...the seeker after foreign ways and foreign thoughts, whose shame is his own mother,—*the man who has no native land.*" (Sister Nivedita in *Mod. Rev.* Aug. 1911.)

§ 2. *The greatness of Bijapur under Muhammad Adil Shah.*

We have seen how the treaty of 1636 (Vol. I., Ch. 3 § 3) had settled all causes of dispute between the Mughals and the Bijapuri king, and, by clearly defining his northern boundary, had left Adil Shah free to extend his dominions, east and south and west. We have seen, how in the next 20 years the kingdom of Bijapur reached its greatest expansion, and stretched from the Arabian Sea to the Bay of Bengal, across the entire Indian peninsula. (Vol. I., Ch. 11 § 1.) At Muhammad Adil Shah's death, in November 1656, his realm had an annual revenue of 7 *krores* and 84 *lakhs* of Rupees, besides 5¼ *krores* of tribute due from vassal Rajahs and zamindars. The strength of the army establishment was 80,000 cavalry and 250,000 infantry, besides 530 war elephants. The exact extent of the kingdom can be judged from the fringe of dependent and tributary States around it, covering the Kanara and Dharwar districts of Bombay, the Bellary and Karnul districts of Madras, and much of the kingdom of Mysore.*

* B.S. 346—348. Ishwardas (106a) gives the revenue of Bijapur as 1,32,00,000 *hun*, excluding Konkan, which was then in Maratha possession. *Dilkasha* (203) puts the armed strength of the kingdom under Muhammad Adil Shah at 1,20,000 cavalry; under Ali II. at 80,000; and at the fall of the capital 2,000 only.

§ 3. *Reign of Ali Adil Shah II., 1656-1672.*

The accession of Ali Adil Shah II., a youth of 18, in November 1656, was followed by quarrels among his nobles for the division of power, and some rebellions in the frontier provinces, especially in the newly conquered Karnatak. The evil was aggravated by Aurangzib's wanton invasion of Bijapur (January 1657) and his seduction of its officers. But the kingdom, thus unfairly attacked, made a heroic defence, and the danger ceased altogether at the end of the year when the contest for the throne of Delhi suddenly recalled Aurangzib from the Deccan. The storm of foreign invasion having blown over, the Bijapur State next showed a revival of power for some time. Ali Adil Shah II. developed great capacity and enterprising spirit from 1661 to 1666. He took the field in person, curbed the growing power of Shivaji, forced the refractory Abyssinian officers of the N. E. province

B.S. (347) names the dependent zamindars thus:—Srirangapatan, Sunda (in N. Kanara), Chitalduig, Habri (? s.e. of Bankapur), Tarikhhera (s. e. of Shimoga), Ratangiri (13.50 N. 77.10 E.), Sarhashi (?), Paogar (14.6 N. 77.20 E.), Manikpala (?), Chak-bala (? Chak Balapur), Kuntikhera (13.30 N. 76.30 E.), Manori (? north of Goa), Hagalwari (s. of Kuntikhera), Harpanhali (14.50 N. 76 E.), Anigundi (n. of Vijaynagar), Kapkuri (?), Kanakgiri (15.35 N. 76.26 E.), Ballary, Gudikota (14.50 N. 76.40 E.), Sagar-gar (the Berad capital.) Fryer (ii. 56-57) mentions only the ten chief grandees of Bijapur, including the Sunda Rajah and the Rajah of Kanara (? Bednur.)

(Karnul) back into submission, humbled the rebel Rajah of Bednur, and finally rolled back the flood of Mughal invasion under Jai Singh. Thereafter the Sultan gave himself up to the pleasures of the harem and the wine-cup, for the rest of his life; but his able *wazir*, Abdul Muhammad, continued to carry on the administration with great success.

With the death of Ali Adil Shah II. on 24th Nov. 1672, the glory of Bijapur departed. His son Sikandar, a boy of four, was placed on the throne, and the reign of selfish regents commenced which finally ruined the monarchy. The expert and successful *wazir* Abdul Muhammad, with his 12 years' experience in guiding the State, was ousted by Khawas Khan, the leader of the Deccani party. This man "held supreme power for three years, but during that period, owing to his indolence and incompetence, affairs went from bad to worse." (B.S. 447.) At last Abdul Karim Bahlol Khan, the head of the Afghan faction, imprisoned the drunken *wazir* (11th Nov. 1675), seized the regency and for two years governed in the king's name amidst constant fights with the Deccani party and a war with the Mughals, while the people groaned under the misery of Afghan rule. On his death, 23rd December, 1677, Siddi Masaud, the leader of the Abyssinians, succeeded to the *wazir*-ship and the control of the puppet king (21st Feb. 1678),

and for the next five years misgoverned the unhappy and disunited country, deserting his post only on the eve of the extinction of the dynasty by Aurangzib.

The history of Bijapur from 1672 to 1686 is really the history of its *wazirs*. It was a period marked by chronic civil war among the factious nobles, independence of the provincial governors, paralysis of the central administration in the capital itself, occasional but indecisive Mughal invasions, and a secret alliance but pretended hostility with the Marathas.

§ 4. *Khawas Khan's regency, 1672—1675.*

On 20th June 1672, Ali Adil Shah II. had a stroke of lateral paralysis, as the effect of excessive drinking. For five months he lingered in bed, and at last, losing all hope of recovery, proposed to crown his son Sikandar, a boy of four, and entrust the regency to his old *wazir* Abdul Muhammad. The latter declined the task and proposed that Khawas Khan, the Abyssinian chief of the Deccani Muhammadans, should be regent instead, and the kingdom should be divided among the four leading nobles: he himself becoming warden of the north-eastern side (to oppose the Mughals), Bahlol Khan that of the western side (to watch Shivaji), and Muzaffar Khan the viceroy of the southern side (to

control the newly conquered Hindus of Mysore), while the regent would hold the capital and the country round it. (B.S. 434-436.)

Even before the sick king had closed his eyes, quarrels broke out among the nobles for the division of his territory, Abdul Muhammad alone remaining true to the interests of the State. Ali Adil Shah II. died on 24th Nov. 1672, and immediately afterwards Khawas seized the supreme power with the help of the late king's favourite body-servant Mirza Yusuf, and crowned the boy Sikandar, the last of the Adil-Shahis, destined to reign as the captive of his ministers and to die as the captive of the Mughals. The new prime minister broke his word to the other nobles and refused to yield to them the forts he had promised. At this, the able and experienced *ex-wazir* Abdul Muhammad left the Court in disgust. "The infancy of the king and the incapacity of the regent threw the monarchy into a decline. Disturbances broke out on all sides." First Shivaji, "the enemy at the elbow," made large conquests at the expense of Bijapur. As for the Mughal Emperor, the Bijapur Government tried to propitiate him by offering him presents worth 4 lakhs of Rupees, as a sort of succession fee, (11th January, 1673.) But, "though all Mughal invasions had hitherto been defeated, now with a boy-king on the throne, weak counsels at Court, and

worthless nobles [in office], came the Mughal's opportunity." (B.S. 442.) Aurangzib appointed the energetic and successful general Bahadur Khan (surnamed Khan-i-Jahan Bahadur Kokaltash) as viceroy. The mild and supine administration of Prince Muazzam was to be replaced by a forward policy in the Deccan. (M.A. 123-'4.)

"The Emperor began to send Bahadur Khan repeated orders for invading Bijapur." But the task was obviously impossible. With the ordinary contingent of a provincial governor, Bahadur Khan was expected to curb the overgrown power of Shivaji,—then at the height of his greatness,—and at the same time conquer Bijapur, though in the last-named enterprise Jai Singh with much larger forces and the co-operation of Shivaji had failed. What Bahadur Khan did was to advance from the seat of his government to Pedgaon (afterwards named by him *Bahadur-garh*), a strategic point on the Bhima river 55 miles due east of Puna and nearly midway between Aurangabad and Bijapur. His aim was to direct his main forces against Shivaji and win territory from Bijapur by corrupting its nobles and threatening war, rather than by actual invasion. "Malik Barkhurdar, the Mughal envoy at the Adil-Shahi Court, began to seduce the Bijapuri nobles from their loyalty day and night."

Khawas Khan saw no other means of saving

the monarchy than to propose peace with the Emperor by promising the hand of Sikandar's sister to one of Aurangzib's sons and active co-operation with the Mughals in a campaign for the extirpation of Shivaji. For this last object the Emperor was ready to concede very liberal terms. But these negotiations, when about to mature, were upset by an envious faction at Bijapur, who took advantage of the regent's incompetence and credulity, and by the lawless outbreak of the Afghan mercenaries.

The Afghans formed "more than half the Bijapuri army" (*H.A.* 82 b.) Their leader was Abdul Karim, surnamed Bahlol Khan II., whose fief lay at Bankapur, and who had bravely fought against Jai Singh and recently against Shivaji. Their harsh demand for arrears of pay and open opposition to his administration had driven the regent to secretly beg the aid of the Mughal viceroy : "pacifying the Afghans or extirpating them."

Meantime, Bahadur Khan, too, was eager for a hearty alliance with the Bijapuris. He had recently been duped by Shiva's pretended offer of submission and had made himself an unconscious helper of the wily Maratha in his conquest of Phonda and other districts (April-May, 1675). Then Shivaji had thrown off the mask, and Bahadur Khan found that the only means of saving his credit with the Emperor was to make a vigorous attack on Shivaji in

co-operation with the Adil-Shahi troops. So, he advanced to the bank of the Bhima river, met Khawas Khan (19th October), and arranged terms for suppressing the Afghan faction at Bijapur and making war on Shiva.

§ 5. *Regency of Bahlol Khan, 1675—1677.*

Sure of Mughal support, the regent formed plans for overthrowing Bahlol Khan, who was commander-in-chief and “used often to disobey and oppose Khawas Khan.” (B.S. 446.) The Afghan chief, getting scent of the matter, forestalled the blow. Inviting Khawas to a dinner, he plied him with wine, seized him, (11th November), and sent him off as a prisoner to Bankapur. He then entered the citadel of Bijapur and made himself *wazir* without a blow. “Khawas Khan had been prime minister and virtual king for three years, during which, owing to the Khan’s indolence and incompetence, affairs went from bad to worse. His wife, Habiba Sultan, managed the revenue and the administration and used to look after public business with full power. With all her wisdom, she was a woman, and the Adil-Shahi officers were impatient of feminine rule. Khawas spent his days in pleasure and ease, not caring for anybody.” (B.S. 447.)

But bad as this Abyssinian’s regency had been,

the rule of Bahlol Khan and his Afghans was even worse. After seizing the regency he began to place his Afghan followers and relatives in power* and removed the Deccanis from office, one by one, and even expelled them from the city. Great disorder broke out throughout the kingdom. The Deccani party was up in arms and so also were the old servants of the king.

Bahlol Khan's administration rested on the ability and vigour of one man, his chief counsellor Khizr Khan Pani. On 12th January 1676, this man was stabbed to death in his tent (between Sangula and Cherdī) by a Deccani named Shaikh Minhaj Junaidi, who wanted to put an end to Afghan rule. Bahlol immediately murdered the helpless captive Khawas Khan (18th Jan.) and then set out from Bijapur to punish Minhaj and other Deccanis. A civil war now openly broke out between the two factions.

§ 6. *War renewed by Bahadur Khan, 1676.*

On 21st March† a bloody battle was fought

* "Abdul Karim, on becoming *wazir*, gave his kinsmen the best *jagirs*. It was Afghan rule at Court. The Deccanis were dispossessed.....Even Sayyid Makhdum Sharza Khan was alienated." (B.S. 450.)

† This date, which is taken from the Persian *Basatin*, is probably wrong, being a month too early. Or, another battle (not recorded in the *Basatin*) was fought in April, which the English factors of Rajapur

between the men of Sharza Khan and the army of the regent near Mokah, in which the Afghans triumphed. Sharza took refuge with Bahadur Khan at Sholapur, who now sided with the Deccani party and denounced Afghan rule at Bijapur. He assembled his own forces and those of his allies among the dispossessed Deccani nobles, and marched southwards from Sholapur, crossing the Bhima near Halsangi on 31st May. There was now no physical barrier between him and the walls of Bijapur,* and his cavalry began to ravage the environs of that city. On 13th June, on a plain between Aliabad and Indi (30 miles north-east of Bijapur), Bahlol Khan offered him battle. The brunt

in a letter to Surat on 1 May 1676, thus describe, "The Nawab [Bahlol Khan] hath a bloody fight with the Deccans. They killed him about a thousand horse; many of his chiefest friends fell; himself much wounded. The Deccans are headed by Shaikh Minhaj and assisted by Siddi Mazhar and Sharza Khan &c. The Nawab hath none [that] sticks to him but the Pathans. Report speaks [of] him [as] in a great strait whilst these fight." (F.R. Surat, Vol. 89.) The place of battle is spelt as *Mukah* in both MSS. of B.S., but *Dil.* 138 says that it was "near fort *Shah-dongar* (? Shahdurg), 12 *kos* from Adoni." There is a *Mokay*, 11 m. n. e. of Bellary. (*Ind. Atlas*, Sh. 58.)

* Dutch Records, Vol. 34, letter from Batavia, 28 Nov. 1676,— "Bahadur Khan approached within half a day's journey [of Bijapur], but having lost fully 4000 men, much baggage and four distinguished captains, retired to the town of Sholapur, where Bahlol Khan sent him a considerable embassy with rich presents and great promises, especially to the prejudice of Shivaji.....The Golkonda militia is in motion to help the young Prince of Bijapur.

of the Deccani attack fell on the Mughal Right under Islam Khan (governor of Malwa) and his Turks, who repelled two onsets. But their ammunition was exhausted, and when a fresh store of gunpowder was being distributed in the field in front of Islam Khan, it exploded; his elephant stampeded into the enemy's ranks, and Islam Khan and his son were slain. The exultant Bijapuris next attacked the Mughal Left and Extreme Right. Here the Rajputs offered an obstinate resistance, and lost many of their officers. The field was covered with the dead on both sides. The Mughals halted there and entrenched their position, which was invested and attacked by the Afghans ceaselessly for three days, "there being no respite even at night." The Mughal base camp on the other side of the Bhima was looted by the Afghans and its guards put to the sword, while the flooded river prevented Bahadur Khan from sending succour to it. The viceroy escaped from this perilous position only by making terms with the Afghans. (B.S. 450-451, *M.A.* 151, *Dil.* 141—143. Jedhe's date is 1 June.)

He moved on to Akalkot and laid siege to Naldurg (about August, 1676), which was held by the sons of Khizr Khan Pani. A relieving army from Bijapur, led by Bahlol Khan, fought the Mughals six miles from the fort, inflicting heavy

losses on the brave Rajputs, entered Naldurg and forced Bahadur Khan to raise the siege. The Mughals merely roamed round the fort for a few days more and then halted at Kambhgaon, 16 miles off.*

Bahadur Khan's position was further endangered by the arrival of a vast Golkonda army, under the premier Madanna Pandit, to reinforce the Bijapuris. But the new-comers were bribed by the Mughal general, and had also (as I suspect) some difference with Bahlol Khan, and therefore retreated without doing anything. Bahadur Khan marched on to Halsangi, where he assembled a vast force, consisting of his own troops, contingents sent by the *faujdar*s of imperial territory and discontented Bijapuri nobles like Siddi Masaud and Sharza Khan, and the bribed forces of Golkonda. He even made friends with Shivaji to guard against any diversion in his rear.

This huge demonstration of strength cowed Bahlol Khan, who then secured safety for himself by agreeing not to hinder the Mughal conquest of certain Bijapuri districts. Bahadur Khan now took

* In my account of this campaign I have depended upon the narrative (*Dilkasha*) of "Eye-witness" Bhimsen, who served in the Mughal camp. The Bijapur official history, *Basatin-i-salatn* (p. 451) is much briefer, but gives some useful additional information. I have rejected it where it conflicts with *Dilkasha* (p. 144.) *M.A.* 155, 160. Bahadur's son Md. Muhsan was slain at Naldurg.

easy possession of Naldurg (14th May 1677) and Kulbarga (7th July) by bribery. But these successes came too late to save him; he had fallen under the Emperor's suspicion* and displeasure by reason of his utter failure against Shivaji and severe reverses at the hands of the Bijapuris. The viceroy's position was rendered untenable by a conflict of policy between him and his second in command, Dilir Khan, (arrived in June 1676), who as an Afghan became the bosom friend of Bahlol Khan and the patron of the Afghan faction at Bijapur. Dilir and Bahlol wrote to the Emperor accusing Bahadur Khan of having formed a secret understanding with the three Deccani Powers and of being really hostile to the success of the imperial enterprises there. Bahlol Khan also offered to conquer Haidarabad if he were reinforced with imperial troops, and to crush Shivaji if the Mughals guaranteed the Afghan chief his position and property. (*Dil.* 146—151.)

* Bahadur Khan began his viceroyalty of the Deccan with great promise. In Sep. 1673 he made a forced march of 120 miles and defeated Shivaji. In July 1675 he was rewarded by the Emperor for "repeated victories over Shiva and success in collecting tribute from the Deccani kingdoms." (*M.A.* 142) But now the Emperor suspected him of being in the pay of Adil Shah. (*Cf. Ruqat*, No. 127.) *M.A.* 160 gives the date of the capture of Naldurg as 14 May. *B.S.* 452 tells us that Kulbarga fell on 7 July and Shahdurg on 2 August. But Shahdurg seems to be only another name of Naldurg. Jedhe's dates (month only given) agree with *B.S.*

§ 7. *Dilir Khan and Bahlol invade Golkonda, 1677.*

Aurangzib accepted this proposal, which was recommended by Dilir Khan. Bahadur was accordingly recalled, and left the province early in September 1677. The prime minister Asad Khan was then sent to Aurangabad with a large army to put matters straight and also to keep a vigilant watch, as the Emperor wanted to guard against the possibility of the establishment of an irresistible Afghan domination in the Deccan, at a time when the N. W. Frontier Pathans were imperfectly subdued. (*Dil.* 157.) But Asad Khan soon afterwards returned to the Emperor's side, and Dilir continued to officiate as viceroy of the Deccan till October 1678.

The departure of Bahadur Khan is a convenient point at which we can pause and look collectively at the Mughal gains in the Deccan during the first twenty years of Aurangzib's reign. As we have already seen (*Vol. I. Ch. 11*), he had in 1657 annexed Kaliani and Bidar in the north-eastern corner of the kingdom of Bijapur. The fort and district of Parenda in the extreme north had been gained by bribery in November 1660. Sholapur had been acquired by treaty in July 1668. And now Naldurg and Kulbarga were annexed. Thus, the vast tract of land enclosed by the Bhima and the Manjira eastwards up to an imaginary line joining

Kulbarga to Bidar (77° E. longitude) passed into Mughal hands, and the imperial boundary on the south reached the north bank of the Bhima, opposite Halsangi, within striking distance of Bijapur city,—while south-eastwards it touched Malkhed, the fortress of the western border of the kingdom of Golkonda. The various Mughal gains were thus linked together into a compact unit.

But neither Bahadur's policy of war with the Afghan party at Bijapur, nor Dilir's opposite course of fraternizing with them, brought the Mughals any nearer success in getting possession of that kingdom. The former viceroy merely annexed a belt of land along its northern border, and the latter merely plundered its territory.

Nor did the Mughals attain any better success in their attack on Golkonda which followed immediately afterwards. During their siege of Kulbarga (June 1677), Qutb Shah had massed his troops on his western frontier, under his commander-in-chief Muhammad Ibrahim, with orders to be watchful; but there was no conflict. After the Mughals had effected their conquests in this corner of Bijapur, they turned to settle accounts with Golkonda. They threatened (middle of August) Qutb Shah with invasion unless he seized and delivered up to them Shivaji and Shaikh Minhaj,—the last of whom had taken much money from the Mughal viceroy by

promising to join him, but had ended by going over to Golkonda. A little later they demanded from the Sultan one *krore* of Rupees and 10,000 horse, as a fine for his having assisted Shivaji. He replied by offering to pay only five *lakhs*. Then Dilir and Bahlol tried to redeem their promise to the Emperor by setting out on an invasion of Golkonda (September.) From Kulbarga, the last Mughal outpost, they advanced to Malkhed, 24 miles eastwards, the first enemy fort on the Golkonda frontier, which they took in one day.

§ 8. *Battles near Malkhed; Mughal retreat.*

But near Malkhed, 80 miles from the Qutb-Shahi capital, the tide of invasion was arrested. The Mughal Van, some 5,000 cavalry under Bahlol Khan, advanced, but were opposed by five times their number of Qutb-Shahi troops, who had been joined by several anti-Afghan nobles of Bijapur, such as Sharza and Masaud. After a long and severe battle, Bahlol was about to be routed, when Dilir Khan came to his aid and enabled him to make an orderly retreat. The Mughals lost 700 men and 5 or 6 great captains. The Qutb-Shahis claimed the victory, but retired to their own camp without attempting pursuit, (about 12th Sept.).

The Sultan of Golkonda quickly sent large reinforcements from his capital under Yengana (the

nephew of Madanna), Mirza Sanjar, Shaikh Minhaj and many other great generals. One day the Qutb-Shahi vanguard under "Hidolsha" (? Haidar Shah or Dula Shah), by an attack and pretended retreat, lured away the Mughal army with all its elephants one Gentu league from their camp to very near the place where the Golkonda forces were settled. The Mughal Van was reinforced by Ali Hasan Khan, who fought very bravely, which caused both armies to retire to their respective camps. The Qutb-Shahis were posted at Mangalgi, 7 m. north of Malkhed, the Mughal encampment (October). Three days after this engagement the newly arrived troops attacked the Mughals, who by a pretended flight drew the enemy into an ambush, where large numbers of them were slain. But Muhammad Ibrahim arrived to the rescue of his men, pressed the Mughals back and released the captives they had taken. For two months there was constant but indecisive fighting. The Qutb-Shahis penetrated far within Bijapuri and Mughal territories and cut off grain convoys coming to the invaders. The desperate Mughals fell on the Golkonda camp on 20th October, and "killed every man and woman and even the very children," looted the bazar of all its grain and other property, thoroughly broke up the camp, and scattered the Qutb-Shahi forces in headlong flight.

But the triumph was momentary. The enemy soon rallied. The Afghans and Rajputs in the allied army suffered terrible hardships from excess of rain and the scarcity of grain caused by the enemy hovering around. Bahlol Khan was struck down by a mortal illness, and his retainers dispersed to save themselves from starvation. Then Dilir made a disastrous retreat to Kulbarga, the enemy hemming him round and making daily attacks. His baggage was looted and his men had to stand to arms from morning to night in self-defence and suffer heavy losses. It took them 12 days to retrace their steps over the 24 miles between Malkhed and Kulbarga, the enemy disputing every inch of the ground. The famished imperialists ate the seeds of the toddy-palm and the date-palm. For two days they had to seek shelter in a *nala* without any drinking water. It was only the unconquerable spirit of the Rajputs and their ready sacrifice of life that brought Dilir's army back to safety at last.

There was nothing left for him but to solicit peace, especially as his only supporter, Bahlol Khan, was dying. Before this, Siddi Masaud and other nobles faithful to the house of Adil Shah, being disgusted with Afghan rule at the capital and the impending ruin of their sovereign, had appealed to Golkonda to mediate. Abul Hasan Qutb Shah brought the heads of the rival factions together and

influenced them to agree to the following terms: (i) Bahlol should resign the regency in favour of Masaud; (ii) Masaud should pay six lakhs of Rupees, the arrears of pay due to the Afghan soldiers, who would then be disbanded and would quit Bijapur, while Bahlol would retire to his own fief; (iii) the kingdom was to be saved from further dismemberment; and (iv) a Resident from Golkonda would advise the administration of Bijapur, Akanna, the brother of Madanna, being chosen for this post.

At Kulbarga Masaud met Dilir Khan and made peace with the Mughals: he was to act as *wazir* at Bijapur, but must obey the orders of Aurangzib, make no alliance with Shivaji, and always help the Mughals in wresting the Maratha chief's usurped territory; Adil Shah's sister, Shahar Banu Begam (popularly called Padishah Bibi) was to be sent to the Mughal Court to marry a son of the Emperor. Dilir then retired northwards to Parnir, s. w. of Ahmadnagar, to be nearer the capital of Mughal Deccan.*

* Dilir's expedition against Golkonda in 1677: *Dil.* 151—154; *M.A.* 165 (one sentence only.) *Factory Records*, Fort St. George, Vol. 27, Letters from Vira Raghavaya, the English agent at Golkonda, 3 July, 26 Aug., 19 Sep., and 28 Oct. 1677 (best.) Peace with Masaud: *B.S.* 456.

§ 9. *Masaud becomes Regent; Afghan mutiny; rebellions in provinces.*

Bahlol died on 23rd Dec. 1677. Masaud, escorted by a Golkonda army, was installed as Regent in February next. Soon afterwards, he sent 11 lakhs of Rupees as tribute to the Emperor, middle of 1678 (*M.A.* 167), and this drained his treasury dry. He had undertaken to pay up the arrears of the Afghan mercenaries, only on the strength of a promise from Qutb Shah to lend him six lakhs. But the latter delayed or refused payment, and then the exasperated Afghans broke out in lawless fury. They seized the houses of Bahlol Khan's orphans, widows and other relatives, publicly insulting them to compel payment of their dues, attached their very beds and cooking pots, and even tore away the ornaments from the persons of the ladies of the harem. "If they could treat their own clansmen thus, one can imagine how they oppressed other people." (*Dil.* 155.) All citizens believed to be rich were caught and tortured by them. Masaud sent a force to besiege the Afghan mutineers in possession of Bahlol's house. A free fight now deluged that suburb of Bijapur with blood. "Chintu Chimna, a Brahman robber, oppressed the people of the city, while the Afghans oppressed those outside the fort-walls.....All the time Masaud sat down in helplessness, shutting the doors of his own

house.....Many people emigrated to the Karnatak in fear." (B.S. 462.)

Nor was the new regent better obeyed in the provinces. When his family was coming from Adoni to join him at Bijapur, the commandant of Raichur slew his son and imprisoned the rest of his family. It was only the intercession of the universally loved princess Padishah Bibi that secured the release of the captives. To crown his misfortunes, he provoked the wrath of the Mughals by trying to strengthen himself by a secret alliance with Shivaji. "The Bijapuri ryots lived in extreme misery, owing to the universal disorder which Masaud utterly failed to put down. He wanted to buy off Shiva whose violence and encroachment had passed all bounds. Dilir Khan forbade him to do so, saying that the Mughal army was ready to co-operate with him in fighting the Marathas. But Masaud, distracted by the lawlessness rampant throughout the kingdom, appealed to Shivaji, as an old subject of Bijapur, to help him in arresting the ruin of the monarchy and expelling the alien Mughals." (B.S. 468.)

§ 10. *Dilir invades Bijapur; Shivaji assists Masaud, 1678.*

This breach of faith on the part of Masaud absolved Dilir Khan from the treaty of Kulbarga,

“respect for which alone had so long kept him back from the invasion of Bijapur.” Besides, the Emperor ordered an attack at this time, as Bahlol was dead, the Afghan soldiery dispersed, and the Deccani nobles divided in a civil war. Dilir Khan began his task in the approved Mughal fashion by seducing the Bijapuri officers with promises of *mansab* and *jagir* under the Emperor. The deserting chiefs were granted six annas daily as cash salary for every trooper under them, pending the granting of *jagirs*. In this way a force of 20,000 Bijapuris was enlisted by Dilir Khan. (*Dil.* 158.) The chief among them were the kinsmen of Bahlol, who had recently been starving through unemployment.

At the end of the rainy season (October 1678) Dilir Khan moved out of Pedgaon and halted at Akluj to complete his preparations for the invasion. At this time Shambhuji ran away from his father to the camp of the Mughal general, (13 Dec.)

Meantime, Shivaji, according to treaty, sent six thousand steel-clad troopers to guard Bijapur and

As the Mughal envoy at Bijapur wrote to the Emperor, “Abdul Karim had assembled a body of good fighters with whom he used to confront Shiva and often defeated him. These men being now out of employment are wishing to go elsewhere. They will turn the scale in favour of whichever side they will join. Better enlist them in the imperial army.” Aurangzib agreed, and ordered Dilir Khan to engage them. (*B.S.* 470.)

reinforce Masaud. But hearty co-operation between the two allies was impossible: Masaud could never shake off the suspicion that Shiva would take the first opportunity of seizing Bijapur by treachery, as he had done in the case of so many other Adil-Shahi forts. When Shivaji's men asked to be put in charge of one gate and bastion of the city, it only confirmed Masaud's fear. They encamped near the city wall in Zuhrapur, while Masaud urged them to remain at a distance at the village of Itangihal (6 m. n. w.) The Marathas were detected in trying to smuggle arms into the fort, concealed in sacks of grain, while they themselves were disguised as drivers of the pack-oxen. So, the two allies stood on guard against each other. The ill-feeling between them daily increased and finally broke out in open quarrel. Then Shivaji resumed plundering the Bijapur territory. The Maratha troops approached the city, and looted the suburbs of Daulatpur (*i.e.*, Khawaspur), Khusraupur, and Zuhrapur, took the rich merchants prisoner and slew some Muhammadan officers. But a cannon-ball from the fort-walls killed the Maratha commander near the tomb of Ibrahim Adil Shah, and they retired. (B.S. 472—474).

Masaud, in greater fear of his pretended ally than of his open enemy, sought the protection of Dilir Khan. A Mughal force was invited to Bijapur

and royally welcomed, and then sent with Bijapuri auxiliaries against the Marathas. Shivaji himself arrived with 7 or 8 thousand more men to strengthen his first detachment. But the Bijapuri cause was weakened by an angry quarrel between the regent and Sharza Khan, whom the death of Bahlol had left as the best general of Adil Shah.

In the meantime, Dilir Khan made a successful diversion in favour of Bijapur by capturing and destroying Shivaji's stronghold of Bhupal-garh and defeating the relieving army of 16,000 Marathas with heavy slaughter. But Masaud's duplicity at last wore out his patience, and he wrote to the Bijapur regent, "Your words and acts are all deceitful. Your real aim is to remain united to Shiva at heart and profess lip-friendship for us. Otherwise, why have you failed to keep your promises?" (B.S. 477).

§ 11. *Civil war between Masaud and Sharza Khan.*

The Mughal general followed this message by crossing the Bhima at Dhulkhed (40 m.n. of Bijapur) with his artillery and marching to Halsangi, only 35 miles north of Bijapur. The Adil-Shahi Government was in no position to offer resistance. Indeed, the Government had been dissolved and there was utter anarchy in the country and capital in consequence of the feud between Masaud and Sharza Khan.

“All the works of Masaud came to a standstill through the opposition of Sharza. Great disorder prevailed. Every day Sharza Khan sat armed and ready for battle in his own quarters, while his soldiers kept their horses saddled day and night in the Bahlolpura and Mahdavi-pura wards.” The regent sent a force of his own with a body of Mughal horse and artillery to destroy Sharza Khan, and issued a proclamation inviting the ruffians of the city to plunder Sharza’s property with impunity. Even the guns on the fort walls were trained on his house. But the grim and silent determination of this hereditary warrior to sell his life dear cowed Masaud’s party and they shrank back without venturing to deliver an attack. (B.S. 479-480.)

Sharza Khan, knowing Masaud to be his deadly enemy, appealed to Diler Khan to do justice between them, and offered to enter the Mughal service. Diler seized this opportunity of getting control over the bravest living general of Bijapur. By a shameful breach of faith he arrested Sharza’s wife and children who had come to his camp at Dhulkhed under his solemn promise of protection and then sent them to Aurangabad to be held as hostages for the blind obedience of Sharza Khan.

The Mughal viceroy of the Deccan had now become the sole arbiter among the warring factions of Bijapur. Even Masaud sent his son and 5,000

troopers,—all the force left at Bijapur,—to his side at Dhulkhed. Finding all the Bijapuri nobles assembled in his camp, Dilir planned to arrest them by treachery and then swoop down upon the city of Bijapur and capture it without a blow as it was now utterly denuded of its troops and leaders. But the Afghan was a bungler in conspiracy; the secret leaked out, the Deccani chiefs became alert, Sharza Khan got ready for battle and sent him a challenge. Dilir was covered with shame; he abandoned his infamous plan and begged Sharza's pardon. He then paid large bribes to Sharza and Venkatadri (the chief adviser and agent of Masaud), and through them seduced many of the Bijapuri nobles. "About 10,000 troopers of Adil Shah, consisting of Deccani Muslims, Afghans and Marathas, entered the Mughal service and gathered round Dilir, while only three or four thousand starving men remained with Masaud in Bijapur, and even these hankered for Mughal pay." (B.S. 481—486.)

§ 12. *Masaud makes abject surrender to the
Mughals: Sultan's sister married to Prince
Azam.*

Such a kingdom was in no position to refuse any Mughal demand. Aurangzib wrote censuring Dilir Khan for not having exacted the terms of the treaty of Kulbarga. The most painful of these, to

the Bijapuris, was that the Sultan's sister Shahar Banu, surnamed Padishah Bibi, should be sent to the Mughal harem. This princess was truly the guardian deity of the dynasty and the beloved idol of the royal family and the citizens alike. Though a girl of sixteen years only, she was very wise and expert in counsel and management of affairs. All the eunuchs and maids of the palace used to obey her cheerfully and all the old servants of the State stood by her side. The wretched Masaud feared this one true soul in a corrupt self-seeking Court, and knew that his power could not be absolute while she was there. She also knew it and refused to desert her young brother Sikandar, go to Delhi, and marry the son of a bigoted Sunni who hated her for a heretic Shia. Masaud, however, influenced her through her dear nurse Taush Ma and convinced her that the safety of the State and the permanence of her brother's throne required that she should enter the Mughal family. This noble Iphigenia of an Eastern clime agreed to sacrifice herself. On 1st July 1679 she left the city of her birth,* amidst the tears and wailings of the Court and the populace. The citizens,—men, women and children,—lined the

* She reached the Emperor's Court at Udaipur on 4th March 1680, and after receiving training in the harem was married to Prince Azam on 26 July, 1681. (*M.A.* 190 and 210.)

streets, to have a last look at the living palladium of their city departing for ever. (B.S. 487).

§ 13. *Dilir Khan invades Bijapur; Shivaji assists Adil Shah, 1679.*

But the sacrifice of the royal maiden was of no avail to the doomed dynasty. Mughal greed was insatiable, and Mughal statecraft knew no generosity or fidelity to plighted word. Dilir Khan now demanded that Masaud should resign the regency and retire to his own fief, while the Bijapur government would be carried on by a creature of the Mughals (Hakim Shams-ud-din) supported by a Mughal garrison, and the Bijapuri army would be sent away to fight Shivaji. Masaud wisely rejected the proposal as "a stratagem of the Mughals for putting an end to the Adil-Shahi dynasty." (B.S. 490.) He imprisoned Venkatadri, his right-hand man, who had entered into collusion with Dilir Khan to effect this change of *wazirs*, (12 Aug. 1679.) At the same time, Masaud's son slipped away from the Mughal camp with his troops and returned to Bijapur.

The Mughal general, being thus openly defied, at once declared war against Bijapur. On 18th August he crossed the river and halted near Dhulkhed to assemble his full force. Masaud sent envoys to avert the blow, but his new overtures were

scornfully rejected. This was the last and greatest Mughal invasion of Bijapur before the final attack by Aurangzib in 1685, and we shall describe it in detail.

Dilir Khan had passed from diplomatic pressure into war in a fit of anger. But his own position was really weak, though he trusted to achieve much by his former seduction of most of the Bijapuri nobles. For one thing, he lacked the chief sinews of war; his treasure-chest was empty, while his soldiers' pay was in arrears. Secondly, the new viceroy of the Deccan, Prince Shah Alam, was his sworn enemy, and tried his best to foil his undertakings and cover him with discredit. The viceroy refused to supply the general with siege artillery and even the necessary money, saying that Dilir was merely wasting the resources of the empire and would be paid his expenses only if he succeeded in capturing Bijapur. (Ishwardas, 59 *a*; B.S. 492.)

Dilir Khan was thus brought to a halt at the very outset of the campaign, and wrote entreating the Prince for money. Masaud utilized the delay in strengthening the defences of Bijapur, provisioning the fort, and mustering troops from all the provinces. Above all, he sent an envoy to Shivaji appealing to him to come to the rescue of Adil Shah in his supreme need. (B.S. 493.)

Shivaji's response was prompt, effectual and

highly creditable to his wisdom and sense of honour. He told off 10,000 Maratha cavalry to aid Masaud, despatched 2,000 ox-loads of provisions to Bijapur, and proclaimed to his subjects that they should send grain and other necessities to that city for sale to save it from scarcity. Urging Masaud to confine himself to the defence of the capital with the 10,000 Marathas placed under his orders, Shivaji himself undertook to go with the rest of his army and punish Dilir Khan.

The Mughals took possession of Mangalvide (52 miles north of Bijapur) and the country between the Bhima and the former fort, in September 1679. They also raided Salotgi, Kasigaon, and Almala, and besieged Akluj, but without success. Dilir Khan, after receiving money and building some redoubts to guard his communications, advanced from Dhulkhed (15th Sept.) and coming to Halsangi halted there for three weeks, fortifying his position. On 6th October he reached Bahman-halli and next day Baratgi (6 m. n. e. of the capital), setting up a line of outposts all the way. Here he was met by the agents of Masaud with offers of peace. But the repeated palaver between the two parties only resulted in much loss of time.

§ 14. *Dilir Khan's failure and distractions.*

Dilir Khan, distracted by the opposition of Shah

Alam, the censure of the Emperor for his delay in effecting the conquest, and quarrels among his counsellors and allies, saw failure staring him in the face. "The Prince repeatedly wrote to the Emperor complaining against Dilir, while Dilir and his associates, Hakim Shams-ud-din and Malik Barkhurdar (the Mughal envoy to Adil Shah), sent despatches stating that Bijapur was utterly defenceless and could be easily captured." The Prince wrote in a contrary strain, saying, "Dilir Khan has spent a vast sum of our money, but accomplished nothing. The capture of Bijapur is impossible. Masaud may even deliver the city to Shivaji for defence against Dilir." The Emperor, getting reports of the ravage of his dominions by Shivaji as the ally of Bijapur, angrily censured Dilir and recalled Shams-ud-din and Barkhurdar to Court. A quarrel broke out between these two men and Dilir, each party accusing the other of having deceived it with false reports of the possibility of capturing Bijapur easily.

Masaud's real object in opening peace negotiations was to gain time, and make Dilir waste his resources in inactivity. But the regent's strongest weapon of defence was Shivaji. The Maratha king had arrived at Selgur (midway between Panhala and Bijapur) with a new division 10,000 strong, and had been joined by his advanced division, of the same strength, under Anand Rao, (31 Oct. 1679.) He

offered to wait upon Adil Shah, but as the Bijapur Court insisted on his escort being limited to 500 men, Shivaji's suspicion was excited by his Peshwa Moro Pant, and he refused to enter the fort. On 4th November he divided his army into two bodies; one, 8,500 strong, under his own command, marched north-east by way of Muslah and Almala, while the second, 10,000 men led by Anand Rao, entered Mughal territory by the Man (?) and Sangula route (north-westwards.) Dilir made light of this movement of the Marathas, thinking it to be their annual raid for blackmail, and refused to be diverted from his main objective, Bijapur, saying, "If I capture Bijapur, it will be the highest gain. Thereafter I can easily expel Shiva from our territory." (B.S. 497.)

But the Maratha chief, with an army swollen to 30,000 horse, spread a fan of freebooters and "raided the imperial dominions in all directions from the Bhima northwards to the Narmada, plundering, burning, and slaying. From the country south of Aurangabad he levied booty beyond imagination, and then turned to ravage Berar, Khandesh, and Baglana, totally ruining them and capturing 12,000 horses, and booty worth *lakhs* and *krores*. The Mughal soldiers who had jagirs in the Deccan were financially ruined and complained to the Emperor. Dilir Khan's enemies, too, seized the opportunity

to run him down, saying, 'This extremely foolish Afghan has caused the ruin of the entire empire through his greed for Bijapur and has wasted money beyond calculation.' "

To add to Dilir's misfortunes, Shambhuji fled from his camp at this time. He had built high hopes on his possession of the person of Shivaji's heir, expecting to paralyse the Maratha power by kindling a civil war and to capture the hill-forts easily with the aid of Shambhuji's retainers, expert in that kind of warfare. But Shambhuji escaped from Dilir's camp on 20th November and reached Panhala early next month. (B.S. 504 & 500.)

§ 15. *Dilir ravages country round Bijapur.*

Stung by the Emperor's reproaches and disillusioned by Masaud's abandonment of his insincere peace negotiations, Dilir Khan resumed the campaign. Despairing of taking Bijapur by siege or *coup de main*, and afraid of being attacked by Shivaji in the rear if he opened siege-trenches, the Mughal general deposited his heavy artillery and unnecessary baggage at Bahmanhalli, left the environs of the city on 14th November and marched westwards, intending to invade the Miraj-Panhala region and create a diversion there, which would quickly recall Shivaji home. The scheme seemed promising, as Shambhuji bragged of his ability to capture forts

quickly with his Maratha followers and thus make the progress of the imperialists easy, while the petty chiefs (*nayak-wars*) of Miraj had been already won over by a Mughal agent.

But his first work was to ravage the Bijapuri territory with insane cruelty. By way of Bahmanhalli, Maknapur, and Jalgeri, he reached Tikota (13 m. w. of Bijapur), a rich and populous village, where the wealthy men of the neighbourhood had taken refuge with their families. "The Mughals were utterly unexpected. When Ikhlas Khan with [Dilir's] vanguard arrived there and began to plunder it, the wives of the Hindus and Muslims with their children jumped into the wells near their houses and committed suicide. The village was utterly sacked. Nearly 3,000 men, both Hindus and Muslims, were taken prisoner [for being sold into slavery.].....Leaving Tikota on 18th November, by way of Honvad and Telsang, ravaging the country and carrying off the people as slaves, the imperialists reached Athni (43 m. w. of Bijapur)." Here, according to the English factory records, a breach took place between the Mughal general and his Maratha ally. Athni, "a considerable mart," was burnt down and Dilir proposed to sell the inhabitants who were all Hindus into slavery. Shambhuji objected to it, but was over-ruled, and began to grow sick of his associates. On 21st

November, Dilir left Athni for Ainapur, 12 miles westwards, but learnt on the way that Shambhuji had fled away to Bijapur the night before. Dilir immediately turned back towards Bijapur and sent his agent Khwajah Abdur Razzaq to that city to bribe the regent to arrest and deliver up the Maratha Prince (28th.) In the night of the 30th, Shambhuji, getting scent of the matter, slipped out of Bijapur, fell in with an escort sent by his father, and arrived at Panhala about the 4th of December.

From Ainapur Dilir Khan had faced round. Making a wide detour round the south side of Bijapur city, by way of Savalgi, Kakhandki, Ukli, and Mangali, he raided the fertile and flourishing valleys of the Don and the Krishna,—the former of which was known as the granary of Bijapur,—laid waste all the gardens, fields, and villages on the way, took all their inhabitants prisoner, and then reached Aliabad (6 miles n. e. of the city) on 4th December, and made it his base of operations. [B.S. 500.]

§16. *Dilir's siege of Bijapur, Dec. 1679.*

From this place he used to march out daily with his guns and men and exhaust his ammunition soldiers and horses by wildly firing at the impregnable fort-walls, one day from this suburb,

§ 17. *Dilir retires from Bijapur and invades Sagar, 1680.*

Dilir's position before Bijapur was no longer tenable. His army refused to obey him; sergeants-at-arms sent from the Court pressed him hard to retreat; an agent of the viceroy came to his camp to make peace with Adil Shah over his head. So, on 29th January, 1680, he broke up his camp at Begam Hauz and began his retreat, after having wasted 56 days before the fort of Bijapur.

Foiled of his purpose and dreading to face his master without being able to show better results for his huge expenditure of men and money, Dilir Khan gave vent to his worst passions, and roamed about like a mad dog, slaying and looting with fiendish cruelty, needlessly inflicting unspeakable misery on the innocent peasants, and turning into a barren wilderness the region from Bijapur city southwards to the Krishna and eastwards to the fork between the Krishna and the Bhima.

His one aim now was to wreak vengeance by ruining Bijapur territory. On 23rd January he detached Sharza Khan with artillery to ravage the Adoni district. Then he himself with the rest of his army left the environs of Bijapur (29th Jan.) and advanced southwards to the bank of the Krishna, plundering the villages on the way, slaying their defenders and dragging away the remnant of the

population into slavery. In one village the offered ransom of Rs. 10,000 was refused, and it was totally looted; the brave headman, who had resisted the entire Mughal army with only 15 musketeers, was slain and the whole population of 2,000 persons with 2,500 heads of cattle was carried off by the invaders. Two other villages bought safety by paying large sums,—in one case Rs. 45,000.

He next invaded the Berad country whose capital was Sagar, then ruled over by Pam Nayak, one of the most powerful and loyal Hindu feudatories of Bijapur. Practising his usual brigandage all the way, Dilir Khan reached Gogi (20th Feb., 1680), the terror-stricken peasants having deserted their villages on his route before his arrival. Here he pitched his camp to conduct the siege of Sagar, which lay 8 miles south. Pam Nayak offered a ransom of $1\frac{1}{2}$ *lakhs* of Rupees for his capital, but Dilir would accept nothing less than 15 *lakhs*. (B.S. 506-509.)

§ 18. *Dilir besieges Sagar; is repulsed.*

But the Berads were then reputed as the bravest soldiery of Southern India, sure shots and hardy hunters. These strong, athletic and patriotic savages were destined to meet Aurangzib's Grand Army itself on almost equal terms a few years later, and now they inflicted a crushing defeat on Dilir Khan.

On the first day (20th February) he began operations by entrenching at Shahpur, a *pettah* or walled village nestling under the fort of Sagar. His two wings were placed in two gardens under Abdul Ghafur and Ikhlas Khan; the centre under Dilir himself took post near the canal. All day an exchange of fire from matchlocks and camel-swivels was kept up. In the evening the Berad infantry charged and drove back Abdul Ghafur's wing with some loss. At sunset Dilir withdrew to Gogi.

Next morning (21st Feb.) he returned with his entire army and artillery, and breached the gate of Shahpur with his cannon. Standing near the gate on his elephant, he kept encouraging his troops, who entered the village and looted it completely. Ikhlas Khan occupied the village, while a reserve under Dilir's son stood near the field of crops. The Berad infantry, sheltered behind the parapet of the fort, hillocks and even boulders, plied their matchlocks with deadly effect on the Mughal troops densely crowded in the village. So heavy was his loss and so impossible any effective reply to the enemy's fire, that Dilir abandoned the village at noon and ordered a retreat to Gogi. But this movement was soon turned into a disastrous rout; the Berads, so long hidden in the passes, rocky nooks and jungles, now charged the retreating Mughals from all sides. Dilir's son escaped with his bare life. Vast numbers of the

Mughals, especially the soldiers dispersed for plunder, were slain or wounded. The imperial cavalry galloped away in a panic, assailed in their backs by the fleet-footed Berads and piteously crying for mercy. The Mughal casualties mounted up to 1,700 men on that day.

The battle was decisive. Dilir himself, indeed, wanted to halt there for three days and avenge his defeat by a fresh attack upon the Berads. But the spirit of his soldiers was utterly broken and they even declined his offer of Rs. 5,000 as bounty for facing the enemy again. "As he still refused to retreat, the imperial sergeants-at-arms deputed to bring him back to Aurangabad publicly rebuked and abused him, cut his tent-ropes, put guards round his kitchen, and drove him about with daily insults. The soldiers, knowing him to be a disgraced general, loosened their tongue in abuse of him. They resolved to abandon him if he persisted in staying there." (B.S. 509-512.)

§ 19. *Dilir Khan is disgraced and recalled.* ·

Dilir Khan was utterly disgraced and his credit with the Emperor entirely gone. At last on 22nd or 23rd February he set out on his return journey, moving northwards along the east side of Bijapur, burning the villages on the route, seizing the population for ransom, and dismantling the outposts and

redoubts he had built during his outward march. Crossing the Bhima near Dhulkhed, he re-entered the imperial territory, a general humbled, ruined and shorn of power and influence. (B.S. 512.)

His officiating viceroyalty of the Deccan had ended in October 1678, when Shah Alam had arrived at Aurangabad to fill that office for the fourth time. The Prince continued in the Deccan till May, 1680. His supine administration was rendered more than usually barren of success by his constant opposition to his general, Dilir, and his only achievement was that he influenced the moribund Government of Bijapur (March 1680) to read the *khutba* and stamp coins in Aurangzib's name. (M.A. 169, 192.)

The Emperor was displeased at the failure of both his viceroy and general and issued an order (1 March), recalling them and appointing Khan-i-Jahan as subahdar of the Deccan for the second time. This general, on his return from his viceroyalty there (Oct. 1677) had fallen under the Emperor's wrath and been deprived of his rank and title, and all his property had been confiscated to the State, on the ground of "tyranny in extorting tribute from the Deccan" and the suspicion of having falsely appropriated a portion of the money to himself. But on 23rd May 1678, he had been taken back into favour

and restored to his former rank and title. (*M.A.* 168, 189; *Dil.* 156, 163; *B.S.* 452.)

Khan-i-Jahan's second viceroyalty began at the end of May 1680 when he relieved Shah Alam at Aurangabad. (*M.A.* 193). That Prince and Dilir Khan hastened northwards to reinforce the Emperor in the war with the Rajputs which absorbed all the resources of the empire for the time being, so that Khan-i-Jahan could not look for any additional men or money till two years later, by which time Aurangzib himself had arrived in the Deccan.

CHAPTER XLIII

SHIVAJI, 1670-1680.

§ 1. *Rupture with the Mughals: its causes.*

In terms of the new agreement with the Mughals, Shambhuji was sent to the viceroy's Court at Aurangabad. He interviewed Prince Muazzam on 4th November 1667 and was next day permitted to return home. On 5th August next year a Maratha contingent was sent to Aurangabad under Pratap Rao and Niraji Raoji. [*Jedhe.*] Shambhuji was created a Commander of Five Thousand again and presented with an elephant and a jewelled sword. Jagirs were assigned to him in Berar. Half his contingent attended at Aurangabad, while the other half was sent to the new jagir to help in collecting the revenue. (*Dil.* 70.) For a year and a half the Maratha contingent lived in the jagir, "feeding themselves at the expense of the Mughal dominion," as Sabhasad frankly puts it.

During 1667, 1668 and 1669, Shivaji lived at peace with the Mughal Government. The English factory letters at the close of 1668 and in 1669 describe him as "very quiet" and as "Aurangzib's vassal, (bound) to do whatsoever is commanded by

the Prince." His relations with Bijapur also were pacific.

In fact, during these three years (1667-69), he was busy framing a set of very wise regulations, which laid the foundations of his Government broad and deep, and have remained an object of admiration to after ages. (Sabh. 27-33, 58.)

But the peace was essentially a hollow truce on both sides. Shivaji's sole aim in making it was to save himself from the possibility of a combined attack by three great Powers and to recover his strength during this respite from war. Aurangzib, ever suspicious of his sons, looked upon Muazzam's friendship with Shivaji as a possible menace to his throne, and he secretly planned to entrap Shivaji a second time, or at least to seize his son and general as hostages. (Sabh. 62.)

Sabhasad tells us that Aurangzib wrote to his son to arrest Pratap Rao and Niraji Pant, the Maratha agents at Aurangabad, and attach the horses of their troops, and that the Prince, who had learnt of the order beforehand from his Court agent, revealed it to Niraji and instigated the Marathas to escape, while the imperial order arrived a week afterwards, when it was too late to carry it out. (Sabh. 61-62.)

The rupture, inevitable in any case, was precipitated by financial causes. Retrenchment of expenditure had now become a pressing necessity to

Aurangzib, and he ordered the Mughal army in the Deccan to be greatly reduced. The disbanded soldiery took service with Shivaji, who had to find employment for them. Another ill-judged measure of imperial parsimony was to attach a part of Shivaji's new jagir in Berar in order to recover the *lakh* of Rupees advanced to him in 1666 for his journey to the Court. The news of it reached Shivaji when he had completed his military preparations.* He sent a secret message to Pratap Rao to slip away from Aurangabad with his men. The other half of the contingent fled from Berar at the same time, plundering the villages on the way! (*Dil* 71.)

§ 2. *War with the Mughals renewed, 1670.*

This breach with the Mughals occurred at the beginning of January 1670, or a fortnight earlier. On 11th Dec. 1669, the Emperor received a despatch from the Deccan reporting the desertion of four Maratha captains of Shivaji's clan (*biradari*) from the imperial service. Aurangzib soon set to strengthening his forces in the Deccan. On 26th January 1670 an order was sent to Dilir to leave Deogarh in the Gond country and hasten to

* There is no evidence for holding that Shivaji broke the peace with Aurangzib (Jan. 1670) as a protest against the latter's general order for temple destruction (9 April 1669), though the two events are placed immediately after one another in an English Factory letter (Foster, xiii. 256) and *Jedhe*.

Aurangabad. Daud Khan was ordered to arrange for the defence of his province of Khandesh and then go to Prince Muazzam's assistance. Many other officers were transferred from North India to the Deccan. (*Akhbarat*, year 12.)

Shivaji opened his offensive with great vigour and immediate success. His roving bands looted Mughal territory, and he attacked several of the forts which he had ceded to Aurangzib by the Treaty of Purandar. "The imperial officers in command of most of these forts fell after fighting heroically. Every day the Emperor got news of such loss of forts. But some of these places defied capture by reason of the strength of their fortifications and abundant supply of war material." (*Dil.* 64.)

His most conspicuous success was the capture of Kondana from Udai-bhan, its Rajput *qiladar*, (4th Feb. 1670). Assisted by some Koli guides who knew the place well, one dark night Tanaji Malusaré, with 300 picked Mavlé infantry men, scaled the less abrupt hill-side near the Kalian gate by means of rope-ladders and advanced into the fort, slaying the sentinels. The alarm was given; the Rajputs, stupefied with opium, took some time to arm and come out; but in the meantime the Marathas had made their footing secure. The garrison fought desperately, but the Mavles with their war cry of *Hara! Hara! Mahadev!* carried havoc

into their ranks. The two chiefs challenged each other and both fell down dead, after a single combat. The Marathas, disheartened by the fall of their leader, were rallied by his brother Suryaji Malusaré, opened the Kalian gate to their supporting columns, and took complete possession of the fort. The rest was butchery. Twelve hundred Rajputs were slain, and many others perished in trying to escape down the hill-side. The victors set fire to the thatched huts of the cavalry lines and the signal blaze informed Shivaji at Rajgarh, nine miles southwards, that the fort had been taken. He mourned the death of Tanaji as too high a price for the fort, and named it *Singh-garh* after the lion-heart that had won it.

On 8th March, Nilo Pant recovered Purandar, capturing its *qiladar* Razi-ud-din Khan. (M. A. 99.) A few days later the Marathas looted the village of Chandor, seizing an elephant, 12 horses and Rs. 40,000 belonging to the imperial treasury, then entered the town and plundered it, while the imperial *qiladar* was shut up in the fort. At one place, however, he met with repulse. The fort of Mahuli (in North Konkan, 50 miles n. e. of Bombay) was held for the Emperor by a gallant and able Rajput named Manohar Das Gaur, the nephew of Rajah Bithal Das of Shah Jahan's time. Shivaji invested it in February 1670 and attempted a surprise

at night. He sent up 500 of his men to the ramparts by means of rope-ladders. But Manohar Das, who "used to be on the alert day and night," fell on the party, slew most of the men and hurled the rest down the precipice. Shivaji then raised the siege, turned to Kalian-Bhivandi and recovered it after slaying its *thanahdar* Uzbek Khan and driving out the Mughal outpost there. (*Dil.* 65; O. C. 3415, Surat to Co., 30 March 1670.) Ludi Khan, the *faujdar* of Konkan, was wounded in a battle with the Maratha forces, defeated in a second encounter, and expelled from his district. The Mughal *faujdar* of Nander (?) fled away, deserting his post.

The only officer who made an attempt to uphold the imperial prestige in the Deccan was Daud Khan Qureshi, who had been second only to Dilir Khan during Jai Singh's Maratha campaign of 1665. Leaving the province of Khandesh in charge of his son, Daud Khan arrived at Ahmadnagar on 28th March 1670. Six days afterwards he set out with 7,000 cavalry to expel Shivaji's men who were roving near Parnir, Junnar, and Mahuli. They evacuated Parnir and Junnar and retired before him, while he occupied these two posts. Meantime, Shivaji had invested three Mughal forts in that region, and Daud Khan left Junnar to relieve them. But at the approach of his Van (under his gallant son Hamid and Ludi Khan) the Marathas raised the

siege and fled away, and the Mughal advanced division fell back on their main body.

Soon afterwards, these two officers went with a detachment and destroyed an old fort which the Marathas were repairing on the frontier, 20 miles from Mahuli. Towards the end of April, Daud Khan himself marched to Mahuli, and after throwing provisions into the fort, returned to Junnar. The Emperor in open Court highly praised Daud Khan for his spirit in invading the enemy's country, regardless of the smallness of his own force, and thereby creating a useful diversion of Shivaji's attention. (*Akhbarat*, year 13.)

On 16th June Mahuli too was lost to the Emperor. Manohar Das, conscious of the inadequacy of the garrison and provisions in the fort to repel another attack of the superior Maratha forces, resigned his post in despair of getting reinforcements. Shivaji seized the opportunity, and captured Mahuli, slaying its new commandant Alawardi Beg and his garrison of 200 men. (*Dil.* 65.) By the end of April 1670 he had looted 51 villages near Ahmadnagar, Junnar and Parendā.

§ 3. *Quarrel between Muazzam and Dilir.*

But the Mughal administration of the Deccan was in no condition to make a stand against Shivaji. For half of the year 1670 it was passing through a

civil war of its own. In obedience to the Emperor's anxious and repeated orders, Dilir Khan left the Gond country, where he had been profitably employed in squeezing the local chieftains, and set off for the Deccan. Starting from Nagpur on 19th March 1670, he expected to reach Aurangabad and wait on the Prince on 12th April. But at his near approach the old quarrel* between the viceroy and his general broke out afresh. We have seen how they had disagreed in 1667. So, now too, when Dilir, after pursuing some enemy raiders, reached Pathri near Aurangabad (about 8th April) and received an order from the Prince to wait on him, he feared to go to the interview lest he should be treacherously imprisoned or killed by the Prince. "Twice or thrice he took horse for the purpose of visiting the Prince, but returned from the way, and spent some days on the plea of illness."

At this act of insubordination, Muazzam and Jaswant wrote to the Emperor accusing Dilir Khan of rebellion. The Khan had already denounced the Prince to the Emperor, saying that he was in collusion

* Quarrel between Muazzam and Dilir Khan in 1670 : *Dil.* 73-75, 80-82 (main source); Ishwardas (important) 59a-62a; *Storia*, ii. 161-166; while *M.A.* 101, *Akhbarat*, year 13, and English records give dates and a few details. O. C. 3415, F. R. Surat Vol. 3, Vol. 105 (Bombay to Surat, 5 Sep.), &c *Mirat-i-Ahmadi*, 290, merely copies Ishwardas.

with Shivaji and had done nothing to defend the imperial dominions, and offering to crush the Maratha chief if the command of the army in the Deccan were left in his (Dilir's) hands for two years with an adequate supply of artillery and siege material.

Aurangzib was at this time filled with serious anxiety at Muazzam's wilful conduct, neglect of the imperial business, and failure to carry out orders. Popular voice in the Deccan could account for the open audacity and easy success of Shivaji's raids and the Prince's inactivity, only by ascribing to Muazzam a treasonable design to attempt his father's throne in alliance with the Marathas.

So, at the end of March 1670 the Emperor had sent his Chamberlain (*Khan-i-saman*), Iftikhar Khan, to Aurangabad to investigate how matters really stood,—whether Muazzam was really bent on treason and what his relations with Shivaji were. This officer was now instructed to inquire into the Prince's charges against Dilir Khan, and, if the Pathan general was found to be really guilty, to bring him by any means to the Prince's presence and there "do to him what the exigencies of the State required." (*Dil.* 74.) Iftikhar's brother, a high officer of the imperial Court, learning of this order, wrote secretly to Dilir to be vigilant when

visiting the Prince. This message only deepened the alarm and suspicion of Dilir Khan.

Iftikhar, after his arrival at Aurangabad, went out to visit Dilir, and listen to his explanations of his conduct. When he tried to dispel the alarm of the general and swore that no disgrace would be done to him in the Prince's presence, Dilir put him to shame and silence by showing him the letter of his brother at Court, reporting the Emperor's instructions. Iftikhar, therefore, could only advise Dilir to keep away from the Prince longer by pretending illness and then march away without seeking an interview or permission from the viceroy.

Iftikhar, no doubt moved by kindly intentions, thus became guilty of double-dealing. As an English gunner in Muazzam's service wrote, "He played the Jack on both sides, and told the Prince that Dilir Khan was his enemy, and went to Dilir Khan and told him that the Prince would seize on him if he came to Aurangabad." His unfortunate advice to Dilir only prolonged the tension.

Iftikhar then returned to the Prince's Court and falsely testified to Dilir's illness, adding many imaginary details to it. Dilir marched southwards to attack a Maratha force (under Pratap Rao) that was raiding Mungi-Pattan (in May).

Muazzam complained to the Emperor that Dilir Khan had openly defied his authority and that the

Khan's Afghan troops used to rob the people and sack the villages along their line of march; and the latter charge was borne out by the reports of the news-writers. Then Dilir, finding his position in the Deccan intolerable, wanted to go back to the imperial Court without waiting for permission; but the Prince ascribed this course to a wicked desire of creating disorder in Northern India. Imperial orders reached him to force Dilir Khan back to the path of obedience. The Prince set himself to raise an army for a war with Dilir and called in the Mughal detachments from the outlying posts to his banners.

Dilir Khan was pursuing a Maratha band across the Godavari river, when he heard of the arrival of a *farman* from the imperial Court, and divined its purport. His former suspicion and anxiety now deepened into alarm and perplexity. Though it was the height of the rainy season (August), the rivers swollen and the roads miry, he burnt his tents and stores and fled northwards with his army on horseback. Marching "in great fear of life, without distinguishing between night and day," he reached the ferry of Akbarpur on the Narmada and swam his horses across the raging stream, losing many men by drowning. Thence he proceeded to Ujjain, the capital of Malwa, to rest for a few days from the fatigues of this march.

As soon as he started from the south, Prince

Muazzam and Jaswant gave him chase with all the available Mughal troops, calling upon Shivaji to come to their aid ! The Deccan was filled with wild rumours of a civil war among the imperialists, which were "so confused that we cannot write them for credible,"—as the English factors of Bombay report.

In the pursuit of Dilir Khan, Prince Muazzam reached the pass of Changdev, six miles from the Tapti, intending to cross the river and enter Burhanpur, the capital of Khandesh, of which Daud Khan was *subahdar*. This governor refused to let him cross his frontier and prepared for armed resistance. The Prince distributed a month's pay to his soldiers to hearten them for the coming struggle. But this unexpected opposition brought him to a halt for some time, during which a letter came from the Emperor ordering Muazzam back to Aurangabad (September). The Prince's evil genius, Jaswant Singh, was separated from him and posted at Burhanpur until further orders.

For, in the meantime, Bahadur Khan, the governor of Gujrat, had taken Dilir Khan under his protection and written to the Emperor praising Dilir's loyalty and past services, explaining how the unreasonable antipathy of Jaswant and the misrepresentations of backbiters had turned the Prince's mind against the Khan, and recommending that

Dilir might be permitted to serve under him as *faujdar* of Kathiawad. The Emperor's suspicion and alarm had also been excited by Muazzam's approach to Hindustan; it looked so very like his own move in 1658! Indeed, his own position now was weaker than Shah Jahan's in that year, for, the war with Shivaji had drawn the greater part of the Mughal forces into the Deccan and Aurangzib had no army in Northern India large enough to confront his son's. It was the talk of the Prince's camp that "if he had marched forward, he would before this have been king of Hindustan." Muazzam promptly obeyed his father's order and returned to Aurangabad at the end of September, 1670.*

These internal troubles paralysed the Mughal arms, and Shivaji made the most of this golden opportunity. We have seen how he had recovered several of his forts early in the year. His cavalry

* We may here conclude this episode in the life of Muazzam. In April his mother, Nawab Bai, was sent from Delhi to visit him and bring him back to the right path by her influence. She returned from her mission in September. Iftikhar Khan, the imperial Chamberlain, had harshly reprimanded the Prince. But when the Emperor learnt that Muazzam's heart was loyal and that his motives had been misrepresented to him by his enemies, the imperial wrath fell upon Iftikhar Khan for having exceeded his instructions and been guilty of double-dealing at Aurangabad. His brother, Mustakhar Khan, too, was punished for communicating official secrets to Dilir Khan. Both brothers remained deprived of office for some months. (*M. A.*, 101; *Akhbarat*, 13-3.)

bands roamed over the country, plundering far and wide. In March the English factors at Surat wrote, "Shivaji marches now not [as] before as a thief, but in gross with an army of 30,000 men, conquering as he goes, and is not disturbed though the Prince lies near him."

§ 4. *Second Loot of Surat.*

In April Bahadur Khan visited Surat with 5,000 horse, to guard the town against an apprehended attack by Shivaji. In August there were false rumours that Muazzam, then supposed to be in rebellion against his father, was coming to Surat, "to take possession of this town and castle." The Mughuls demanded from the Court of Bijapur a contingent of 12,000 horse for service against Shivaji, and some ammunition from the English at Bombay for the fort of Koridru (?) People were expectant as to what the imperialists would do when the rains would cease and campaigning again become possible. But Shivaji, as usual, struck the first blow. On 3rd October he plundered Surat for the second time.

Throughout September he had been assembling a large body of cavalry at Kalian, evidently to invade Gujrat. The matter was so notorious that on 12th September the English factors at Surat had rightly concluded that "that town would be the first place

he would take," and "foreseeing the ensuing danger, [we] had taken a convenient time to empty all our warehouses at Surat of what goods were ready baled and sent them down to Swally;" even their entire Council with the President (Gerald Aungier) were at Swally at the beginning of October. And yet the Mughal governor was so criminally negligent as to keep only 300 men for the defence of the city. On 2nd October came successive reports of Shivaji's arrival with 15,000 horse and foot within 20 miles of Surat. All the Indian merchants of the city and even the officers of Government fled away in the course of that day and night. On the 3rd, Shivaji attacked the city which had recently been walled round by order of Aurangzib. After a slight resistance the defenders fled to the fort, and the Marathas possessed themselves of the whole town except only the English, Dutch and French factories, the large *New Serai* of the Persian and Turkish merchants, and the *Tartar Serai* midway between the English and French houses, which was occupied by Abdullah Khan, ex-king of Kashghar, just returned from a pilgrimage to Mecca. The French bought off the raiders by means of "valuable presents." The English factory, though it was an open house, was defended by Streynsham Master with 50 sailors, and the Marathas were received with such a hot fire from it that they lost several

men, and, leaving the English alone, assaulted the Kashghar king's *serai* from the advantageous position of some avenues next to the French factory, which they were suffered by the French to occupy. The Tartars made a stout resistance all the day, but finding the post untenable they fled with their king to the fort at night, giving up to plunder their house with its valuable property, including a gold *palki* and other costly presents from Aurangzib.

From the safe shelter of the *Tartar Serai* the Marathas prepared to open fire on the English factory the next day, but the resolute attitude of the handful of Englishmen cowed them, and after an angry parley they came to an understanding and agreed not to molest the English. The Dutch warehouse was untouched. "A messenger came from the invader to assure us that no harm would befall us if we remained quiet.....and gave him our assurances that we would not interfere for or against him." The Turks in the *New Serai* successfully defended themselves, inflicting some loss on the raiders.

The Marathas plundered the large houses of the city at leisure, taking immense quantities of treasure, cloth, and other valuable goods, and setting fire to several places, so that "nearly half the town" was burnt to the ground. They then approached the fortress of Surat, threatening to storm it; but it was

a mere demonstration, as they were not prepared to conduct a siege, and did not venture close to the walls. The third day (5th Oct.) they again appeared before the English factory, threatening to burn it down. Shivaji and his soldiers were greatly enraged at the loss of their men in the first assault on this house, and they clamoured for vengeance. But the wiser among his captains knew that a second attack would result in further loss of life, and at their request two English agents waited on Shivaji in his tent outside the town, with some presents of scarlet cloth, sword blades and knives. The Maratha king "received them in a very kind manner, telling them that the English and he were good friends, and putting his hand into their hands he told them that he would do the English no wrong."

§ 5. *The total loss suffered by Surat.*

On 5th October, about noon Shivaji suddenly retreated from the town, though no Mughal army was near or even reported to be coming. "But he had got plunder enough and thought it prudent to secure himself. When he marched away he sent a letter to the officers and chief merchants, saying that if they did not pay him twelve lakhs of Rupees as yearly tribute, he would return the next year and burn down the remaining part of the town. No

sooner Shivaji was gone than the poor people of Surat fell to plundering what was left, in so much that there was not a house, great or small, excepting those which stood on their guard, which were not ransacked." Even the English sailors under S. Master took to plundering.

The fact that all the three European factories at Surat were untouched while every other shop and house was ransacked by the raiders, naturally excited suspicion. Both at Surat and the imperial Court people "talked of the three Christian nations having made a league with Shivaji when he was here." The foreign merchants therefore received no reward from the ruler of the land *this* time.

An official inquiry ascertained that Shivaji had carried off 66 *lakhs* of Rupees' worth of booty from Surat,—*viz.*, cash, pearls, and other articles worth 53 *lakhs* from the city itself and 13 *lakhs* worth from Nawal Sahu and Hari Sahu and a village near Surat.

But the real loss of Surat was not to be estimated by the booty which the Marathas carried off. The trade of this, the richest port of India, was practically destroyed. For several years after Shivaji's withdrawal from it, the town used to throb with panic every now and then, whenever any Maratha force came within a few days' march of it, or even at false alarms of their coming. On every such occasion the merchants would quickly remove their

goods to ships, the citizens would flee to the villages, and the Europeans would hasten to Swally. Business was effectually scared away from Surat, and inland producers hesitated to send their goods to this the greatest emporium of Western India.

§ 6. *Shivaji defeats Daud Khan at Dindori,
17th October 1670.*

Prince Muazzam had just returned to Aurangabad after chasing Dilir Khan to the bank of the Tapti, when he heard of the plunder of Surat. He immediately summoned Daud Khan from Burhanpur and sent him off to attack the Maratha raiders. Meantime, Shivaji had left Surat, entered Baglana, and plundered the villages nestling at the foot of the fort of Mulhir. Daud Khan, after sending his baggage back to Aurangabad, marched westwards with light kit to Chandor, a town at which the road from Nasik to Baglana crosses the hill range. Spies brought him news that Shivaji had started from Mulhir, and intended to cross the Chandor range by the pass of Kanchana-Manchana, ten miles west of Chandor. Arriving at the hamlet of Chandor (below the fort) at about 9 P.M., Daud Khan waited to verify the news of the enemy's movements. At midnight his spies reported that Shivaji had already issued from the pass and was rapidly following the road to Nasik with half his forces, while the other

half of his army was holding the pass to pick up stragglers. Daud Khan at once resumed his march. But the moon set about three o'clock in the morning, and in the darkness the Mughal soldiers were somewhat scattered.

Ikhlas Khan Miana (son of Abdul Qadir Bahlol Khan, a former Pathan leader of Bijapur), commanded the Mughal vanguard. Ascending a hillock in the early morning, he beheld the enemy standing ready for battle in the plain below. While his men were putting on their armour, which was conveyed on camels, he himself with a handful of followers recklessly charged the enemy. The Maratha rearguard, which had faced about, was 10,000 strong and commanded by distinguished generals like Pratap Rao Gujar, the Master of the Horse, Vyankaji Datto and Makaji Anand Rao (a natural son of Shahji Bhonslé). Ikhlas Khan was very soon wounded and unhorsed. After a time Daud arrived on the scene and sent up Rai Makarand and some other officers to reinforce the Van, while he left his elephants, flags and drums at a ruined village on a height, surrounded by *nalas*, with orders to make his camp and rearguard halt there when they would come up.

For hours together an obstinate and bloody battle raged. Sangram Khan Ghorî and his kinsmen were wounded, and many were slain on the

Mughal side. The Marathas, "like the *Bargis* of the Deccan, fought hovering round the imperialists." But the Bundela infantry of the Mughal army with their abundant fire-arms kept the enemy back. Daud Khan himself entered the fight, repulsed the enemy with his artillery, and rescued the wounded Ikhlas Khan.

Meantime, in another part of the field, Mir Abdul Mabud, the *darogha* of the divisional artillery, who had been separated from the main army by a fold in the ground, was attacked. He was wounded with one of his sons and some followers, while another son and many soldiers were slain; and his flags and horses were carried off by the enemy. There was a lull in the fight at noon.

At that time Daud Khan had less than 2,000 men with him, while the Marathas outnumbered him fivefold. In the evening they charged him again, but were driven back, evidently by the artillery. At night the Mughals bivouacked under the autumn sky, their camp was entrenched, and they engaged in burying the dead and tending the wounded. The Marathas retreated to Konkan without further opposition. This battle was fought near Dindori on the 17th of October, 1670. About a week later the Peshwa captured the fort of Trimbak (Nasik district.)

This battle neutralized the Mughal power for more than a month afterwards. The day after the

fight, Daud Khan marched with the broken remnant of his army to Nasik, and halted there for one month, evidently to recoup his strength and also to watch the route from Konkan (by the Tal pass?). The wounded were sent to Aurangabad. Late in November, he removed to Ahmadnagar, but at the end of December he was recalled to the scene of his last battle by the revival of Maratha activity in the Chandor range.

§ 7. *Maratha raid into Berar and Baglana.*

We shall pass over Shivaji's activity at sea and in the western coast-strip during November and December 1670, after his return from Surat. Early in December a Maratha force under Pratap Rao made a raid into Khandesh, after capturing Ahivant and three other forts in Baglana on the way. Advancing by rapid marches, he plundered Bahadurpura, a village two miles from Burhanpur (the capital of Khandesh), but did not come closer to the city, because of the warning of Jaswant Singh, who had been posted there since September last. Passing into Berar, he fell, when least expected, upon the rich and flourishing city of Karinja, and looted it completely. Four thousand oxen and donkeys were loaded with the booty—consisting of fine cloth, silver and gold, to the value of a *krore* of Rupees, captured here. All the rich men of the

place were carried off for ransom. Only the most eminent one among them escaped in the disguise of a woman. The other towns also yielded vast sums of money. That rich province, with its accumulated wealth of more than half a century of peace and prosperity, afforded a virgin soil to the plunderers in this their first raid. A force, reported to be 20,000 strong, looted the neighbourhood of AUSA and collected *chauth*, but they rode away without attacking the fort. In the neighbourhood of Karinja and Nandurbar the Marathas took from the affrighted people written promises to pay them one-fourth of the revenue (*chauth*) in the future.

No resistance was made by the Mughals. Khan-i-Zaman, the governor of Berar, moved too slowly to intercept the raiders, and he stopped on reaching Deogarh. Daud Khan, the governor of Khandesh, was absent campaigning near Ahmadnagar, while his son Ahmad Khan, who officiated as his deputy at Burhanpur, was at open war with Maharajah Jaswant Singh, who was trying to raise money for the Prince's expenses and had demanded five *lakhs* from the treasury of Khandesh. Daud Khan's son replied that if the Maharajah could procure Aurangzib's order, he would pay him even 20 *lakhs*, or else not a pice, at which message Jaswant threatened to sack the town.

Daud Khan from his camp near Ankai Tankai

hastened towards Burhanpur. Arriving near the pass of Fardapur he heard that the Marathas returning from Berar had turned aside from Burhanpur and taken the road to Baglana. The situation at the capital of Khandesh was also saved by the arrival there on 1st January 1671 of a new supreme commander, Mahabat Khan, who took Jaswant away with himself when leaving the town.

§ 8. *Shiva takes Salhir.*

From Fardapur, Daud Khan swerved to the west and entered Baglana on the heels of the Marathas. While Pratap Rao had been sacking Karinja in Berar, another Maratha band under Moro Trimbak Pingle had been looting West Khandesh and Baglana, and now these two divisions had united in the neighbourhood of Salhir. They had plundered the village under the hill-fort of Mulhir and laid siege to Salhir. Daud Khan arrived near Mulhir at about 8 P.M., but could advance no further as most of his camp and army were lagging behind.

The Khan urged his troops to start next morning in order to raise the siege of Salhir. He himself set out before sunrise. But most of his men had not yet arrived, and the few that had come with him were scattered. They busied themselves in cooking food or taking rest in the camp, instead of resuming the march with their chief. Daud Khan

heard on the way that Salhir had already been captured by the Marathas, and so he returned in disappointment to Mulhir, and after a short halt there fell back on his new base near Kanchana-Manchana in the Chandor range.

Shivaji had invested Salhir with a force of 20,000 horse and foot, and one day finding the garrison off their guard he had scaled the wall by means of rope-ladders. The *qiladar* Fathullah Khan fell fighting, and his wife's brother then gave up the fort to the enemy. This happened about 5th January 1671. The success of the Marathas continued. They threatened other forts in the province, such as Mulhir, Chauragarh and Hūlgarh. Their roving bands cut off the grain supply of Neknam Khan, the faujdar of Baglana (whose headquarters were at Mulhir.) They also laid siege to Dhodap, the loftiest hill-fort in the Chandor range.

§ 9. *Campaigns of Mahabat and Daud Khan, 1671.*

The second sack of Surat and the Maratha ravages in Baglana roused Aurangzib to a sense of the gravity of the situation in the Deccan. As early as 28th November, 1670, he had appointed Mahabat Khan to the supreme command in the Deccan. The events of December only deepened the Emperor's anxiety. On 9th January 1671, he sent orders to Bahadur Khan to leave his province of Gujrat and

take the command of one of the imperial army corps in the Deccan, Dilir Khan being directed to accompany him. The Emperor also repeatedly talked of going to the Deccan and conducting the war against Shivaji in person, but the idea was ultimately dropped. Daud Khan was instructed to attack Shivaji wherever he was reported. Amar Singh Chandawat and many other Rajput officers with their clansmen were posted to the Deccan. Reinforcements, money and provisions were poured into Baglana in January, 1671.

Mahabat Khan left Burhanpur on 3rd January 1671 with Jaswant Singh, reached Aurangabad on the 10th, paid his respects to the viceroy, Prince Muazzam, and set out to join the army near Chandor. Daud Khan had been appointed his chief lieutenant and the commander of his vanguard; but he despised this office as below his rank, and begged the Emperor to recall him.

We shall now trace the history of the war in the Chandor range. Late in December 1670 Shivaji's men had laid siege to Dhodap, and Daud Khan had started on the 28th of that month to relieve the fort. But the *qiladar*, Muhammad Zaman, successfully repelled the attack unaided. Daud Khan had next advanced to the relief of Salhir, but had been too late to save it, as we have already seen. In January 1671, he held a

fortified base near the Kanchana pass from which he sallied forth in every direction in which the Marathas were heard of as roving. From the Emperor's letters it appears that Daud Khan was under a general order to right everything that might go wrong in Baglana! Once after a night-march he fell on a body of the enemy near Hatgarh and slew 700 of them.

Late in January 1671, Mahabat Khan joined Daud Khan near Chandor and the two laid siege to Ahivant, which Shivaji had recently taken. After a month had been wasted in a fruitless exchange of fire, the fort was entered from the trenches of Daud Khan and the garrison capitulated to him. Mahabat Khan became furiously angry at losing the credit of this success. He had been previously treating Daud Khan, a 5-hazari, with discourtesy, and now the relations between them became strained to the utmost. Leaving a garrison to hold Ahivant, Mahabat spent three months at Nasik and then went to Parnir (20 miles west of Ahmadnagar) to pass the rainy season (June to September) there, while Daud Khan was recalled to Court (about June).

§ 10. *Campaign of Bahadur and Dilir, 1671-72; defeat of Ikhlas Khan at Salhir.*

The Emperor was dissatisfied with Mahabat

Khan for the poor result of his campaign in the first quarter of 1671 and his long spell of inactivity afterwards, and suspected him of having formed a secret understanding with Shivaji. So, he sent Bahadur Khan and Dilir Khan to the Deccan next winter. They marched from Gujrat into Baglana, laid siege to Salhir (now in Maratha hands), and leaving Ikhlas Khan Miana, Rao Amar Singh Chandawat and some other officers to continue the siege, proceeded towards Ahmadnagar.

From the environs of Ahmadnagar, Bahadur Khan advanced to Supa (in the Puna district), while Dilir Khan with a flying column recovered Puna, massacring all the inhabitants above the age of 9 years, (end of December 1671). Early in January 1672, Shivaji was at Mahad, draining his forts of men to raise a vast army for expelling the invaders from the home of his childhood. But the pressure on Puna was immediately afterwards removed and Bahadur Khan was recalled from this region by a severe disaster to the Mughal arms in Baglana. There, the division left to besiege Salhir was attacked by a large force of Marathas under Pratap Rao, Anand Rao and the Peshwa. After an obstinate battle, Ikhlas Khan and Muhakam Singh (the son of Rao Amar Singh Chandawat) were wounded and captured, with 30 of their principal

officers,* while Rao Amar Singh and many other commanders as well as several thousand common soldiers were slain, and the entire siege-camp was taken by the enemy. Shortly afterwards Moro Pant captured Mulhir, and then putting fresh men, munitions and provisions in the two forts, he hurried back to Konkan unmolested. This took place at the end of January and the first week of February, 1672. Shivaji's prestige and confidence in his own power were immensely increased by these successes. Surat was now in constant terror of him, as he entirely dominated Baglana.

From the English records we learn that Shivaji now "forced the two generals (*viz.*, Bahadur and Dilir), who with their armies had entered into his country, to retreat with shame and loss." But the Persian accounts are silent about it. We can, however, be sure that the Satnami rising in March and the rebellion of the Khaibar Afghans in April next, made it impossible for the Emperor to attempt the recovery of his prestige in the Deccan, and Shivaji was therefore left the master of the situation throughout the year 1672.

Bahadur Khan returned from Baglana with failure, encamped for some time on the bank of the

* They were released after a time and returned to Ahmadnagar (Dil. 115). On the Maratha side also many soldiers were slain and only one chief of note, Surya Rao Kakre, a comrade of Shivaji's youth.

Bhima, and then went back to Ahmadnagar to canton for the rains. About May 1672 Mahabat left the Deccan for Hindustan, and a month later Muazzam did the same. Bahadur Khan was appointed commander-in-chief and acting viceroy of the Deccan, in the place of these two, becoming substantive *subahdar* in January 1673 and holding that office till August 1677.

§ 11. *Maratha occupation of the Koli country and demand of chauth from Surat, 1672.*

So greatly was the spirit of the Marathas roused by their victory over Ikhlas Khan, capture of Mulhir, and expulsion of Bahadur and Dilir from Puna, that their activity continued unabated even during the hot weather and the rainy season of this year. On 5th June, a large Maratha army under Moro Trimbak Pingle captured Jawhar from its Koli Rajah, Vikram Shah, and seized there treasure amounting to 17 *lakhs* of Rupees. The place is only 100 miles from Surat, and adjoins the Nasik district, from which it is separated by the Western Ghats. Advancing further north, he threatened the other Koli State of Ramnagar which is only sixty miles south of Surat. Heavy rain stopped the activity of the Marathas for a few days. But soon afterwards Moro Pant, with his army raised to 15,000 men, returned to the attack, and took Ramnagar in the first week of July.

The old capital, Ramnagar, now called Nagar, is 24 m. s. w. of Dharampur, the new capital, whose name is now borne by this petty State.

The annexation of Jawhar and Ramnagar gave the Marathas a short, safe and easy route from Kalian up Northern Konkan to Surat, and laid that port helplessly open to invasion from the south. The city became subject to chronic alarm, whenever any Marathas were heard of even 60 miles off, at Ramnagar.

From the neighbourhood of Ramnagar, Moro Trimbak Pinglé sent three successive letters on behalf of his master to the governor and leading traders of Surat demanding four *lakhs* of Rupees as blackmail, and threatening a visit to the city in the event of their refusal. The third of these epistles was very peremptory in tone; in it Shivaji wrote, "I demand for the third time, which I declare shall be the last, the *chauth* or quarter part of the king's revenue under your government. As your Emperor has forced me to keep an army for the defence of my people and country, that army must be paid by his subjects. If you do not send me the money speedily, then make ready a large house for me, for I shall go and sit down there and receive the revenue and custom duties, as there is none now to stop my passage."

At the first news of the arrival of the Maratha army in Ramnagar, the governor of Surat summoned all the leading Hindu and Muhammadan merchants and proposed that they should subscribe Rs. 45,000 for engaging 500 horse and 3,000 foot to guard the town for two months. Officers were immediately sent to make a list of all the Hindu houses in the town for assessing this contribution. But no soldiers were enlisted, and the governor pocketed whatever money was actually raised for the defence.

On the receipt of the third letter from Shivaji, the helpless citizens were seized with a panic. The rich went to the governor that very night and wanted permission to remove their families to Broach and other towns for safety. He kept them waiting till after midnight, gave them the permission, but retracted it next morning, when he held a second conference with the townsmen, asking them to raise the blackmail demanded,—the merchants paying one *lakḥ* and the *desais* raising two *lakhs* from the cultivators of the villages around. After a discussion lasting a day and a night, in which he reduced his demand to Rs. 60,000, the people finally refused to pay anything, as they knew too well that he would appropriate the money instead of buying the enemy off with it. Thereafter, every time that there was an alarm of the approach of Shivaji's troops, the

pursued till evening, many of the horses of traders and other kinds of booty were recovered from the enemy and restored to their owners. Next day the Mughals crossed the pass and encamped at Durgapur, four miles from the fort of Antur.

The following day, when they were marching to Aurangabad in rather straggling groups, before the time fixed for the starting of the general, one division of 10,000 imperialists was charged by 750 picked Maratha cavalry on the left of the pass of Bakapur, six miles off. After an obstinate battle, in which the Mughals were reinforced by their general, the Marathas retreated, leaving 400 of their number dead in the field. The credit of this victory belongs to the Bundelas under Subh-Karn, whose gallant son Dalpat Rao was wounded in the fight.

The division under Dilir Khan headed the other Maratha band off into Bijapur territory, capturing much booty and rejoining Bahadur Khan. That general cantoned his troops at Pathri, 76 miles s. e. of Aurangabad. This Maratha raid into Khandesh and Berar, unlike their first incursion in December 1670, was completely foiled, and the Mughal troops showed commendable mobility and enterprise. (Nov.-Dec., 1672.)*

* It is probably this campaign that is referred to in *M.A.* 128, among Court news of 1673, in the following terms: "Bahadur Khan had defeated Shiva after a forced march of 120 miles, made large

To guard against a repetition of these two Maratha penetrations into Khandesh from Balaghat, Bahadur Khan set up gates across the tops of the chief passes and posted troops with artillery at each of them. Bajaji Nayak Nimbalkar, "a great Deccani zamindar" and father of Shivaji's son-in-law Mahadji, with his family, was now won over by the Mughals.

§ 13. *Desultory fighting in Desh, 1673.*

Maratha activity, thus shut out of Khandesh and Berar, burst forth in another quarter (Jan. 1673.) They next raided the Puna district. Bahadur Khan left his baggage at Chamargunda, hastened to meet the invaders, and defeated them after a severe battle. Then he encamped at Pedgaon, on the north bank of the Bhima, eight miles due south of Chamargunda. This place became the residence of his army for many years afterwards, and here a fort and town grew up from their cantonment, which the Emperor permitted him to name Bahadur-garh. (*Dil.* 126).

Pedgaon occupies a position of great strategic importance. It stands on the plain just clear of the long mountain spur running eastwards from Puna. From this place the Mughal general could at will move westwards along the north of the range to

captures of spoils and sent them with Dalpat to the Emperor, who viewed them on 22 Oct."

protect the valleys of the Mula and the Bhima (the North Puna district), or along the south of it to guard the valleys of the Nira and the Baramati (the southern portion of the district). Northwards he could communicate with his great depot of arms and provisions at Ahmadnagar, without having to cross any river (except at the foot of that fort); and southwards he could easily invade Bijapur through the Sholapur district. In short, the cantonment at Pedgaon served as the Mughal advanced base for some years after this time, exactly as Aurangzib's camp at Brahmavari, 90 miles s. e. of it, did twenty-two years later, when the Mughal empire had extended further south.

It was most probably in this year (1673)* that Shivaji met with a sore disappointment. The fort of Shivner, a mile west of Junnar, was no doubt of strategic importance, as it guarded the Mughal frontier in the north of the Puna district and blocked the shortest route by which he could sally out of North Konkan to overrun Mughal Deccan. But what gave it the greatest value in Shivaji's eyes was that it was his birth-place. The Mughal governor of Shivner was Abdul Aziz Khan, a Brahman convert to Islam and one of the most faithful and valued servants of Aurangzib. Shivaji promised

* But J S asserts that he besieged Junnar (i.e., Shivner) in Sept. 1670

him "mountains of gold" for surrendering the fort into Maratha hands; and he, pretending consent, received the money, appointed a day for the delivery, and asked Shivaji to send 7,000 cavalry to take the fort over. But Abdul Aziz at the same time secretly informed Bahadur Khan of the plot; the Maratha army fell into an ambushade planned by the Mughals, and retired in disappointment with heavy loss. (Fryer, i. 339-340.)

§ 14. *Gains from Bijapur and raids into Kanara,*
1673.

In another direction, however, a wide door of conquest was now opened to the Marathas. Ali Adil Shah II. died on 24th Nov., 1672, and in a few months the government of Bijapur (with a boy of four on the throne) fell into disorder and weakness. This was Shivaji's opportunity. On 6th March 1673, he got possession of Panhala a second time, by bribery, and on 27th July he secured the hill-fort of Satara by the same means. In May his men under Pratap Rao Gujar burst into the inland parts of Bijapuri Kanara, looting Hubli and many other rich cities. But they received a great check from the Bijapuri general Bahlol Khan, who (in June 1673) took post near Kolhapur, repeatedly defeated the Maratha rovers, and expelled them from Kanara.

Maratha activity in this region was checked, but for a time only.

As Mr. Gerald Aungier, the English President of Bombay, wrote on 16th Sep. 1673, "Shivaji bears himself up manfully against all his enemiesand though it is probable that the Mughal's army may fall into his country this year and Bahlol Khan on the other side, yet neither of them can stay long for want of provisions, and his flying army will constantly keep them in alarm, nor is it either their design to destroy Shivaji totally, for the Umarahs maintain a politic war to their own profit at the king's charge, and never intend to prosecute it violently so as to end it."

Shivaji took full advantage of his enemies' moral and political weakness. Early in October 1673, he was reported to have made 20,000 sacks "ready to convey what plunder he can get, having also a considerable flying army ready for that action." On the 10th of October, this army, 25,000 strong, led by Shivaji in person, burst into west Bijapur territory, plundering many rich towns, and then passed into Kanara for more plunder. This work occupied him till the middle of December.

§ 15. *Defeat of Dilir Khan, Jan. 1674.*

Late in January 1674, a Mughal army tried to descend into Konkan and cause a diversion in that

quarter simultaneously with the Bijapuri invasion of the Panhala region. But Shivaji stopped the paths by breaking the roads and mountain passes and keeping a constant guard at various points where the route was most difficult; and the Mughals had to return baffled. It was probably this expedition to which the English merchants refer in a letter written at the end of January 1674, in the following words, "Dilir Khan hath lately received a rout by Shivaji and lost 1,000 of his Pathans, and Shivaji about five or six hundred men." If so, Dilir Khan had either made a rash frontal attack on one of the entrenched passes or fallen into an ambuscade of the Marathas. Throughout these four months, December 1673 to March 1674, Shivaji's wars with Adil Shah and the Siddis were carried on languidly with only occasional outbreaks of vigour. The soldiers on both sides were weary of fighting and their commanders not in earnest to end this paying business. The winter rains of this year were very heavy and bred pestilence. Shivaji in December and January was compelled to distribute his horses throughout his dominions in order to stable them in comfort.

Soon afterwards, the Mughal power in the Deccan was crippled. The rising of the Khaibar Afghans became so serious that Aurangzib had to leave Delhi (7th April) for Hasan Abdal, in order to direct the war from the rear, and next month Dilir

Khan was called to the North-western frontier. Bahadur Khan was left alone in the Deccan with a greatly weakened force. This lull in the war was utilized by Shivaji to crown himself with the greatest pomp and ceremony, on 6th June, 1674, at Raigarh.

§ 16. *Loot of Bahadur Khan's camp and extensive contest with the Mughals.*

The coronation exhausted Shivaji's treasury and he was in need of money to pay his troops. It was, therefore, necessary for him to be out on raid immediately afterwards.

His first movement was against Bahadur Khan. As early as May 1674 it was the talk of the Maratha Court that Dilir Khan, whom they feared most, having been recalled by the Emperor, the Mughal forces in the Deccan were commanded by Bahadur Khan alone, whom they despised and whose "quarters they intended to beat up after the rains." The blow was struck much sooner, at the very height of the monsoons. Towards the middle of July, a body of 2,000 Maratha light cavalry, made a false demonstration and lured Bahadur Khan some 50 miles away from his cantonments at Pedgaon, when Shivaji himself with another division, 7,000 strong, swooped down by another route on his defenceless camp, carried away a *krore* of Rupees in booty and 200 fine horses collected for presentation to the

Emperor, and burnt all his tents. In August, September and October Maratha bands spread northwards into the Koli country, giving repeated alarms to the port of Surat. But a body of three to four thousand Bhils of Ramnagar held the jungles and passes through that State and opposed the Marathas, who vainly offered them a bribe of one *lakh* of Rupees for a safe passage (middle of October 1674).

Shortly afterwards the baffled Maratha army, after provisioning their forts in that region, marched away to join Shivaji near Aurangabad, and Surat breathed freely again. They had found an easier prey in another quarter. Late in October, a large army commanded by Shivaji in person crossed the Ghats into the Deccan plateau, skirted Bahadur Khan's camp, which was "hotly alarmed," looted several towns near Aurangabad, and then burst into Baglana and Khandesh, where they continued for more than a month (Nov. to middle of Dec.). Among other places they pillaged and burnt "Dungom" (Dharangaon, 10 m. north of Erandol) and its English factory. Qutb-ud-din Khan Kheshgi bravely opposed the raiders, but his small force was routed with the loss of 3 to 4 hundred men, and he fled to Aurangabad for refuge.

It was probably on his return from this raid that Shivaji encamped near Junnar, but a short time

22 feet narrow-bore gun on the walls of Shivner killed a Rajah of his army* and caused the prompt retreat of the Marathas. (Fryer, i. 332.)

At the end of January 1675, a band of 3,000 Maratha cavalry under Dattaji roved in the Kolhapur district, levying blackmail from the towns. In the middle of February, a Mughal force crossed the Ghats, fell on the town of Kalian, burnt the houses (including those of many Khojas) and then quickly retired, after which the Marathas re-occupied the place.

§ 17. *Shivaji's false negotiations with
Bahadur Khan, 1675.*

Shivaji next opened delusive peace negotiations with Bahadur Khan, who eagerly swallowed the bait, as he was weary of the war and at his wits' end how to guard all parts of his viceroyalty against such a mobile and elusive enemy. For nearly three months (March—May) Shivaji kept the Mughals in play, by feeding false hopes of a peace. His real motives were to gain respite from Mughal attacks in order to provision his forts, to get money out of Adil Shah by the threat of an alliance with, the

*Fryer says that it happened "some four months before" 22 May, 1675.

Mughals for the invasion of Bijapur, and to secure his northern frontier during the siege of Phonda.

It was proposed that Shivaji should cede 17 of his forts to Aurangzib and send his son Shambhuji with a contingent to serve under the Mughal subahdar, while the Emperor would create Shambhuji a commander of 6 thousand horse, and grant Shivaji all the country on the right bank of the Bhima. The negotiations were deliberately spun out. Shivaji "demurred to sending his son to the Mughal general until he had better security for his safety." Bahadur Khan reported the terms to the Emperor, who sent in reply a *farman* accepting them and pardoning Shivaji's past misdeeds. Then the viceroy sent messengers to Shivaji to receive the *farman* and deliver the forts. But, by this time (July 1675), Phonda had been captured. Shivaji now threw off the mask and dismissed the Mughal envoys with taunts, saying, "What pressure have you succeeded in putting on me that I should seek peace with you? Go hence quickly, or you will be disgraced."

Bahadur Khan, ashamed at being thus outwitted and anxious to cover his foolish credulity and diplomatic defeat by some striking success, hurriedly made an agreement with the Bijapuri wazir Khawas Khan (October) for a joint war on Shivaji. (B.S. 445.) Aurangzib approved of the idea, and is said to have offered to give up one year's tribute from Bijapur if

that State heartily co-operated with his viceroy in a concerted attack on Shivaji from two sides. But the overthrow of Khawas Khan and the usurpation of the regency by Bahlol Khan (11th Nov.) spoiled this plan, and soon afterwards the Mughals were drawn into the whirlpool of faction-fights at the Adil-Shahi Court.

§ 18. *Shivaji's war with the Mughals renewed;
his union with Bijapur.*

In November, Bahadur Khan, on being sharply censured by Aurangzib, marched to Kalian, and pressed Shivaji hard in North Konkan. In January next (1676), a Maratha band spread near Aurangabad, but Bahadur with light equipment and no tent, made a rapid march from Pedgaon, defeated the rovers near Lasur, 28 miles from the capital, and drove them back towards Junnar.

At this time Shivaji was taken severely ill, and passed the next three months on the sick-bed at Satara. His perfect recovery was announced at the end of March. The Marathas looted Athni, 43 m. west of Bijapur, in April. The civil war that had broken out between the Deccani and Afghan parties at Bijapur, was Shivaji's opportunity. Early in May we hear of his having sent out "4,000 horse that ranges up and down, plunders and robs without any hindrance or danger."

In May, his prime minister Moro Trimbak drove the Rajah of Ramnagar out of his country and took Pindol* and Painecah within three days' march of Surat. But the monsoons being at hand, he left 4,000 men to garrison the district and retired with the rest of his army to Raigarh at the end of the month.

On 31st May Bahadur Khan opened a vigorous and long campaign against Bijapur, where the Afghan faction had seized the Government. The consequence was to drive the new regent Bahlol Khan into the arms of Shivaji, and in July we have the report of a peace between the two having been concluded through the mediation of the Golkonda minister Madanna. The terms of this treaty were that the Adil-Shahi Government would pay Shivaji 3 lakhs of Rupees down as a gift and one lakh of *hun* annually as subsidy for protection against the Mughals, and confirm him in the possession of the country bounded on the east by the Krishna, including the Kolhapur district. But the union was shortlived, as no policy could be durable in a State ravaged by civil war and subject to almost daily changes of authority. Shivaji hardly minded the rupture of this subsidiary alliance; his eyes were

* *Pindval*, 11 m. s. e. of Dharampur, in the Dharampur State, south of Surat. *Painecah* is probably either *Panva*, 5 m. w. of Pindval, or *Panaj*, 9 m. n. of Dharampur. (*Ind. At.*, 24 N. E.)

fixed elsewhere; and in January next (1677), he set out on the greatest expedition of his life, the invasion of the Karnatak.

§ 19. *Diplomatic preparations for the Karnatak expedition.*

The political situation in the neighbouring countries was eminently favourable to the design. The Mughal Emperor had, no doubt, returned to Delhi on 27th March, after a two years' absence in the Panjab, but his best troops were still engaged in controlling the revolted hillmen of the N. W. frontier. At Bijapur the Afghan leader Bahlol Khan, who had seized the guardianship of the boy-king Sikandar, alienated Bahadur Khan, the Mughal viceroy, who openly took the side of the Deccani party and on 31st May opened a campaign against Bijapur which was to continue for more than a year. The rotten and tottering Adil-Shahi Government was in no position to trouble Shivaji at such a time.

Over the Mughal viceroy of the Deccan, Shivaji's clever diplomacy won a complete triumph. Bahadur Khan had now grown weary of his more than two years' war with Shivaji, which had been chequered by as many defeats as successes and which seemed to promise no decisive end as far as he could look into the future. He had already coquetted with Shivaji for a friendly understanding

and offered to make peace between him and the Emperor and get a command of 6,000 horse for his son Shambhuji (June, 1675.) And now, on the eve of opening the Mughal campaign against Bijapur, (May, 1676), it was as much his interest to make friends with the Marathas on his right flank as it was Shivaji's to secure Mughal neutrality in his rear during his invasion of the Karnatak. When two parties find a mutual advantage in being at peace, the terms are quickly settled.

Shivaji sent his Chief Justice, Niraji Raoji, "a clever logician," to Bahadur Khan, with costly presents to induce him to promise neutrality during his projected absence in the Karnatak, the conquest of which was expected to take one year. Bahadur received a large bribe for himself in secret, and a certain sum in public as tribute for his master, and made a formal peace with the Marathas.

With Golkonda close friendship and co-operation were secured. Madanna Pandit, the all-powerful wazir of Abul Hasan Qutb Shah, had already made a subsidiary alliance with Shivaji, promising him an annual tribute of one *lakh* of *hun* for the defence of the realm. Prahlad Niraji, a shrewd diplomatist, had been posted at Haidarabad as Maratha envoy. Shivaji decided to get from Golkonda the expenses of the campaign and the assistance of an auxiliary force, by promising a share of the conquest. But he

was careful to avoid the least show of force, and trusted to his personal magnetism and power of persuasion in winning Qutb Shah's alliance.

§ 20. *Shivaji's alliance with Golconda and conquest of the Karnatak.*

Qutb Shah having agreed to receive him, Shivaji started from Raig'urh at the beginning of January 1677, and advanced due east by regular marches, at the head of 50,000 armed men, arriving at Haidarabad early in February. Abul Hasan, being very favourably impressed by Shivaji's personal charm, character and ability, and the strength and discipline of his army, bade his wazir grant him whatever he wanted. After some discussion a secret compact was made regarding the coming campaign. The Sultan was to pay Shivaji a subsidy of 3,000 *hun* a day, or four and a half *lakhs* of Rupees a month, and send an army of 5,000 men in charge of one of his generals (*sar-i-lashkar*), Mirza Muhammad Amin, to co-operate in the conquest of the Karnatak. A train of artillery with material was also supplied by Qutb Shah, and probably a large sum of money as advance payment of the promised subsidy. In return for this aid, Shivaji promised his ally such parts of his conquests in the Karnatak as had not belonged to his father Shahji. The defensive alliance against the Mughals

was strengthened anew with solemn oaths taken by Shivaji in the presence of Qutb Shah, while the latter promised to pay his annual tribute of one *lakh* of *hun* regularly and to keep a Maratha ambassador at his Court.

The territory annexed by Shivaji in the Karnatak in the course of 1677 and 1678 was estimated to yield 20 lakhs of *hun* a year and included a hundred forts, taken or built by him. In August 1678, the Madras factors write, "Shivaji by his deputies has a full and quiet possession of all these countries about those two strong castles of Jinji and Vellore, which are worth 22 lakhs of pardoes or 550 thousand pounds sterling per annum, at five shillings the pardoe, in which he has a considerable force of men and horse, 72 strong hills and 14 forts [in the plain],—being 60 leagues long and 40 broad." (*Diary and Consult.* 1678-79, pp. 105-106.) But gold, and not land, was his chief object. The whole of the Karnatak was "peeled to the bones" by his system of organized plunder and exaction.*

* "With a success as happy as Cæsar's in Spain, he came, saw and overcame, and reported so vast a treasure in gold, diamonds, emeralds, rubies and wrought coral that have strengthened his arms with very able sinews to prosecute his further victorious designs." (H. Gary to Co., dated Bombay, 16 Jan., 1678. O.C. 4314.) Pardoe = chakram, a gold coin worth Rs. 2·1.

§ 21. *Shivaji's return from the Karnatak.*

After his marvellous success in the invasion of the Karnatak, Shivaji left the Madras plains (early in November, 1677) and entered the Mysore plateau, conquering its eastern and central parts. From Sera in the heart of the Mysore kingdom (December, 1677), he marched to Kopal, 125 miles north, the fort of which he took, then turned 35 miles westwards to Gadag, and 24 miles south of the latter to Lakshmishwar in the Dharwar district, (capturing the forts at both these places). Bankapur, 20 miles s. w. of Lakshmishwar, was besieged unsuccessfully, about the middle of January, 1678. From this place Shivaji retraced his steps northwards, and arrived in the Belgaum district.

Soon afterwards he had a very great disappointment,—the greatest in his life, which we describe in the words of the Rajapur factors in their letter dated 3rd April. “Jamshid Khan, since the death of his master the Nawab [Bahlol Khan, on 23rd Dec., 1677], found himself incapable of longer holding out, agrees with Shivaji to deliver up [the fort of Bijapur and the person of Sikandar Adil Shah] for 600,000 pagodas. Siddi Masaud, having intelligence of this, feigns a sickness, at last death, and causes a *handol* publicly to be sent away with part of the army to Adoni, the residue (of his troops)

about 4,000 sent to Jamshid, pretending that since the leader was dead, if he would entertain them they would serve him. He presently accepts their service and receives them into the Fort, who within two days seized his person, caused the gates to be opened and received the Siddi in alive."

The news of the transfer of the Adil-Shahi capital to Siddi Masaud (21st February) reached Shivaji at Turgal, and he swerved aside to the west and returned to his own stronghold of Panhala in the first week of April, 1678.

§ 22. *Maratha activity in 1677—'78.*

During this period (January, 1677—March, 1678), the army left at home under Moro Trimbak in Desh and Annaji Datto in Konkan, naturally confined itself to the defence of the realm, without venturing on any distant expedition. In November 1677, however, Dattaji taking advantage of the crushing repulse of Dilir and Bahlol by the Golkonda troops (in September), roved the inland parts of Kanara and looted Hubli. Early in January, 1678, Moro Pant "plundered Trimbak, Nasik and other considerable places in the Mughal territory." Dilir Khan hastened there with the remnant of his broken army, (middle of February).

Late in April, 1678, Shivaji's troops plundered Mungi-Pattan, on the Godavari, 30 miles south of

Aurangabad. (*M.A.* 166.) It was probably next month that they made a second attempt to get possession of Shivner. They invested the village (of Junnar) at its foot, and at night tried to scale the fort. "Three hundred Marathas climbed the fort-walls at night by means of nooses and ropeladders. But Abdul Aziz Khan was an expert *qiladar*. Though he had sent away his sons and followers to reinforce the faujdar Yahiya Khan in the village, he personally with a few men slew all the infantry of Shivaji who had entered the fort. Next morning he hunted out the few who had concealed themselves in the hill [side] below the fort and among rocks and holes, and released them with presents, sending a message to Shivaji to the effect, 'So long as I am *qiladar*, you will never take this fort.' "

§ 23. *The Mughals, Bijapur, and Shivaji, 1678.*

A rupture now took place between Shivaji and Qutb Shah, and the diplomatic system so patiently built up by Madanna Pandit fell to the ground. Qutb Shah's indignation had been rising as he found himself made a mere cat's paw of Shivaji in the Karnatak adventure. He had borne all the expenses of the expedition and supplied artillery and an auxiliary force for it. But not one of the conquered forts was given to him, not one pice of his contribution was repaid out of the fabulous booty carried away by

Shivaji from that land of gold. And now the Maratha plot to capture Bijapur by treachery destroyed the last trace of patience in the Golkonda king, especially as he had been playing for some years past the flattering role of a chivalrous friend and protector of the boy Adil Shah. So, Abul Hasan arranged for a peace between the new Bijapuri regent, Siddi Masaud, and his rivals (especially Sharza Khan), helped him with money to pacify the unpaid mutinous soldiery, and bound him to wage war against Shivaji and "confine him to Konkan." The Adil-Shahi nobles prepared to open the campaign in October next, with about 25,000 cavalry and numerous infantry. But Dilir Khan spoiled the whole plan.

Dilir Khan had exacted heavy and humiliating concessions from Siddi Masaud when he made peace with him at Kulbarga (Nov. 1677). The odium of that treaty fell on the new regent, and all the disorders in the State and all the sufferings of the people were laid at his door. Distracted by domestic factions, daily insulted and threatened by the Afghan soldiers, and hopeless of preventing "Shiva's boundless violence and encroachments" with the resources of the ruined, divided and bankrupt State, Siddi Masaud wrote to Shivaji, "We are neighbours. We eat the same salt. You are as deeply concerned in [the welfare of] this State

as I am. The enemy [*i.e.*, Mughals] are day and night trying to ruin it. We two ought to unite and expel the foreigner."

At the news of these negotiations, Dilir Khan grew angry and set himself to conquer Bijapur. Only respect for treaties had kept him from doing so before; but Masaud's breach of faith absolved him from the obligation to spare Adil Shah. And he now received a most unexpected accession of strength. Shivaji's eldest son Shambhuji was the curse of his old age. This youth of twenty-one was violent, capricious, unsteady, thoughtless and notoriously depraved in his morals. For his outrage on a married Brahman woman he had been confined in Panhala fort, but escaped with his wife Yesu Bai and a few comrades to join Dilir Khan (13 Dec. 1678). Shivaji sent a force in pursuit, but was too late.

Dilir Khan was thrown into transports of joy at the desertion of Shivaji's heir to his side. "He felt as happy as if he had conquered the whole Deccan!" "He beat his drums in joy and sent a report to the Emperor. Shambhu was created a 7-hazari and a Rajah and presented with an elephant." (*Dil.* 159.) The Khan with his valuable new ally halted at Akluj (50 miles south of Buhadurgarh) for some time to prepare for the invasion of Bijapur.

In this danger Siddi Masaud immediately asked for help from Shivaji, as agreed upon. The Rajah sent six to seven thousand well-armed cavalry to guard Bijapur. Masaud could not fully trust his ally. Then Shivaji threw off the mask. He began to plunder and devastate Adil-Shahi territory again. Masaud now made peace with Dilir Khan.

A Mughal force was invited to Bijapur, royally welcomed, and sent off with a Bijapuri army under Venkatadri Murari (the confidant of the regent) and other officers, against the Marathas. They reached Tikota (13 miles w. of Bijapur), when spies brought the report that Shivaji himself had arrived at Selgur (55 miles w. of Bijapur and the same distance east of Panhala) with 7 to 8 thousand men and wanted to make a night-attack on the Mughal or the Bijapuri army, whichever would advance first. But a new quarrel between Masaud and Sharza Khan paralysed the power of Bijapur.

§ 24. *Dilir captures Bhupalgarh.*

Dilir Khan next marched to the fort of Bhupalgarh,* (20 miles n. w. of Jath and 45 miles s. w. of Pandharpur) situated among the Majra hills, which Shivaji had built as a storehouse of his property and

* Bhupalgarh described in *Bom. Gaz.* xix. 455-456 (ten miles s. e. of Khanapur in the Satara district; the modern name of the village is Banur).

the refuge of the families of his subjects in the neighbourhood during his wars with the Mughals. By great labour the imperialists dragged some guns to the top of a neighbouring height during the night and next morning began to batter the walls and towers. The assault was launched about 9 A.M. and the Mughals fought with vigour till noon, when they captured the fort, after heavy slaughter on both sides. Vast quantities of grain and other property and large numbers of people were captured by the victors. Seven hundred survivors of the garrison were deprived of one hand and then set free; the other captives were evidently sold into slavery.

Before this Shivaji had sent 16,000 horse to relieve the fort. They arrived too late, but hovered on the four sides of the Mughals. Suddenly they learnt that Iraj Khan and Bajaji Rao [Nimbalkar] were bringing provisions from Parenda to the besieging army, and then they immediately hastened to intercept the convoy. But Dilir Khan detached Ikhlas Khan with 1,500 cavalry to the aid of Iraj Khan. Twelve miles from Bhupalgarh he overtook the Marathas. Ikhlas Khan's small force was enveloped and he took refuge in a walled village and repelled the Maratha assault with his back to the wall, doing great havoc among the enemy with his artillery, and slaying nearly one thousand of

Shivaji's men. Then large reinforcements arrived from Dilir Khan, at whose approach the Marathas fled. Dilir then went back to Bhupalgarh, burnt everything that he could not carry off, dismantled its fortifications, and returned to Dhulkhed.

The fugitive Marathas, however, scored a success. Near Karkamb (30 miles south of Parenda), they fell in with Iraj Khan, looted all his grain and the property of his troops, and forced him to flee with a few men into a small fort hard by, where he was afterwards relieved by his kinsman, Mir Muhammad Khan, the *qiladar* of Parenda.

The fall of Bhupalgarh took place on 2nd April, 1679. Then followed a period of puzzling intrigue and counter-intrigue between the Mughal viceroy and the Bijapur nobility, and also quarrels between Masaud and Sharza Khan, Masaud and Dilir, and Masaud and his favourite Venkatadri. About the middle of this year Shivaji sent to Aurangzib a well-reasoned and spirited letter of protest against the *jaziya*, which was drafted by Nila Prabhu in eloquent Persian. (*Hist. of Aurangzib*, iii. Ch. 34 Appendix.)

§ 25. *Dilir invades Bijapur, Shivaji aids
Adil Shah.*

On 18th August, Dilir crossed the Bhima at Dhulkhed, 40 m. due north of Bijapur, and opened

a new campaign against Masaud. That helpless regent begged aid from Shivaji, sending to him an envoy named Hindu Rao charged with this piteous appeal: "The condition of this royalty is not hidden from you. There is no army, money, or ally for defending the fort and no provision at all. The enemy is strong and ever bent on war. You are a hereditary servant, elevated by this Court. And, therefore, you will feel for this house more than others can. We cannot defend the kingdom and its forts without your aid. Be true to your salt; turn towards us. Command what you consider proper, and it shall be done by us."

Shivaji undertook the defence of Bijapur, as we have seen in Ch. 42. Shambhuji, who had fled from Dilir, reached Panhala about the 4th of December.

§ 26. *Last campaign of Shivaji.*

We shall now trace the history of Shivaji's movements from 4th November, 1679, when he marched out of Selgur (55 m. w. of Bijapur.) The Maratha cavalry, 18,000 strong, rapidly moved northwards in two parallel divisions under Shivaji and Anand Rao, and poured like a flood through the districts of Mughal Deccan, plundering and burning all the places in their track and taking an immense booty in cash and kind. In the middle of

the month, Jalna, a populous trading town, 40 miles east of Aurangabad, was captured and plundered.

Here the godly saint, Sayyid Jan Muhammad, had his hermitage in a garden in the suburbs. As Shivaji in his raids always spared the holy men and holy places of all religions, most of the wealthy men of Jalna had taken refuge in this hermitage with their money and jewels. The raiders, finding very little booty in the town and learning of the concealment of the wealth in the saint's abode, entered it and robbed the refugees, wounding many of them. The holy man appealed to them to desist, but they only abused and threatened him for his pains. (K. K. ii. 271; *Dil.* 165; *T. S.* 39a.) Then the man of God, "who had marvellous efficacy of prayer," cursed Shivaji, and popular belief ascribed the Rajah's death five months afterwards to these curses.

Retribution visited the Maratha army very much sooner. Jalna, both town and suburb, was thoroughly plundered and devastated for four days. Then as the Marathas, loaded with booty consisting of "countless gold, silver, jewels, cloths, horses elephants and camels," were retreating, an enterprising Mughal officer, Ranmast Khan,* attacked

* Ranmast Khan, brother of Khizr Khan Fani, received a robe of honour from the Emperor on 18th September, 1682, and was created Bahadur Khan in August next (*M. A.* 222, 235.) *T. S.* speaks of him

their rear-guard. Shidhoji Nimbalkar with 5,000 men held him in check for three days, but was at last slain with many of his men. In the meantime, very large reinforcements were hastening up to the Mughals from Aurangabad, close at hand, under Kesari Singh and Sardar Khan. When these came to a halt six miles from the fighters, Kesari Singh sent a secret message to Shivaji as a brother Hindu, to run away at once before the Mughals could complete their circle and cut him off. Shivaji trusted to his chief spy, Bahirji, under whose skilful guidance the Maratha army escaped by an obscure path after three days and nights of anxious and ceaseless marching. But they had to sacrifice much of their booty, besides losing 4,000 horsemen killed and Hambir Rao wounded.

From this disastrous expedition, Shivaji returned to Patta-garh* (about 22nd November) and rested his exhausted and stricken army for some days, and then, at the beginning of December, went to Raigarh,

as thanahdar or qiladar of Jalna at this time. We afterwards meet him as thanahdar of Akluj (*Dil*.)

* Patta, 20 m. s. of Nasik and the same distance east of Thal Ghat (*Ind. Atlas*, Old sheet 38), 19.42 N. 73.54 E. The fort was renamed Vishram-garh or the Castle of Rest. Bombay writes (29 Nov.) that he "fled here with 500 horse, having lost the greatest part of his army near Bijapur, where Diler Khan wholly routed him, and took 2,000 horses besides prisoners." [*F. R. Surat* 108.] Here the place of battle and the Mughal general are incorrectly named.

where he seems to have passed the whole of that month.

As Dilir Khan was advancing westwards from Bijapur (middle of November) and seemed intent on laying siege to Panhala, and the presence of Shambhuji in the enemy's camp threatened a civil war in the Maratha State, Shivaji tried to convert Panhala into an impregnable refuge by removing to it the guns of many of his other forts, besides 40 pieces bought from the French.

Towards the close of November, a fresh Maratha army of 12,000 men assembled near Rajapur in South Konkan. They fired the town (26th) and set out (on the 28th) for Burhanpur, but abandoned the idea and turned off towards Malkapur, where Shivaji himself was reported to have arranged to meet them with 20,000 more cavalry. Evidently, he did not do so, and the Maratha division that raided Khandesh, in the last week of November, "burning and plundering Dharangaon, Chopra, and many other considerable towns adjacent," was led by one of his generals.

§ 27. *Death of Shivaji.*

The recent rebellion of Shambhuji had revealed the serious danger that threatened the newly founded Maratha kingdom. The character of his eldest son filled Shivaji with the gloomiest

anticipations of the future. A profligate, capricious and cruel youth, devoid of every spark of honour, patriotism or religious fervour, could not be left sole master of Maharashtra. And yet, the only alternative to Shambhuji was Rajaram, a boy of ten, whose accession would have meant a regency. But there was such mutual jealousy and discord among the old ministers of the State, especially between Moro Trimbak, the premier, and Annaji Datto, the viceroy of the West, that a council of regency would have broken up in civil war and the ruin of the State as surely as the Puna council of ministers did a century later. A division of the kingdom between the two princes was proposed, Shambhuji taking Maharashtra and Rajaram the Karnat country beyond the Tungabhadra; but the plan was not given effect to.

Shivaji tried hard to conciliate and reason with Shambhuji. He appealed to all the nobler instincts of the prince as well as to his self-interest, read him many a lecture, showed him his treasury, revenue returns, list of forts and muster-rolls of troops and horses, and urged him to be worthy of such a splendid heritage and to be true to all the high hopes which his own reign had raised in the Hindu world. But a born judge of character like Shivaji must have soon perceived that his sermons were falling on deaf

ears, and hence his last days were clouded by despair.

On 23rd March, 1680, the Rajah was seized with fever and blood dysentery. The illness continued for twelve days. Gradually all hopes of recovery faded away, and then, after giving solemn charges and wise counsels to his nobles and officers, and consoling the weeping assemblage with assurances of the spirit's immortality in spite of the perishableness of the body, the maker of the Maratha nation performed the last rites of his religion and then fell into a trance, which imperceptibly passed into death. It was the noon of Sunday, 4th April, 1680, the full moon of the month of Chaitra.

He had not yet completed the 53rd year of his age.

§ 28. *Extent of Shivaji's kingdom.*

At the time of his death Shivaji's kingdom included all the country (except the Portuguese possessions) stretching from Ramnagar (modern Dharampur State in the Surat Agency) in the north, to Karwar or the Gangavati river in the Bombay district of Kanara, in the south. The eastern boundary embraced Baglana in the north, then ran southwards along an irregular shifting line through the middle of the Nasik and Puna districts, and encircled the whole of the Satara and much of the

Kolhapur districts. A recent but permanent acquisition was the western Karnatak or the Kanarcse-speaking country extending from Belgaum to the bank of the Tungabhadra opposite the Bellary district of the Madras Presidency.

Shivaji's latest annexation was the country extending from the Tungabhadra opposite Kopal to Vellore and Jinji, *i.e.*, the northern, central and eastern parts of the present kingdom of Mysore and portions of the Madras districts of Bellary, Chittur and Arcot. His two years' possession of them before his death was too short to enable him to consolidate his gains here, and this province was really held by an army of occupation and remained unsettled in 1680; only the forts garrisoned by him and as much of the surrounding lands as they could command, acknowledged Maratha rule.

Besides these places there was one region where the contest for mastery was still undecided at the time of his death. This was the Western Kanara highlands, including the south Dharwar district and the principalities of Sunda and Bednur.

Outside these settled or half-settled parts of his kingdom, there was a wide and very fluctuating belt of land subject to his power but not owning his sovereignty. It consisted of the adjacent parts of the Mughal empire (*Mughlai* in Marathi), which formed the happy hunting-ground of his horsemen. In

these he levied blackmail (*khandani*, i.e., ransom, in Marathi), as regularly as his army could repeat its annual visit to them. The money paid was popularly called *chauth*, because it amounted to *one-fourth* of the standard assessment of the land-revenue of a place. The payment of the *chauth* merely saved a place from the unwelcome presence of the Maratha soldiers and civil underlings, but did not impose on Shivaji any corresponding obligation to guard the district from foreign invasion or internal disorder.

His revenue is put by his courtier Sabhasad (p. 102) at the round figure of one *krore* of *hun*, while the *chauth* when collected in full brought in another 80 *lakhs*.

§ 29. *The Maratha army and chauth.*

It was Shivaji's settled policy to use his army to draw supplies from foreign dominions every year. "The troops were to go into cantonments in the home territory during the rainy season (June—September). Grain, fodder and medicines were kept in stock for the horses, and the huts of the troopers were kept thatched with grass. On the day of *Dasahara* (early in October) the army should set out from the camp for the country selected by the Rajah. At the time of their departure a list

of Brahmans. (Bhushan's poems.) His Court and his son's became the rallying-point of the opposition to Aurangzib. The two rivals were both supermen, but contrasts in character.

Shivaji's private life was marked by a high standard of morality. He was a devoted son, a loving father and an attentive husband, though he did not rise above the ideas and usage of his age, which allowed a plurality of wives and the keeping of concubines even among the priestly caste, not to speak of warriors and kings. Intensely religious from his very boyhood, by instinct and training alike, he remained throughout life abstemious, free from vice, respectful to holy men, and passionately fond of hearing scripture readings and sacred stories and songs. But religion remained with him an ever fresh fountain of right conduct and generosity; it did not obsess his mind nor harden him into a bigot. The sincerity of his faith is proved by his impartial respect for the holy men of all sects (Muslim as much as Hindu) and toleration of all creeds. His chivalry to women and strict enforcement of morality in his camp was a wonder in that age and has extorted the admiration of hostile critics like Khafi Khan.

He had the born leader's personal magnetism and threw a spell over all who knew him, drawing the best elements of the country to his side and winning the most devoted service from his officers,

while his dazzling victories and ever ready smile made him the idol of his soldiery. His royal gift of judging character was one of the main causes of his success, as his selection of generals and governors, diplomatists and secretaries was never at fault, and his administration, both civil and military, was a great improvement on the past. How well he deserved to be king is proved by his equal treatment and justice to all men within his realm, his protection and endowment of all religions, his care for the peasantry, and his remarkable forethought in making all arrangements and planning distant campaigns.

His army organization was a model of efficiency; everything was provided beforehand and kept in its proper place under a proper care-taker; an excellent spy system supplied him in advance with the most minute information about the theatre of his intended campaign; divisions of his army were combined or dispersed at will over long distances without failure; the enemy's pursuit or obstruction was successfully met and yet the booty was rapidly and safely conveyed home without any loss. His inborn military genius is proved by his instinctively adopting that system of warfare which was most suited to the racial character of his soldiers, the nature of the country, the weapons of the age, and the internal condition of his enemies. His light

cavalry, stiffened with swift-footed infantry, was irresistible in the age of Aurangzib.

§ 31. *Shivaji's true achievement.*

Shivaji's real greatness lay in his character and practical ability, rather than in originality of conception or length of political vision. Unfailing insight into the character of others, efficiency of arrangements, and instinctive perception of what was practicable and most profitable under the circumstances (*tact des choses possibles*),—these were the causes of his success in life. To these must be added his personal morality and loftiness of aim, which drew to his side the best minds of his community, while his universal toleration and insistence on equal justice gave contentment to all classes subject to his rule. He strenuously maintained order and enforced moral laws throughout his own dominions, and the people were happier under him than elsewhere.

His splendid success fired the imagination of his contemporaries, and his name became a spell calling the Maratha race to a new life. His kingdom was lost within nine years of his death. But the imperishable achievement of his life was the welding of the Marathas into a nation, and his most precious legacy was the spirit that he breathed into his people.

Before his rise, the Maratha race was scattered

like atoms through many Deccani kingdoms. He welded them into a mighty nation. And he achieved this in the teeth of the opposition of four mighty Powers like the Mughal empire, Bijapur, Portuguese India, and the Abyssinians of Janjira. No other Hindu has shown such constructive genius in modern times.

Before he came, the Marathas were mere hirelings, mere servants of aliens. They served the State, but had no lot or part in its management; they shed their life-blood in the army, but were denied any share in the conduct of war or peace. They were always subordinates, never leaders.

Shivaji was the first to challenge Bijapur and Delhi and thus teach his countrymen that it was possible for them to be independent leaders in war. Then, he founded a State and taught his people that they were capable of administering a kingdom in all its departments. He has proved by his example that the Hindu race can build a nation, found a State, defeat enemies; they can conduct their own defence; they can protect and promote literature and art, commerce and industry; they can maintain navies and ocean-trading fleets of their own, and conduct naval battles on equal terms with foreigners. He taught the modern Hindus to rise to the full stature of their growth.

CHAPTER XLIV

REIGN OF SHAMBHUJI, 1680-1684.

§ 1. *Rajaram crowned as Shivaji's successor.*

The death of Shivaji left the newly created Maratha kingdom utterly divided and distracted. Not only was the strong hand that had so long held the State together suddenly withdrawn, but the future also looked very uncertain. Shivaji had not named his successor before his death; nor was the question easy to decide. True, his eldest son Shambhuji had come of age and gained experience in the conduct of campaigns and the civil administration in his father's lifetime. But his licentious character promised an unhappy reign to his subjects, while his recent desertion to the mortal enemy of his faith and fatherland discredited him in the eyes of all right-thinking men. Indeed, his wise father, in his last days, after vainly trying to reform Shambhuji, had been constrained to keep him under surveillance in the fort of Panhala. Though the prince was not confined in prison, his freedom of movement was restricted and his actions strictly watched. The governor of the fort, Vittal Trimbak Mahadkar, was to be the prince's keeper and to take his orders from Shivaji.

And yet the alternative to Shambhuji as king was his brother Rajaram, a boy of ten, whose succession meant a long regency. A regency can succeed only under an able and energetic queen-mother like Tara Bai or a united and patriotic council of ministers like the one led a century later by Nana Fadnis. But Rajaram's mother Soyra Bai lacked the capacity and spirit of her future daughter-in-law, and there was mortal jealousy between Shivaji's two highest ministers, Moro Trimbak Pinglé (the *Peshwa*) and Annaji Datto (the *Shurnis*), and also between the Brahman ministers as a class and the Maratha generals. Singleness of policy and concerted action were impossible among Rajaram's partisans; while the fact of Shambhuji being his own master and knowing his mind gave to all his measures unity of command and promptness of execution. This factor decided the contest for the throne between the two brothers.

Meantime, at the Maratha capital as soon as Shivaji's funeral was over, the question of filling the vacant throne called for immediate decision. Soyra Bai convinced most of the ministers and generals present there that the accession of Shambhuji would mean disaster to the State and their own loss and humiliation, while her son's character promised better times for his subjects. They agreed, and Rajaram was proclaimed as king

by the ministers present in Raigarh, on the lead of Annaji Datto.

This change in the natural order of succession was effected by a party only at the capital. The people in general and the troops outside had not been consulted, and they naturally murmured. The selfish love of personal gain and the consequent mutual jealousy among the ministers and army chiefs was the solvent of the Maratha monarchy. They had no public spirit, and neither Shivaji's towering personality nor Ramdas's spiritual teaching had schooled them to subordinate self-interest to the general good. The disruptive force may be kept in check for a time by a hero as king,—a Shivaji or Bajirao I; it is sure to break out again on his death.

The crowning of Rajaram gave the signal for a division among the Marathas. A faction for Shambhuji was soon formed, not because they felt themselves morally bound to guard the just rights of the eldest born, nor that they feared any harm to the nation from Rajaram's coming to power, but solely because they had gained little from the new king and hoped to gain much more by going over to his rival and earning his favour by their timely help. The army, gorged with plunder in Shivaji's time, seems to have received no bounty at this change of masters and was eager to transfer its venal sword to Shambhuji, whose helpless condition made

him reckless in his promises for gaining adherents. There was, also, greater hope of plunder and distinction under a general like Shambhuji who had led expeditions in the late reign than under a boy like Rajaram whose future military capacity was unknown. The council of regency as constituted at Raigarh meant Brahman rule, and the commander-in-chief (a Maratha by caste) was not prepared to take his orders from a priestly Mayor of the Palace, any more than another *Senapati* of the Maratha realm, Khande Rao Dhabaré, was fifty years later.

§ 2. *Shambhuji gains the throne.*

The result was that within a week of Shivaji's death, parties of soldiers began to flock daily to Shambhuji at Panhala, and he openly assumed royal powers, ignoring the Government at Raigarh.

Shambhuji's first measures displayed a degree of sagacity and timely energy which was quite unexpected from a man of his character. He first made himself master of Panhala and then consolidated his possession of the South Maratha country and South Konkan before venturing on a contest with the forces of his rival at the capital.

While his enemies at Raigarh were planning to imprison him, he guessed out the fact of Shivaji's death from the long cessation of news about him after the first reports of his illness; he then very

promptly anticipated his enemies by taking possession of the fort of Panhala and confining its former governor. The letters he sent out to all the important personages and officers, appealing to them to support his rights as the eldest born, had effect. Every day large parties of soldiers proceeded to Panhala to join him. He next took charge of the Government of the neighbouring district through his own men. He ordered all the corn in Karwar city to be seized (about 15th April) and sent to Panhala, intending to make himself secure there. A week later, he sent down Ravji Pandit to summon all the governors of the Kanara coast to Panhala for delivering their accounts and cash balances to him. The same thing was done in South Konkan; as the Rajapur factors wrote on 27th April: "Shambhuji has taken upon him to govern and title of king. He has sent for all persons that were in command as subahdars, havladars etc. Some he imprisoned, and some he discharged of their employs."**

Janardan N. Hanumanté, who held the Kolhapur district under Shivaji, and Hiraji Farzand, who had run away to Chiplun with Government treasure on hearing of that king's

* Karwar to Surat, 19 and 26 April, 1680 in *F.R.* Surat 108; Rajapur to Bombay, 27 Apr. in *O.M.* 116.

death, were arrested by Shambhuji's men. [Chitnis, ii. 3-4.]

In the meantime, Annaji Datto had placed Rajaram on the throne at Raigarh, on 21st April, and shortly afterwards started for Panhala with the Peshwa, ostensibly for the purpose of recovering that fort and imprisoning Shambhuji.* But the news of the successful *coups* of Shambhuji disheartened them and they hesitated to attack him. Soon, the hands of the selfish double-dealing ministers were forced by the army. At the end of May the commander-in-chief, Hambir Rao Mohitê, arrested Annaji and Moro Pant and took them as captives to Shambhuji at Panhala. There all the army chiefs assembled and recognized Shambhuji as their king.

Annaji was cast into prison, loaded with chains, and the rumour at first spread that he had been beheaded. The Peshwa made a timely recantation and thus gained Shambhuji's favour mingled with distrust. The new king felt that his position was now absolutely secure and he could deliver the decisive attack upon his rival. He had already collected a force of 5,000 men and won

* *Jedhe S.* But a Bombay letter to Surat, 3 May, says, "Shambhu is proclaimed and put in his father's place. Moro Pandit and Annaji Pandit etc. are gone to Panhala to receive his order." (Not likely.) *Jedhe S* is my authority for the conduct of the army.

their devotion by advancing them two months' pay. Then, after posting his own subahdars and other officers at different places, he set out for Raigarh, his army swelling to 20,000 men during the march.

The capital opened its gates to him (18th June.) Rajaram made no opposition, because he was incapable of making any. A Government may possess all the resources of the State, but if it has a woman or child at its head, with division of command and jealousy among its agents, it can make no stand against a strong man of action with decision of character and concentration of authority in one hand, however small his original force may be.

For the first few days Shambhuji seems to have acted with combined vigour and thoughtfulness. On 12th July the Bombay factors write, "Shambhuji is publicly declared Rajah, the country begins to be well settled. Report speaks of him as very diligent and careful." Rajaram, though deposed, was treated "with all kindness," because he had been a mere tool in the hands of more designing men. But Annaji Datto, as the head of Soyra Bai's party, was "loaded with chains and put to great trouble."*

* *Jedhe S*; Bombay to Surat 30 June and 12 July in *O. M.* 116. Chitnis's story that Shambhuji put Soyra Bai to death and persecuted the ministers in Raigarh immediately after his accession is

Shambhuji first sat on the throne on 20th July. The formal coronation was performed with full ceremony and splendour on 16th January 1681. A son and heir was born to him on 18th May 1682, who was destined to revive the Maratha kingship about 30 years later. It was Shivaji II., popularly known as Raja Shahu. [*Jedhe S.* supported by Portuguese records. Chitnis is wrong about date.]

§ 3. *War with the Mughals renewed.*

The new monarch gained a long respite from foreign attacks. All the military resources of the Mughal empire were then concentrated for the war with the Rajputs under the Emperor's own eyes. His invasion of Mewar had failed, and immediately after Shivaji's death he had recalled his eldest son Shah Alam from the Deccan to his side. Khan-i-Jahan* was sent to the South for the second time as viceroy, but with inadequate forces, (end of May 1680). In July, he laid siege to Ahivant, a fort in the Chandor range which Shivaji had recovered some months earlier; but the "defenders made good resistance," and the Mughals gained no success. They encamped in the neighbourhood for the rains.

proved raise by the English records; in fact he has antedated the events of August—October 1681 by one year.

* From this point onwards we shall designate Bahadur Khan by his new title of Khan-i-Jahan, and Muazzam as Shah Alam. Ranmast Khan, who was now created *Bahadur Khan*, will continue to bear his former title.

(*Dil.* 167; Chopra to Bomb. 7 Aug. in *F.R.* Surat 108).

The Marathas could make no immediate reprisal on account of the weather. But Shambhuji sent word of defiance to Khan-i-Jahan that he would "give him battle in the open field after the rains." At the end of October his armies were out, as usual, after *Dashahara*. One division, both horse and foot, was designed to march towards Surat and another towards Burhanpur, while a third kept Khan-i-Jahan in check by forming a screen before his encampment near Aurangabad. (Chopra to Surat, 20 Aug. and 10 Nov. *F.R.* Surat 108.) The news of the raids, however, quickly drew the Mughal general into Khandesh (about 25th Nov.) and the Marathas retreated from the province, but it was for a time only.

§ 4. *Sack of Burhanpur suburbs.*

At the end of January next (1681) the raiders were back again, evidently emboldened by the news of Prince Akbar's rebellion, which rumour had exaggerated into the downfall of Aurangzib. One band under Hambir Rao (said to be 20,000 horsemen) sacked Dharangaon,* and other towns in North

* The Dharangaon factors report the raid in a letter dated 11th February 1681. This town may have been sacked by the Maratha army retreating from Burhanpur (unlikely), or by a second band.

Khandesh, and, passing further east, fell on the suburbs of Burhanpur, (30th Jan.) after making a rapid dash for 70 miles from the place where they were last heard of. The garrison of the capital of Khandesh had been temporarily reduced to 250 men, and the deputy *subahdar* (then in charge of the town) was absolutely unprepared for defence and taken by surprise. Early in the morning, before their approach was even known, the Maratha cavalry rode into Bahadur-pura, a rich and populous suburb 3 miles from Burhanpur and the chief resort of the traders, and there gathered an immense quantity of booty from the numerous shops and houses in it. Seventeen other wards (*puras*) outside the city-walls were similarly plundered. The surprise was so complete that none could conceal or remove a penny worth of property, or save his wife and children. The smoke of the burning houses first informed the governor of the enemy's presence, but he was powerless to do anything and merely shut himself up in the fort. Lakhs of Rupees worth of booty was taken in every *pura*. Many respectable men slew their wives and daughters and then fell desperately fighting the brigands, rather than see their family honour outraged. Others sat down helplessly, leaving their Fate to work its will.

For three days the Marathas looted the suburbs to their hearts' content, without the least interruption

and dug up the floor of every house, thus discovering the buried treasure of many generations past. They even made ladders and tried to take the fort by escalade, but were repulsed. They carried off nothing but gold silver and gems, and left the streets littered with the metal and China ware clothing and spices which they had at first seized.

On hearing of the enemy's dash on Burhanpur, Khan-i-Jahan made a forced march northwards from Aurangabad across the Kanner and Fardapur hills, "covering in one day and night the space of four days' march." But his army suffered terrible privations from the roughness of the track, the abundance of jungles, and the many hills in the way. The camp-followers and transport cattle were footsore and lagged two stages behind the army, while the horsemen had to live on whatever they could get on the spot and to bivouac in the open. This unwise haste brought about its natural result. The whole force had to halt for two days to let the baggage come up. The enemy's horsemen, overloaded with booty, were sure to take the road to Salhir, their nearest stronghold for depositing plunder from Khandesh and Berar, as the forts of Konkan and the Sahyadri were too far off. Khan-i-Jahan ought, therefore, to have hastened to Erandol and Chopra to intercept their flight. But after losing two days below Fardapur, he followed exactly the

opposite direction and marched towards Idalabad and Burhanpur, long after the last-named town had been evacuated by the enemy. The Marathas immediately took the open road westwards and reached Salhir in four or five days with all their prisoners and booty. Popular voice in the Deccan charged the Mughal viceroy with having been bribed by Shambhu to follow this wrong strategy. The citizens of Burhanpur complained to the Emperor to this effect and the Muslims threatened to stop their Friday prayers unless they were assured of the safety of their life and honour in future.*

* K. K. ii. 272-275; *Dil.* 167-168.

K. K., ii. 272, gives 20 Muharram 1091 (11 Feb. 1680) as the date of the raid on Burhanpur, but Shivaji was then reigning and Shah Alam was viceroy at Aurangabad. As usual with Khafi Khan, the day and month are correct, but the year is wrong. I read 1092, which gives 30th January 1681, when the Deccan was depleted of Mughal troops and Shambhu was on the throne. It cannot be January 1682, because on 13th November 1681 the Emperor himself had reached Burhanpur, and though the "thieves" (*i.e.*, Marathas) looted the camp of Lutf-ullah Khan near Lalbagh at night ten days later, during a powder-magazine explosion (*M.A.* 215, K. K. ii. 278), the city was strongly guarded ever afterwards (usually by a son or grandson of Aurangzib) to ensure the communication of the Emperor in the Deccan with his northern capital. The plunder of 23rd Nov. 1681 may have been done by one of the Maratha guerilla bands that used to hover round the imperial camp, cut off small convoys and mockingly pray for the Emperor's long life as the giver of their daily bread! *Jedhe S.* places the sack of Burhanpur in the month of *Marga-shirsha* (12 Nov.—11 Dec. 1680), which is evidently a mistake for *Magh* (10 Jan.—8 Feb. 1681.)

§ 5. *Maratha raid on Aurangabad fails.*

After missing the Marathas, Khan-i-Jahan encamped near "the *dargah* of Shaikh Farid, 30 *kos* from Aurangabad," and subsequently moved on to Babulgaon, some 26 miles west of the city. Here he learnt that another Maratha band was coming up from the south, by way of Ahmadnagar and Mungi-Pattan to loot Aurangabad. He took horse immediately and set off with his cavalry at 3 o'clock in the morning, arriving near the city at noon, just in time to save it. The enemy were located at the Baipura suburb and the Satara hill, 6 miles southwards. The city was in the wildest terror. Rajah Anup Singh Rathor, who commanded the garrison, had too small a force to take the offensive and contented himself with standing ready near his own *pura*. All houses were closed, the men sitting armed and trembling and the women weeping within doors. The streets and bazars were entirely deserted; only three footmen guarded the Prefect's office (*kotwali*.) As soon as the Khan arrived, the enemy fled without fighting. (*Dil*, 169.)

This relief of Aurangabad took place probably late in February 1681. At the approach of the rainy season, (April) the Khan took up his residence in the old quarter (*Kuhna*) of the city, built by the Mughal Government, as distinct from the suburbs (*puras*) built by the nobles, and began to raise a

protective wall* round the city, as ordered by the Emperor. (*Dil.* 170.) But he was soon disturbed by the arrival of a new enemy, the rebel prince Muhammad Akbar.

We get details of other Maratha activities in the Persian news-letters (*Akhbarat.*) In June 1681, Shambhuji's troops came plundering towards Indur, but they were driven back by Khan-i-Jahan's son Muzaffar and Ranmast, near the pass of Dharampur, and fled abandoning 8,000 heads of cattle and captives and many drums flags and weapons. Next month Netaji entered Baglana with 8,000 men. As usual, after the *Dashahara* day in October, the Maratha light horse set out to rove in different directions. There were rumours of their making a dash across the Ghats towards Ahmadabad, but Gujrat escaped this time. One division, 3,000 strong, came to raid Punagarh(?), but was routed by Ranmast Khan, who recovered much booty from the raiders. Another band, reported to be 25,000, moved towards Ahmadnagar, but Khan-i-Jahan intercepted it at a place some 22 miles north of Bijapur, and defeated it with heavy slaughter. An attack on Ahmadnagar was, however, actually attempted, as two Maratha princesses (a wife and a sister of Shambhuji) captured by Dilir Khan were lodged in that fort

* The wall was completed in four months, about April 1683, by Abdul Qadir, the son of Amanat Khan. (*M.A.* 224.)

and the Marathas wished to rescue them. Some Maratha soldiers who had secretly entered the fort in disguise were detected and killed by the qiladar (Muqim Khan) and the rest driven away after a fight, (end of October.)

Shortly afterwards a band of 6,000 men threatened Sholapur, but the imperial qiladar, Manohardas Gaur, made a sortie and pushed them back; then the siege was raised on the arrival of Khan-i-Jahan's vanguard. Yet another Maratha force was out near Mulhir and Salhir, but Shihab-ud-din Khan, leaving his baggage at Galna, made a forced march, killed 900 of the enemy and cleared the Salhir region. (There is an unfortunate gap in the news-letters for the year 1682.)

§ 6. *Prince Akbar seeks refuge with Shambhuji,*
June 1681.

Prince Muhammad Akbar, the fourth son of Aurangzib, had crowned himself Emperor (1st Jan. 1681), issued a manifesto deposing his father, and advanced on Ajmir to defeat and capture him; but the pretender's army had melted away and he had been driven to take to flight from the neighbourhood of Ajmir (16th January),—as we have seen in Chapter 37. After being long pursued by his father's forces through Rajputana, Akbar at last crossed the Narmada near Akbarpur (9th May) under

the guidance of the faithful Durgadas Rathor and made his way to Maharashtra. Two days later he wrote to Shambhuji begging asylum with him, but being unable to wait for a reply he pushed on through Khandesh and Baglana, writing again to Shambhuji. About the third week of May, Khan-i-Jahan heard of the Prince's coming and set out at night from Aurangabad northwards, evidently in the direction of Burhanpur. On the way he learnt from a letter of the *faujdar* of Baglana that Akbar had taken the route to Nasik. The Khan immediately swerved to the west and marched to Nasik only to find out that Akbar had passed that town one day before him. The Prince entered Konkan by a pass near Trimbak. On crossing the Mughal frontier he was welcomed by several high officers of Shambhuji and conducted with honour to Pali (1st June.)*

The Prince was accompanied by 400 cavalry, a small body of infantry (mostly Rajputs with a few Muhammadans) and 50 camels for transport. The residence chosen for him was "a large house covered

* *Dil.* 170-171. *Pali fort* (*l. Atlas*, 25 S. E.) is 6 m. due east of Nagothna, and overlooks the same Amba river. Raigarh is some 25 m. s.s.e. of Pali. Akbar was lodged at the village of *Padishahpur*, 6 m. east of Pali, and two miles south of *Dhondsa*. *Chit.* ii. 11, says that the name of the last village was changed to *Padishahpur* in honour of the new Emperor, but the two villages are quite distinct. The *Belgaum Gazetteer* (ed. 1884) makes the absurd statement that *Pachapur*, north of Belgaum, was Akbar's residence.

with straw, at the foot of Pali-garh'' ; the walls were lined with white calico and the floor covered with ordinary carpets.

Three hundred Maratha foot soldiers were told off to form his body-guard, and Shambhuji's *subahdars* (collectors) near about waited on him to pay their respects. A fortnight after his arrival, Hiraji Farzand (a natural son of Shahji) brought him a letter from Shambhuji with presents,—a thousand *hun*, a large string of great pearls with a diamond pendant, a large aigrette set with diamonds, and many pieces of costly cloth. Netaji Palkar was left in attendance upon him as Shambhuji's representative. "All the respect imaginable is paid to him and provisions for himself horse and men are daily brought in by the several *subahdars*, (it) being Shambhuji's order. He is in want of money but hath with him jewels of great value." (Bomb. to Surat, 10th and 21st June, 1681, quoted in Orme's *Frag.* 268—270; *M.A.* 211; *Akh.*]

Shambhuji waited for an auspicious day to be chosen by his astrologers for paying his first visit to the new Emperor. But there was considerable delay in his coming. He at first suspected his guest's friendly intentions, and was later too engrossed in watching a conspiracy in his own Court to leave his capital.

§ 7. *Internal condition of the Maratha Court.*

After gaining Raigarh (18 June 1680), Shambhuji imprisoned his chief enemies, including their leaders, Annaji Datto and Nilkanth Moreshwar Pinglé. The latter's father Moreshwar Trimbak Pinglé had retained the Peshwa-ship by a timely desertion of Rajaram's cause, but he neither deserved nor enjoyed his new master's confidence ever after. Early in October Moreshwar died, and Shambhuji so far forgave the past as to set his son Nilkanth free and bestow the vacant prime minister-ship on him. A still greater act of royal clemency was the release, at the same time, of the arch-traitor Annaji Datto from prison and his appointment to the post of Accountant-General (*Majmuadar*), which was second only to the Peshwa-ship in influence.

But the unquiet ambition of Annaji Datto abused his master's unexpected generosity. In August 1681, he formed a conspiracy with Soyra Bai, Hiraji Farzand, and some other leading men to murder Shambhuji and give the throne to Rajaram, under the protection of Prince Akbar. They intended to kill Shambhuji by putting poison in his dish of fish. But a boy who was in the secret "prevented his eating of it; he gave some of it to one of his servants and a dog; both died in a few hours." Another story is to the effect that the

conspirators invited Akbar to join them, but he declined and promptly informed Shambhuji of the plot.

The traitors were immediately seized, flung into prison, and put to torture. Annaji Datto, his brother Somaji, Hiraji Farzand, Balaji Avji Prabhu, and Mahadev Anant, with three others were killed by being flung in chains under the feet of elephants. Twenty more culprits were sentenced to death later. Rajaram's mother, Soyra Bai, who had been the prime mover of every conspiracy against Shambhuji, was charged with having poisoned her husband (a year and a half earlier), and she was put by Shambhuji to a painful death, through poison (according to the Bombay factory report) or by starvation (according to Chitnis.) All this happened in October 1681. Her father's family, the Shirkés, fell under Shambhuji's persecution; their property was seized, many of their members were killed, and the rest fled to Mughal territory, entered the imperial army, and tried to carry on their blood-feud with him to the end of his days.

Throughout this dismal affair, Akbar's conduct had been spotlessly upright, frank and loyal to his host, and Shambhuji appreciated it.

* The story of this conspiracy and its punishment is based entirely upon the English Factory Records, which disprove Chitnis. Bombay to Surat, 30 Aug., 8 Sep. and 12 and 27 Oct. 1681 in

§ 8. *Kavi-kaḷash, the favourite of Shambhuji.*

Shambhuji's character and conduct made it impossible for any of the old servants of the State to regard him with that love and devotion which Shivaji had inspired among all ranks of the people. His cruel vengeance on all who had sided with Rajaram separated many of the leading Maratha families from him by a river of blood, while his rudeness, caprice and violence of spirit made even the highest of his officers feel insecure and unhappy in his service. On his part, he could never forget that practically all the notable ministers and generals had at first given their assent to removing him from the line of succession. He, therefore, felt that he stood absolutely alone and friendless in his native country; and his whole reign was in fact disturbed by frequent conspiracies and desertions among his officers and rebellions among his vassals.

In this forlorn situation he seemed to have

O.M. 116. "The conspirators against S. was (sic) Annaji Pandit, Rajaram's mother and Hiraji Farzand, who would have brought Akbar in, but he would not but immediately gave S. notice of it by a messenger, which hath so much gained on the Rajah that he hath promised the Sultan 30,000 horse that are making ready to accompany him to Burhanpur." [8 Sep.] "S. is now at Raizi. For plotting against his life, he hath put to death Annaji Pandit, Hiraji Farzand, Bowji (?) P, and five more (bound and put under elephants' feet.) Twenty more are to suffer death. [12 Oct.] "Rajaram's mother is dead, by report poisoned by Shambhuji Rajah's contrivance." [27 Oct.]

gained a truly devoted servant. A Kanauji Brahman, who had been the hereditary priest of the Bhonslé family at Allahabad, arrived at Raigarh shortly before Shambhuji's grand coronation. He was deeply versed in Sanskrit theology and popularly believed to be a master of necromancy. He soon made his way into the Rajah's heart, and gradually monopolized his trust and the supreme control of the administration, while Shambhuji rapidly became a *faineant* king, blindly following the minister's advice, and devoting all his time to wine and women, with fitful outbursts of martial vigour. Already in November 1682 he was known in Bombay as "the chiefest minister of State" along with Prahlad Niraji.

This new Sejanus was ennobled with the title of *Kavi-kalash* or Pinnacle of Poets. But he was a foreign Brahman and his administration ended in Shambhu's ruin and the fall of the Maratha kingdom. Hence, the local Brahmans and the Maratha patriots alike have cherished the bitterest hatred to his memory. They have vented their spite by perverting his name from *kalasha* (pinnacle) to *kalusha* (sin)! The vulgar in Maharashtra easily swallowed the tale (Chit. ii. 7) that this minister, by performing many hideous *tantrik* rites and occult practices on the pretence of increasing Shambhuji's health wealth and dominion through supernatural agency, really destroyed the young Rajah's

intelligence and will-power and made him the helpless slave of his magic.* The foreign favourite's wife is supposed to have seconded his wicked efforts by her marvellous cunning.

§ 9. *Akbar's relations with Shambhuji.*

In his obscure village refuge Prince Akbar kept up the pageant of an Emperor as far as his reduced means allowed. He held public Court (*darbar-i-am*) without subjects, maintained a Chancellor of the Exchequer (*diwan*) without any revenue, and

¹ Kavi-kalash could not have been "the minister of Shambhuji's pleasure" as Orme (following Manucci) calls him, because Shambhu had already learnt to outrage women in his father's lifetime, and wine-drinking and meat-eating are customary among the Maratha caste to which the Rajah belonged. Nor can the failure of Shambhuji's reign, compared with the glorious success of Shivaji's, be attributed to this minister, because Moro Pant himself had been unable to induce his young master to achieve anything great. It is not contended that Kavi-kalash filled the administration with his own men, as the other seven *pradhans* and all the lower officers were men of Maharashtra. It is, therefore, historically untrue to make Kavi-kalash the scapegoat for Shambhu's sins. His unpopularity with the Maratha ministers of the time (and, therefore, with the Maratha historians ever after) was due solely to the fact that he gained the royal favour and they could not. Could he have possibly reformed a character on which Ramdas's teaching produced no effect? *Odium theologicum* intensified the political hatred felt by the Maratha Brahmins for Kavi-kalash; they were vegetarians and Vaishnavas or Shaivas by creed, but he was a Shakta and Tantric worshipper, whose beliefs and rites were abominated by them. The mutual jealousy between the priests of these two creeds and their sordid rivalry for the royal patronage are luridly illustrated in the *Shira-avisheka-Kalpataru*.

wrote letters in the imperial style dated in the years of his reign! Mercenary horsemen were constantly joining him, and by the month of August he had collected about 2,000 cavalry in his pay.

But the rapid increase of Akbar's forces and the assembling of thousands of foreign troopers round him alarmed Shambhuji. At the end of July the Maratha Rajah warned his guest, "If you wish to raise an army, go away to some other kingdom. But if you wish to live in my realm, you must remain in the same condition that you came in." He forbade any more men to join Akbar, but fixed a daily subsistence allowance of 60 *hun* (Rs. 300) on the prince. [*Akh.*, 16 Aug. 1681.]

Akbar's frank and friendly attitude during Annaji's conspiracy convinced Shambhuji of his royal guest's sincerity. He now promised to Akbar the co-operation of a strong Maratha army in conquering Mughal Deccan, set about equipping his troops for the proposed war, and finally, after he had gained peace of mind by extinguishing the conspiracy in blood, paid his first visit to Akbar in order personally to cement the alliance and settle the plan of the joint campaign. "On 13th November, 1681, Shambhuji interviewed Prince Akbar at Padishahpur (=Pali), taking the entire army and retinue with him. Durgadas was with

Akbar. Great honour was shown to him." [Jedhe S.]

But nothing came of this long-cherished plan of invading the Mughal empire. Indeed, before the year 1681 closed, Akbar's sole chance of success was gone. The crisis of the Rajput war had ended in June, when the Maharana made a definite peace with the Emperor. The Mughal forces were now free to hunt Akbar down. On 31st July Prince Azam was sent off from Ajmir to the Deccan with a vast force, reaching Burhanpur in September and Aurangabad on 11th November. On 8th September the Emperor himself started from Rajputana for the South and took up his residence at Burhanpur on 13th November. Thus, by the middle of November all the military resources of the empire were concentrated in the Deccan under the Emperor himself, three of his sons and all his best generals, while a strong force under his grandson and the prime minister occupied Rajputana, across the road to Delhi. Aurangzib himself took post at the strategic centre Aurangabad (on 22nd March 1682), while he "secured all the frontiers with strong garrisons,..... the better to keep watch on the doings of Shambhuji Rajah and to give Akbar no opportunity of undertaking any notable enterprise." (Dutch letter from Surat, 31st Jan. 1682, *D.R.* Vol. 37.) At first he contented himself with following a watchful policy,

waiting for Akbar and Shambhuji to show their hands, before choosing his own line of attack.

§ 10. *Aurangzib's strategic dispositions, 1682.*

In addition to meeting internal troubles, Shambhuji was busy during the winter of 1681-82 in attending to his navy and his maritime possessions, and spent the whole month of January 1682 in making a furious attack on Janjira under his own eyes. This was Aurangzib's opportunity. Hasan Ali Khan, who had distinguished himself in the Jat and Rajput wars and risen to high favour, was ordered (on 7th November 1681) to descend from Junnar into North Konkan at the head of 14,000 horse. The Maratha attempt to oppose him when coming down the Nanaghat pass was defeated, and he took possession of Kalian (about 30 Jan. 1682) burning all the Maratha villages on the way and also, by mistake, some nine villages in Portuguese territory. At Kalian he encamped and sent an agent to Bombay to buy some gunpowder and other munitions from the English. Many battles were fought with the Marathas in which the imperialists (especially the Bundela contingent under Dalpat Rao) distinguished themselves. (*Dil.* 172; Bomb. to Co. 4 Feb. in *F.R.* Surat 108; Surat to Bomb. 24 Feb. 1682, in Vol. 90.) In May next Hasan Ali withdrew from the province, in order to save his horses from the effect of the heavy rainfall of the west coast.

Early in 1682 Khan-i-Jahan was ordered to make Bahadurgarh his base, and leaving his baggage there to hasten wherever he heard of Maratha bands roving. In the course of one of these expeditions he sacked Shivapur, a town midway between Puna and Shirwal. (*Dil.* 173; *M.A.* 216.)

The news of Hasan Ali's victories recalled Shambhuji, to his great mortification, from the unfinished siege of Janjira. Leaving 10,000 men there to keep up the attack, he returned to Raigarh (Feb.) and made defensive arrangements. Five thousand men were posted to guard the fords near the mouth of the Pen river and arrest the southward advance of the Mughals, while the low country from Chaul to Nagothna was defended by 15,000 men. East of the Ghats 20,000 horse were distributed between Satara and Phonda to face the southern division of the Mughal grand army. (*Orme*, 110.)

§ 11. *Mughal siege of Ramsej fails.*

Soon after this Aurangzib arrived at Aurangabad (22nd March 1682) and sent off Azam Shah and Dilir Khani to Ahmadnagar in the south, while Shihab-ud-din Khan with Dalpat Rao was sent to Nasik on the western frontier. The latter general took some small forts in this region and then (in April) laid siege to* Ramsel, 7 miles north of Nasik,

* The gossipy Khafi Khan tells us (*il.* 282) that as Shah Jahan

and standing 3273 feet above sea-level. But it was defended by a gallant Maratha garrison under an expert *qiladar*, and the Mughals could make no impression on it. If we may believe Khafi Khan who was present at the siege, the fort had no iron cannon, but the garrison hollowed out trunks of trees and fired leather missiles from them "which did the work of ten pieces of artillery."

Siege trenches were dug and mines run, but with no success. At last Shihab-ud-din decided to raise on a hillock near the fort a wooden tower large enough to hold 500 musketeers. With incredible labour and cost it was built up storey by storey till it overtopped the fort-tower opposite. (*Dil.* 176.)

In May, hearing that Rupaji Bhonslé, and Manaji Moré were coming with a relieving army, the Khan advanced and checked them near Ganeshgaon (11 miles west of Nasik), though he lost 500 horses in the battle. [*Jedhe S.*]

Learning that the siege was protracted and a large Maratha force was coming to raise it, the Emperor sent Khan-i-Jahan to reinforce the besiegers. But even he could achieve no better success, though he tried feints and even magic. (*K. K.* ii. 282-'83.)

had very easily captured this fort and its fall had been a happy omen of the speedy fall of all other forts in the neighbourhood in 1636. Aurangzib ordered Ramsej to be besieged first out of superstition.

The Emperor was displeased, and about the end of May he sent a *sazawal* (bailiff) to the siege-camp to compel his generals to deliver an assault. (*M.A.* 219). One night Khan-i-Jahan tried a secret escalade on one face, while he made a noisy false attack with all his fire-arms on the opposite face of the fort. But the defence had seen through his trick and sat in grim and silent preparation at both points. The Mughals in trying to climb the hill-side were assailed by a shower of stones, burning grass roofs, and old quilts steeped in naphtha and set on fire. The few who had mounted the ladders were brained. At last the Khan retired with heavy loss. A second attack, delivered by Shihab-ud-din, fared no better, his second in command, Dalpat Rao, being wounded with a stone. (*K. K.* ii. 283, *Dil.* 177.)

The Mughals gained two minor successes. On 20th May, a foraging party under Sharif Khan was attacked by the Marathas near Aurangabad, but returned after inflicting a heavy loss on them. (*M.A.* 218). Hambir Rao arrived with 18,000 infantry to raise the siege of Ramsej, but he was put to flight with the loss of 2,000 men. (*Karwar Occurrences*, 30th July 1682, in *F.R.* Surat 108.)

§ 12. *Aurangzib's vigorous efforts.*

Aurangzib's spirit was now up. He decided

Aurangabad (20th Jan. 1683), but the Emperor sternly refused him audience and ordered him to join Prince Muizz-ud-din who was marching eastwards from the Ahmadnagar district to Nander and Bidar on the heels of a Maratha force rumoured to be commanded by Akbar in person. (*M.A.* 224; *Dil.* 178.)

The Khan united with the Prince's force at Ramdoo, on the Godavari, 25 miles s. of Aurangabad, and pushed on eastwards to Nander. Thence the division went to Bidar, 86 m. due south. But learning that the imperial elephants out grazing near Pathri (57 m. w. of Nander) were being carried off by the Marathas, Khan-i-Jahan hastened back from Bidar, sent his baggage back to Nander from Lasona (20 m. w. of that city), and by forced marches overtook the raiders and rescued the elephants after a long running fight, which carried him to the frontiers of Chanda and Golkonda. Then he encamped at Kamtan, 6 m. s. w. of Bidar. It was a highly creditable feat. During this campaign the troops had to bear great hardship; even the general had no tent; only the coarsest food could be procured, and at every stage many of the men straggled behind. (*Dil.* 178—180.)

Ranmast Khan's army held Kalian for some months and was victualled by the Mughal fleet from Surat, (Dec. 1682.) Later (March 1683) Ruhullah

Khan came with a division from the Court and reinforced him. (M.A. 227; O.C. 4889.)

Hasan Ali Khan, who seems to have been posted at Bahadurgarh, moved in the Parenda district in pursuit of the enemy. Early in 1683 he had a fight with them at Phaltan and was wounded.*

At the end of December 1682, Prince Azam had a severe encounter with the Marathas. On 14th June he had been ordered to march out of Ahmadnagar and invade Adil-Shahi territory. In the course of this campaign he took Dharur. Then he entered Shambhuji's territory and leaving his wife Jahanzeb Banu (popularly called Jani Begam) behind in his camp, with Rao Anurudh Singh Hada and his Rajputs to guard her, he advanced with his army further into the enemy's country. The Marathas, sending off one division to keep Azam engaged, suddenly threatened the Begam's camp in overwhelming force. The heroic daughter of Dara Shukoh mounted her covered litter on an elephant, and advanced two miles from her camp to oppose the enemy on the way. Although Anurudh and other officers, as well as her eunuchs, tried to dissuade her from leaving the shelter of the camp, she did not agree, but urged them to advance,

* *Dil* 174, BS 528. The year and place (Bhālbān) of the battle are given by *Basatin*. The place may also be *Bhalauna*; the Litho. ed. reads 'Almān (? Almala)

saying, "The situation is critical. Leave off talking and turn to the work."

Calling Anurudh Singh near her elephant she spoke to him *in her own voice*, "The honour of the Chaghtais is to the Rajputs the same as their own honour.* I call you my son." Giving them some spears with her own hand, she told them, "If God gives us victory with this small force, well. Otherwise, you may rest assured about me; I shall sit down after doing my work (*i.e.*, committing suicide, in order to avoid capture.)" Then a great battle was fought. Nine hundred Rajputs fell on Anurudh's side, and many of the Marathas too. At last Anurudh gained the victory, though he was wounded. While the fight was raging, Jani Begam continued to send her eunuchs to present packets of betel leaf to every one of the Rajput captains individually in order to cheer them.

After the battle she called the wounded Anurudh Singh to her side and comforted him, gave him her own necklace of pearls worth Rs. 40,000 (a recent gift from Aurangzib), and placed it round his neck with her own hands. Then, playing the music of victory, she returned to her camp.

Azam, on his return from his expedition, was greatly pleased with his wife's heroism and the

devoted valour of the Rajputs. [*Akhbarat.*] Then after some time spent on the bank of the Nira, he was recalled to Court in June 1683.

§ 13. *Failure of Mughal efforts: Emperor's distraction and suspicions.*

In March 1683, all the Mughal divisions operating against Akbar were recalled to the Emperor's side. Ruhullah and Ranmast Khan evacuated Kalian on 23rd March, after burning and razing to the ground the fortifications they had built round the city. The retreat was opposed by a Maratha army under Rupaji Bhonslé, who attacked the Mughal rear at Titvala (seven miles n. e. of Kalian), killing many men and carrying off a large number of horses. [Surat to Co. 10 Apr. 1683 in *F.R.* Surat 91; *Portuguese Records*, Vol. I, pt. 2, Trans.] The Jedhe chronicle tells us that Rupaji captured the Rajput chief Padam Singh (son of Rao Karn), but "in the stress of the battle slew him and many other high officers." [*Dil.* i. 172-3 wrongly puts the event a year earlier.]

The severity of the struggle by which Ruhullah had to extricate himself from that broken wooded region and make his way over the Ghats back to the Deccan plateau, is thus vividly described in a news-letter from the imperial Court: "After Ruhullah had descended into Konkan on the sea-

coast, he sighted the enemy and fired on them with rockets, one of which wounded and unhorsed the son of the enemy general, and the Marathas fled away leaving the son captive. Ruhullah had him nursed and cured, but the youth would not divulge his father's name. The Khan declined an offer of two lakhs of Rupees made by the Marathas for his ransom.

"Then the enemy returned with a force of 35,000 men and closed the roads and mountain passes. Ranmast Khan who was in the pass, had to stop there, unable to reach Ruhullah. Provisions were cut off from the Mughal army. Ruhullah won the Feringees over, gave them robes of honour and rewards and got some provisions by the sea in ships. Then the enemy tried to close the sea-route, too. Ruhullah's force was 8,000 troopers on paper. To the Khan's prayer for speedy reinforcement, the Emperor replied, 'If he has 8,000 horse, he needs no reinforcement. He can secure an easy retreat by releasing the captive general's son'." [Akh.]

Thus we see that for more than a year after his arrival in the Deccan, from November 1681 to April 1683, the Emperor accomplished nothing notable, in spite of his immense resources. In truth he was at this time passing through a domestic and mental crisis which has been entirely concealed by the Persian Court-historians. The unexpected

rebellion of Akbar whom he loved most among all his sons, as he in one of his letters calls upon God to witness, had totally shaken his faith in his family, and he did not know whom to trust or where he would be safe. Hence his policy for some time after was hesitating, suspicious, watchful and seemingly capricious or self-contradictory.

On 3rd April 1682, the Surat factors report that Aurangzib "hath with him a great army, with which he sits still and attempts nothing, being under great jealousies and fears, thinks himself hardly secure." On 31st August a false rumour is reported from Khandesh, "All the news that we have heard since our last is that Sultan Azam is revolted and sides with the Deccanis" [*i.e.*, Bijapur.] Next year (10th April 1683) the Surat Council write, "All his forces that were against his son Akbar and Shambhuji Rajah he hath withdrawn, which was a sudden thing, and put several thoughts into all people." In May 1683 Aurangzib repeatedly proposed to go back to Hindustan, leaving either Khan-i-Jahan or Shah Alam or Azam in charge of the Deccan War. But they successively declined the onerous task, giving very sound reasons for doing so. Shah Alam replied that if Amir Khan, the able and successful subahdar of Kabul, was given to him as his second in command he could accept the viceroyalty of the Deccan, otherwise not. Amir Khan asked to be

allowed to hold his Kabul viceroyalty by deputy while serving in the Deccan! [Jaipur records.]

Again, on 19th June, it is reported in a Surat letter, "The Mughal is grown very crazy and his mind continually alters; his *umaras* generally much dissatisfied in him and if his days be not shortened, he will in all likelihood not live much longer. Sultan Akbar hath the good will of most." Still later (2nd Oct.) it is the same tale: "How the king's mind may alter we cannot tell. It is continually wavering and he is extraordinarily peevish and uneasy because of Sultan Akbar. Sultan Azam, Begam [*i.e.*, Jahanzeb Banu] and Dilir Khan degraded for even nothing but only suspected, without any grounds, of being kind to Akbar, that all persons of quality stand on ticklish terms, are mighty careful." (*F.R. Surat*, 91.)

Two years afterwards there were similar rumours again. On 18th July 1685, the Surat factors write, "We have frequent alarms here of all the Rajputs being in arms to assist Sultan Akbar &c., backed by many of the *umaras* dissatisfied to the king, who is very old, and in all appearance there will be great troubles on his decease." (*F.R. Surat*, 92.)

So much we learn from the camp gossip recorded by the English merchants and more briefly by Manucci too. (*Storia*, ii. 259). The private

memoir-writers in Persian tell us a little more. Bhimsen narrates, "The Emperor felt a suspicion against Prince Azam who had been sent to Ahmadnagar, and he summoned the Prince and Dilir Khan to his presence. They delayed coming, but with great insistence he made them come. Dilir fell under the Emperor's punishment." (180.) Ishwardas (87) is more detailed. He tells us that the Prince paid a midnight visit to the tent of Dilir Khan, his chief officer, and spent four hours in private talk with him. Spies reported the incident to the Emperor, whose suspicion was roused, so that he removed the Prince from the command of the expedition and recalled all his officers to Court. The Prince in anger resigned all his posts, disbanded his army, and shut himself up in his house, refusing to see anybody. Then the Emperor visited him and pacified his mind with soothing words. Dilir Khan took poison to avoid the Emperor's wrath.

* Much of this account is mere gossip. Dilir died a natural death about 20th September, 1683. The official history tells us that Azam, when summoned to Court, arrived from the bank of the Nira by forced marches in spite of rain and mud (June 1683), and was warmly received by Aurangzib (*M.A.* 230—234). But in August 1683, Muhamad Hadi (a son of that Mir Khan who had been punished in 1670 on suspicion of having put ideas of independence into the head of Azam) was brought under arrest from the camp of Azam and after some days spent in the custody of two officers (probably in investigation and torture), was imprisoned. (*M.A.* 237.) Azam paid another visit to his father late in October, and therefore after Dilir's death. (*M.A.* 239.)

The Emperor's anger against Shah Alam was said to have been due to that Prince's very great kindness towards Akbar and unwillingness to follow the ruthless policy of slaying him in battle or, worse still, bringing him in alive to undergo his incensed father's vengeance.

§ 14. *The Maratha navy and wars with the Siddis,*
1680—82.

Shivaji had seized and fortified the island of Khanderi in 1679 and beaten off the attempts of the allied English and Siddi fleets to wrest it from him. Early next year (9th January 1680), the Siddi had landed men on the neighbouring rock of Underi and mounted heavy artillery on it, which neutralized the Maratha occupation of Khanderi. The English then broke off their alliance with the Siddi and made terms with Shivaji by promising neutrality.

But there could be no amity between the English and Shambhuji, because the Siddi fleet, as well as occasional Mughal squadrons from Surat, used to pass the stormy monsoon months (May to October) in the safe shelter of Bombay harbour every year, and the Siddis settled in the Mazagaon quarter of the island, from which they frequently ravaged the *Kurlas* or rich low-lying tracts of Maratha territory on the mainland east of Bombay. The Siddis also used to bring into Bombay harbour their Maratha

prize-vessels and the captives seized by them for ransom in these villages, and the Bombay Council were not strong enough to always prevent such outrages on their neutrality. Shambhuji by turns threatened the English and offered them his alliance if they would only exclude the Siddis from their harbour; but the President and Council of Surat, "more afraid of the Mughal's displeasure than Shambhuji's, ordered the admittance of the Siddi fleet." (Orme, 112.) Their policy is clearly stated in the instructions to Bombay on 3rd Jan. 1684: "You must use all contrivances to keep fair with them; as we would by no means quarrel with Shambhuji Rajah, so upon no account can we with prudence fall out with the Siddi at present, it being a very unfit time."

As they advised the Bombay factory: "The king (*i.e.*, Aurangzib) being so near us, both you and we must . . . prudently contrive to act the best for our Masters' interests, keeping fair with all. . . . We much desire to keep fair with Shambhuji Rajah, and would not afford him the least seeming face of displeasure, so far as in us lies; but such is our necessities, as we have no reason to think him our friend because of the Siddis' being continually supplied by our island; and yet he continues fair with us, not out of any respect to us, but of kindness to himself, reaping a great benefit from our trading

to the *Kurlas*, which brings into him a great deal of money yearly." Therefore Shambhuji did not declare war against the English. [24 April, 1682; also Surat Consultation of 26 April.]

The strength of the Maratha fleet off Bombay in Nov. 1680 is given as 60 ships (both *ghurabs* and *gallivats*), carrying 5,000 soldiers on board. But in May 1682 we read of 85 *gallivats* lying in the rivers opposite Bombay, with about 5,000 soldiers on board,—his total naval strength being 120 *gallivats* and 15 *ghurabs*. Shambhuji's admirals were, besides Daulat Khan, (i) the son of Mai Nayak (a Bhandari of Rajapur), (ii) Siddi Sambole's son, and (iii) Siddi Misri, the nephew and son-in-law of Siddi Sambole. The last-named Siddi, a very gallant fighter, joined Shambhuji in May 1682 and died of wounds received in battle on 5th October next.

The Maratha vessels being smaller in size and armament* than the Siddi's, lay sheltered up the Nagothna creek and in Khanderi harbour during the monsoons, without venturing on pitched battles. But occasional skirmishes took place between the rival *gallivats* (*jalbas*) in which the Siddis had the advantage, and these seas were often closed to the Maratha trading vessels. An attempt by 200

* "They could not resist the artillery of the Siddis, but sailed much better and could anchor in much shallower water." (Orme, 98)

Marathas to surprise Underi in the dark night of 1st August 1680 totally failed, the Siddis next day bringing to Bombay 80 severed heads of the defeated assailants. A year afterwards the attempt was repeated on a vaster scale but with no better success. About the middle of August 1681, Shambhuji's flotilla of 22 gallivats tried to land 4,000 men on the island of Underi, but were beaten off by the Siddi fleet after a four hours' fight.

"The Siddi's gallivats at Bombay, elated with this success, sailed over to the *Kurlas*, and brought away some of the principal inhabitants, who had purchased their protection by an annual tribute, equal to what they paid to the Government of Raigarh; and though several of them, as well as the Siddis, were Muhammadans, they were carried to Underi and beaten unmercifully, until they deputed one to fetch a ransom of Rs. 18,000." [Orme, 107.]

On 7th December, 1681, the Siddis burnt the town of Apta, on the Patalganga, ten miles south of Panvel. (They had first sacked it in 1673.) "A few days afterwards their whole fleet went down to Chaul and . . . ravaged a large tract of the adjacent country. On this provocation Shambhuji, accompanied by Sultan Akbar, came down from Raigarh, with 20,000 men and a vast train of cannon, to Danda, [18 Dec.] . . . and from the

hill opposite to Janjira" bombarded that island incessantly for 30 days, until all the fortifications were levelled to the ground. But the garrison under Siddi Carry (? Karim) clung to a rocky citadel in the centre of the island.* The success of the Marathas was illusory, because they did not command the sea and their vessels durst not transport their army across the bare half mile's breadth of the channel to the island in the teeth of Siddi Qasim's fleet stationed there.

Shambhuji now set 50,000 men to work to fill up the channel, 800 yards broad and 30 yards deep, with stones (or "with timber and bags of cotton," according to a Bombay letter) and thus form a causeway for his storming parties. But the Mughal invasion of N. Konkan and capture of Kalian (c. 30 Jan.) forced him to hasten back to Raigarh, leaving only 10,000 men to continue the siege, which was done very slackly in his absence. Large Maratha forces had to be posted elsewhere to meet the three main Mughal armies, as we have already seen.

* Orme, 109, corrected from Bombay to Surat 3 Jan. and 19 Jan. 1682, the last of which adds: "Shambhuji incessantly keeps firing against Danda Rajpuri (*i.e.*, Janjira island), and it is thought by many that Siddi Carry will be forced to quit it, for the number of shot and grenado shells that are sent to the island every day does his people much mischief and there is security in no part, and Shambhuji is resolved not to raise the siege so long as he hath a rag to his back."

In July 1682, the Marathas getting some boats together delivered an assault on Janjira, but they could gain no footing on the storm-beaten rocky coast and had to retire with heavy loss. "Sham-bhuji Rajah . . . ordered Dad Prabhu, with several of his eminent commanders to choose out 4,000 stout resolute soldiers for that purpose and the better to encourage them to go boldly on this design, he gave them all gold and silver shackles (*i.e.*, bangles, *ḥara*), but they say most part gold weighing half a seer each; but it seems they had ill-success, for not above 500 escaped, the rest being all killed by the Siddi and his men." (*F.R. Surat* 108, *Karwar Occurrences*, 30 July 1682.)

In August the Siddis again raided the *Kurlas*, brought away the Maratha havladar of Ganuan (?) captive and cut off the noses of several inhabitants there besides a great many taken at Nagothna.

On 4th October, Siddi Misri (in Maratha service) with 30 gallivats gave battle to Siddi Qasim's squadron of 16 vessels, crowded with his best men, off Kalgaon, 8 miles south of Kolaba Point. But he was defeated after a brief fight, his other vessels fled away, and he was carried a prisoner, mortally wounded, with seven of his vessels to Bombay. The other Maratha squadron of 80 gallivats under Daulat Khan, lay hiding in the Nagothna river, without venturing out to his

assistance. [Orme 113 corrected from Bombay letter of 5 Oct.]

Then Shambhuji played a dirty trick. He bribed an Arab admiral of Masqat to fall on the E. I. Co.'s ship *President* (Captain Hide), with two ships and four large *ghurabs* off Sangameshwar (16th January 1683.) But the English defended themselves gallantly and put the Arabs to flight with the loss of 700 men killed, 3 ships sunk and the other three "miserably shattered." The victors lost 11 killed and 35 wounded, chiefly by a fire caused by the explosion of an enemy *ghurab* close by. Shambhu disavowed all knowledge of the outrage and expressed sympathy for the English. (Surat to Co. 10th April 1683, *F.R.* Surat 91, &c.)

§ 15. *Shambhuji's war with the Portuguese, 1683.*

After his failure at Janjira, Shambhuji's anger had been swelling against the Christian Powers of the western sea-board. As we have seen, he tried alternate promises and threats on the English of Bombay, who used to let the Siddi fleet anchor in their harbour every monsoon, to the great loss of the Maratha coast districts and ocean trade, "which doth highly exasperate the Rajah against us." But the English merchants, under orders from their chief at Surat, followed the delicate and difficult

policy of "keeping fair with all,"* though they also honestly tried to restrain the Siddi's excesses and to prevent him from abusing the neutrality of Bombay in an outragenous manner. The Maratha ministers, on their side, long hankered for an alliance with the English as the best counterpoise to the Mughal-Siddi fleet.

Shambhu's wrath, therefore, fell on the Portuguese alone. They had given him provocation enough. Early in 1682, he had sent a *subahdar* with the intention of fortifying Anjidiv, an island just south of Karwar, as a naval base, to counteract the Siddi stronghold of Janjira. But the necessary troops were not sent, the opportunity was lost, and on 17th April four Portuguese *ghurabs* landed there 200 men who fortified the island under their own flag. To this mortification was added the

* Surat to Sir John Child, 8th May, 1682 :—"We are very sensible [that] the Siddi's wintering at Bombay will much prejudice the island, not only by a scarcity of provisions, but by many other accidents which will unavoidably happen; and if the Rajah become our enemy it will be much worse. But we see not at present how it can be avoided, we having promised the [Mughal] governor here [to let the Siddi winter at Bombay.] Therefore, that the best may be made of it, let the Deputy Governor [of Bombay] send a letter to the Rajah...to this effect 'That our consenting to the Siddi's wintering there was merely for the Rajah's sake, that we might save all his land within Underi Khanderi from being destroyed, which is our conditions with the Siddi, and that upon his first touching of those places he shall that very hour be turned out and never receive any more benefit of the island'." (F.R. Surat, 90.)

Costa, the captain of Portuguese or Lower Chaul, bombarded and partly demolished Upper Chaul, which was a Maratha possession, in reprisal for the detention of a Portuguese priest in prison there. Shambhuji retaliated on 31st July, when his Peshwa, with 6,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry, laid siege to Chaul. Early in the morning of 8th August the Marathas made an assault on the city. The time was well-chosen; "the night watch had dispersed, and the men, weary from their vigil (the night having been very rainy), were resting and others were withdrawing to their houses. The enemy attacked the walls with many scaling ladders, which they easily set up, there being very few to oppose them. . . . But the alarm being sounded, religious and lay men flew to the walls, slew those who were already upon the walls and threw down the scaling ladders. The enemy suffered great loss, . . . and in a short time were forced to abandon their attempt."

On the very same day the Marathas also "attempted to take the fortress of Morro [? Korlai], which is upon a mountain at the mouth of the bar of the city [of Chaul.] . . . The enemy sent six spies from the side facing the land to scale the bastion of the fortress which looks in that direction as silently as possible, kill the sentinels, and having done so, to sound the two trumpets they had with

them, and at the signal the rest of their army would come forward and take possession of the fortress. The spies scaled the wall of the bastion but were caught and being put to the torture confessed the purpose of their coming. The captain ordered the guns to be loaded Then he ordered the spies to blow their trumpets and give the signal for the attack, which being done, so great a squadron attacked the wall that the hill was covered with men. The guns were then discharged with such disastrous effect upon the enemy that they withdrew with the loss of more than 500 men."

In the plain of Chaul outside the fort is a Capuchin convent and church of the Virgin, with a watch-tower in one corner of the enclosure. It was held by a small force of Portuguese and Indian soldiers for more than five months, though several times attacked by the Marathas, who would have entirely commanded the interior of the fort if they could have gained possession of the tower.

On 17th August, Francisco de Tavora, Count of Alvor, the Viceroy of Goa, called out and armed all the monks of the city, as Shambhuji was reported to be approaching against it with a large army. Then, very unwisely, he determined on going out and invading Shambhuji's dominions. At midnight following the 29th, he assembled all the

Indians of the island of Goa and ferried them across the river to the mainland of Savant-vadi, with a general licence to plunder and burn the villages of Shambhuji. This attempt to imitate the Maratha policy of *mulkgiri* was a failure, as "the spoils were not considerable."

The Marathas gained some success in the Portuguese territory on the coast north of Bombay. We have recorded their sack of Tarapur in the preceding April. On 2nd September 50 of their men began to destroy the ripe crops at the village of Anzor, near Basein, but fled as soon as they saw the 25 European soldiers whom the captain of Fort Parsica had sent against them. The Portuguese in making a headlong pursuit fell into an ambush, then fled in disorderly panic and were all slain with the exception of six men, who kept together and retreated by presenting an armed front to the enemy.

Both sides made active preparations during the closing months of the rainy season. In October the siege of Chaul was pressed very close, "Shambhuji's forces having taken possession of a hill close by the town on which they have raised four bulwarks and are bringing great guns to plant on it." (Bombay to Surat, 8th Oct. 1683, *F.R.* Surat, 109.) But though for some months longer, "Chaul lay in a desperate condition," the Marathas failed to take it.

§ 16. *Portuguese attack on Phonda and disastrous retreat.*

The Viceroy of Goa planned to make a diversion by laying siege to Phonda,* though his forces were utterly inadequate for an offensive campaign, in number, valour, and material resources. On 17th October he set out from the town with 800 white troops and 8,000 Kanarese, and five pieces of heavy artillery, disembarked at Durbata and arrived (on the 22nd) in the vicinity of Phonda without meeting with any opposition. Mounting his artillery upon a hill a short distance from the fort, he opened fire immediately. "Our guns for the first few days were occupied in dismounting the only three guns which the enemy had mounted, (one of which was 40 calibre), and also in breaking a huge beam which supported a large machine like a watch-tower, which after many shots and much trouble was broken . . . After three days' firing the [enemy] artillery was dismounted, and the [Portuguese] guns were then

* *Phonda*, 10 miles s.s.e. of Goa town and now included in Portuguese territory. It must not be confounded with another *Phonda* in the extreme south of the Ratnagiri district. The Viceroy took ship at *S. Lorenzo*, 5½ m. due south of Goa and disembarked at *Durbata* on the right bank of the *Rachol* river, 6 m. s.e. of *S. Lorenzo* and 3 m. s.w. of *Phonda*. (*Ind. At.* 41 S.W.) Martucci (ii. 263) tells the story that a spy of Shambhuji lured the Viceroy into attacking *Phonda* by falsely informing him that the fort contained a vast treasure!

placed at the mouth of a street near the fortress, from whence they began to batter the walls . . . A breach was made in the barbican after long battering. Then the Viceroy sent three companies of Portuguese soldiers with some Kanarese to carry a fascine and raise a palisade at the mouth of the breach, and that this might be accomplished with less loss, the General Dom Rodrigo da Costa attacked the enemy upon the other side of the fortress." But the feint failed, and the Portuguese had to retreat with 8 dead and some 27 wounded. "The Viceroy was sunk in deep depression But he ordered the battery to continue and a breach was made in the very strong interior wall."

The 30th of October had been fixed for scaling the breach of the inner wall. But that very day a relieving force under Shambhuji was sighted,—at first 800 cavalry and a large body of infantry. The Portuguese army was completely outflanked and lost heart, "none could resolve to prevent them" (*i.e.*, the Marathas.) The Viceroy held a council of war which voted with only one or two dissentients for raising the siege.

On the 31st the besiegers began to retreat. The garrison sallied forth in a body and tried to seize the guns, but were beaten off. The retirement was bravely and skilfully conducted by the Viceroy in person; all the field pieces and ammunition were brought

away, and the Portuguese had only a small skirmish which cost about 100 men on each side. Next day, the 1st of November, they reached Durbata, where they were to embark for return to Goa.

On the retreat of the besiegers, Shambhuji razed the fortifications of Phonda to the ground, saying that his father had taken several months in capturing it and had not been able to damage it in that long period so much as the Portuguese had done in ten days! By his order another fort was built near the place. (*F.R. Surat*, 109, Karwar to Surat, 26 Nov.) I suspect that the real reason was the extensive injury done to the walls by the Portuguese fire, which made it hardly worth while to repair the old fort.

The retreat from Durbata was disastrous for the Portuguese. A hill dominated the place of embarkation, and the Viceroy sent three companies of white and one company of native infantry to fortify the hill-top with wooden *chevaux de frise* and hold it at all costs in order to ensure a safe retreat. But the Maratha foot posted behind the hill, by a pretended flight, lured the holders of the hill to descend from it and pursue them in the open. The Viceroy, seeing the danger, himself hastened to occupy this supremely important position, but only 16 out of his 60 horsemen followed him, the rest hanging back in fear. .

“When he reached the summit of the hill the enemy’s cavalry was already attacking our infantry, which was in such disorder that all the three companies fired at once. Several of the enemy were killed, but the rest . . . reforming and bending to the necks of their horses and covering themselves with shields, attacked our infantry with great determination. The Kanarese [*i.e.*, the native troops of Goa] . . . threw down their muskets and fled. Finally, nearly all the Portuguese did the same, but in vain, for the blacks rode over them, trampling most of our men under their horses’ hoofs; though some who were present in the conflict declare that it was our cavalry that first trampled them.”

“That afternoon our men were for a long time exposed to the knives, muskets and blunderbusses of the enemy. . . All our men fled in utter disorder, each one trying to save himself. . . . Of the Portuguese infantry nearly a whole company of seamen were killed, the dead and wounded amounting to two hundred. The Viceroy twice escaped death in this skirmish.

“Those [Portuguese soldiers] who were on the low ground near the shore . . . rushed into the water; one took to swimming and others embarked with the water up to their necks.”

The Maratha force (800 horse and 2,000 foot) retreated after the skirmish. The Portuguese

crossed over with their artillery in the course of that afternoon and the following day, and returned to Goa. Great grief was caused in that city by the fruitless loss of so many lives. The Viceroy shut himself up for four days in the House of the Jesuits and would see no one.

§ 17. *Shambhuji invades Goa.*

In a few days the exultant enemy threatened Goa itself. From the walls of Phonda Shambhuji marched with 7,000 cavalry and 15,000 infantry against Goa city. At 10 o'clock in the night of 14th November, forty Marathas entered the island of Santo Estevao, two miles north-east of Goa, by crossing a channel which is fordable at low tide. Then they scaled the fort on the top of the hill, without meeting with any resistance whatever. After slaughtering its small garrison, they fired the artillery of the fort to inform their comrades on the other side of the river about their success, and were immediately reinforced by four thousand men from the main army.

"The alarm was immediately sounded in the city, and nearly all, both ecclesiastics and laymen, answered the summons... Next morning at 7 o'clock, the Viceroy with 400 men disembarked at the island of Santo Estevao, and marched to a hill upon which is the church of the saint. Here...the

old soldiers said that they would go no further (without artillery.)... The Viceroy answered, 'Gentlemen, do you all wish to be viceroys?' Then he ordered his men to form up and attack the fort.

"On the hill were about 800 of the enemy's musketeers, and the Viceroy attacked them with such courage that they took to flight. The flying enemy met three hundred cavalry who were coming to their succour, and turning back with this reinforcement, they fell upon our men with great fury... Our men began a headlong flight down the hill... Four horsemen attacked the Viceroy with their swords, ready to kill him... Several honourable men scorned to fly and remained with their Viceroy, and of these few escaped with their lives...

"Among all those who were engaged in this battle, not counting the dead, who were said to be more than 150,—there was not one who was not wounded by a ball, sword or stone. The Viceroy had his arm pierced by a ball... He withdrew to a trench, under cover of which about forty of our men defended themselves from the foe, until at two o'clock in the afternoon he embarked... His horse was left behind and was captured by the enemy, as also were those of all the men in the trench. The rest of the men,—about 120,—fled into the river... Some stuck in the mud, and some swam off. All those who were in the mud died, for as they were

stuck fast they were cut off by the enemy, and those who were sunk very deep were drowned by the rising tide. Those who could swim... were for the most part drowned. This conflict took place in sight of all the Muslims and Hindus, who assembled to see this grievous spectacle in such numbers that they covered all the surrounding hills. The misfortune was also seen from the city." The following night the Marathas burnt the church of St. Stephen with his statue. But next day (16th Nov.) they left the island in great haste, by order of Shambhuji.

On 1st December one thousand Maratha horse and 3,000 foot entered the district of Salsette lying immediately south of the island of Goa and separated from the latter by a creek only. They plundered everything that they could find... The people of Margaon defended themselves in the church and some other fortified buildings for ten days... But on the 13th of the month, the only seven white men there, *viz.* four Jesuit Fathers and three Portuguese soldiers,—escaped to Goa at night. Next day the natives surrendered. "By the terms of the capitulation it was agreed that they should march out with their arms, wives and children, and all that they could carry upon their person. But the enemy did not keep faith, for... they took them prisoner. There were about 200 women in the church,... and

the enemy were so barbarous that they ravished those whom they liked best * * *

“Many of the women of Margaon... threw themselves into the wells and were drowned. Others, who valiantly resisted the evil designs of some of the enemy’s soldiers were killed by the sword or by having their breasts cut off. The same thing occurred throughout all the lands of Salsette traversed by the enemy.”

The villages of Asolna and Cocolin made an agreement with Shambhuji’s captains to pay them the same amount that they did to the Portuguese, redeeming their villages from plunder, “which being accepted they accompanied the enemy in their invasion of other lands” !

All the villages of the district of Salsette were deserted by their Jesuit priests and left open to the enemy.

On the same day that the Marathas entered Salsette, another division of their army invaded the peninsula of Bardes, north of Goa. The neck of the peninsula was protected by a wall which was held by Kanarese soldiers. At night forty Marathas entered, blew their trumpets, and the native sentinels immediately fled from the wall, which the Marathas occupied, making two breaches in it for their cavalry to enter. There were also three forts in Bardes, garrisoned by three companies of Portuguese

soldiers, but they did not come out to prevent the entrance of the enemy.

“Wherever they did not meet with determined opposition, the enemy entered, burning and pillaging all the villages and many of the churches, carrying off the cattle, and doing all the damage they could... The three forts surrendered to them,... the first, after a siege of ten days, for want of drinking water,... and the other two in a cowardly manner... The Marathas did not keep faith with the garrisons... but led them away prisoners (150 Portuguese men.)... The enemy also surrounded the fort at the mouth of the river Chapora... Its captain traitorously delivered up the fortress, and the enemy carried away from it 40 white men as prisoners... From the forts of Bardes the enemy carried off 46 pieces of artillery... and occupied Salsette and Bardes for the space of a month, no one went out to oppose them.”

But the Portuguese gained one striking success. They pretended to evacuate the small island of Kumbarju [*Kumbhar-juve* in Marathi], immediately to the east of Goa and south of Santo Estevao. Shambhuji fell into the trap, and occupied this island with 7,000 picked troops, to get still nearer to Goa. But soon the tide set in, the Portuguese flotilla occupied the two wide streams that enclose Kumbarju, while on the remaining side their fort kept up a hot

fire upon the invaders, so that "few of the 7,000 escaped alive." Shambhuji saved his own life only because he happened to have left the island immediately after its occupation and before the tide rose.*

This disaster "much abated his fierceness." And shortly afterwards a deliverer came to terror-stricken Goa in the person of Shah Alam, whom Aurangzib had sent with a vast army across the Ramghat to assist the Portuguese and afterwards, by moving northwards, to ravage Savant-vadi and Ratnagiri. On the 5th of January 1684, the Prince occupied Bicholim (an important town belonging to Shambhuji) and three days later a very powerful Mughal fleet reached the harbour of Goa. At the news of the Prince's approach Shambhuji fled (23rd December) to Raigarh, leaving Kavi-kalash with Akbar to negotiate with the Portuguese for a peace.

§ 18. *Shambhuji's war with the Portuguese* (concluded.)

In the northern theatre of this war, "the

* Karwar to Surat, 26 Nov. 1683. All the Portuguese records, the English F. R. with the sole exception of this Karwar letter, and even Manucci (who was present at Goa at the time) are silent about Shambhuji's occupation of Kumbarju. The only authority for it, in addition to the Karwar letter, is the Jedhe chronicle. From this Pissulencar [ii. 47n] very plausibly suggests that the incident really refers to the Maratha occupation of Santo Estevao, the *Kumbhar-juve* (=Kumbarju) of the story being a popular mistake for *Jua* (the local name of S. Estevao), and the mistake was all the more natural as the two islands are close to each other.



Portuguese were severely beaten." Kambara, Tulloja (? Tulini) and Kolva were taken by the Peshwa, while Thana and Salsette were in risk of sharing the same fate, (end of November 1683.) Shortly afterwards, Mahim, Quelme (=Kelva), Duntarah (? Dhansar), Sarragom (? Shirgaon), and Supara [*Atlas*, Sh. 24 S. E.] were captured, and Sabajo burnt; on 22nd December the island of Karinja, only 10 miles south-east of Bombay, was occupied by the Marathas. A month afterwards, the English factors express a fear that "in a short time from Chaul up to Daman in appearance all may be his." (Bomb. to Surat, 28th Nov. and 23rd Dec. 1683 in *F.R.* Surat 109; Surat to Co., 25th Jan. 1684 in Vol. 91.)

Shah Alam's invasion of S. Konkan diverted the Maratha forces from that direction and "gave the Portuguese a little breathing time." They "took this opportunity and made peace with the Rajah, the restoration of Karinja being promised to them."

By the time that Shah Alam occupied Bicholim (5 Jan. 1684) and a Mughal fleet rode into Goa harbour (8 Jan.), Shambhuji hurriedly fled northwards to his capital, leaving Kavi-kalash as his plenipotentiary for concluding a peace with the Portuguese through the mediation of Akbar. These two at first took refuge from the Mughals in the forest of Bhimgarh (27 m. east of Goa) and then at Phonda

and settled the terms with the Portuguese envoy, Manuel S. de Albuquerque (about 20 January.)

The agreement arrived at between the two Powers was—

(1) That Shambhuji would return all the lands forts &c. which he had seized in Portuguese India, together with the arms, vessels, goods and prisoners taken by his officers before and during the war.

(2) That the Portuguese would make a similar restitution of their captures.

(3) That Shambhuji would be paid the *gaon-khandi* of the district of Bassein and *chauth* for the province of Daman, on condition of defending the Portuguese possessions and giving free passage to the traders and vessels of the other side through his territory.

(4) That the Portuguese would not permit ships with materials for the Mughal Emperor to pass within gunshot of their forts.

(5) That Shambhuji would pardon the *desais* of his territory who, after joining his enemies, had taken refuge in the Portuguese possessions.

But this treaty, forced on Shambhuji by a greater fear, was neither ratified nor respected by him. It was a hollow truce. As the English factors of Surat write on 28 March, "There is now a cessation of arms... and we hope there may be a peace, the Portuguese having been soundly banged and all

their *aldeas* (villages) and *battee* ground (corn-fields) burnt and ruined."

When Shah Alam's expedition to South Konkan ended in disaster through famine and pestilence (March 1684), the Maratha king* prepared for a second encounter with the Portuguese, wishing "ere long to be master of all their country." He could never forgive the atrocities committed by the Portuguese, such as "burning men alive and destroying pagodas" (mentioned in an English letter, Karwar to Surat, 4 Sep. 1683.) On 10th March his armada brought into Karwar several Portuguese rice-boats they had seized, while his army was gathering near Phonda to make a sudden attack upon Goa. (*F.R.* Surat 109, Karwar to Surat.) In June the Viceroy visited all his forts, as he was unable to pay the tribute Shambhuji demanded, and a Maratha incursion was to be apprehended. On 19th September the Portuguese attacked and recovered the high hill in Karinja island (crowned with a church) that had been occupied by Shambhuji nine months earlier, and they made prisoners of the entire Maratha garrison in the island. And for some time afterwards Shambhuji and the Portuguese continued to "snarl and snap at each other." (Karwar to Surat, 15 Sep.) However, by October next, a sort

*Pissurlencar (ii. 63) illustrates how Shambhuji broke his treaty promises in every possible way.

of peace was at last patched up, and Karinja island was formally restored to the Portuguese, to the immense relief of the English at Bombay. But languid hostilities with the Portuguese continued till the end of Shambhuji's reign.

It was extremely foolish on the part of the Portuguese to have provoked a war with Shambhuji.* They had neither the men nor the money, neither the armament nor (if we may believe their English trade-rivals) the courage adequate to a contest with the Maratha king. The English, on the other hand, kept their heads cool and long followed the delicate and difficult policy of "keeping fair" with Shambhuji, the Siddi and the Mughals alike. For example, after the naval battle with Shivaji about Khanderi, they wisely put their dignity in their pocket and made peace with him to avoid ruinous expense and the loss of white troops. The Portuguese Viceroy unwisely rushed into war and lost much in men money and the property of his villagers, besides subjecting Goa to the risk of capture. Aurangzib, on whose friendship and co-operation he relied and who had induced him to attack the

* Piasurlencar [ii. 68 *et seq.*] argues against this view, the gist of his contention being that it was the time-honoured policy of the Portuguese ever since the days of Akbar to remain friendly with the Mughal empire. But this does not explain the Viceroy's open breach with Shambhuji in 1682.

Marathas, was a broken reed, as his real aim was to annex Goa after exterminating Shambhuji. (*Storia*, ii. 260—282; O. C. 5642.) Shambhuji, too, made a great mistake by frittering away his army and resources in a war on the western coast, which could not really benefit him on account of his want of sea-power,—at a time when his great enemy Aurangzib was posted in full force on his eastern flank. The Portuguese war remained an open sore for years and continued to drain the blood of the Maratha State.

§ 19. *Prince Akbar's designs and disappointments at the Maratha Court.*

We must here turn to the history of Prince Akbar since January 1682, when he returned with Shambhuji leaving the siege of Janjira unfinished. Eight months had passed away since he had sought asylum with the Maratha king; but no grand expedition against the Mughals had been yet undertaken; on the other hand, strong enemy forces had in the meantime arrived and barred his way north, east and south-east. Unless they could be signally defeated he had no hope of making a dash to Northern India. And yet, Shambhuji was frittering away his strength in small predatory incursions here and there, or engaging in fruitless wars with the Siddis and the Portuguese, having "too many irons in the fire" to do anything effective, as the Surat

factors rightly remarked in December 1683. The proper strategy for him should have been to concentrate all his forces against his chief enemy and deal a crushing blow at any of the main Mughal divisions,—at Ahmadnagar, Aurangabad, Junnar or Burhanpur—and thus clear the way for an invasion of the imperial dominions that would produce an important political effect. Akbar constantly urged such a policy on Shambhuji and asked him to a conference for elaborating the plan of such a campaign, but in vain. His host could not look at things from his point of view.

Akbar's one thought was, how to gain the throne of Delhi. He valued Shambhuji only as an instrument of this design,—to lend him money and men, escort him to Rajputana, and thus enable him to join the Rathors and Sisodias, invade Upper India, rally all malcontents against Aurangzib's rule, overpower the imperial forces, and enter the Mughal capital in triumph, as his own father had done in 1658. Every day that he spent in Maharashtra was a day more of hope deferred. It was also a day more of unwonted suffering to him. A pampered youth of only 25, the favourite son of the greatest monarch in Asia, he was now living in a thatched cottage whose straw-plaited walls were barely concealed by cloth hangings and mud floor by coarse carpets. Accustomed to the richest dishes of a

luxurious race, he had to be content with such poor fare as the Konkan villages yielded to a people of primitive simplicity. His wives and children were captives in Aurangzib's forts or exiles in the impenetrable nooks of Marwar. His present neighbours were people worshipping strange gods, speaking a strange language, wearing a strange dress, and leading a strange mode of life. There was no polished society, populous city, or customary instrument of pleasure within his reach. He felt like being a prisoner in a desert, in addition to being a disappointed claimant. Only by leaving Maharashtra could he get back to civilization.

Kavi-kalash naturally drew close to the exiled Mughal prince.* He, too, felt himself as living among a strange people and a strange tongue, and under hostile glances. The North Indian Brahman could speak to Akbar in his own language and readily understand his way of life. Moreover, it is easily conceivable that surrounded as he was by the ill-suppressed enmity of his Dakshini colleagues, with his position property and even personal safety depending upon the life or caprice of his master, Kavi-kalash should be anxious to go to a securer

* As Akbar wrote to Shembhuji, "Kavi-kalash is an excellent and faithful servant of yours. May none destroy him out of jealousy! It is proper that you should consider it your duty to protect him."
(18 Jan. 1685.)

haven. It was not an impossible dream that, if he could help to put Akbar on the throne of Delhi, he would govern the royal Court, or at least his native district, as the favourite of a grateful Emperor.

But Shambhuji's interests did not exactly coincide with Akbar's. Why should he go out of the safety of the Deccan hills and jungles into the broad plains of North India where his troops would lose their natural advantage? Why should he denude his country of its defenders by accompanying Akbar in the wild project of invading Hindustan, and thus give Aurangzib an opportunity of conquering Maharashtra in his absence and cutting off his return home from North India, where a defeat would mean annihilation for the Maratha army? His work lay at home.

Gradually Akbar became convinced of the insincerity of his host's devotion to his cause.

§ 20. *Akbar wants to leave Maharashtra, 1683.*

There was much talk of a Maratha dash into Northern India through Surat, (in September 1682 and also in 1683 and 1685), with Akbar at its head. But nothing was really done. At last after 18 months of heart-sick waiting, hope deferred and evasion of promises, Akbar saw through Shambhuji's character and ~~peron~~ ^{person} and despaired of ever being

effectually helped by him. He, therefore, decided to leave Maharashtra.

His patience was exhausted, and despairing of securing Maratha help in his plans, he issued from his asylum at Pali (Dec. 1682) with his Rathor contingent, with a view to leaving Shambhuji's territory. For a time he thought of going to the Qutb Shah, but evidently he was headed off from Golkonda by the Mughal forces posted across his path. Then turning to the south, he took up his residence at Banda in Savant-vadi, which lay within the Maratha kingdom. Banda is some twenty-five miles north of Goa and within easy reach (15 miles east) of the great port of Vingurla. From this place Akbar (January 1683) sent an agent (Abdur Rahim Khan) to the Viceroy of Goa, presenting him with his own jewelled dagger and begging his permission to sell some jewels in Goa and his influence with the Portuguese factor at Mangalore (in the kingdom of Kanara) to assist Akbar in chartering a ship there to carry him to Arabia. The Viceroy gave him passports for five ships (3rd Feb.) and also wrote to his agent at Mangalore and to the Queen of Kanara to help the Prince in every possible way.

On hearing of these things (through Shaikh Muhammad, the Mughal envoy at Goa), Siddi Yaqut (now Mughal admiral) wrote to the Viceroy not to befriend the rebel son of his Er or. In March

and April the Siddi lay with his fleet in the Rajapur creek, on the watch to intercept Akbar, who was planning to take ship at Goa.

Afraid of being captured at sea by the imperial fleet, Akbar gave up the idea of a voyage across the Indian Ocean from Mangalore in a private vessel, and begged the Viceroy to send him to Mecca in a Government frigate. This request the Portuguese authorities naturally declined.

So, in September, Akbar removed from Banda to Bicholim, a town in Shambhuji's territory, less than ten miles north of Goa. Hopeless of securing a naval escort from the Portuguese, he tried the Dutch, to whom he paid a visit in this month, but with no better success. [Karwar to Surat, 26 Nov. 1683.]

Thus, Akbar was at last thrown on his own resources. He secretly bought a ship at Goa in the name of another man (Muhammad Khan), who obtained a passport for Surat, but took the ship to Rajapur, where Akbar rejected it on seeing that it was too small for a voyage to Arabia. [Viceroy's letter, 13 Oct. 1683.]

Akbar then came back to Bicholim.* Here he

* Iswardas (1880) describes the place thus: Bicholi is a large town in which the English, the Dutch, the Portuguese and the French have built high houses looking like small forts, in the courtyards of which they have laid out spacious gardens, . . . with streams of water in the middle. In this town Akbar and Shambhu also had built very large mansions of their own."

became utterly disgusted with Shambhuji, who, "after taking away from him a part of his jewels, broke his promise of giving him large sums of money and help with men to march against Aurangzib." The poor deluded Prince, at last (about 8th Nov.) bought a ship and embarked at Vingurla, wishing to shake the dust of Maharashtra off his feet. But Kavi-kalash hurriedly arrived from Rajapur and with Durgadas visited Akbar on board, pressing him "not to go away but to come back to land as his master had agreed to keep his word and wanted to help him to defeat the army of the Emperor; and after the victory he could go with greater safety and with a greater army wherever he wanted, without risking himself in the sea...Under this persuasion he disembarked and remained on land."

Siddi Yaqut seized two or three servants of Akbar and a boat of provisions that was intended for him, and began to brag of having all but captured Akbar himself!

In the meantime the Portuguese-Maratha war had broken out, the Viceroy's siege of Phonda (22 Oct.—1 Nov.) had failed disastrously, and on the 14th of November Shambhuji seized the island of Santo Estevao, close to Goa. But the Maratha king, on hearing of the approach of a powerful Mughal army under Prince Shah Alam, opened peace

negotiations with the Portuguese, making Akbar his mediator. That Prince with Kavi-kalash concluded an agreement (about 20 January 1684) and then retired to Jaitapur (20 Feb.) and Malkapur.

Akbar spent a whole year from February 1684 in the Ratnagiri district (at Sakharpen and Malkapur), inviting Kavi-kalash repeatedly to meet him and decide on future plans of action. His letters show that he was heartily sick of acting as an intermediary between Shambhuji and the Portuguese and constantly dreaded a repetition of the futile attempt at settlement made at Bhingarh in January 1684. Next January (1685) he sent his troops towards Khelna, evidently to join the Marathas in some raid.

The remainder of his doings in India will be narrated in a later chapter.

§ 21. *Rebellions against Shambhuji; Mughal operations from July 1683.*

It is now time to take up the history of the doings of the Mughals where we dropped it, about April 1683. From the following July the prospects of the imperialists in the Deccan began to brighten. Akbar was estranged from Shambhuji and meditating flight from India. The Marathas became plunged into a long war with the Portuguese. The Mughals profited by these circumstances. The Emperor's indecision and cautious inactivity ended;

his suspicions of his sons seemed to have abated; and a vigorous offensive was opened in many directions. We shall here briefly summarize the main incidents as far as accurately known.

Shambhuji's profligacy capriciousness and violence and the decline and disorder in his Government created a general discontent among his officers and vassals. Aurangzib's bribes aggravated the evil, and there were frequent desertions from the Maratha service. Early in 1682 (or probably late in 1681) Avji Pandit* was dismissed by the Maratha king and was then engaged by the Portuguese. From Gorbandar he went to Bombay in April 1682 and thence by way of Surat to the Mughal Emperor's Court (in June.) (*F.R.* Surat 90, Surat to Bomb. 24th April and 1 June, 1682.) On 6th April, Chimmaji, zamindar of Kharg-garh, who had deserted Shambhu, had audience of the Emperor. (*M.A.* 218.) On 26th July 1683, Qazi Haidar, Shivaji's *munshi*, did the same, (*M.A.* 234), and was created a 2-hazari and a Khan, and later on

* This Avji Pandit could not have been Avji Ballal, the son of Shivaji's chitnis Balaji Avji, who was a *Prabhu*. Yet he was a person of importance, as a Dombay letter of 27 Nov. 1680 informs us, "Avji Pandit, a person of great esteem and quality, in Shivaji's time commanded the army next under Moro Pandit; he came to the island on the 20th instant, with a letter from Shambhuji complaining of our harbouring the Siddi." [*O. M.* 116.] I conjecture that he was Avji Mahadev, a *Karkun* mentioned in *Sabhasad, Bakhar*, 4th ed., p. 103.

(1706) rose to be chief Qazi of the Empire. In Nov. 1684, a Rajah under Shambhuji, intending to desert, went away to Nasik with his permission on a pretended pilgrimage; but Shambhu, detecting his real object, at once sent a large force after him which cut off the unsuspecting Rajah and most of his 2,000 retainers. [Dharangaon to Surat, 18 Nov.] In 1683 he had also a dispute with the Rajah of Sunda, who had evidently withheld tribute, so that Shambhuji had to threaten him through a Brahman envoy. (Surat to Karwar, 19th May 1683, in *F.R.* Surat 91.)

Khem Savant (ruler of Kudal and a vassal of Shambhuji) rebelled against him and took the side of the Portuguese, who reinforced him with three hundred men of their own. Khem Savant now roamed over Savant-vadi, burning and robbing many places in the Maratha kingdom immediately north of Goa, (Feb. 1685.) He with two other rebels, named Dulva Nayak (of Phonda) and Ram Dalvi, had taken refuge in Portuguese territory and Shambhuji had promised to pardon them in the Luso-Maratha treaty of January 1684. But as they were without employment, hunger drove them to renew their lawless disturbances. The three rebels mustered a force of 15,000 men between them and with the active backing of the Portuguese after the disruption of the above peace, they made Goa a safe

base for their operations and kept South Konkan and Kanara in turmoil, "so that the Rajah's people are in a miserable condition in several parts of his country." [Karwar to Surat, 19 Feb. 1685.]

The contagion spread. The whole coast region was up in arms against Shambhuji. As the Surat factors write (21st April), "Shambhuji Rajah's affairs on this coast are in no good condition, the Mughal pressing hard upon him hath made some of his own people to rise up against him." In the same month we learn, "the desai of Kadra is in rebellion and has robbed some merchants and burnt several houses belonging to the Rajah's [i.e., Shambhuji's] people, and the subahdar with his people have been there and burnt his house, and he is flown into the woods for refuge, but is daily expected to return and do more mischief, for he is assisted by the Dalvi, who is still in rebellion with the desais about Phonda and those parts. And it is now reported that Seyacka [=Sharza Khan] doth take part with ditto rebels, and is come to Ramghat with 6,000 horse, part of which are already down the Ghat,—which has made Ramchandra Pandit and Dharmaji Pandit [the local Maratha governors] fly away in such haste that they have left some of their elephants behind them....It is thought the Dalvi will come suddenly to take this country" [Karwar to Surat, 8 Apr. 1685, in O.M. 118.] In January

next (1686) we have the same sickening tale of dissolution of Government.

All the Mughal divisions operating against Akbar had, as we have seen, been recalled to the Emperor's side early in April 1683. Shihab-ud-din Khan, who had been posted near Junnar, came to the Court in June. In the enforced inactivity of the rainy season (June and July) all the army chiefs were summoned to the imperial headquarters at Aurangabad and a council of war was held which matured a grand plan of campaign for attacking the enemy by means of several independent army corps from different points simultaneously.

The Mughal offensive was opened at the end of the rainy season, about the middle of September. A few days after 15th September, Shah Alam marched out of Aurangabad with a grand army* to penetrate into Savant-vadi and South Konkan by the Ramghat pass, while Shihab-ud-din was sent to Puna (Oct.), from which he made a raid on Nizampur in the Kolaba district across the Ghats (27 Dec.) Prince Azam, who had been sent against Bijapuri territory (on 20th August), returned to Court in October and was transferred to Nasik (Nov.), to guard the nothward road to Baglana and Khandesh, the Siddi cruised off Vingurla watching Akbar's

* 45,000 horsemen (*Storia*, ii. 272); 20,000 cavalry (*K. K.* ii. 291.)

movements (Oct.), the Emperor himself marched further south to Ahmadnagar (Nov.) and another army corps (under Khan-i-Jahan) was advanced from Bidar to Akalkot to watch the Golkonda and Bijapur frontiers and prevent those Powers from making any diversion in aid of the Marathas. [*M.A.* 236, 239.]

The time was well-chosen. Shambhu was in the thick of his war with the Portuguese and had concentrated all his resources against Goa (Nov.) to strike a decisive blow. Aurangzib had already made an alliance with the Portuguese, promising them the lands that they might wrest from the Marathas, while on their part they agreed to give him naval aid and allow his provision-boats to pass up their rivers to feed the Mughal army of invasion, though they could be never wholly free from the fear that he would treacherously try to seize Goa. (*Storia*, ii. 260—278.)

§ 22. *Shah Alam invades South Konkan.*

From Aurangabad Shah Alam marched due south through Bijapuri territory, was joined by Hasan Ali Khan with his contingent from the bank of the Bhima (Bahadurgarh?), and then crossing the Krishna entered the Belgaum district in the Western Karnatak. Here he began to meet with Maratha opposition and advanced slowly and very cautiously,

with the brave and skilful Ranmast Khan and Daud Khan as commanders of his vanguard. A detachment took the "strong stone fort of Shahpur standing on the plain,"—evidently the *pettah* close to Belgaum fortress, in two days. So, too, Sampgaon (18 m. s. e. of Belgaum) and some other large cities and a few forts of that region were captured from the Marathas, and "much booty was taken" in this, the first Mughal invasion of the district. Then the Prince turned sharply to the west, crossed the Ramghat pass (26 m. due west of Belgaum) and descended into the plains of Savant-vadi, while Hasan Ali Khan held the top of the pass with 5,000 men to guard the line of communication.

The crossing of the pass was effected with great difficulty in about a week. Shambhuji had been too much engrossed by his attack on Goa to think of disputing the passage while the Mughal army was painfully toiling through the defile and jungle. He offered battle to the Mughals two* marches beyond the pass, but was routed after heavy slaughter on both sides. Ramghat is only 30 miles north-east of Goa as the crow flies. The Mughal penetration of it automatically raised the siege of Goa.

On 23rd December Shambhuji hurriedly

* So in Ishwardas. I think *ten* instead of *two* was meant by the author, as we learn from Manucci that the encounter took place near Goa.

retreated northwards for Raigarh, leaving Kavikalash to make a settlement with the Portuguese from Bhingarh and Phonda. Shah Alam reached Bicholim on 5th January, 1684, and there demolished the spacious mansions and pleasure-gardens of Shambhuji and Akbar. Three days afterwards a large Mughal fleet rode into Goa harbour with provisions for the Prince's army.

On arriving near Goa, Shah Alam demanded a huge fee from the Portuguese for having saved them from being plundered by Shambhu! He then tried to bring the imperial gallivats from the sea up the river of Goa to his camp. This the Portuguese disallowed as likely to endanger the safety of their city, and in revenge the Prince ordered his army to plunder the village of Nerul in Bardes. If we may believe Manucci, he also plotted to seize Goa by treachery. This rupture with the Portuguese was the worst mistake that the Prince could have committed, because it ultimately caused the annihilation of his army through famine.

From the neighbourhood of Goa Shah Alam marched northwards to Malvan and there blew up with gunpowder the famous white temple and other edifices belonging to the Maratha king. Kudal and Banda (in Savant-vadi) were burnt and Vingurla sacked by him during this expedition. Turning south again he returned to the bank of the Chapora

river, (north of Goa), either to establish touch with his provision-vessels or to make a second attempt on the Portuguese capital. (*Storia*, ii. 286.)

§ 23. *Disastrous retreat of Shah Alam, 1684.*

It was now March and the further progress of the Mughal army was stopped by famine. It had been Aurangzib's original plan that while Shah Alam's army would work its way northwards through the Ratnagiri district, another division under Shihab-ud-din would enter Konkan from the north by the Devghat, advance conquering southwards, and join hands with the Prince near Mahad. This second body did indeed gain many victories and looted Nizampur, 11 miles north of Raigarh (27 Dec. *Jedhe S., Dil.* 182.) But its junction with the Prince now proved impossible.

As early as September 1683 the Emperor had ordered his governor of Surat to buy four lakhs of maunds of corn there for feeding the Prince's army in Konkan. (Surat to Bomb. 2nd Oct.) Two months later the Mughal provision-fleet of 12 vessels was ready at Surat and expected to sail for Vingurla and Goa on 21st Dec. (*Ibid*, 17th Dec.) Portuguese suspicion had prevented the fleet from sailing up the creek of Goa to the Prince's camp, but in Bardes he received from these vessels

a supply of grain.* It was however insufficient for a large army like his own and seems to have been wastefully consumed, while no corn could be secured locally, and famine was raging in Goa. (*Storia*, ii. 286.) The Prince's only work in Konkan had been, as the English merchants remark, "to range to and fro, as he pleases, with little resistance. He hath taken no stronghold but ruins the country, lays all waste and burns all towns he comes near." (Surat to Hugli, 28th Mar. 1684.) The factors also record the universal report that the Prince and his officers were bribed by Shambhu into wasting their time and men by aimless marches and fruitless raids. (Surat to Co., 30th Nov. 1683.)†

'The army ranging along the coast found no forage for their horses, nor food for themselves. "The scarcity in the camp reached an extreme point. Nay more, for some days the very name of grain was unknown. The soldiers through fasting retained only the last breath of their lives." (Ishwardas, 89*a*.) Just then a consignment of provisions

* *Dilkasha* says that the Prince received grain twice, Ishwardas says once, by ship from the Siddi base of Danda-Rajpuri.

† "So long as he [Shambhu] can anyway get money to feed the Umrahs, who sell the King's interest and honour daily,..... and not only they, but the whole soldiery account *Shambhuji their bread*, so that it is not their interest to destroy him, for then they may lose their employment and income, for when the King's occasions require them not, they are laid aside." Also Fryer.

was landed by the Siddi and the Prince returned to the *ghat* on 20th February.

His difficulties only thickened. In the narrow Ramghat pass, the air bred a pestilence of such virulence that in a week one-third of his men died, none escaping who was attacked. The horses, elephants and camels perished in an even larger proportion and their carcasses poisoned the air. This failure of transport led to a second famine, and "the soldiers had more than enough to undergo." The troopers had to trudge on foot on the death of their remounts, and many of the officers (*amirs*) even had no horse left to ride on. "Many died of the great heat and thirst they underwent." (*Storia*, ii. 287, K. K. ii. 292.)

About the middle of April the Emperor heard the news of the disaster and immediately sent his Chief Paymaster, Ruhullah Khan, with a strong force and many transport beasts and horses to reinforce the Prince (*M.A.* 242—243) and bring him back in safety. Shah Alam crossed the pass and descended into the Kanara plains. The enemy hovered round, cut off stragglers and plundered the baggage and convoys "in all directions". The miserable remnant of the army, with its woe-begone condition somewhat concealed by the gifts of the Emperor and Khan-i-Jahan on the way, passed some 20 miles west of Indi, and reached Ahmadnagar on 18th

May (*M.A.* 244; *Dil.* 183)*, without having done anything except burning a few villages and robbing a few towns.

§ 24. *Minor operations, 1683-85.*

Towards the end of 1683 the Emperor arrived at Ahmadnagar. From this centre he used to send flying columns to drive away the Marathas wherever they were reported to be raiding, while large independent armies under his sons Shah Alam and Azam and his chief generals Khan-i-Jahan and Shihab-ud-din Khan (finally created Firuz Jang) were posted at important strategic positions for conquering the enemy's dominions. Thus in December 1683 Sarbuland Khan was detached from Ahmadnagar to punish a Maratha band near Bahadurgarh, Ruhullah Khan to the bank of the Nira, and Bahramand Khan towards Ashti, while Mamur Khan gained a great victory over the Marathas, probably in the Puna district. (*M.A.* 240.)

Then the Marathas appeared in the north, and in January 1684 Bahramand Khan had to march

* The best accounts of this expedition are those by Ishwardas (full) and Manucci (latter half only.) *K. K.* (ii. 280, 291—292) and *Dil.* (181 and 183) tell us nothing new. The few references in *F. R.* have been already given. The Portuguese records and *Jedhe S.* supply some useful details and dates. *B.S.* 528, 531 says that the Prince reached Ahmadnagar on 29th June, by way of Bidri and Tikota.

to the neighbourhood of Mungi-Pattan to disperse them. Shortly afterwards Khan-i-Jahan after a forced march of 60 miles defeated "the infidels" with heavy slaughter on the bank of the Krishna and captured their property. (*M.A.* 241.)

Shihab-ud-din Khan, who had gained many victories over the Marathas, was highly rewarded on 24th Dec. 1683 and given the title of Ghazi-ud-din Khan. [*M.A.* 240.] In the following February and March Prince Azam was posted at Bahadurgarh in the south, Bahramand Khan at Nasik in the north-west, and Shihab-ud-din Khan at Puna and Garh Namuna in the south-west, whilst Ruhullah Khan marched to the far south in April to reinforce and escort the broken remnant of Shah Alam's army after the Ramghat expedition. In the same month 112 officers of Shambhuji who had been captured were put to death by order of the Emperor. (*M.A.* 240-243.) In May, the Mughals occupied Sangola and Mangalvide. (*B.S.* 530). During the rainy season (June—September) of this year the Mughal army intended to canton along the brow of the Western Ghats "for the greater conveniency of coming down on surprise; they keep as yet good correspondence with all places belonging to the king of Bijapur, but.....have proclaimed that whoever they find in Shambhuji's territories must expect no mercy." (Karwar to Surat, 7th May 1684, in *F.R.*

Surat 109.) But their signal victories over the Marathas enabled the imperialists to change their plan of war and send considerable forces against Bijapur in the winter of this year.

Their campaign in the first half of 1684 was highly successful; many Maratha forts were taken, their field armies repeatedly defeated, and much territory annexed. Their crowning feat was the capture of two wives, one daughter and three slave-girls of Shambhuji, who were confined in the fort of Bahadurgarh in July. (*M.A.* 245-246.) One wife and one sister of the Maratha king had been captured before by Dilir Khan and lodged in Ahmadnagar fort. [*Akh.* 27 Nov. 1681.]

Where was Shambhuji all this time? After the failure of his attack on Goa at the end of 1683, he entirely gave himself up to pleasure. On 10th February 1684, the Dutch factors write, "Shambhuji is not in very good odour with his officers. He diverts himself far too much with women and drink." (*D.R.* vol. 37, No. 936.) Manucci (ii. 258) gives the same evidence, "Shambhuji's victories were not the fruit of his own labour, but were due to his officers. He was much more inclined to spend his time with women, amusement, and wine, than to take the field and emulate the example of valour and untiring exertion bequeathed him by his father." The Maratha ministers, however, were wise enough to

aid Bijapur when Adil Shah was hard pressed by the Mughals, but from the character of their master such aid was not effective* like that given by Shivaji in 1679.

The rainy season and the month of fasting (August 1684) being over, the campaign was resumed in September. On the 21st of that month Shihab-ud-din Khan was sent against the Maratha capital, Raigarh.† About the middle of January 1685, he made a fresh dash into Konkan by the Bhorghat and set fire to the village (Pachad) at the foot of this fort, "slew many of the infidel chiefs, plundered their wealth and property, made many captives and gained a great victory," but at Gagoli he was attacked by Kavi-kalash and forced to withdraw [*Jedhe.*] For his brilliant success he was created Khan Bahadur Firuz Jang, and lavishly

* On 15th June 1684 the Karwar factors write, "The major part of the Mughal's army lies at Bijapur gates :..... they will compel the king to send his army with them against Shambhuji or take his country. The poor king [Sikandar] is in a perplexed dilemmaShambhuji recruits him with money and men but in vain." (*F. R. Surat* 109.)

† This date is given by *M.A.* 248, but it ought to be one month earlier. On 3rd Sept. the factors at Vissava wrote to Surat, "just now came news that the Mughal forces have surrounded Rairi." On 19th Feb. 1685, the Karwar factors write, "We hear there is another party [of Mughal troops] of 40,000 horse at the foot of Rairi." (*F. R. Surat* 109).

rewarded along with his officers. On his return to Court on 26th March he received further favours. (*M.A.* 248-255.)

In October 1684, we find Mughal outposts holding Chakan, Garh Namuna and Supa in the Puna district. Many Maratha captains were induced by Firuz Jang to desert to the imperial side, among them being Padamji, Ankoji, Malhar Rao, and Subhan Chand, and, later, Arjunji the son of Shambhu's uncle. In May 1685 more of his officers,—Babaji (or Manaji), Vikaji, Nagoji and one Shambhuji—were won over by Aurangzib. [Jaipur records.] Early in December Kondana was captured by Abdul Qadir; evidently it was poorly defended. (*M.A.* 249-258.) While every Maratha soldier was sorely needed for home defence, they made the mistake of blindly following their policy of *mulḱ-giri* and raiding Khandesh. On 5th February 1685 they entered Dharangaon, plundered it, and burnt about a quarter part of the town or more than 1,000 houses. This band of horsemen was only six to seven thousand strong and led by Ranke Rao (? Ranga or Janki Rao) and Niloji Pandit. The incursion did not continue for more than eight days; but this small force in such a short time “made a vast havoc in the country,seeing that the king [Aurangzib] had drawn most of his forces towards Bijapur and left the passages on this side but thinly guarded.” (Jetpad

to Surat, 12th Feb., in *F.R. Surat* 109.) At the same time there were frequent conspiracies against Shambhuji and rumours about his being deposed and even killed. In February the imperialists gained the fort and town of Karwar. (Karwar to Surat, 19 Feb. 1685, in *F.R. Surat* 109.)

But at the end of March the siege of Bijapur began, the Mughal forces were concentrated there, and in May the Emperor himself arrived at Sholapur to direct the operations. The pressure upon the Marathas ceased, and the war entered on a new stage.

§ 25. *Shambhuji and the English.*

We have already explained why Shambhuji did not go to war with the English traders of the west coast, in spite of the provocations he had received from them, and how the English successfully observed a policy of "keeping fair with all" the rival Powers of the land. A closer approach between the two was made in 1684.

On 27th December 1683, Captain Richard Keigwin, at the head of a band of English mutineers, seized the fort of Bombay from the East India Company's governor, and proclaimed the direct rule of the king of England over the island. He adopted a vigorous policy and, in April 1684, forced Siddi

Qasim, the Mughal admiral, to respect the neutrality of Bombay by ceasing to make that island the base of his operations against the Maratha villages on the mainland opposite to it. At this time an ambassador of the Maratha State was prisoner to one of the Mughal generals who wanted to put him to death. But Keigwin by friendly negotiations secured the person of the ambassador and set him free. These two events highly pleased Shambhuji, who gave up all hostile intentions towards the English. Keigwin seized the opportunity by sending at the end of April two ambassadors (Captain Henry Gary and Lt. Thomas Wilkins) with Ram Shenvi as interpreter, to Shambhuji, to settle the long-standing differences about the indemnity claimed by the English for Shivaji's sack of their Rajapur factory in March 1661 and other matters and to make a friendly alliance with the Maratha Rajah. The mission was a complete success. Shambhuji granted all the demands of the English and signed two agreements with them containing 30 and 11 articles [*Orme MSS.* 118.]

Among the terms agreed upon the more important were the following, (all the benefits were to be reciprocally shared by the subjects of the two States) :—

- (1) The observance of neutrality in each other's wars.

- (2) Permission to the English to settle factories and carry on trade in all parts of the Maratha kingdom, including the Madras Karnatak, on the payment of a single import duty of $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.
- (3) English shipping to be allowed to take refuge in Shambhuji's ports, when driven by stress of weather, without hindrance or demand of custom duty. Property in wrecks to be given back to owners, as was the rule of Shivaji.
- (4) No English factory in the Mughal territory to be plundered by Maratha invaders.
- (5) English merchandise on board Mughal vessels captured by the Marathas to be restored to the English.
- (6) Bombay island to be allowed to buy wood (fuel) in Shambhuji's dominions free of custom duty.
- (7) Maratha officers to help the English to recover their debts from Shambhuji's subjects and to do them justice when such subjects offended against them.
- (8) English trade not to be molested in transit nor illegal perquisites exacted by local governors from them; English not to

be hindered in employing weavers and watchmen or in sending messengers with letters through the Maratha kingdom.

- (9) Out of the 10,000 *hun* promised by Shivaji as compensation for the loot of Rajapur, Hubli and other factories, the outstanding balance, 6633 *hun*, was to be paid to the English by the Maratha governor of Rajapur "in coconuts, betel-nuts &c. by degrees according to the time," after deducting from this amount the money spent by the Maratha Government in rebuilding the English factory-house at Rajapur. [The full details and all the connected papers have been printed by me in the *Puna 9th Sammelan Proceedings* (Mandal Quarterly), pp. 30-44.]

CHAPTER XLV

THE FALL OF BIJAPUR, 1685-6.

§ 1. *Aurangzib's policy towards Bijapur from 1680 to 1683.*

For four years after Dilir Khan's failure and retreat (February 1680), nothing was done by the Mughals against Bijapur, as they were harried and distracted by the fertile audacity of Shambhuji, who raided various points in the imperial dominions with startling rapidity and unexpectedness. The Adil-Shahis got a respite from foreign attack, but it was of no avail to them; their monarchy was now in the last agonies of dissolution, the sad story of which will be unfolded in this chapter.

After the last invasion under Dilir had been rolled back, the regent Siddi Masaud highly rewarded the victorious Berad chieftain, Pam Nayak. He also released his former favourite Venkatadri Murari from prison (where he had been confined from 12 Aug. 1679 to 12 May 1680), after torturing and fleecing him, though this Brahman's diplomatic skill had detached Sharza Khan from the Mughals and brought him back to the side of his old master, Adil Shah. (B.S. 523.)

His rebel son Akbar having taken refuge with Shambhuji, Aurangzib hurriedly patched up a peace with the Maharana of Udaipur (14th June, 1681), left Rajputana for the South on 8th Sep., and reached Burhanpur two months later. At this stage, Shambhuji was his only enemy, and no invasion of Bijapur or Golkonda was as yet contemplated. Indeed, Aurangzib wrote a friendly letter to Sharza Khan, the leading general of Bijapur, (13th July, 1681), pressing him to co-operate with the Mughal generals in crushing Shambhuji and recovering the Bijapur territory he had usurped: "The Emperor is going to the Deccan to punish Shambhu and wrest the Bijapuri forts from him. Don't be alarmed, but assist Khan-i-Jahan in this work." Shahar Banu, the Bijapuri princess recently married to Azam, also sent a personal appeal to Sharza (18th July), saying "Help the imperialists loyally for the good of the Bijapur State. Conquer the infidel's possessions." (B.S. 520-21, 528.)*

* The political situation in 1682 and 1683 is well described in a Dutch factory letter dated 10th Feb. 1684: "Previously the residents had learnt that the Bijapur captains Siddi Masaud Khan and Sayyid Makhdum had sent envoys to the Mughal to learn why it pleased him to make war on them, since they scarce had enough lands and property to keep them alive, for Shambhuji had taken everything from them. To which the monarch replied that his action was directed not so much against them as against Shambhuji.....So, they came to an agreement that the Mughal should pay them half a Rupee a day for any horseman, and moreover entertain them suitably whenever they helped

But a rupture with Bijapur could not be long averted. No response came from any Adil-Shahi officer to the Emperor's appeal for co-operation with him by recovering what Shambhuji had seized of their master's territory; "they would not leave the side of Shambhu," as the Bijapur historian frankly admits. (B.S. 528.) The Emperor received repeated and clear proofs of the help that the Marathas used to get from the Bijapuri Government. Adil Shah's secret treaty with Shivaji in 1663 had been strengthened by the Maratha king's priceless services in defeating Dilir Khan's attempt on Bijapur in 1679. And in Shambhuji, both Adil Shah and his advisers knew that they had their only reliable friend in the day of need.

So, Aurangzib decided to increase the pressure on Shambhuji by making a diversion against the Bijapuris and compelling them to concentrate their resources on the defence of their own realm. As early as January 1682, a division under Ruhullah Khan was detached to invade Bijapur territory, evidently the northern frontier of it, which had been a scene of anarchy since the accession of the

to wage war on Shambhuji, and if they recovered the lands taken from them [by the Marathas], they were to hold them as before in fee.....It is said that a great number of Mughal horse has invaded Bijapur and wished to compel the young king to add his weak forces to theirs and attack Shambhuji." [Dutch Rec. Vol. 37.]

boy-king Sikandar and the outbreak of faction-fights at his Court. The object of this expedition was simply to ravage as much of Bijapuri territory as possible and curb Shambhuji's activity in the Parenda and Sholapur region. The detachment did not effect, nor was it intended to effect, any conquest. It was evidently too small to do anything more than raid defenceless villages and lay corn-fields waste, and it soon returned to headquarters. (*M.A.* 216-218.)

On 13th May, 1682, an envoy from Bijapur waited on the Emperor at Aurangabad with a few presents, but these peace-offerings were not accepted. A month later, a much larger force was sent under Prince Azam to enter Bijapur territory. He ravaged the frontier, took the fort of Dharur (about 140 miles north of Bijapur), and tried to fight his way to the environs of the Adil-Shahi capital. The campaign languished for many months, and the Prince had not advanced further south than the Nira river when he was recalled to Court (June 1683). His force was inadequate for the purpose of conquering the vast Adil-Shahi kingdom, and this fact was recognized by the Emperor. After the rainy season, Azam was again sent to invade Bijapur (20th August), but was two months later transferred to Nasik (30th October), and these desultory attacks on Bijapur

ceased for a time. (M.A. 218-219, 230, 239; B.S. 529.)

§ 2. *Aurangzib actively attacks Bijapuri territory, 1684.*

But on 13th November 1683, the Emperor himself arrived at Ahmadnagar to direct the operations, and a vigorous campaign was begun. On the 13th February following, Azam was sent to Bahadurgarh (Pedgaon), about 45 miles south of Ahmadnagar, and made it his headquarters for a year. The Mughal plan of war at this stage was to establish a number of outposts in the Bijapur territory,—under Azam in the north-west and Khan-i-Jahan in the north-east of that kingdom,—and try to occupy or at least to ravage the surrounding lands. The great energy thrown by both sides into the Maratha war in the first half of 1684 prevented the Mughals from undertaking any serious enterprise against Bijapur. Moreover, during the earlier months of the year, the disastrous march of Shah Alam into South Konkan diverted all the imperial resources into that quarter. Bijapur was besieged in right earnest only as late as March 1685. And we shall have to revert to the internal affairs of that city in order to understand this crisis in its history.

The condition of Bijapur was now hopeless. Five years' *wazir*-ship at the decadent Court of Adil

Shah had thoroughly disgusted Siddi Masaud with a post which brought him only trouble, anxiety and loss of money. "With all his efforts he failed to reform the government or restore order in the administration. No man from peasant to chieftain ate his bread in peace of mind for a single day; none from king to beggar slept in happiness for a single night."* Despairing of improving the administration or propping up the falling throne of Sikandar, and eager to create for himself an independent principality in the Karnul district safe beyond the Krishna and Tungabhadra, in view of the rapidly approaching extinction of the Adil-Shahi monarchy, Masaud left the Court on 21st November 1683, on the pretext of a visit to his jagir, and formally resigned his post on reaching his fort of Adoni. Aqa Khusrau was invested with the robe of *wazir* on 19th March 1684, but died in six months (11th October). And then the implacable Mughal foe was already knocking at the gate of the capital. (B.S. 523-524.)

§ 3. *Bijapuri defence measures.*

In view of the constant Mughal encroachments,

* B.S. 525, "Masaud was expert in defending forts, but loved to cherish low people and suspected his friends and even his own wives and sons. He failed to conciliate the army or the peasantry. His six confidants were his brother-in-law, a slave, a water-carrier, an athlete, a cotton-dresser, and a Brahman Persian secretary named Venkatadri."

vigorous steps had been taken for the defence of the realm: Sikandar had entrusted this task (3rd March 1684) to his bravest general Sayyid Makhdum, surnamed Sharza Khan, the head of a family famous throughout the Deccan for valour and martial skill. At the same time he invited his vassal Pam Nayak of Wagingera, to come to the capital with his Berad clansmen, who were reputed as the bravest foot-soldiers and best shots in the country.

On 30th March, a letter was received from Aurangzib, calling upon Adil Shah as a vassal, to supply provisions to the imperial army promptly, allow the Mughal troops a free passage through his territory, supply a contingent of 5 or 6 thousand cavalry for the Emperor's war with the Marathas, abstain from helping or harbouring Shambhuji, and expel Sharza Khan from his country! In the meantime the Mughals continued to appropriate bits of the Adil-Shahi kingdom and establish their own outposts in it. At the end of May, Khan-i-Jahan took possession of Mangalvide and Sangola and their environs. So, Sikandar sent a spirited reply to Aurangzib, demanding that the Mughals should return to him the tribute and territory they had exacted in the past, withdraw their outposts from his dominions, march against Shambhuji through their own territory only, and never make peace

with the Maratha king till they had recovered from him and restored to Adil Shah every inch of his territory that Shambhuji or Shivaji had usurped, and, finally, refusing to banish Sharza Khan. (B.S. 530.)

“The show of friendship which Aurangzib had so long kept up with Adil Shah, was now dispelled, as the Emperor became convinced of Sikandar’s unalterable determination to support Shambhu.” The Mughal generals were now ordered to plant outposts in Bijapuri territory and they at once came into collision with Sharza Khan, who was guarding the land, but whose force was repulsed with heavy loss (near Jālihal.) But even then war did not formally break out; for some months after, Sikandar continued to receive letters and robes of honour from the Mughal Court, and even pretended to be equipping a contingent for co-operating with Prince Azam against the Marathas. In the meantime, he was busy seeking allies. An envoy was sent to Golkonda (30th July), earnestly beseeching aid, and a messenger despatched to Siddi Masaud at Adoni for his advice. The defence of the environs of the capital was entrusted to Chintu Chimna, a Brahman, (18th June), while the premier noble, Nawab Abdur Rauf, with Sharza Khan as his right-hand man, took the command of the field army. (B.S. 532).

The Bijapuris are said to have made two brisk sallies on the Mughal army in June and inflicted a severe defeat on Azam in August, 1684. (F.R. Surat 109, Karwar to Surat 15 June, Surat to Karwar 22 Aug.)

In January 1685, Sharza Khan returned to the capital, and a son of Masaud came to deliver his father's counsels to the Sultan. Shortly before, promise of support had arrived from Golkonda. On 21st February a Maratha contingent under Shambhuji's *diwan* Melgiri Pandit reached Bijapur and was welcomed by the Sultan from the Zuhrapur gate. Diplomatic relations with the Mughals had already ceased, and both sides were preparing for an appeal to the sword.

True, there had been another collision between the Mughals who were setting up outposts near Turgal and the Bijapuri troops who opposed it (January), but the war was precipitated at the end of March, when the Mughal army arrived within sight of Bijapur. On 28th March, Khwajah Abdur Rahim, the Mughal envoy, was attacked by the Adil-Shahi troops and the imperialists hastened to his aid. Next day the fort was reconnoitred from the side of Daulatpur (or Khawasapur) and Raz Muhammad's tomb, and on 1st April 1685 the first

trenches were opened and the siege of Bijapur began.* (*B.S.* 533-534.)

§ 4. *City of Bijapur described.*

As the traveller enters the Bijapur district from its northern boundary near Sholapur, he passes through a vast desolate plain, absolutely treeless, uncultivated and untenanted by man as far as the eye can see. For forty miles this stretch of country is a monotonous succession of low wavy uplands which grow a crop of millet during the three months of rain but are covered with dry dust-coloured grass or expose large patches of black trap-rock for the rest of the year. Hidden deep among the uplands are the beds of some streams, with a few trees and hamlets and patches of cultivation, forming a pleasing oasis in the surrounding desert. The landscape is extremely depressing by reason of its barrenness and dreary by reason of its monotony; even the villages look deserted on account of their ruined battlements and houses with flat mud roofs and blind walls all around.

Half way across this plain the southern horizon is first seen to be pierced by a gigantic faint white

* A contemporary official return (*Zawabit*, 138) tells us that Aurangzib assembled at the siege of Bijapur, 2900 *barqandazes*, 23,027 *ahsham*, 110 pieces of artillery, 40 *gajnal*, 154 *shutarnal*, 404 (?) *banduq*, and 7561 maunds of powder. The *Chahar Gulshan* (89a) says that 77,105 horse and foot was the armed strength of the besiegers.

bubble,—the largest dome in the world, standing 300 feet above the ground, which dominates the entire landscape. It is the *Gol Gumbaz* or tomb of Muhammad Adil Shah. Coming nearer, as the railway climbs up from a dip in the ground, Bijapur suddenly bursts into view like a dream city, with its strange mingling of beauty and melancholy, its sadly impressive grandeur derived from palace and tomb. "Far on every side the country is covered with buildings of varied shapes in different stages of decay. A number of tombs, mosques, palaces and towers lie scattered in every direction. To the right (*i.e.*, north-west of the city), the white domes of Pir Amin's tomb gleam in the sunlight, a brilliant contrast to the dark grey ruins in the foreground. In front lie the city's massive walls and bastions, with here and there a stately building towering over the fortifications, while on the left the colossal proportions of the *Gol Gumbaz* dwarf its surroundings. Still further to the left (*i.e.*, north-east of the city), the plain outside is dotted with tombs, among which is conspicuous the massive dark grey mausoleum of *Ain-ul-mulk*." (*Bomb. Gaz.* xxiii.)

The city walls enclose two and a half square miles of land, forming an ellipse. After crossing the deep moat, 40 to 50 feet broad, we meet the massive and strong walls, varying in height from 30 to 50 feet, with an average thickness of 20 feet and

strengthened with 96 bastions besides ten at the gates. The broad masonry platform, which constitutes the top of the walls all around the fort, was protected inside by a battlemented curtain wall ten feet high running from bastion to bastion and loopholed for artillery and small arms. The strongest bastions are three, namely the Lion Tower (*Sharzi Burj*) on the west, built in 1658, and containing the famous cannon *Malik-i-maidan*; the *Landa Kasab Burj* in the south wall, completed in 1662, and armed with the largest gun at Bijapur; and the *Firangi Burj*, built by a Portuguese general in 1576 with extreme durability and massiveness. Aurangzib seems to have let the *Sharzi Burj* alone and directed the whole fire of his artillery against the *Landa Kasab* tower, pitted it with shot-marks, and breached the curtain wall close by. Between this tower and the *Firangi Burj* is the Mangali gate, which was renamed *Fath Darwaza* after Aurangzib's victorious entrance into the city through it. In the plain outside, some distance south of this gate, stands the tomb of Ikhlas Khan, a convenient advanced post for the besiegers, which changed hands repeatedly during the siege, as its battered condition graphically tells the visitor to this day. As for the five large gateways in the city wall, they were impregnable with the siege appliances known in the

17th century and Aurangzib wisely made no attempt to force them.

In the heart of the city there is an inner fortification, called the *qila ark* or citadel, forming a circle about a mile in circumference and "a perfect treasury of artistic buildings. Its defences are a strong curtain, with, on the south and east, several bastions of considerable strength, a *fausse braye* or rampart mound and ditch, the whole well-built and massive. The *fausse braye* is very wide, especially on the north and north-west, where a second wet ditch was cut at the foot of the rampart, which on these sides was very low." But "the site of the citadel is unfavourable. It is almost the lowest part of the city and is commanded by the rising ground on the north-west, on which is built the *Upri Burj*. It seems unlikely that such a citadel could have ever stood for any time against an enemy armed with artillery who had forced the city fortifications." But all the royal palaces and public offices of the Adil Shahs were situated within this inner enclosure. (Bomb. Gaz. xxiii.)

§ 5. *Siege of Bijapur begins.*

The Mughals began their siege operations on 1st April, 1685, when Ruhullah Khan and Qasim Khan opened their trenches on the Shahpur or N. W. side, half a mile from the fort-wall, with a large

tank in their rear, while Khan-i-Jahan ran his approaches near Zuhrapur or Rasulpur in the west, a mile from the wall, enjoying the shelter of this large suburb. The supporting army of Prince Azam was posted far in the south-west, on the bank of the Tungabhadra,* where the Bijapuris under Sharza attacked it early in April, but were routed with heavy loss. (*M.A.* 256; *Dil.* 185—186; *B.S.* 534.)

The Emperor felt it necessary to go nearer to the scene of war. On 26th April he left Ahmadnagar and on 24th May reached Sholapur, which continued as his headquarters till next year. But at first the Mughal operations were languidly

*The movements of Azam's divisions in the Karnatak portion of the Bombay Presidency are described fully in the Factory Records (only source.) On 19th February 1685, the Karwar factors write, "Gokak, Hubli, and many other places [e.g. Karwar fort and city] are already in the possession of the Mughal's army...In all likelihood they will fall down into these parts after they have taken Bankapur and some other strong places above the Ghat." On 2nd March: "The Prince had left Dharwar for Gadak, where the army now lies, being about 40,000 horse and four or five hundred elephants. And within 4 *kos* [of him] lies about 15,000 men that belong to the king of Bijapur, who on all occasions retire a little as they find the Mughal's army to approach nearer to them." Again, on 30th April: "It is reported that Sharza Khan and Bahlol Khan with about 20,000 men have fought the Mughal's army at Kopal, and have killed them a great many men and that the Prince Sultan Azam is wounded." The Surat Council answered Karwar on 18th July, "The news you write of Sultan Azam being wounded and his forces beaten, we have confirmed from others to be true." (*F.R.* Surat, 109 and 92.)

carried on; of the two generals of the siege army, Khan-i-Jahan left Bijapur for Sholapur and was then sent off to Indi, on 29th May, to guard the line of communications with the base, while Ruhullah Khan was posted to Ahmadnagar on 15th July. Prince Azam arrived with a large army on 14th June and took over the supreme command, halting at the Begam Hauz, due south of the city. A fortnight later he came nearer the fort and began to advance his trenches, run mines and raise batteries.

The Mughals were proverbially slow and clumsy in taking forts by siege. The soil round Bijapur was, in addition, extremely hard; only a foot or two below the surface one strikes solid rock. (B.S. 536-'39.) The Mughal advance was, therefore, extremely slow and laborious. And the garrison gave them no rest. Following the time-honoured Deccani plan of war, Adil Shah kept 30,000 men in the fort for resisting the besiegers, while another and equally large army was sent out to cut the Mughal communications and raid the imperial territory. For more than a year after its commencement, the siege of Bijapur was in no sense an investment. The Mughals simply made lodgements in the suburbs at two points and tried to batter down or undermine the wall opposite. It was beyond their power to hem the fort round and prevent all ingress and egress. The garrison sallied out

whenever they liked, and attacked the siege trenches, while reinforcements and provisions freely entered the fort from outside.

§ 6. *Difficulties of the besiegers.*

Allies began to flock to Adil Shah in his distress. On 10th June Siddi Masaud's contingent arrived in response to a pathetic appeal written by Sikandar on 18th April. Next, on 14th August, a Golkonda force, under Ambaji Pandit, arrived, and finally on 10th December a second army from Shambhuji under Hambir Rao.* But the last corps was sent away a few days afterwards to create a useful diversion by ravaging the Mughal dominions,—a task more congenial to the Maratha spirit and military capacity. (B.S. 536.)

In the meantime the Mughal cause had been further weakened by an open rupture with Golkonda, which Aurangzib with all his efforts could not avert. Before beginning the siege of Bijapur, he had warned Qutb Shah not to help Sikandar in any way, if he cared for his own throne. (B.S. 533.) As early as July 1684, Sikandar had appealed to Abul Hasan for a defensive alliance, and four months later his

* *Jedhe S.* states that in July Shambhuji ordered Kavi-kalash to go to the aid of Bijapur, but the minister himself stayed at Panhala and merely despatched an army under some officers to Bijapur.

envoy had returned from Golkonda after winning over the prime minister Madanna Pandit to the wise policy of making all the Deccani Powers stand side by side against the spoiler from the North. Qutb Shah's chivalry was also touched by the distress of a brother king who was a mere lad of sixteen.

Arrived at Sholapur, Aurangzib had sent a small force under Bahramand Khan to watch the Golkonda side, (24th May, 1685.) He soon intercepted a letter from Qutb Shah to his agents at the Mughal Court, promising to send 10,000 men to the help of Sikandar and urging Shambhu to do the same. This new situation had to be met at once, and, therefore, on 28th June Shah Alam was sent with a large army to invade Haidarabad, though the Emperor knew that "this dispersion of forces was sure to cause delay and obstruction to the enterprise against Bijapur." Khan-i-Jahan who was holding the outpost of Indi, 30 miles n. e. of Bijapur, to guard the route of supplies for the investing army of Azam, was ordered to join Shah Alam. (*M.A.* 259-261.)

Prince Azam had arrived close to the fort of Bijapur (29th June, 1685) and infused more vigour into the siege; but the garrison were no less active. In less than a month he had to fight three severe battles with them. On 1st July his trenches were assailed by Abdur Rauf and Sharza Khan, and

several Mughal officers were wounded and slain, while an explosion* of the Prince's powder-magazine destroyed 500 foot-musketeers. (*M.A.* 262; *B.S.* 536.) Next day the Deccanis fell on the supplies coming to the siege-camp and evidently cut them off. On 25th July a Mughal foraging party was attacked with heavy loss near Mangali, 16 miles south of the city.

§ 7. *Famine among Mughal besiegers.*

Nor were the Bijapuris the only enemy that Azam had to face. A famine broke out in his camp; the oft-ravaged neighbourhood of Bijapur could yield no food supply, the roads from the north were closed by the activity of the Marathas and the flooded streams, as the rainy season had now set in. "Grain sold at Rs. 15 a *seer*, and that too in small quantities." (*Dil.* 198.) The hungry soldiers ate up their draught cattle and camels, and then began to pine away through lack of food and sleep, because they

* *Dilkasha*, 201, says that the explosion took place after Aurangzib's arrival at Bijapur, and that the sound of it was heard distinctly at Naldurg, 38 *kos* off. The miserable condition of Azam's army in September (before relief arrived under Firuz Jang), gave rise to strange rumours. Thus the Karwar factors write on 2nd Oct. "It is here reported that the king of Bijapur with the assistance lately received from Golkonda &c., hath given the Mughal forces a battle near Bijapur, and killed them a great many men, and taken Prince Sultan Azam prisoner, who hath since taken poison and is dead"!!! (*F.R.* Surat, 109.)

had to be ever on the alert to repel the daily sorties of the garrison and the attacks of the Bijapuri field army roving in the open. "No food came from any side. The soldiers were greatly weakened and many of them died." (*B.S.* 536; *M.A.* 263).

For lack of men the Mughal outpost at Indi, midway between Sholapur and Bijapur, had been withdrawn, and thus the road from the base to the siege-camp was closed. (*Dil* 198; *M.A.* 266.) Aurangzib saw no other means of saving his son than by ordering him to retire from Bijapur with his army. The Prince held a council of war, and told his chief officer, Ali Khan, "The work of the campaign depends upon the co-operation of my officers. I have received this order from the Emperor. Your advice on the question of war or peace, haste or delay, is a weighty thing. What is your opinion in the present case?" They all voted for a retreat. But the Prince's spirit had been roused; he would not reduce himself to the level of his rival Shah Alam, who had recently come back from Konkan covered with dismal failure. Turning to his officers, Azam exclaimed, "You have spoken for yourselves. Now listen to *me*. Muhammad Azam with his two sons and Begam will not retreat from this post of danger so long as he has life. After my death, His Majesty may come and order my corpse to be removed, for burial. You, my

followers, may stay or go away as you like." Then the council of war cried out with one voice, "Our opinion is the same as your Highness's!" (M.A. 263-264.)

§ 8. *Mughals at Bijapur reinforced.*

When this Spartan resolution of his son was reported to Aurangzib, he at once took steps to send relief. All the grain-dealers in his camp with their 5,000 pack-oxen were despatched to convey food, some treasure loaded on many hundred spare remounts, and much munition to the Prince. A strong escort under Ghazi-ud-din Khan Bahadur Firuz Jang, left the imperial camp with the party on 4th October, 1685, and fought its way to the famished army. Sharza Khan at the head of 8,000 cavalry, barred their path at Indi,* and during the encounter a detachment of Deccani horse made a swoop and carried off 500 oxen with their loads, from the centre of the Mughal host. But finally the enemy were repulsed, though with the loss of some imperial officers.

The arrival of Firuz Jang "turned scarcity into plenty in the Mughal camp, and the famished soldiers revived." His next success was the cutting off of a force of 6,000 Berad infantry, each man

* K. K. ii. 317 gives a graphic account of this battle; Ishwardas 97b. Dil. 199 says that it was fought at Nagithan. M.A. 265.

carrying a bag of provisions on his head, which Pam Nayak tried to smuggle into the fort at night. Firuz Jang, informed of the position of these men by his spies, "fell on them before daybreak and not one of them escaped the Mughal sword." The outpost of Indi was re-established in the middle of October and communication between Bijapur and Sholapur was again made secure. (M.A. 265-'6).

The outlook now brightened for the imperialists in other quarters too. Early in October, Haidarabad, the capital of Qutb Shah, was entered by Shah Alam unopposed, its ruler having shut himself up in Golkonda. Many of his officers deserted to Shah Alam, and the king wrote to Aurangzib offering submission. The Mughal control over the Qutb-Shahi State was confirmed in March, 1686, when the prime minister Madanna Pandit—who had pursued a policy of alliance with Bijapur and the Marathas,—was murdered. On 7th June Shah Alam rejoined his father, bringing tribute from Golkonda.

§ 9. *Aurangzib goes to the siege.*

By this time (June 1686) the siege of Bijapur had dragged on for 15 months with no decisive result. On 2nd November 1685 the Mughals had captured an elevated gun-platform near Bijapur and seem to have drawn their lines closer round the city.

(Ishwardas, 98*a*.) But discord and mutual jealousy broke out among their commanders. The Bijapuris, undismayed by the immense superiority of the Mughal armaments and the confusion and faction fights in their own Government, continued to offer a stubborn opposition, destroying the siege trenches and driving the Mughals back from the walls. (B.S. 537.) The Emperor realized that unless he took the command in person, the fort would not fall. As he told a holy Shaikh of Sarhind, "I had hoped that one of my sons would take the fort; but it is not to be. So, I want to go there myself and see what kind of barrier this Bijapur is that it has not been forced so long." On 14th June 1686 he left Sholapur and on 3rd July reached Rasulpur, a suburb west of the fort. (M.A. 276-'7.) Orders were at once issued to press the siege vigorously. "He ordered Firuz Jang and the Chief of Artillery to work even harder at night than in the day and advance the trenches. The circumference of the fort was divided into sections and distributed among his generals for investment." (B.S. 539.) Working under their master's eyes the sappers carried the galleries to the edge of the moat in a short time and the city was completely beleaguered. But even then it took him 70 days more to capture it.

The Emperor had brought Shah Alam from Sholapur, and with Shah Alam he had imported the

chronic rivalry of his sons into the siege. This Prince, now the eldest living, commanded the sector opposite the north-western or Shahpur gate and wanted to steal a march over his brother Azam, the general in charge of the siege. During his long viceroyalty of the Deccan, Shah Alam had always been friendly to the Sultans of Bijapur and Golkonda, and he now opened a correspondence with Sikandar Adil Shah and his officers to effect the peaceful surrender of the fort and thus rob Azam of the credit of being called the captor of Bijapur. One of his confidential officers, Shah Quli, even used to enter the fort in secret to negotiate with the garrison, while Sayyid Alam, the agent of Sikandar, used to visit the Prince in return. "It was impossible for these intrigues to remain a secret, with a jealous rival like Azam Shah watching close at hand. The drunken ruffian and babbler Shah Quli, when visiting the trenches to change the guards, used to shout to the Bijapuris on the wall, 'These are your friends. Take care not to shoot your muskets artillery and stones this way.' The matter became the talk of the camp and reached the ears of Muhammad Azam Shah and of the Emperor." (K.K. ii. 320-321.) Shah Quli was arrested and put to torture and betrayed the whole plot and the names of his accomplices among the Prince's servants. Shah Alam was censured, but

he disavowed Shah Quli. Some of the officers incriminated were thrown into prison and the others were expelled from the camp* (28th Aug.), and the Emperor's heart grew bitter against his eldest surviving son. (M.A. 293; Ishwardas, 100b—101a.)

§ 10. *Sufferings of the besieged.*

The result of this silly backdoor diplomacy was to "throw the Bijapur enterprise into confusion." The sufferings of the besiegers were aggravated by a scarcity† which was raging in the Deccan on account of the failure of rain that year. (K.K. ii. 317.) But the sufferings of the besieged were ten times worse. The Mughals could now draw their supplies from all parts of India, the Bijapuris had to depend solely on their sterile neighbourhood. As the lines of investment were drawn closer round the city, the supply failed altogether. "Countless men and horses died within the fort," and from lack of horses the Deccanis could not follow their favourite

* M.A. 293 says that some of these secret couriers were executed.

† Ishwardas draws a lurid picture of the famine of grain and fodder in the Mughal camp and the consequent epidemic of fever and flux. But the official history and *Dilkāsha* (whose author was present in the camp by deputy) are silent about it. I fear that Ishwardas has transferred to the siege of Bijapur what happened at the siege of Golkonda a year later.

tactics of hovering round the enemy and cutting off stragglers and transport. (K.K. ii. 322; *Dil.* 202.)

In the extremity of the siege, a deputation of Muslim theologians issued from the city and waited upon Aurangzib in his camp, pleading, "You are an orthodox believer, versed in Canon Law, and doing nothing without the warrant of the *Quran* and the decrees of theologians. Tell us, how you justify this unholy war against brother Muslims like us." Aurangzib was ready with his reply. "Every word you have spoken is true. I do not covet your territory. But the infidel son of the infernal infidel (meaning Shambhuji) stands at your elbow and has found refuge with you. He is troubling Muslims from here to the gates of Delhi, and their complaints reach me day and night. Surrender him to me and the next moment I shall raise the siege." (B.S. 542.) The scholars were reduced to silence.

Shortly after Aurangzib's arrival the sap had been carried to the edge of the moat, but the filling up of the ditch seemed an impossible task. "From the fort walls the artillery struck down whosoever reached the edge of the ditch. None durst show his head. For three months the broad and deep moat remained unfilled. Then it was proclaimed that every man throwing a basket of earth into the moat would get four annas for it. But when many of the men were struck down, the labourers gave up the

work. Then one Rupee and finally one gold coin were given as the reward for throwing one basket of clay. The work was now done incessantly. Every man or beast that died was dragged and flung into the ditch. Nay more, some godless work-people, inspired by greed, threw living men and women into the ditch and took away their money ! By dint of hard exertion many of the trenches were carried to the moat and it was almost filled up." (Ishwardas, 101 b.)

When this stage was reached, Aurangzib on 4th September advanced his tent from two miles in the rear to a place immediately behind the trenches. Thither he rode fully armed, by a covered lane, and received the salute of the investing officers. Next he rode to the edge of the moat to inspect the battery raised to command the fort bastion and to learn for himself why the conquest was delayed. The Mughal troops, inspired by the Emperor's presence and words, attempted an assault on the wall opposite. But it failed. The Bijapuris fired briskly at him and his cortege, inflicting much loss. (Ishwardas, 102 a; *M.A.* 278.)

§ 11. *The Fall of the last Adil Shah.*

Bijapur fell a week after this date, but not to assault. At these proofs of the grim determination of Aurangzib and the completeness of his

preparations, the garrison lost heart. The cause of the Adil-Shahi monarchy was hopeless: the king was a plaything in the hands of selfish nobles, the administration could not possibly be reformed, the dynasty could not be restored to real power and prosperity, and all hope of help from outside was gone. The future was absolutely dark. For what master and with what prospects would the Bijapuri generals continue their resistance to the bitter end? Even to Sikandar Adil Shah himself it was hardly a change for the worse to pass from the condition of a puppet under his "mayors of the palace" to that of a pensioner under Aurangzib.

So judging, Sikandar and his officers decided on capitulation, as the only means of preventing useless bloodshed. (*B.S.* 540.) The garrison had by this time shrunk to 2,000 men. (*Dil.* 203.) In the night of 9th September the secretaries of the two Bijapuri leaders, Nawab Abdur Rauf and Sharza Khan, waited on Firuz Jang and discussed terms of surrender. Next night their masters themselves visited the Mughal general and agreed on behalf of Sikandar to yield the fort. On the 11th they repeated the visit and were introduced to Aurangzib, who received them with favour.

Sunday, 12th September, 1686, saw the downfall of the Bijapur monarchy. Amidst the tears and lamentations of his subjects who lined the streets,

Sikandar, the last of the Adil-Shahi Sultans, gave up his ancestors' throne and issued from the capital of his house, at one o'clock in the afternoon, in charge of Rao Dalpat Bundela and some other imperial officers whom Firuz Jang had sent into the fort. The fallen monarch cast a last look at the royal city, henceforth to be widowed of her lord, and passed out of the Shahi gate of the citadel towards Aurangzib's camp in Rasulpur. As soon as he came in sight, the imperial band struck up the music of triumph proclaiming far and wide the crowning success of Mughal arms. Firuz Jang with many other nobles of high rank advanced to the gate to welcome the captive and lead him to the Emperor.

Meantime the large tent which served as the Hall of Public Audience in Aurangzib's camp, had been richly decorated for this historic scene. "All the high grandees and *mansabdars*, great and small, had by order come fully armed to the Hall and each taken his stand at his proper place. Bahramand Khan, the superintendent of the Private Audience Chamber, marshalled the ranks and regulated the ceremony." When Sikandar arrived at the door of the tent, the Chief Paymaster, Ruhullah Khan, with a train of high officers, welcomed him and ushered him into the Presence. The fallen monarch made his bow at the foot of the conqueror's throne. His

extreme beauty and combined grace of youth and royalty excited universal admiration and pity for his fate. Even Aurangzib was touched: he spoke soothingly to Sikandar, "God's grace be on you! You have acted wisely and chosen your own good. I shall exalt you with many favours and gifts. Be composed in mind." Then he seated Sikandar on his right hand, close to his grandson Muizz-ud-din, and presented him with a gorgeous robe of honour, a dagger set with jewels, worth Rs. 7,000, a pearl necklace with an emerald pendant, worth Rs. 13,000, a jewelled crest (*kālgī*), and a costly mace. The deposed Sultan was enrolled among the Mughal peers with the title of *Khan* (lord), and a pension of one *lakh* of Rupees a year was settled on him. The princes and nobles present shouted their congratulations and made the customary presents to the Emperor.

After the vesper prayer, Sikandar was given leave to retire and was conducted to the tents erected for him and his family within the enclosure of the imperial residence. All the Bijapuri officers were taken over into Mughal service, their chiefs, Abdur Rauf and Sharza Khan, were created 6-*hazaris* with the titles of Dilir Khan and Rustam Khan respectively. Imperial officers took possession of Bijapur and attached Sikandar's property. (Ishwardas, 104; *M.A.* 280; *Dil.* 202.)

§ 12. *Aurangzib enters Bijapur.*

A week afterwards, Aurangzib's tent was removed from Rasulpur to a tank a mile outside the Allapur gate. That day (19th September) the victor, seated on a portable throne, rode into the fort by way of the trenches of Saf Shikan Khan and the southern or Mangali gate, which had once been chosen for the assault. Along the roads of the city he marched, scattering handfuls of gold and silver coins right and left, and viewed the fort walls and bastions and the palaces within the citadel. Then he went to the Jama Masjid and rendered two-fold prayers to God for His favours. In Sikandar's palace he rested for some hours and received congratulatory offerings from his courtiers. All paintings on the walls drawn in violation of the Quranic law that man should not presumptuously vie with his Creator by depicting living beings, were ordered to be erased, and an inscription recording Aurangzib's victory was placed on the famous cannon *Malik-i-maidan*. In the evening the Emperor returned to his camp amidst a salvo of artillery. The Mangali gate was repaired and newly named the Gate of Victory (*Fath Darwaza*). (Ishwardas 105; Dil. 202; M.A. 281.)

§ 13. *Bijapur in ruin.*

Complete desolation settled on the city of Bijapur after the fall of its independent dynasty.

From a royal capital it became the seat of a provincial governor. The revenue of a kingdom was no longer spent on it; there was no resident royalty or nobility to foster the fine arts, no Court to maintain a vast crowd of idle but cultured dependents. Two years after its conquest, a terrible plague swept away more than half its population. A few years later, Bhimsen noticed how the city and its equally large suburb Nauraspur looked deserted and ruined; the population was scattered, and even the abundant water-supply in the city wells had suddenly grown scanty! (*Dil.* 203; *M.A.* 310.) Bijapur had formerly been a city of splendid sepulchres; and it henceforth continued as a dismal example of departed greatness,—a vast city covered with “long lines of fallen houses, ruined mansions and lonely patches of jungle, stretching far and near in a waste whose desolation glimpses of noble buildings, some fairly preserved, others in ruins, make the more striking... Half its interior is a dreary waste, with almost nothing save fallen palaces and roofless dwellings overgrown with custard apple and other wild shrubs, while an occasional unharmed tomb or mosque makes the surrounding desolation the more complete.” “Mournful as is the desolation, the picturesque beauty of the buildings, the fine old trees and the mixing of hoary ruins and perfect buildings form an ever changing and

impressive scene." (*Bombay Gazetteer*, xxiii, 568, 573.) Above the whole scene the lofty domes of many kingly tombs brood in silent but winkless reverie upon the buried royalty and departed greatness of a city that was the queen of Southern India for a century.

§ 14. *Death of Sikandar Adil Shah.*

We may here conveniently follow the last Adil-Shahi Sultan to his grave. After being carried about in the Emperor's train for some time, and begging in vain for the trans-Krishna district of his late kingdom to be given to him as a fief, he was lodged in the State-prison of Daulatabad. Here in a few small apartments almost overhanging the steep bare side of the hill, he sighed out many years of his life in the company of a brother in misery, Abul Hasan, the deposed Sultan of Golkonda. Later, he was again carried about with the camp of Aurangzib, a captive within the limits of the *gulalbar* tents, in the keeping of Hamid-ud-din Khan Bahadur. In this condition he died on 3rd April, 1700, at the foot of Satara fort, which Aurangzib was then besieging. (*Akhbarat*, 44/52.) He had not yet completed 32 years of age. Having ascended the throne when a boy of four only, he had passed 14 years as an impotent puppet in the hands of his ministers and

another fourteen years as Aurangzib's prisoner.* (B.S. 541.)

According to Sikandar's dying wish, his mortal remains were carried to Bijapur and buried at the foot of the sepulchre of his spiritual guide, Shaikh Fahimullah, in a roofless enclosure. As the bier of the last of the Adil Shahs entered the capital of his fathers, the whole city went into mourning; "thousands of women wept, broke their bracelets and performed such other ceremonies as if they had been widowed." (B.S. 545.)

And well they might do so. True, their king had been deposed fourteen years ago, and during his whole reign he had never once governed by his own will. But under him they had at least had a king of their own; they had formed a nation and an independent State, instead of being a mere province of an alien empire, ruled by a mere officer who had to take his orders from a capital a thousand miles distant. Even a subject race liveth not by bread alone.

* B.S., 544, tells a story that Aurangzib murdered Sikandar by means of a poisoned melon, in order to deprive the old Adil-Shahi officers of the plea that they had a master other than Aurangzib. The story has a Manuccian ring, and rightly finds a place in *Storia do Mogor*, iii. 195. The author of B.S. qualifies his statement by adding the pious cry, "The burden of proof lies on the original narrator!"

CHAPTER XLVI

THE DECLINE OF THE QUTB SHAHS.

§ 1. *Reign of Abdullah Qutb Shah, 1626-1672.*

Abdullah Qutb Shah, the 6th king of Golkonda, had succeeded his father in 1626, at the age of twelve, and reigned for 46 years, during the whole of which he was a mere puppet on the throne. The actual administration was conducted for more than 40 years by his mother, Hayat Bakhsh Begam, a lady of strong character, the imperious daughter of one king, wife of another and mother of a third. After her death (12th Feb., 1667), Abdullah was swayed entirely by his eldest son-in-law Sayyid Ahmad.

The clever diplomacy of these two had for half a century saved the Qutb-Shahi State from being annexed by the Mughals. But it was only a temporary respite, and the dissolution of the kingdom was inevitable. Abdullah was throughout life, indolent and almost imbecile, and his narrow escape from capture and assassination by Aurangzib's army in 1656 had given him such a fright that Bernier noted eleven years afterwards, "The King has lost all mental energy and has ceased to hold the reins of government. He never appears in public

to give audience and administer justice according to the custom of the country, nor does he venture outside the walls of the fortress Golkonda. Confusion and misrule are the natural and unavoidable consequences of this state of things. The grandees, totally disregarding the commands of a monarch for whom they no longer feel either affection or respect, exercise a disgusting tyranny." (Bernier, 194-195.)

Nor was the state of things any better within the palace. The worthless king spent his time in the company of dancing-girls, practising ingenious forms of sensuality, while his family was torn by discord between rival factions. (Tavernier, i. 158.) Abdullah had no son, but three daughters, the second of whom had been married to Aurangzib's son Muhammad Sultan, and the first to Sayyid Ahmad, who claimed descent from one of the noblest families of Mecca and who rose by his ability to the position of prime minister and *de facto* ruler of the State. It was proposed to marry the third princess to Sayyid Sultan, a *protege* of Sayyid Ahmad and a former disciple of Ahmad's learned father. But a quarrel broke out between the two as the result of Sayyid Sultan scoffing at the pedigree of Sayyid Ahmad. At last feelings were so embittered in consequence that, on the day proposed for the marriage, Sayyid Ahmad told Abdullah that if he gave his daughter to Sayyid Sultan, he would at

once leave the kingdom. The weak king could not lose his long accustomed support, nor disoblige his beloved eldest daughter, and so the expectant bridegroom was suddenly stripped of his gala dress and expelled the city, and his house was looted by the ruffians under royal orders ! A hurried search was made for another match for the princess in order to marry her without fail at the moment selected by the astrologers. The choice of the palace agents fell on Abul Hasan, a youth descended on his father's side from the Qutb-Shahi family, who had spent the last 16 years in the lazy pampered life of a monk by entering himself as a disciple of the saint Sayyid Raju Qattal. On account of his low tastes, dirty habits and debauched life, the Court and the gentry had shunned him. But he had pleased his master by his devoted attendance, and a story is told that the saint on the eve of the marriage-day had laughingly daubed Abul Hasan with red clay, saying "Thus I dye your fingers with *henna* like a bridegroom's." The words of a holy man are prophetic; next day the royal emissaries, instructed by the ladies of the harem, came to the hermitage, seized Abul Hasan, dragged him to a hot bath, washed him clean, smeared him with scents, clad him in the wedding robes made for Sayyid Sultan and led him on a richly caparisoned horse with music and lights to the palace,

where he was forthwith married to the princess. (*Qutb-numa*, 90-94.)

§ 2. *Succession of Abul Hasan and ministry of Madanna.*

On 21st April, 1672, Abdullah died, and at once there arose a dispute for the succession. Sayyid Ahmad* claimed the throne as the husband of the late king's eldest daughter, Mā Sahib, and that lady armed her foreign slave-girls and stood within the palace sword in hand to defend her rights. But Sayyid Ahmad during his long *wazir*-ship had made many enemies at Court by his pride and harshness, —possibly also by his administrative vigour, while the easy pleasure-loving character of Abul Hasan promised a golden age to the dishonest courtiers and self-seeking officials if he could be seated on the throne. After some confusion and fighting, Sayyid Muzaffar, a leading general of high Persian origin, supported by Musa Khan *mahaldar* and several other

* Tavernier calls him 'a prince of Arabia', 'a relative of the Grand Shaikh of Mecca' (i. 161—162.) Azad Bilgrami alleges that he was the offspring of a runaway marriage between Sayyid Masum (a scholar and devotee of Persia) and a sister of Shah Abbas II, and that his full name was Sayyid Nizam-ud-din Ahmad of Najaf. Fryer says (i. 83—84) that Abul Hasan was chosen as heir by the king of Golkonda at the instigation of Sayyid Muzaffar. For the Golkonda succession, K. K. ii. 309—313 (full) M.A. 143 calls Abul Hasan "brother's son to Abdullah," but the word brother is loosely used in India for any kind of cousin.

officers of the harem, overpowered Sayyid Ahmad and forced him into prison. Abul Hasan was crowned king, Muzaffar becoming his prime minister. But the new *wazir's* greed of power and policy of turning his master into a cypher, exasperated the king. Abul Hasan bought over Madanna, the Brahman *factotum* of Muzaffar, and through him corrupted most of the captains of his personal followers, so that one day Muzaffar was quietly deprived of his wazir-ship, which was conferred on Madanna, with the title of Surya Prakash Rao.

This change of ministers took place about 1673 and Madanna's rule continued till his own assassination in 1686, on the eve of the fall of the kingdom. His brother Akkanna became commander-in-chief and his nephew, the gallant and learned Yengana surnamed Rustam Rao, was given a high command. Musa Khan, too, was sent into retirement and Muhammad Ibrahim, a creature of Madanna, was first created *sar-i-khel* (Master of the Horse) and then premier peer ("great Nawab") for a bribe of one *lakh* and ten thousand *hun* paid to Madanna.

§ 3. *Madanna's pro-Maratha policy.*

During the twelve years of Madanna's ministry the internal administration of the country was marked by the same disorder and tyranny as in the reign of Abdullah, and matters naturally declined from bad

to worse. As the English at Madras wrote on 23rd July 1676, "Madanna has sole control, and nothing is thought of but peeling and squeezing the people. . . . The government of the country (*i.e.*, the Karnatak) is now in so bad hands that nothing but fraud and oppression, and so void of shame that no credit can be given to either agreements, promises, *qauls* or *farmans*." (Love, i. 356-357.) With a grasping and suspicious paramount Power, a sensual king, a venal aristocracy, and an ignorant and timid people, the reform of the kingdom was hopeless.

In foreign affairs, ever since the extinction of the Nizam-Shahi dynasty in 1636, the Deccan Powers had but one absorbing thought,—How to avert the approaching annexation by the Mughals? For this the Qutb Shahs had very wisely professed lip-obedience to the Emperor of Delhi, but secretly helped Adil Shah with money and assembled their forces on the frontier as a threat to the aggressor, every time the Mughals had tried to invade Bijapur. No Mughal general could undertake such an invasion without running the risk of a Golkonda army raiding the imperial dominions or attacking the Mughal expeditionary force from two sides in concert with the Bijapuris.

Madanna continued the same foreign policy with a necessary variation. There was no estrangement from the Adil-Shahi Government, but that Court was

now the scene of chaos, faction-fights and changes of regency, so that co-operation by that weak and unsteady State was practically impossible and would have been useless. Madanna, therefore, built his hopes of national defence chiefly on a close alliance with the ever-victorious Maratha king. In 1677 he had given Shivaji a more than royal welcome on his visit to Haidarabad and promised him a regular subsidy of one *lakh* of *hun* for the defence of Golkonda. After Shivaji's death the alliance had been renewed with his successor and the subsidy continued.

§ 4. *Mughal treatment of Golkonda king.*

The Qutb-Shahi kingdom was badly situated for defending itself. Its northern frontier, adjoining the Mughal dominion, was an open plain, without any natural stronghold, inaccessible mountain, or barren and arid belt like those that protected Bijapur on the north. But so long as Bijapur stood, Golkonda was safe. (Fryer, ii. 51.) Aurangzib knew it, and therefore did not try to annex the latter first. Nor was it necessary for him to do so. As Bernier noted, "Aurangzib has no great inducement to march troops into that kingdom (Golkonda), which he probably considers as his own. It has long been tributary to the Mughal . . . Aurangzib's ordinary ambassador at the Court of

Golkonda issues his commands, grants passports, menaces and ill-treats the people, and in short, speaks and acts with the uncontrolled authority of an absolute sovereign." (194-195.)

The Emperor found it more profitable and cheaper to fleece and terrorize the Qutb-Shahi Government than to extinguish it. The Mughal "Resident" at Haidarabad domineered over the king and the people, insulted and taxed them, but without provoking armed protest. Mirza Muhammad, an exceptionally rude and heartless envoy, was sent by Aurangzib to Abul Hasan expressly for the purpose of goading him into defiance and thus giving the Emperor a valid pretext for exterminating him. As he told the envoy, "I am not really sending you there to get these useless bits of stone (namely, two famous diamonds possessed by Qutb Shah) which I do not care for. My sole intention is that you should not humour him, but bandy words with him so fearlessly that he too may be harsh to you and thus give me a justification for extirpating him. As far as possible quarrel with him, and never treat him politely in private or public." (K.K. ii. 294.)

But like Wajid Ali Shah, the last Nawab of Oudh, of whom Dalhousie wrote that he "would not offend or quarrel with us (the English) and took

any amount of kicking without being rebellious,"—the last Sultan of Golkonda refused to be hustled into a war by his enemy's ambassador. His ignoble clinging to a throne that gave him ease at the expense of honour, was redeemed only by an inborn courtesy and readiness of speech which often gave him the best of any wrangle with the Mughal envoy. One day Abul Hasan mildly protested against the habitual insolence of Mirza Muhammad's address to him, saying "I too am called Emperor in my own country." The haughty envoy retorted, "It does not become you to assume the title of Emperor. If Aurangzib hears of it, he will become more angry." Abul Hasan promptly replied, "You chide me by mistake. If we are not to be called Padishahs, how can Aurangzib be styled the Padishah of Padishahs?" And the Mughal envoy had to admit to his friends that the repartee totally silenced him. (K.K. ii. 295.)

From the thoughts of these humiliations and the impending ruin of his house, Abul Hasan, like Wajid Ali Shah, sought distraction or oblivion by plunging into unrelieved sensuality, (Fryer, i. 85.) Resigning his royal functions to his wazir, Madanna, he shut himself up in his palace with a host of concubines and dancing-girls. Under his predecessor, Haidarabad had become the Indian Babylon, with its twenty thousand public women

(who had to dance before the king in the public square every Friday) and its countless taverns, close to these women's quarters, where 1200 large leather bottles of fermented palm-juice were consumed daily. (Tavernier, i. 157-158.) But he also promoted several fine arts contributory to luxury; he settled in his capital and supported by his bounty skilled craftsmen of various kinds whose exquisite manufactures were famous throughout India. The king's own skill in music was of no mean order. He was rightly called Tana Shah or "the dainty king." (*Chahar Gulshan*, 91b-92a.)

§ 5. *Why Aurangzib wanted to annex Haidarabad.*

The enormous wealth of the country was derived from its well-watered fields which at once arrest the eye by their greenness and abundance of tropical fruits as the traveller enters the State from the arid and sterile region round Bijapur, its rich mines of diamond and iron, and its prosperous ports on the east coast from Chicacole southwards to St. Thome. The king had a secure income of $2\frac{3}{4}$ *krores* of Rupees, which could easily maintain all his personal luxury and at the same time pay for the inglorious defence of his country by the arms of a subsidized ally. This wealth became the cause of his ruin after Bijapur had fallen and Mughal imperialistic ambition hungered for fresh food.

For nearly thirty years after Aurangzib's accession to the throne, the kingdom of Golkonda had enjoyed respite from Mughal attack. It had not been so openly hostile to the empire as Bijapur, and the pre-occupation of the Mughals with Shivaji and his patron Adil Shah had prevented them from turning to Golkonda. Qutb Shah had also paid tribute to the imperial Government more regularly than the Sultan of Bijapur.

But his attitude to his suzerain had been one of covert disloyalty bursting, on three occasions, into open rebellion, though varied by the offer of presents at intervals. His faults were many. First, the war-indemnity promised in the treaty of April 1656 (*ante*, i. Ch. 10 § 12) and the older annual tribute of two *lakhs* of *hun*, were perpetually in arrears; but that was the normal condition of vassal States during the Mughal period. Secondly, for a long time past he had made persistent attempts to keep in his own hands the extensive *jagir*,—almost equivalent to a kingdom,—which Mir Jumla had won in the Karnatak when in his service, (*ante*, i. Ch. 10 § 14,) and he had taken advantage of the war of succession among Shah Jahan's sons to wrest Gandikota and Sidhout from Mir Jumla's agents. But after the second anniversary of his coronation, Aurangzib had recovered these places. In more recent times, when the Mughals captured

Kulbarga, in the declining days of Bijapur, the officers of Qutb Shah had seized Malkhed, Serum, and some other districts beyond their western border and politically appertaining to the new Mughal province of Bidar, after raising the false plea that these tracts had formerly belonged to Telingana and were therefore lawfully included in the kingdom of Golkonda. (K.K. ii. 293.)

During the Mughal invasions of Bijapur under Jai Singh in 1665-6, under Dilir Khan in 1679 and under Prince Muhammad Azam in 1685, the Sultan of Golkonda had openly sent his troops to assist his brother in distress. The first two of these acts had been condoned, or atoned for by the payment of tribute. The last brought ruin on him.

But, in the eyes of Aurangzib his worst offence was his fraternizing with infidels. He had effectively helped Shivaji with the sinews of war after his flight from Agra in 1666 and thus enabled him to recover his forts from the Mughals. Again, Qutb Shah had rapturously welcomed Shivaji on his visit to Haidarabad in 1677 and behaved like a humble vassal of the Maratha, placing a necklace of gems round his horse's neck and promising him an annual subsidy of one *lakh* of *hun* for the defence of his territory. Above all, he had made the Brahmans Madanna and Akkanna, his chief

ministers, and thus allowed Hindu influence to predominate in his administration.*

§ 6. *Rupture with the Mughals, 1685.*

The active help that he gave to Bijapur during its last siege brought his quarrel with the Mughals to a head and sealed his fate. Aurangzib had begun his attack on that fort (in March 1685) by warning Abul Hasan not to assist Sikandar Adil Shah in any way. Next, as a precaution he had, immediately after his arrival at Sholapur (24th May), detached Bahramand Khan to watch the Haidarabad frontier. In the imperial camp at Sholapur the two Golkonda envoys were kept under watch and their correspondence was opened by the Mughal police. At the end of June, a letter from Abul Hasan to these agents was intercepted, in which he had written, "The Emperor is a great man, and has acted magnanimously up to this time, but now, finding

* As the Emperor wrote to his envoy at the Golkonda Court, "This luckless wretch (meaning Abul Hasan Qutb Shah) has given the supreme power in his State to a *kafir* and made Sayyida, Shaikhs and scholars subject to that man. He has publicly allowed (in his realm) all kinds of sin and vice (*viz.*, taverns, brothels, and gambling houses). He himself is day and night sunk in the deadly sins, through the intoxication of kingship, and fails to distinguish between Islam and infidelity, justice and oppression, sin and piety. By refusing to respect God's commands and prohibitions, by sending aid to infidel Powers,...and by recently paying one lakh of *hun* to the *kafir* Shambhu, he has made himself accursed before God and man." (K. K. ii. 328.)

Sikandar a helpless orphan, he has laid siege to Bijapur and pressed him hard. It is, therefore, necessary that while the Bijapur army and Shambhu with his countless hordes are offering resistance from one side, I should, from this side, send 40,000 men under Khalilullah Khan to enter into the war. We shall then see on which front the Emperor can meet and repel his enemies." (*B.S.* 533; *M.A.* 259-260.)

At this clear proof of Qutb Shah's disloyalty, Aurangzib's anger boiled over. He at once (28 June, 1685), detached Prince Shah Alam with a vast army to march on Haidarabad, and ordered Khan-i-Jahan to advance from his outpost of Indi and join the Prince on the way, though he knew that this diversion of his forces would delay and hinder the success of the undertaking against Bijapur.

This Mughal force marched south-eastwards along the north bank of the Bhima river. The 70 miles between Sholapur and Kulbarga were easily passed, as this country was imperial territory. Then Khan-i-Jahan, in charge of the advanced division, reached Malkhed, 25 miles further east, while the Prince kept 3 or 4 marches behind. But when the Mughal vanguard under Jan Nisar Khan approached Serum, 8 miles east of Malkhed, he found his path barred by a Golkonda army, variously estimated

from 40,000 to 70,000 men, under Mir Muhammad Ibrahim, the premier peer, Shaikh Minhaj, and Madanna's gallant nephew Rustam Rao. The enveloping movement of the Deccani cavalry was defeated after hard fighting; but the Mughal advance was stopped and Jan Nisar Khan fell back on Malkhed. Every day there were skirmishes with the enemy, who hovered round the imperial army and tried to assail it at a disadvantage. In view of the enemy's superior numbers, Khan-i-Jahan ran up walls round his camp at Malkhed and practically stood a siege there. As Bhimsen writes, "He fought on the defensive, because it was difficult for him to advance one step." (*Dil.* 187.) After some time the Prince arrived on the scene* with the rest of the army. Some days were passed in negotiations, but the Deccani generals insolently rejected the Prince's offer to secure a pardon for Abul Hasan on condition of his submitting to the Emperor.

§ 7. *Battles near Malkhed.*

The Mughals deposited their baggage at Malkhed and their Van again advanced under

* *Dil.* 187 says that Shah Alam started from the imperial camp at Sholapur after Khan-i-Jahan had been checked at Malkhed and had reported it to the Emperor. But *M.A.* 260 distinctly states that the Prince received marching orders on 28th June and Kh. J. about three weeks later. Ishwardas (89b) makes a mess of the whole campaign.

Khan-i-Jahan to hack a way towards Haidarabad. The Deccanis outnumbered this force as three to one; but the Mughal troops, especially those under Himmat Khan and Sayyid Abdullah Khan of Barha, fought with obstinate bravery, and, in spite of heavy losses, always succeeded in beating the Deccanis back at the end of the day. Khan-i-Jahan himself was attacked by a Golkonda captain named Bari Khan, who was celebrated for his skill in throwing stones with the accuracy of a musketeer marksman; but the Mughal general shot him dead with an arrow. On one occasion a Mughal defeat is said to have been averted only when an infuriated elephant of Rajah Ram Singh was driven into the enemy's ranks, with a three *maund* iron chain swinging from its tusk, which unexpected charge caused the horses of several Deccani captains to rear and overthrow their riders. Each such encounter was followed by a halt of three or four days on the Mughal side. (K.K. ii. 296-298.)

It was already August, and the heavy rain caused great hardship to the Mughal troops and impeded their advance, while the Deccanis were reinforced by 10,000 fresh horsemen of Madanna's own contingent. Jan Nisar Khan, who had taken the mud-fort of Serum, was invested there by the enemy, but held out gallantly. In the daily fights that followed, both sides suffered heavy losses in

killed and wounded. The Mughals, worn out with the day's murderous contest, had to rest content with a bare victory and had no strength left in them to pursue the vanquished. They were, besides, weakened by quarrels among their generals, by the resentment of Khan-i-Jahan at the Emperor censuring him for slackness, while younger officers like Itiqad Khan and Khwajah Abul Mukaram were openly praised for energy and courage, and finally by the tame and unenterprising spirit of their supreme commander, Shah Alam. It is also evident that these daily losses at last took the heart out of the Mughal soldiery. So, the imperial generals halted and wasted two months in the neighbourhood of Malkhed without fighting, their camp being occasionally fired upon by the enemy with rockets at night.

Then a stinging rebuke from the Emperor and an unusually audacious act of sniping on the Prince's camp, roused him to seek battle again. After a very bloody contest the Deccanis were pushed back to their camp at noon, when the Prince very chivalrously granted them a few hours' respite to remove their women to a place of safety, as it was a war between *men* on both sides. Thereafter, the battle was renewed; but at sunset the Deccanis retreated, after Shaikh Minhaj and Rustam Rao had been wounded and both sides had suffered heavy losses. Next morning it was learnt that they had

fled towards Haidarabad. The cause of this sudden break-down of the Deccani resistance was dissension between the commander-in-chief, Mir Muhammad Ibrahim, and his second in command, Shaikh Minhaj, and the seduction of the former by the Mughals. The Prince, being now unopposed, rapidly marched towards Haidarabad. It is said in some histories that Ibrahim's intended treachery was suspected by the Golkonda Government and a plan was formed to arrest him, but he forestalled it by escaping to the Prince's camp when the Mughals arrived in the vicinity of Haidarabad, in the beginning of October, 1685. (K.K. ii. 298-306; Dil. 189; Ishwardas, 91a.)

The flight of the commander-in-chief paralysed the defence of Haidarabad. Though more than half the army and several generals were still loyal, Qutb Shah did not know whom to trust. Shaikh Minhaj told him that as Mir Ibrahim was Madanna's *protege* the desertion of the general must have taken place with the consent of the prime minister, who also would take the same step soon. Losing faith in his long accustomed guide and all-powerful minister, the weak imbecile king thought only of securing his own safety. He fled to Golkonda, an impregnable fort, which had baffled Aurangzib thirty years ago and might do so now. Madanna very wisely advised him not to shut himself up in Golkonda, but to go to

Warangal or some other distant fort, so that, in the event of Golkonda being besieged by the Mughals, he would be free to move about and reinforce its defenders. But this advice only deepened the king's suspicion of his wazir's sinister design as suggested by Shaikh Minhaj. (*Dil.* 190.)

§ 8. *Second Mughal capture of Haidarabad City,*
1685.

The king's flight to Golkonda was so precipitate that all his property was left behind. When the people learnt that the city of Haidarabad was abandoned by the Government and that the enemy were at hand, there was a mad scramble to flee to the fort. "Thousands of high-born persons, who had no time to procure conveyances or remove their property, grasped the hands of their wives and children in bewilderment and, without giving them time to dress fully, ran towards Golkonda." The confusion was aggravated by the indiscriminate looting which began immediately. "A noise and tumult arose like that of doomsday. The royal property worth 4 or 5 *krors* of Rupees and the belongings of the soldiers who had left their families at Haidarabad began to be plundered at once." (*K.K.* ii. 306.)

Some citizens removed to the fort, in the course of the night, whatever they could carry away on

their own persons or by means of hired porters. But most people had to stay in their own houses, dazed and helpless, as Bhimsen found them a few days afterwards. The city presented the spectacle of a sack after assault by an enemy. "Before the news of the king's flight could reach Prince Shah Alam's camp, the ruffians and robbers of the city began to loot it. . . . In every ward, street, and market-place, there were lakhs of Rupees worth in cash, property, China-ware of the nobles and tradesmen, and carpets of the king and the aristocracy, besides horses and elephants. These were looted in the midst of a terrible uproar. Many Hindu and Muslim wives and children were kidnapped and some of them outraged. Rich carpets, too heavy to be carried off, were slashed with the sword or dagger and the pieces removed by the robbers . . . Even the doors were taken off their hinges." (*Dil.* 190; K.K. ii. 306-307.)

Haidarabad was then the richest and most voluptuous city in the Deccan, the seat of a gorgeous Court, the home of many fine arts and an extensive trade, and the abode of twenty thousand women of pleasure; and its accumulated wealth was almost inexhaustible.

Next day Shah Alam sent a party of his soldiers to protect the citizens, but these men themselves joined in the plunder! "So many tents were taken

away from the city that in the Prince's camp no old tent could be seen." Fires lighted by the ruffians blazed in the city, destroying what had escaped plunder. After two days the Prince appointed Khan-i-Jahan to police the city, and he succeeded in restoring order to some extent. But, by that time, everything portable had disappeared, and the imperial provost-marshal (*kotwal*) and *diwan*, who were sent to attach the property of Abul Hasan, could secure only a small fraction of it. At this disappointing result Aurangzib grew angry with his son and suspected him of concealing the loot for his own use, or at least of showing culpable negligence in looking after the Emperor's interests. (*Ibid.*)

The Mughal army made this its second entry into Haidarabad about 8th October 1685. The Prince first came by way of Dhobipettah (16 miles west of Haidarabad) to the Gagan-pahari suburb, and thence, after a few days, removed to the Gosha-mahal palace and garden of Abul Hasan, close to the fort. For some days after this date, Qutb Shah continued to send agents to the Prince, helplessly appealing to him to make peace and promising "to agree to every demand" of the Mughal Government. Many more Deccani nobles now deserted to the Prince, among them being Sharif-ul-mulk, the husband of Abul Hasan's sister.

At the Prince's recommendation, which reached

the Court on 18th October, the Emperor consented to pardon Abul Hasan on the following conditions : (1) He must pay one *krore* and 20 *lakhs* of Rupees in settlement of all past dues, and in addition a tribute of 2 *lakhs* of *hun* every year. (2) He must dismiss Madanna and Akkanna. (3) He must give up all claim to Malkhed and Serum, which the imperialists had already occupied. (Ishwardas, 91 a; *Dil.* 190-191; K.K. ii. 307; M.A. 267.)

While the Prince was waiting for the fulfilment of these terms, a small party sent by Aurangzib approached the city, carrying costly rewards for Shah Alam and his chief officers, in recognition of their splendid success in capturing the enemy's capital. But the Golkonda administration was now in utter disorder, and every man acted for himself without obeying the king or his agents. At Munagal, 28 miles west of Haidarabad, the deputation was attacked by Shaikh Nizam and a body of Afghan mercenaries; and its leader Mir Abdul Karim was wounded and carried off into captivity, many of his followers were slain, and all the imperial gifts as well as the property of the traders who had joined the party in a caravan for the sake of the escort, were plundered (middle of November.) Qutb Shah disavowed and apologized for this outrage, released the captive Abdul Karim, and restored as much of the lost property as he could get out of the

plunderers. (*M.A.* 268—9, *Dil.* 192, K.K. ii. 315.)

§ 9. *Murder of Madanna, 1686.*

Shah Alam stayed for some months, first close to Golkonda and afterwards at Qutb Shah's request withdrew to Kuhir, (48 miles n. w. of it), waiting for the collection of the war-indemnity. Considering the ruined state of Golkonda finance and the disorder in the administration, this was no easy task. Abul Hasan put off the dismissal of Madanna as long as he could. At this his discontented nobles lost all patience. They regarded Madanna as the cause of all their sufferings at the hands of the Mughals,—“the cause of the ruin of the State and of the slaughter of Muslims and soldiers.” In a day of national disaster, the popular fury naturally turns against the ministers who have failed to avert it, as John DeWitt of Holland had discovered to his cost only 13 years before this. A plot was formed against Madanna by the discontented Muslim nobles, whose leader was Shaikh Minhaj, and by Saruma and Jani Sahiba, the widows of Abdullah Qutb Shah, who now ruled over the king's harem with despotic powers. One night, early in March, 1686, just after Madanna had left his master's presence, he was set upon and murdered in the streets of Golkonda by Jamshid and other slaves, with the

help of some of the minister's own guards who had been corrupted by the conspirators. Akkanna, who was with him, shared his brother's fate on the spot. Their brave and accomplished nephew, Rustam Rao,—whom Khafi Khan calls "a renowned master of the pen and the sword alike,"—was pursued to his house and there stabbed to death. The minister's family residences were plundered. Next, a general attack was made by the mob on the Hindu quarter of the fort and "many other Brahmans lost their lives and property in that night." (K. K. ii. 308; Ishwardas, 91 b; *Dil.* 191.)

The Dowager Sultana now sent the heads of the obnoxious ministers to Aurangzib as the best of peace-offerings. The Emperor, being thus assured that henceforth Golkonda State counsels would not be swayed against the Mughal interests, and also wishing to bring the siege of Bijapur to a decisive issue, recalled Shah Alam to his side at Sholapur, where the Prince arrived on 7th June 1686. Five days later Qutb Shah's envoy was received in audience and presented 100 elephants on behalf of his master. Golkonda territory was now completely evacuated by the Mughals, and all the resources of the empire were concentrated against Bijapur. (*M.A.* 272—274.)

Bijapur fell on the 12th September of that year, and its fall set the Mughal forces free to deal the

death-blow at the Qutb-Shahi monarchy. At last the fateful hour had come,—the hour which the kings of Golkonda had dreaded for half a century, which they had so abjectly tried to avert, and which the last among them had tried to banish from his mind by drowning himself in sensual pleasure. Aurangzib was about to carry to completion what Akbar and Shah Jahan had merely dreamt of and he himself had fruitlessly sought during seventy years of his life : the Mughal empire was to embrace the whole of the Deccan without a rival.

APPENDIX

Madanna, prime minister of Golkonda.

M.A. 272, records, "On 16th March 1686, Zain-ul-abidin, a kinsman of Abul Hasan had audience with the Emperor. Abul Hasan had cut off and sent to Shah Alam the head of Madanna Brahman as a proof of his own submission, and the Prince sent it on to the Emperor with Bahadur Ali Khan." Ishwardas, 91b, agrees, adding that Madanna, at the time of his death, cried out, "O thoughtless fool! as you are slaying me at the interested accusation of my enemies without investigating the truth of the charge.—I know that the term of your kingship has neared its end. You will not sit on your throne for more than six months after this." Khafi Khan, who was particularly well informed about Haidarabad affairs, writes (ii. 308) that the murder was done without Abul Hasan's knowledge or consent. Bhimsen, who was present in Shah Alam's camp at this time, agrees with Khafi Khan, (*Dil.* 191.)

As for the date of the murder, it was early in March, 1686, (M.A. 272.) B.S. 534 states that on 16th Nov. 1685, news reached the king of Bijapur that Abul Hasan had thrown Madanna into prison. This was unlikely to have been a fact, and looks rather like a distorted account of what Abul Hasan had merely promised to do. Khafi Khan distinctly says that Abul Hasan put off arresting the two brothers till his army lost patience and rose against them.

The best account of the fall of this Brahman *wazir* is given by the contemporary Dutch writer D. Havart in his *Op en Ondergang van Cormandel* (published in 1693):—

Akkanna and Madanna were two brothers born of a very poor family, who entered service as shroffs in A. D. 1666 on a pay of 10 gilders per mensem under Sayyid Mustafa, a nobleman of Golkonda. Madanna, *alias* Surya-Prakash Rao, was an intelligent man, while Akkanna was a man of cunning and roguery with very little of understanding. The brothers rose in rank by an apparent act of treachery which cost Mustafa Khan his high office under the Nawabs of Golkonda. Madanna became a very prominent figure in the

administration of the kingdom, so much so that the Sultan left everything to his care and was satisfied with receiving 75,000 dollars for his personal use. Madanna was well versed in Persian, Hindustani and the vernaculars of the country, and lived in a kingly style. As the golden palanquin in which he went out passed in the streets, people showed their respect by stopping on the way. He was very kind to the Dutch, and Havart had the honour of seeing Madanna often.....[When Shah Alam took possession of Haidarabad.] the people were in a state of panic and accused Madanna of high treason. Under orders from the Sultan they murdered the two brothers in a most ignominious way. Akkanna and Madanna were dragged along the streets in the presence of the people. The head of Madanna was severed from the body and sent to Aurangzib, while that of Akkanna was trampled under the feet of an elephant. (Quoted from Madras Annual Report on Archæology, 1914-15, page 118.)

The two brothers were Vaishnavas. We learn from a Madras record dated 17th May 1682, that Muhammad Ibrahim had been removed from the supreme command (*sar-i-lashkar-ship*) of Golkonda and Akkanna appointed in his place, shortly before (Ancient Record No. 1687.) Their nephew Gopanna, surnamed Ramdas Swami, was appointed revenue collector at Bhadrachalam, but he "fearlessly spent six lakhs of pagodas of Government money in building halls, shrines and corridors for the god Ram and passed his days joyously rendering numerous other services to Ram." He was arrested in consequence and put to torture by royal order, but was released through the miraculous interposition of Ram and Lakshman, who appeared in the guise of men and paid up the deficit to the Sultan on behalf of their devotee, who is now worshipped as a saint. (Information supplied by Prof. K. V. Rangaaswami Aiyangar; also in *Indian Antiquary*.)

It is surprising that though Madanna had held the supreme place in the State for years, not a hand was raised to defend his family or punish his assassins. He had never realized that the ultimate basis of Government is force, and that a minister might bask in the sunshine of royal favour and trust, but if he has no army behind him his position is precarious and his power a hollow show. Evidently the long political degradation of the Hindu population in Golkonda had robbed them of the power of self-defence. As Fryer wrote in 1674, "Over the Centoos (the Qutb-Shahi Government) keeps a strict

hand, entrusting them with no place of concern, using them as mechanics and servitors." (i 86) Madanna had done nothing during his fifteen years of absolute power to raise the *people*, and so the great minister fell undefended, unavenged and unhonoured.

CHAPTER XLVII

FALL OF GOLKONDA, 1687.

§ 1. *Fort of Golkonda described.*

On 30th October 1686, Aurangzib left the newly conquered city of Bijapur and then travelled by easy stages to Kulbarga and Bidar, halting there for several weeks. "At last on 14th January 1687 he mounted his horse to punish that luckless man, Abul Hasan," and on the 28th of the month arrived within two miles of Golkonda. Meantime, Abul Hasan had again fled from his capital to this fort, and the city of Haidarabad was occupied for the third and last time by the Mughals. Firuz Jang had been detached after the fall of Bijapur to capture the Qutb-Shahi fort of Ibrahimgarh (or Yadagiri, 30 m. s. of Malkhed.) After carrying out that task, he had advanced and taken possession of Haidarabad in the name of the Emperor. (*M.A.* 287-288.)

On hearing of Aurangzib's coming, "Abul Hasan was in utter despair and perplexity. His lips were strangers to laughter, his eyes full of tears, his head vacant of sense, his tongue speechless. He offered submission to the Emperor with new protestations of devotion. But the Emperor's only reply was the sword." (*M.A.* 287).

The walled city of Haidarabad, the seat of the Qutb-Shahi Government, stands on the south bank of the Musi river, which was then crossed by a grand old stone bridge of early 17th century construction. North of the river were a number of suburbs, "where all the merchants, brokers, and artisans dwelt, and in general all the common people," Haidarabad itself having been reserved for the Sultan, his Court, nobles and military officers. Even to-day the westernmost of these suburbs bears the name of *Karwan*, from the many caravanserais for merchants and travellers that it once contained. Next, to the east, came Dhulpet, and beyond it Begam Bazar with the Gosha Mahal ("Secluded Palace") standing in the midst of a park north of the peopled quarter. Further east, after crossing a thin stream feeding the Musi, lay the site of the British Residency and the aristocratic Chadarghat ward of the present day.

Two miles due west of this stone bridge, some 160 yards north of the Musi river, lies the fort of Golkonda,* the impregnable stronghold of the Deccan. It is an irregular rhombus, with a rough pentagon (the *Naya Qila*) annexed to its north-eastern face. A strong crenellated wall of granite,

* Described from my personal observations in October, 1916. An excellent large scale map has been prepared by the Archaeological Department of the Nizam.

over four miles in length and of great thickness, surrounds the fort, which is further defended by 87 semi-circular bastions, each from 50 to 60 feet high and built of solid blocks of granite cemented together, some of them weighing more than a ton. The eight massive gates could have safely defied any artillery known to the 17th century. On the walls were mounted a vast display of cannon, some of them being very fine specimens of the mediæval gun-founder's art. Outside is a deep ditch, 50 feet broad, with stone retaining walls, and along the entire southern side there are traces of a second parallel moat still visible.

But Golkonda really consists of four distinct forts joined to each other and included within the same lines of circumvallation. The lowest of these is the outermost enclosure into which we enter by the Fath Darwaza near the south-eastern corner; it is a vast tract covered with mansions of the nobles, bazars, temples, mosques, soldiers' barracks, powder magazines, stables and even cultivated fields. Here the whole population of Haidarabad used to live in times of danger. Proceeding inside along the grand main road for some 1,250 yards from the Fath Darwaza, and leaving a set of rather later palaces, harems and offices on a low site on the right, we arrive at the Bala Hisar gate which leads us, over a flight of steps, to a higher area with exceedingly

lofty and strong walls and containing a capacious three-storied armoury, magazines, stables, mosques, audience chambers, harems, gardens, large wells with steps, and even two *serais* and a temple of the monkey-god !

Further west, some 200 steps cut in the solid rock lead the traveller up to the very apex of the fortress, the *Bala Hisar* (or Upper Fort), standing on a bed of solid granite, its walls being formed by huge boulders with here and there connecting curtains and parapets that tower far overhead. This is the citadel of the citadel, the kernel of the whole fort; and here the early Dravidian Rajahs of the land had built their first stronghold, by filling the gaps in the natural rocky walls with mud and rough stones, and here their rude ancient temples cut into the rock still stand. In this *Bala Hisar* the Qutb-Shahi kings had erected a two-storied palace, the roof of which commands a free view of the environs for miles and miles around. Here they could have retired as a last resource, for it contains, in spite of its great height, a well of water, and powder magazines and numerous granaries (*ambar-khanah*) hollowed out of the bed-rock. The western face of the *Bala Hisar* is a steep scarp, between which and the outermost wall on that side, the plain is broken by three long granite spurs running westwards, and presents to

the eye a bare uneven desert some 260 yards in width, strewn with fragments of rock.

At the north-western corner of the fort, on both sides of the Patancheru Road, there are reservoirs of water and thick human habitations, gardens, and a small cemetery. At the north-eastern angle stands a mound commanding parts of Golkonda; but it was enclosed by a wall and added to the fort, under the name of the *Naya Qila* or New Fort, by king Abdullah as a defensive precaution after Aurangzib's first siege in 1656. (*M.A.* 301.) North, south and even west of this last area are large tanks, and the water-supply of the fort was unfailing.

Between the fort and the northern suburbs of Haidarabad the ground is low and scored by stream-lets draining the surplus water of the Langarcheru into the Musi. Here, as well as round the *Naya Qila* lie many hundred acres of rice-field, secure of irrigation from the tanks of this region. North of the fort, at a distance of a mile and a quarter, runs a low range of bare fantastically piled up hills, skirted by the great old road from Sholapur and the west. Here Aurangzib is said to have established his own quarters at the last siege. About a thousand yards outside the Patancheru or North-Western gate, stand the magnificent tombs of the Qutb-Shahi kings, queens and nobles; and this position seems to have sheltered some of the besieging force. But so far

as we can infer from the scanty details left about the siege, the Mughal attack was directed on the south-eastern and southern faces of the fort, their soldiers moving along both the north and south banks of the Musi, while the N. W. gate was bombarded only as a feint.*

§ 2. *Siege of Golkonda begins: death of Qalich Khan.*

Arrived within view of Golkonda (28th January, 1687), Aurangzib at once ordered his generals to assail and drive away the enemy's troops who had assembled in the dry ditch under shelter of the fort walls, "like a swarm of flies." One charge of the

* Siege of Golkonda: *M.A.* 288—300 (most authentic and complete.) Niamat Khan Ali in his *Waqai* treats only eight select episodes of the siege (16th May—22nd June) in an intolerably rhetorical and rather obscure style. He, however, gives us several details and graphic touches not to be found elsewhere. But his narrative stops full three months before the fall of the fort. The lithographed edition of Niamat published by the Newal Kishore Press is here referred to, but it abounds in gross mistakes, especially of date, which I have corrected from a MS. in my possession. K. K. (ii. 329—368) gives a simple and useful summary of Niamat Khan, with many additional details, esp. of the last stage of the siege, evidently gathered from survivors. His evidence, esp. about the diplomatic rupture, is extremely valuable. *Dil.* 206—208 is very short and supplies no new information; the author was not an eye-witness of the siege. Ishwardas is useful for the surrender only. *Storia*, ii. 306—308 (of little value and partly doubtful.) *Chahar Gulshan*, 92a—93a (secondary source.) My papers in the *Journal of the Haidarabad Archaeological Society*.

imperialists swept them away, or as the Mughal official history puts it, "the wind came and the gnats fled away"; and their property, wives and children were captured. Qalich Khan (the grandfather of the first Nizam) tried to enter the fort pell-mell with the fugitives and capture it by one stroke. But Golkonda was not to be taken by a *coup de main*. He was hit on the shoulder-blade by a *zamburak* bullet from the fort walls, and with one exception all his followers hung back from this desperate enterprise. So the Khan had to return in disappointment. The old warrior bore his pain with stoic fortitude. "When the surgeons were extracting the splinters of bone from his shoulder, he was sitting calmly engaged in conversation with the men around, without twitching a muscle of his face, and sipping coffee with the other hand. He cried out, 'I have got an excellent tailor!' In spite of all the remedies tried by the doctors, he died after three days." (*M.A.* 288-289; *Dil.* 206.)

Regular siege operations had, therefore, to be undertaken against the fort. On 7th February the trenches were opened and thus began the siege of Golkonda which was destined to last seven months and a half, to cause unspeakable suffering and loss to the Mughals, and to end, not in a glorious victory of arms, but in a shameful capture through bribery.

§ 3. *Shah Alam's offences.*

The siege began under the Emperor's own eyes, but at the very outset his arms were paralysed by a conflict of policy and a bitter personal jealousy in his camp. The greatest sinner in this respect was his eldest surviving son and intended heir, Shah Alam. This Prince was of a soft pleasure-loving nature, and constitutionally averse to strenuous exertion and heroic enterprise. He did not wish to see a brother sovereign like Abul Hasan utterly ruined. This generous impulse was mingled with a more sordid feeling: if Golkonda were taken by assault, all the credit of the achievement would go to the commander-in-chief Firuz Jang, as the credit of the capture of Bijapur had gone to his younger brother Muhammad Azam. But if he could induce Abul Hasan to sue for peace through his mediation, then he himself would be proclaimed in the official reports as the captor of Golkonda. Abul Hasan knew it and worked on the Prince's feelings. His agents secretly visited Shah Alam with costly presents, begging him to use his influence with the Emperor to save Abul Hasan's throne and dynasty. The Prince gave encouraging replies, in order to induce Qutb Shah to look up to him as his only friend at Court and not to seek any other intercessor. For

some time envoys and letters continued to pass between the two.*

In thus negotiating behind the Emperor's back and with an enemy beyond hope of the Emperor's pardon, Shah Alam was playing a dangerous game. And he had enemies in the camp ever on the look out for a chance to ruin him. His rival, Azam, was no doubt absent, but had friends in the imperial army and Court, who were glad of an opportunity to trip up Shah Alam. The Prince's position was rendered still more dangerous by dissensions in his harem. His favourite wife, Nur-un-nisa (the daughter of Mirza Sanjar Najam Sani) had monopolized his heart by her accomplishments as a Hindi poetess, devotion and care for his comfort, and charity to all, so that his other wives were jealous of her to the death. Azam's partisans revealed to the Emperor the secret of the communications passing between Shah Alam and Abul Hasan, while the neglected wives of the Prince denounced Nur-un-nisa as her husband's counsellor and agent in these treasonable negotiations. They even spread the false tale that she had shamelessly gone to the fort in disguise and

* The captivity of Shah Alam: *M.A.* 293—295; *K. K.* ii. 330—334; Ishwardas 113b—116a (gives a different cause); *Dil.* 207 (only five lines); Hamid-ud-din's *Ahkām* §9; *Storia*, ii. 302—'4. Relaxation of captivity: *M.A.* 335, 341—345, 350—351, 370—373; *K. K.* ii. 397—'98, 404, 407—418, 437, 443; Ishwardas, 148b; *Ahkām*, §10 and 11, also *Akhbarat*.

assured Abul Hasan that Shah Alam would come over to him if the Emperor rejected the proffered peace. An order of Shah Alam to bring his women's tents closer to his headquarters, really as a precaution against surprise by the enemy, strengthened Aurangzib's suspicion that the Prince was meditating flight to the enemy's fort with his family. All doubts were set at rest when Firuz Jang intercepted and showed to the Emperor one night some letters which the Prince had been trying to send to the fort.

§ 4. *Shah Alam imprisoned.*

Aurangzib acted promptly. Shah Alam's own contingent was sent to the front on the pretext of meeting an expected night-attack, while imperial troops took their place as guards round the Prince's camp. Next morning (21st February), Shah Alam with his four sons was invited to the Emperor's tent for consultation. After a few minutes' talk with him, they were asked by the *wazir* to step into a side-room (the chapel) with him to hear some secret instructions of the Emperor. There they were politely asked to consider themselves as prisoners and surrender their swords. Shah Alam readily submitted; but his eldest son Muizz-ud-din had more spirit; he laid his hand on the hilt of his sword and looked up to his father for a signal to draw it and make a dash for liberty. But Shah Alam's answer

was an angry frown and a stern order to obey. The Prince's entire family was imprisoned, his property attached, his troops distributed among other commands, and his trusted eunuchs tortured to make them divulge their master's treasonable plots. The more the Prince protested his innocence, the more did the Emperor's anger flame up; he increased the rigours of Shah Alam's captivity and ordered that he should not be allowed to cut his hair or pare his nails, nor be supplied with delicate food, cooling drinks or his customary dress. It was seven years before the Prince recovered his liberty.

Aurangzib's mortification at this stern necessity was extreme. His eldest son had been put in prison and had died a captive. His eldest daughter, the gifted poetess Zeb-un-nisa, had been doomed to lifelong confinement in the State-prison of Delhi. And now his eldest surviving son had to be punished similarly. After the arrest of the Prince, the Emperor hurriedly broke up his Court, ran to his wife Aurangabadi Mahal, and kept slapping his knees and moaning, "Alas! Alas! I have razed to the ground what I had been rearing up for the last forty years." (*M.A.* 294.)

§ 5. *Aurangzib's distrust of Shias and other difficulties.*

But Shah Alam was not the only discordant element in the siege-camp. The many Shias in the

imperial service heartily disliked the prospect of the extinction of the last Shia kingdom in India, and though a few notable exceptions among them served the Emperor loyally against their own religious sympathies, others secretly helped the besieged, especially during the dark days of rain and famine. Apart from the Shias, this war of extermination against Abul Hasan was condemned by many orthodox Sunnis even, as an unprovoked "war between Muslims" and therefore sinful. The upright and saintly Chief Justice, Shaikh-ul-Islam, had counselled the Emperor not to invade the two Decanni sultanates, and on his advice being rejected he had resigned his high post and retired to Mecca. His successor in office, Qazi Abdullah, tendered the same unpalatable advice and entreated the Emperor to accept submission and tribute from Qutb Shah and thus stop the effusion of Muslim blood. The Emperor's answer was to pack off this honest adviser to the Base camp.

This natural distrust of Shias hindered the Emperor's business. At first the only high and distinguished officer at the siege was Firuz Jang. As for Khan-i-Jahan, he was fighting in Northern India. The only other great general, Ruhullah Khan (Paymaster-General), was a Persian Shia, and hence he was at first suspiciously kept in the rear at Bijapur, and called to Golkonda only after five and a half

months had elapsed from the opening of the siege and the Mughals had been driven into the sorest straits. Persians, though undoubtedly the cleverest among the Islamic peoples, were now jealously kept out of the post of Chief of Artillery which was of the first importance in a siege.*

Saf Shikan Khan, the Chief of Artillery, was a Persian and jealous of the superior position and favour enjoyed by Firuz Jang, a Turk. After working strenuously for some time in carrying the trenches towards the ditch and raising lofty batteries to command the towers of the fort, he resigned "in order to spite Firuz Jang." Salabat Khan succeeded him, but failed to do his work well, and resigned in a short time. The next Chief of Artillery was Ghairat Khan, who was surprised by the enemy in a state of gross carelessness and carried off as a prisoner. Then the post went abegging for some time, to the ruin of the siege operations. Salabat Khan, on being pressed to resume it, replied that he could not bear the roar of artillery and begged that he might be allowed to stay in the rear and discharge his duties by deputy! The whole camp laughed at

* At the siege of Golkonda Aurangzib assembled 1900 *barqandazes*, 42725 *ahsham*, 106 pieces of artillery (of which 17 were large, carrying balls weighing 4 *sr.* to 41 *sr.*, and 89 were smaller pieces), 5809 *maunds* of powder, 1244 *maunds* of shot, and 3¼ lakhs of bags for filling the ditch. (*Zawabit*, 137b.)

him and refused to be his deputy. Then at last, Saf Shikan Khan was taken out of prison and restored to this office (22 June 1687.) But by that time the field-works constructed after five months of toil, had been demolished by the enemy, and the investment had to be begun anew. This internal history of the besieging army will supply the key to the actual course of its operations.

When, at the end of January, the Mughals sat down before Golkonda, an enemy force of 40,000 cavalry under Shaikh Nizam and other officers remained outside and tried to hinder the progress of the siege. Aurangzib detached Dalpat Rao Bundela and other officers of Firuz Jang's division to repel them. A severe battle was fought, in which many Rajputs were slain and Krishna Singh Hada was mortally wounded; but in the end the enemy fled, after receiving such a severe punishment that for some months afterwards they never again molested the Mughals. (*Dil.* 206; K. K. ii. 329, 335.)

The circle of investment had been divided among the various generals and the first turf cut for the approaches on 7th February. But the fort had an inexhaustible supply of munitions and its walls bristled with guns of large calibre. Day and night the garrison kept up an incessant fire on the approaching Mughals. "The fort looked as if made of fire; the smoke turned the day into night." (*M.A.*

290; K. K. ii. 336.) Every day some men were slain or wounded on the Mughal side. But the dauntless courage and tireless perseverance of the troops under Saf Shikan carried the sap to the edge of the ditch in about six weeks. Then they began to raise lofty platforms and mount guns on them to dominate the towers of the fort. The next step was to fill the ditch and make a path for the assaulting column. For this purpose, Aurangzib, after performing his ceremonial ablutions and uttering prayers, sewed with his own fingers the first bag of cotton to be filled with earth and thrown into the ditch.

§ 6. *Firuz Jang's surprise fails.*

While these slow operations for breaching and assault were going on, the commander-in-chief made an attempt to take the fort by an escalade. On 16th May, he stole out of his camp at 9 P.M., and on reaching a bastion where the enemy's sentries were asleep, he planted a ladder against the wall and sent two men up to the rampart. The two other ladders he had taken with him proved too short, and so a rope-ladder was fastened to the top of the gate. By chance a pariah dog was standing on the wall, seeking a path for descending to the moat and feeding on the corpses lying there. Alarmed by the appearance of strangers, it set up a loud bark, which

roused the garrison. The two Mughal heroes were slain at once. The enemy ran to the wall with torches, discovered the assailants, threw the ladder down, cut the rope-noose, and despatched with hand-grenades the men at the foot of the wall. A smart musketry-fire drove away the Mughal supports. Firuz Jang was covered with failure, but returned to his camp in the early morning, beating his kettle-drums in a spirit of vain defiance.

To the Muslims the dog is an unclean animal. But this dog had played the part of the sacred geese of the Capitoline Hill during the Gallic invasion of Rome. Abul Hasan rewarded his canine deliverer by giving it a gold chain, a collar set with jewels, and a gold embroidered coat, and styling it *Seh-tabqa* or "Peer of three degrees,"—in mockery of Firuz Jang's three titles of *Khan*, *Bahadur*, and *Jang*,—and remarking wittily "This creature has done no less a deed (than Firuz Jang)!"

The garrison promptly retaliated for the surprise that had failed. Early in the morning of the next day (17th May), they made a sortie on the raised battery, slaying the artillerymen. Reinforcements were soon pushed up from the trenches, and the enemy withdrew after killing 70 men. They had also brought a large gun to a point on the wall opposite Aurangzib's own tent and began to fire it, the balls falling around his residence. To subdue

its fire he ordered a new raised battery to be built opposite it; but no officer would undertake to heap up the earth quickly in the face of the enemy's murderous fire. The Emperor, therefore, ordered two hundred quilted coats (inscribed with extracts from the *Quran*) and leather helmets (*mighfar*) to be sewn and supplied to the forlorn hope for an assault on the walls. He had, in addition, some long ladders made, set them up against his tent-poles and himself climbed up one of them in order to charm them into invulnerability and thus put heart into his troops; for, did he not enjoy the reputation of being a living saint, *Alamgir zinda pir*?

§ 7. *Rain and famine : troubles of the besiegers.*

Indeed, his troops sorely needed to be heartened by appeals to supernatural aid. The siege operations had ceased to make any progress for some time past, on account of the confusion in the artillery branch. Saf Shikan Khan, quarrelling with the commander-in-chief, had resigned the supreme command of the artillery, and the post had been filled by the cowardly Salabat Khan and then by the sleepy Ghairat Khan. The enemy's fire was still unsubdued, and the ditch far from filled up. The Mughals also now fell into the grip of famine. During the preceding year there had been an utter

failure of rain throughout the Deccan, and the millets (*jawari* and *bajra*) which are the chief food crops of the peninsula, had dried up on their stalks. In the Haidarabad district, rice was the staple produce; but the war had prevented the sowing of the fields, and this fertile region had become a desert. The Deccanis and their Maratha allies infested the roads and prevented the transport of grain to the Mughal camp. Then, in June, the rain descended in torrents, the swollen water-courses and rivers became impassable, the roads were turned into quagmires. No provisions could reach the besiegers even from their neighbourhood. To crown their misery, terrible reverses fell on them in quick succession at this time.

The incessant rain of the middle of June completely spoiled the siege-works. The raised gun-platforms collapsed into mud-heaps; the walls of the trenches fell down and blocked the passages; the covered lanes ceased to exist. The camp became a sheet of water out of which the white tents stood up like bubbles of foam; the canopies were torn away by the violence of the storm, leaving the men without any shelter over their heads. The shivering troops began to steal away from the front, and their officers sought cover and repose instead of keeping a strict watch at their posts.

§ 8. *Sortie of the garrison : heavy Mughal loss.*

The enemy seized the opportunity. In the night of 15th June, amidst a deluge of rain, they raided the Mughal advanced batteries and trenches, slew the careless artillerymen, drove nails into the port-holes of the guns, destroyed the stores of sapping and gun material, and then fell on the officers. Salim Khan (an Abyssinian) and Saf Shikan Khan (the ex-Chief of Artillery) saved themselves by jumping down into pits of mud and water. Jamshid Khan the sapper fled before the onset. Ghairat Khan, the new Chief of Artillery, ran for safety into a covered lane and after rolling about in the mud, to disguise his appearance, shammed the dead ! The enemy followed him there, and an Afghan deserter from the imperial army recognized him and carried him off into captivity with Sarbarah Khan (a trusty old servant of the Emperor) and twelve other high officers.

The Emperor, at the first report of the raid, had ordered Haiat Khan to go with 70 elephants and convey reinforcements to the scene of the fight in the advanced trenches, over the flooded *nalah* which no boat could cross. But the water was too deep and swift even for elephants ; and after standing for hours on the nearer bank of the stream as helpless spectators of the slaughter of their comrades going

on on the other bank, Haiat Khan and the troops under him returned to their tents. The trenches and batteries between the *nalah* and the fort were lost to the Mughals for three days.

The Emperor's wrath fell on Saf Shikan Khan, who was flung into prison and his property confiscated, on the suspicion of his having collusively aided the enemy out of spite against Firuz Jang and Ghairat Khan. On the 16th, Lutfullah Khan was sent with the Emperor's body-guards and other picked troops to recover the lost ground. But it was only after three days of struggle and with the assistance of a fresh division that the enemy could be expelled and the ruined battery re-occupied by the Mughals.

Abul Hasan treated the captive Mughal officers very kindly, gave them rich presents and sent them back to the Emperor. These luckless men were sternly punished on their return; all of them were degraded in rank; Ghairat Khan was sent off to the Base, Sarbarah Khan was deprived of his peerage (title of *Khan*) and reduced to his former status of a slave.

With them Abul Hasan had sent a petition to the Emperor, saying, "If Golkonda is left to me as a vassal paying tribute, it would be more profitable to the Emperor than if he annexes it and governs it by a viceroy, as the expenses of the latter course

would swallow up the entire revenue of the province. It will take 7 or 8 years to restore cultivation and population to this war-wasted land, and during that period the Mughals will get nothing out of it. If, on the other hand, Aurangzib makes peace and retires beyond my frontiers, I shall pay him one *krore* of Rupees as indemnity, besides one *krore* in honour of every assault that he has led in person." He also offered to present 5 or 6 *lakhs* of maunds of grain from the fort to feed the starving Mughals, even if his peace-terms were rejected.

But imperial prestige had been lowered by the late brilliant *coup* of the enemy, and it must be restored whatever further suffering and loss such an attempt might bring down upon the imperial army. Aurangzib rejected both offers of Abul Hasan and scornfully replied to the Golkonda king, not directly, but through one of the Mughal officers, "If Abul Hasan is really submissive to me, as he professes to be, let him come with his arms tied together and a rope round his neck (like a sentenced felon), and then I shall confer on him any favour that I may consider proper."

Vigorous measures were taken to retrieve the late disaster and press the attack home. Orders were sent to Aurangabad, Khandesh and Berar for 50,000 cotton bags, two yards by one yard, and other materials necessary for filling the ditch anew and

making a path for the assaulting column. The starving imperialists complained of the rejection of the enemy's offer to supply them with food, but Aurangzib continued stern and unbending in his attitude to Qutb Shah.

Soon he prepared to strike his greatest blow. Three mines had been carried from the siege-trenches to under the bastions, and they had been reported as nearly complete, as early as 17th May. Everything was ready by 19th June; each chamber stored with 500 *maunds* of gunpowder, the fuses laid, and the army only waiting for the Emperor's order.

§ 9. *Mines exploded, severe battles, 20th June.*

The next day (20th June) was fixed for the explosion of the mines and the delivery of the assault, which the Emperor went to supervise in person from Firuz Jang's trenches. The Mughal troops, as ordered, rushed out of their trenches and made a noisy feint against the undermined bastion in order to induce the enemy to crowd at this point and then to kill vast numbers of them by the explosion! Dense masses of Mughals—artillerymen, musketers and infantry,—stood in battle order in the plain below the glacis, ready to storm the breach when made.

Early at dawn the signal was given; the fuse was lighted and then followed a deafening noise.

But the force of the explosion was directed outwards ; a vast mass of rock and earth from the glacis was hurled upon the Mughal ranks crowded below : "In a twinkling of the eye the flying splinters killed 1,100 imperialists, while the fort walls remained intact." A universal clamour rose from the Mughal army, the groans of the dying, the shrieks of the wounded, the wild cries of the terror-stricken, and the lamentation of the friends of the victims mingled in a dissonant tumult which "suggested the Day of Judgment." A cloud of smoke and dust covered the imperialists as with a pall.

The enemy seized the opportunity by making a sally and attacking the confounded Mughals. No resistance could be made under the circumstances. The exultant garrison put to the sword the few survivors of the assaulting column whom the explosion had spared, and then seized the trenches and outposts which it had taken the Mughals four months to make and occupy. A force sent by the Emperor drove them out and recovered the position after a long contest and heavy loss. This had been hardly effected when the second mine was fired with the same disastrous consequences. Again the splinters of the blown-up tower fell on the Mughals, and killed more than a thousand of them. The enemy who had got news of the intended assault through their friends in the siege-camp, had vacated

the undermined bastion the night before, leaving only a look-out man there. They now made a second sortie and fell on the unhappy imperial vanguard, doing the same havoc as before.

Firuz Jang then hastened to the scene with a large force, but by the time he arrived from his distant quarters, the enemy were in possession of the Mughal field-works and shelters. A severe struggle for them now took place; the enemy alternately fired their guns and charged sword in hand; and Firuz Jang with all his efforts could not reach the lost ground and dislodge them. He himself was wounded with two other generals, Rustam Khan and Dalpat Rao Bundela, while vast numbers of his men were slain. "The men could not advance one inch in the face of the murderous discharge of muskets, rockets, chain-shot and bombs." (*M.A.* 295.)

At the news of this serious check, coming as it did on the top of two disasters on the same day, Aurangzib himself, girt round by his staff, advanced from his station in Firuz Jang's tent to aid his hard-pressed troops. Cannon-balls began to fall near his portable throne (*takht-i-rawan*), and one of them carried away the arm of his body-servant (*khawas*.) But he coolly kept his position and cheered his soldiers by his example.

While the battle was raging fiercely, the

elements themselves seemed to mingle in the war of mortals. A tropical storm burst on the plain with all the violence of wind rain and thunder. The imperialists in the plain could not advance or even see their objectives distinctly amidst the blinding shower, while the Qutb-Shahi troops, safely sheltered in the fort walls and the captured Mughal trenches, plied their fire-arms with deadly precision on the crowded Mughals in the open.

The rain continued to descend in torrents; the water in the field rose above the horses' breasts, the raised batteries were washed away, the dry *nalahs* and even low paths became rushing streams. The Mughals, assailed by men and the gods, gave way; and then the Deccanis made their third sortie of the day. Sallying forth from the gates, they seized the trenches further off and the elevated gun-platforms, carried off as many guns as they could and destroyed the others. The big planks, beams and thousands of bags filled with earth which the Mughals had thrown into the ditch were quickly removed into the fort and used in repairing the breach caused by the explosion!

By this time the plain of battle had been turned into a lake of mud. The Mughal generals continued to charge the enemy, but to no effect. An imperial elephant worth Rs. 40,000 was killed on the spot, and many men were shot down by the Deccani

musketeers and the incessant discharge of artillery from the bastions of the fort. Towards evening the prime minister Asad Khan and Prince Kam Bakhsh brought up fresh reinforcements, but could not restore the battle. (*Dil.* 207, *M.A.* 295.) Advance was impossible, and to hold the position was to face a gradual but sure destruction. Therefore, at sunset the defeated Mughals retired to their quarters; the Emperor spent the night in Firuz Jang's camp.

§ 10. *Mughal failure; famine and pestilence.*

Next morning (21st June) he issued forth again to fire the third mine and try his fortune by another assault under his own eyes. The mine did not explode at all. It was then learnt that the enemy had discovered the three mines, countermined them by digging with incredible labour in the solid rock of Golkonda, removed all the powder from this (third) mine, and partially emptied the other two and flooded their chambers with water on the fort side, so that only the powder at the Mughal end was dry and the explosion had, therefore, been driven outwards. After some futile exchange of blows, the Mughal soldiers returned to their camp in utter disappointment. The baffled Emperor stole back to his own tent "without ceremony." "Various other plans were tried, immense wealth was spent, but the siege dragged on." (*M.A.* 295.)

The *morale* of the imperial army was utterly gone. True, reinforcements soon arrived (10 July) under Prince Azam and Ruhullah Khan, the governors of Malwa and Bijapur respectively. True, Shaikh Minhaj, "the best servant of Abul Hasan" (*M.A.* 296), deserted to the Emperor's side (28th May), and Saf Shikan Khan, restored to liberty and the Mir Atish-ship (22nd June), began to do his utmost to erect a new gun-platform very quickly. But all these were of no avail. The famine grew worse than before, and pestilence appeared as its inseparable companion. "The scarcity of grain and fodder was so great that even rich men were reduced to beggary, while the condition of the poor baffled description." (*K. K.* ii. 336.) As the official history records it, "Wheat, pulse, and rice disappeared. The city of Haidarabad was utterly depopulated; houses, river, and plain were all filled with corpses. The same condition prevailed in the Mughal camp. At night piles of the dead used to accumulate, and next day the sweepers used to fling them, without funeral, on the bank of the river. This happened day after day. The survivors in the agony of hunger ate the carrion of men and beasts. For miles and miles around, the eye rested only on mounds of corpses. Happily, the ceaseless rain melted away the flesh and the skin, otherwise the rotting carcasses would have poisoned the air and

despatched even the men spared by the famine. After some months, when the rains ceased, the white piles of skeletons looked from a distance like hillocks of snow." (*M.A.* 292.)

"Many of the Mughal soldiers, unable to bear the pangs of hunger, deserted to Abul Hasan; others, in secret league with him, gave help to the besieged." (*K. K.* ii. 337; *M.A.* 295.) The reinforcements brought by Ruhullah Khan and Prince Azam only added to the scarcity of food.

"The siege was protracted." All hope of taking Golkonda by escalade or breaching was gone. And there was no course left but to sit down before the place with grim tenacity and starve it into surrender. And this Aurangzib did. "The Emperor decided to build a wall of wood and earth round the fort of Golkonda. In a short time it was completed and guards were placed at its doors, ingress and egress being forbidden except on the production of passports." (*M.A.* 296.) A new lofty gun-platform was also constructed opposite one of the bastions, and the Emperor reconnoitred the fort from it on 7th July. Prince Azam, on his arrival, was appointed commander-in-chief in the place of the wounded Firuz Jang. (*M.A.* 299; *K. K.* ii. 358.) At the same time, to prevent the garrison from getting fresh supplies, Aurangzib issued a proclamation annexing the kingdom of Haidarabad. He

appointed his own magistrates and revenue-collectors for all places in it, saying "How long can Abul Hasan remain hidden in the fort, when his towns villages and corn-fields are in our hands?" The *khutba* was read in the Emperor's name and a Censor of Public Morals (*muhtasib*) was posted by him at Haidarabad to put down all the Hindu usages and deviations from Islam which Abul Hasan had tolerated, to demolish the temples, and to build a mosque. (K. K. 358; *Waqai*, 134.)

§ 11. *Golkonda surrendered by treachery.*

In time the rain ceased, the roads became dry and the rivers fordable again, provisions began to come to the Mughal camp, and the famished troops got a new life. On 21st September, after the siege had lasted nearly eight months, "the luck of Aurangzib did its work, without a stroke of sword or spear." Golkonda was captured by bribery. (*M.A.* 292; K. K. ii. 361.)

An Afghan soldier of fortune, named Abdullah Pani, surnamed Sardar Khan, had deserted Bijapur service for the Mughal and then left the Mughals to join Abul Hasan; and now in the decline of the Qutb-Shahi monarchy he had risen to be one of the two highest officers in the fort. This double-dyed traitor now sold his master to the enemy.

He left the *khirkī* or postern gate of the fort

open, and at his invitation a party of Mughal soldiers under Ruhullah Khan crossed the broken ground between the siege batteries and the wall and entered the fort unchallenged, at about 3 o'clock in the morning of 21st September, 1687. They posted some men within to hold the ground and then opened the main gate through which the flood of Mughal invasion now poured into the fort. Prince Azam with the supports advanced from the river, at the foot of the fort, to the front trenches and then to the gate, and struck up the music of victory, proclaiming that Golkonda was at last won.

§ 12. *Heroic feats of Abdur Razzaq Lari.*

But it was not to be won without a final struggle. One last feat of the purest heroism cast its radiance on the fall of Golkonda and redeemed its infamy. When the exultant Mughals were swarming into the fort and making their way to the palace, a single rider who had no time to gird his belt on or put saddle on his horse's back, fell like a lunatic on that myriad of enemies. It was Abdur Razzak Lari, surnamed Mustafa Khan, the one faithful man among that faithless crew of Golkonda. Throughout the siege he had rejected with scorn all the bribes of Aurangzib, including a command of Six Thousand Cavalry in the Mughal army, saying that "he would rather be ranked among the 72 faithful

companions who perished with the Imam Husain at Karbala than with the 22,000 traitors who overcame him." Alone he rushed against the flood of invaders, shouting, "While I live, there will be at least one life sacrificed in defence of Abul Hasan." He forced his way against "a thousand swords" to the gate of the Bala Hisar. But covered with 70 distinct wounds, one eye badly damaged, and the skin of his forehead slashed and hanging down so as to obstruct his vision, his horse reeling from wounds and loss of blood,—Abdur Razzaq no longer saw the path before him, but did his best merely to keep his seat and gave his horse the loose rein. The animal escaped from the press and dropped him near an old cocoa-nut tree in the Nagina Bagh garden near the citadel. Here the only hero of the siege of Golkonda lay blood-stained, insensible, half dead, for an entire day, and was then found and taken to his home. Thence he was removed to the Mughal camp and nursed back to life by order of the Emperor.

§ 13. *Abul Hasan made captive.*

In the meantime, when the roar of the advancing Mughals and the din of street fighting and plunder reached the ears of Abul Hasan, he knew that his end had come. "After trying to console his wives and begging pardon of each of them, he came out

to the audience chamber and sat down on the throne calmly waiting for his unbidden guests, and even ordered his morning meal to be served at the usual time. When at last Ruhullah Khan and his party entered, Abul Hasan was the first to say "Good morning," greeted them kindly, and behaved with royal dignity throughout the painful scene. Then, after bidding his captors to breakfast with him, he finished his meal and left the palace amidst the frantic lamentations of his women, servants and friends. On reaching Azam's tent outside the gate, the deposed king was consoled by the Prince, lodged in his tent, and in the evening presented to the Emperor. The Court historian writes that "Aurangzib, in his infinite mercy, shut his eyes to the offences of this hapless man and ordered him to be safely lodged in a tent." After a time he was sent to Daulatabad. On the steep wind-swept side of that grim prison-fortress, in a set of narrow apartments now choked with grass, brambles and fallen masonry,* the most luxurious king of the Deccan sighed out his captive life on a pension of Rs. 50,000 a year.

Nothing in Abul Hasan's reign became him like the ending of it. As king he had been known only for swinish sensuality and a criminal neglect of the

* This was their appearance when I visited the place in October 1916.

duties of his office. But at the moment of leaving his throne and passing into the rigours of captivity under a sworn enemy, he showed a self-control and a dignity which surprised his captors. To their cries of admiring surprise he replied that though born of royalty he had been trained in youth in the school of poverty, and knew how to take pleasure and pain with equal indifference as gifts of God, "who had made me a beggar, and then a king, [and now a beggar again], and who never withdraws His gracious care from His slaves, but sends to each man his allotted share of food. Praised be God, that I feel neither fear nor repining now. I have given away *lakhs* and spent *krores*. Now that He has cast me out of His favour as a punishment for my sins as king, I still thank Him for placing me in my last years in the hands of a pious king like Alamgir."*

* K. K. ii. 363—364. But Dr. Careri (in Churchill's *Voyages*, iv. 249) and Manucci (ii. 306—'8) speak of his being insulted and beaten when taken to Aurangzib. Ishwardas tells the characteristic story that at the time of his capture Abul Hasan was merry-making with his dancing-girls and musicians and, when the girls stopped their dance in alarm at the entrance of the enemy, he cried out to them, "Go on dancing as before. Every minute that I can spend in pleasure is a great gain." Firuz Jang raised him from his throne and led him, mounted on a horse, to the Emperor's presence. Abul Hasan, without making *kurnish* or *salam* walked in erect. The Emperor asked, "How are you?" He replied, "I neither rejoice..... nor grieve. But I am delighted to gaze at what has made itself visible from behind the screen of the inscrutable." (93 a and b.)

The spoils taken at Golkonda amounted to nearly seven *krores* of Rupees in cash besides gold and silver plate, jewels and jewelled ware. The revenue of the conquered kingdom was 2 *krores* and 87 *lakhs* of Rupees. (K. K. ii. 367.)

The report entered in the Fort St. George Diary on 12th Nov. 1687 is more reliable than Manucci's account. It runs thus: "...News from the French, Dutch and other nations that the Mughal had taken Golkonda fort by treachery on the 2nd of last month [New Style] about midnight.....Upon the king of Golkonda's prostration the Mughal had made a large discourse to him for his corrupt government, wherein he had been very unfaithful, in the charge he had committed to him, in encouraging the Brahmans and discouraging the Moors, to the dishonour of their religion and country, whereby he had justly brought these troubles upon himself; and ordered him to be put in chains, of which it is reported he was next day released."

CHAPTER XLVIII

DOWNFALL OF THE MARATHA KINGDOM.

§ 1. *Defeat of Pam Nayak of Sagar.*

On the surrender of Bijapur (12th Sep. 1686), Aurangzib appointed his own governor and other officers and made the Adil-Shahi kingdom a regular *subah* of the Mughal empire. His generals were sent to the different parts of the newly-conquered country to make a revenue settlement, maintain peace, and take charge of the forts. (M.A. 282-283). By the month of November we read of 20 fortresses having been conquered by the Mughals. (Ish. 111 a.) Early next year (1687) Ibrahimgarh or Yadagiri and Turgal were won by Firuz Jang and Qasim Khan respectively. But from February to September the Mughal forces were concentrated at the siege of Golkonda, and it was only after the fall of that fort (21st Sep. 1687) that the imperialists could renew their activity in the provinces of the old Adil-Shahi kingdom.

The first campaign was directed against the Berad* clan, who ruled over "the delightful, fresh

* The *Beydars* of Shorapur in Meadows Taylor's *Story of My Life*. M.A. is confused in spelling the name of the Berad chieftain who ruled up to 1687, as *Padam*, *Pam* and *Pid*, while his nephew and successor was *Pidia*. I have called the former *Pam*. (See Vol. V, Ch. 56 §2 and 3 foot-notes.)

and fertile land'' (*M.A.* 307) situated in the fork between the Krishna and the Bhima, with their capital at Sagar. They had inflicted a crushing defeat on the Mughals under Dilir Khan only seven years ago (Feb. 1680), and their strategic position almost midway between the forts of Bijapur and Golkonda made it imperatively necessary to conquer them. Pam Nayak, the ruling Berad chieftain, commanded 12,000 cavalry and a hundred thousand infantry, mostly militiamen, but also including many hardy, accurate and steady marksmen. Sagar was reputed as an impregnable fortress in that age. His great military power made his friendship an object of eager desire to his neighbours, and he had been induced to send aid to both Bijapur and Golkonda during their late siege. The offence could not be left unpunished by Aurangzib.

The Emperor detached from Haidarabad a large army under Khanazad Khan (the son of Ruhullah Khan), with instructions to intimidate Pam Nayak into submission and bring him to the Court as a vassal. Fighting was to be avoided and the homes of the people spared, unless the mere demonstration of force failed. The terror of Mughal arms inspired by the fall of Bijapur and Golkonda within one year, did the work. Pam Nayak submitted, gave up his fort (28th November),

in which now for the first time the Muslim creed was chanted and a mosque built.

Pam Nayak was a huge strongly-built uncouth savage with a jet-black complexion. He was presented to the Emperor on 27th December 1687, but suddenly died after five days. His country was annexed, but his sons were provided for with *mansabs*. (M.A. 304-'7.)

§ 2. *Conquest of the provinces of Bijapur.*

Mughal enterprise was next directed towards the east and the south of the newly-conquered States. "Part of the army was ordered against the king of Kanara" (i.e., Rajah of Sunda) at the close of the year 1687. (O.C. 5642.) And on the 25th of January next Firuz Jang was sent at the head of 25,000 cavalry to conquer the district of Karnul and the fort of Adoni,* south of the Tungabhadra, where Siddi Masaud was now reigning in independence. Firuz Jang's call for surrender was rejected by the Siddi. Then the Mughals sacked the prosperous villages of this province, burnt the

* The accumulated treasure and regalia of the Adil Shahs were believed to have been removed to Adoni by Masaud during his wazirship. (M.A. 308.) Siege of Adoni, in M.A. 308, 315-316. Ishwardas (124-127) gives a very long account of this expedition and a description of the fort. The Emperor's letter to Masaud accepting his submission is given in A.S.B. MS. F. 56 p. 126 and Asafiya Library MS. Insha 59 folio 48. K. K. ii. 372 and Dil. 96a (meagre.)

pettah at the foot of Adoni, and invested the fort. At last on 6th August 1688, Siddi Masaud was induced to capitulate; his fort was occupied and renamed Imtiaz-garh, the Siddi was enrolled in the Mughal peerage as a 7-hazari, his sons and relatives were highly favoured, the Court-band played joyous notes on hearing of the success, and the courtiers made their bow of congratulation at the submission of the most powerful noble of Bijapur.

Prince Azam had been sent with 40,000 veteran cavalry against Shambhuji on 25th January, 1688. He marched into the south-western corner of the Bijapur kingdom, captured the strong fort of Belgaum after a siege, and then returned to Court (at Bijapur) to encamp for the rainy season. (*M.A.* 308 and 315; Ishwardas, 127 b-130 b, gives a long account of the siege, wrongly calling the fort *Banglur*.) In other directions, too, "innumerable forts were captured by the imperialists" (*M.A.* 311.)

The Emperor left Haidarabad on 25th January 1688, and after making a leisurely progress by way of Bidar, the tank of Kamtan and the shrine of Kulbarga, arrived at Bijapur on 15th March. Here his attention was taken up by the necessity of giving relief to the people who had fallen into want through the ruin of the city and its environs during the late long and desolating siege, the disappearance of the

Adil-Shahi Court and nobles and their charity, and probably also some of the severe diseases which always walk on the heels of war. The chief want of the citizens was the lack of drinking-water, because the aqueducts were damaged during the siege and the water suddenly dried up (probably from this cause.) Mukhlis Khan, the Mir Atish, was ordered to cut a canal for conveying the water of the Krishna to the city. (*M.A.* 310, 313; *Dil.* 203; *Ishwar.* 123 b, cost Rs. 35,000.)

§ 3. *Plague at Bijapur.*

When the rainy season ended and the imperialists were about to set out on a vigorous and extensive campaign for crushing the Marathas, a terrible epidemic broke out in the city of Bijapur and the imperial camp, at the beginning of November, 1688. "First a bubo appeared in the arm-pit and the corner of the thigh, then high fever and unconsciousness supervened; medical treatment produced no effect; few men lived beyond two days, but most died in less.....Even the survivors, on seeing the prevailing state of things, considered themselves as dead. No one looked after anybody else. The half-dead people abstained from all worldly work and lay expecting death every hour.....Joyous practices ceased. All sat down sunk in mourning. Death wanted to remove even the seed-corn of the

human race from this world. It was a Day of Judgment which made great and small alike lose their lives."

"Among the victims were the Emperor's old and devoted wife Aurangabadi Mahal, Maharajah Jaswant's son Muhammadi-Raj who had been brought up in the imperial harem and reached the age of 13, Fazil Khan the *Sadar*, and many other grandees. The middle class and poor people, both Hindu and Muhammadan, who died, cannot be counted, but are conjectured to have been not less than a lakh. Many [saved their lives] but had disorder of the brain or loss of sight, speech or hearing. Firuz Jang's eyes were lost." (*M.A.* 317-'18.)

But the Emperor firmly set out on his campaign on the appointed date, 14th December, 1688, and a week afterwards the fury of the epidemic abated. He marched on to Akhuj, 85 miles north of Bijapur, and there at the end of January he received the happy news that Shambhuji had been captured.

§ 4. *Last efforts of Akbar in India.*

But before we turn to the final scene of the tragedy of the Maratha king, it is necessary to complete the story of his ally, Prince Muhammad Akbar. We have seen (Ch. 44 § 20) how his rupture with Shambhuji was patched up in November 1683

by Durgadas and Kavi-kalash and he continued to live in Maratha territory, though as an unwilling guest. His father's emissaries at first continued to visit him, tempting him to return with offers of pardon and restoration to favour. (*Storia*, ii. 258-259.) But nothing came of these negotiations. In fact, the canonical sentence of deposition which Akbar had issued against his father and the taunting letters* he had addressed to him in 1681, had dug a gulf of hate between the two, which nothing could cross. On 12th April, 1685, a slave of Akbar came to the Emperor with a present of two horses, but he was refused audience and ordered to speak to Princess Zinat-un-nisa. (*M.A.* 256.)

In September and November 1684 the English factors of Surat report a rumour that Akbar at the head of 15,000 horse and Shambhuji with 10,000 were getting ready to sack Surat. (Surat to Co. 26th Sep. and 29th Nov. in *F. R.* Surat 91 and *O. C.* 5206.) But nothing came of it.† Sardar Tarin, an Afghan of the imperial service used to recruit soldiers in secret in Aurangzib's camp at Ahmadnagar and send them to Akbar. He was detected and put to death (early 1685.) (*Dil.* 184.) Next year, Abdus Shakur (son of Uzbek Khan), a dismissed imperial officer,

* Translated by me in my *Studies in Mughal India*, pp. 96—108.

† There were similar rumours in 1687, after Akbar had left India (*O. C.* 5563 and 5621, dated 10 Feb. and 29th Sep.)

fled from Sholapur with 180 Uzbek soldiers and joined Akbar. (Ish. 108 b.) About 20th July 1685, the Emperor ordered Kar Talb Khan, the governor of Ahmadabad, to bar Akbar's northward path to Agra. In October 1685, a body of 4,000 rebels killed the imperial governor and other officers of Broach and took possession of the city in the name of Akbar, whom they proclaimed Emperor there. At the same time a rumour spread that Akbar was advancing to join them with 30,000 men, and that some of his forces were coming to Surat. But the insurrection failed. (Surat to James King, 30th Oct. in *F.R.* Surat 92. *Mirat-i-Ahmadi*, 339, describes it as a religious outbreak quite unconnected with Akbar.)

Akbar's real dash into Mughal territory was at last made in June 1686, after the Emperor had left Sholapur to join the siege of Bijapur and Mughal Deccan was denuded of his forces. The attempt, however, failed, because the Emperor with his usual foresight had left Murhamat Khan (a grandson of Jafar Khan) with a division to guard Ahmadnagar. The Khan "calling to his side all the *faujdar*s of the district, fought a severe battle with Akbar near Chakan, and defeated and repulsed him. Akbar went back to Shambhuji's dominions," foiled in his design of marching to Northern India and joining the Rajpûts. (*Dil.* 200.)

Ishwardas Nagar who, though an officer of the imperial Government, was in touch with Durgadas and the Rathors, gives the following account of the last activities of Akbar in India :

“A despatch from the thanahdar of Shirwal informed the Emperor that Shambhuji was intending to send Akbar to some place in Northern India at the head of a large army. The Emperor ordered Prince Azam with 30,000 horse to go towards Ahmadnagar, close the path of the rebel, and catch him wherever he might be passi ... When Azam reached Kandapur, Akbar in fear fled through the wilderness with a thousand hardships to the neighbourhood of Salhir. Azam arrived near fort Ahivantgarh, in pursuit. Akbar escaped to Mahuli with great difficulty and fatigue.”

“After this the Emperor learnt from the newsletter of Shirwal, that Akbar had gone from Mahuli to Kalian-Bhivandi, halted there for two or three days, then crossed the hilly country to the environs of Panhala, where a severe battle was fought with the imperialists, after which he found his advance impossible and retired to the hills again.”

“Sayyid Muhammad, the son of Mariam Mughalani, having by the Emperor's order carried a conciliatory letter from Zinat-un-nisa Begam to Akbar, brought back a reply, in which the Prince

asked for forgiveness. An imperial farman was at once sent to Akbar assuring him of safety and asking him to come quickly...One month afterwards, spies brought the news that Akbar after roaming in all directions in the valley of despair and finding no way for escape, had gone to Shambhuji, taken aid from him, marched to Mahuli, made war preparations there, and then advanced to Shahpur, wishing to march [towards Surat] by way of Jawhar. The Emperor remarked, 'Eternal misery has seized him and is making him roam over hills and deserts'.'''...

"Spies reported that Akbar under the guidance of Raghubir Khande, the brother of Tukaram [= Vikram ?] Trimbak, the zamindar of Jawhar, had reached the Portuguese frontier [? Daman] and wished to turn back thence and reach Hindustan. Azam was directed to hasten in pursuit and block his path to the imperial territory.".....

"A secret letter from the army of Prince Azam informed the Emperor that spies had brought to the Prince the news that Durgadas had embarked Akbar in a ship and leaving him had himself gone back to Jodhpur." (Ish. 108 b, 109 b-110 b, 113 a, 119 a.) With Zia-ud-din Muhammad (a former follower of Shuja) and 45 retainers, Akbar embarked in a ship hired at Rajapur (commanded by Bendal, an Englishman), and sailed for Persia (in Feb. 1687), but was driven by stress of weather

to the port of Masqat. (K. K. ii. 285.) He reached the Persian Court at Isfahan on 24th January, 1688.*

§ 5. *Internal condition of the Maratha kingdom and Shambhuji's doings, 1685-1687.*

While Aurangzib was directing the full strength of his empire against Bijapur and Golkonda, Shambhuji made no adequate effort to meet the danger that threatened all the Deccani Powers alike. His soldiers plundered places in the Mughal territory as a matter of routine, but these raids did not influence the military situation. Aurangzib disregarded such pin-pricks, as he knew that he would be able to destroy Shambhuji for ever after he had put an end to the Adil-Shahi and Qutb-Shahi States. The Maratha king was not wise enough to follow any

* The *Jedhe Shakavali* states that Akbar went by ship to Persia in Falgun Shaka 1608 (=Feb. 1687.) This is supported by Kämpfer (as quoted in Orme's *Fragments*, 292), who says that "Akbar arrived in that part of Arabia bordering on Persia, in the beginning of the year 1687.....and at Isfahan on 24th January, 1688." Ishwardas (119) places Akbar's departure from India after Shah Alam's imprisonment (which took place in Feb. 1687.) Orme's statement (*Frag.* 149) that Akbar embarked at Rajapur as soon as the monsoon was changed in Oct. 1686 and arrived at Masqat in Nov., is evidently based on O. C. 5621, Madras to Surat dated 29 Sep. 1687, which states, "Mr. Dobson, belonging to Calicut, assures us he saw Sultan Akbar in November last at Masqat, and that he and his retinue were designed for Persia." Here the month must be wrong. Full history of Akbar's life in Persia, K. K. ii. 286-290, 450, 546. *Storia*, ii. 279, 322; *Ruqat* No. 95; *M.A.* 484. (*Ante*, iii. ch. 27 § 3.)

large and well-thought-out plan for diverting the Mughals from the sieges of Bijapur and Golkonda and averting their fall. Indeed, while he was sunk in pleasure, his Government was hopelessly weakened by rebellions among his vassals and plots among his courtiers, [*ante* Ch. 44 § 21.]

Within a few years of the accession of Shambhuji, nearly all the officers who had contributed to the glory of his father's reign disappeared. The Peshwa Moro Trimbak Pingle died in October 1680. Annaji Datto (second only to the Peshwa in influence and ability) was put to death with his brother Somaji Datto (a civil administrator), Hiraji Farzand (a distinguished general), Balaji Avji (the cleverest of secretaries), Mahadji Anant and 23 other officers of leading positions, for their participation in the plot to kill Shambhuji and crown Rajaram (Aug.-Oct. 1681.) Raghunath Narayan Hanumanté was arrested in the Eastern Karnatak over which he ruled, in December 1680, and though taken back into State employ after a suspension of two years, in January 1683, died within four months of it (4th May.) His brother Janardan, followed him to the grave a month afterwards (28 June 1683.) Netaji Palkar, the most dashing of Shivaji's generals, is last heard of in July 1681, and he evidently died of age and the hardships endured during the many years spent by him in active service in Afghanistan as a forced

convert to Islam and a Mughal captain. Avji Pandit (Avji Mahadev), whom the English describe as a person of great esteem and quality, who commanded the army next under the Peshwa in Shivaji's time, was dismissed in January 1682.

In this dearth of talent at the Maratha Court and camp, Kavi-kalash's ability shone more conspicuously and his predominance became naturally unrivalled, while Shambhuji's affairs in the outlying parts of his dominions suffered from the lack of competent agents on the spot. The evil was aggravated by fresh conspiracies against the king, which were inevitably followed by the execution or at least imprisonment of more Maratha generals and ministers of leading positions. We hear of the arrest of Manaji Moré (a great general), Gangadhar Pant, Vasudev Pant, and Sahuji Somnath on 29th Oct. 1684 [J.S.] A few months later Hambir Rao (the commander-in-chief) is said to be in prison along with Rajaram. [Karwar to Surat, 8 Apr. 1685 in O.M. 118.] At all events, there is a surprising silence about Hambir Rao's doings after 1683 which shows that he was out of favour and office, even if not in prison. What could not the enterprising spirit, eye for the actual situation and promptness in seizing it, which Netaji and Hambir possessed, have done for Shambhuji in his war with the

Portuguese and his attempt to raise Aurangzib's last siege of Bijapur?

The Madras Karnatak, a kingdom in itself, had practically passed out of Shambhuji's control and was ruled by his brother-in-law Harji Mahadik with the title of Maharajah in semi-independence. (Vol. V, Ch. 51 § 2.)

In May 1685, after Aurangzib had advanced to Sholapur to direct the siege of Bijapur, the Marathas tried to enter the fort of Ahmadnagar by escalade at night, but the attempt was defeated by the vigilance of the *qiladar* Sayyid Zain-ul-abidin Bukhari. (*Dil.* 186.) A month after the fall of Bijapur, the Marathas appeared near Mangalvide (Oct. 1686), but could do nothing. (*M.A.* 283.) The Emperor now "turned his arms against Shambhuji and laid siege to a famous castle," evidently Panhala, (*O.C.* 5534, dated 30th Nov. 1686.) Many Maratha forts fell into his hands from this time onwards, and the Marathas gained only isolated successes over small detachments or grain convoys of the imperialists.* In May 1687, the Maratha *qiladars* of Salhir (named Asuji in *M.A.* and Krishnaji by Ishwardas) and Saluna (? Sangola) sold their forts to the Mughals. (*M.A.* 297.) Kohaj fort (Thana district) was taken

* Ishwardas's account of these operations is given in the appendix to this chapter, as I am doubtful about the correctness of his dates and order of events.

by Vikram (ex-Rajah of Jawhar) in March 1688, Hulgarrh by Hasan Ali Khan (July), Samangarrh by Bahadur Khan (Sep.), and Mahuli was offered by its qiladar for the same price as Salhir. [Jaipur records.]

As we have seen before (Ch. 44 § 21 & 24), there were frequent rebellions desertions and plots against Shambhuji after 1684, in addition to his family feud with the Shirkes and the intrigues of his other ministers against Kavi-kalash. On 12th February 1685, the English factors in Khandesh record a wild rumour: "Some time before thisthere was a report that a great Brahman had invited Shambhuji Rajah to a feast and clapped him in prison because he was remiss in his actions, and had set up Ram-Raja in his room." But they in the same letter contradict this rumour as false. A little later, 2nd March, the Karwar traders write, "It hath been for some time credibly reported here that Shambhuji is killed by some of his own people; which we are the more apt to believe is true, because there are so many *desais* and other people up in rebellion in his country, who formerly stood in great awe of him." They repeat the same rumour a month later: "Some say that Ram-Raja and Hambir Rao, that were both in prison, are got out and flown to Sharza Khan [who was said to have come to Ramghat with 6,000 horse.]Here are

various reports concerning Shambhuji Rajah. Some say he is dead, others say not; but in all probability we judge he is dead, or else he would have appeared before this to appease the rebels that are got together to destroy and spoil his country." [Karwar to Surat, 8 April 1685, in *O.M.* 118.] In January 1686 the state of things had not improved, and the English report that "the considerable persons who have revolted against Shambhuji Rajah are grown so strong as in appearance may be the downfall of the Rajah." [*O.C.* 5461.]

The economic decay of the Maratha kingdom through Shambhuji's supine rule, the corruption of his officers, and the disorder caused by the rebels, is graphically described in the English factory records. They tell us,—“Europe commodities are afraid to come into Shambhuji's country by reason of his ministers' exactions; who not only take custom of us [the importers], but the [native] merchants too, with a peshkash exacted according to the quality [*i.e.*, rank] of the person, which is really our loss.” [Karwar 4 Sep. 1683.]

In May 1685, owing to the disturbed condition of the Karwar region, slaves became so cheap that they could be had at a pagoda (Rs. 5) a head, while the normal price was thrice as much.

At the same time the Surat factors write, “In former years there was a quantity of pepper about

1,500 *khandi*, it grew in and near about Rajapur; but now grows not the tenth part since that place hath been in Shivaji's hands;—not only the pepper is lost, but decayed in trade [so] that it is a miserable poor town [now.]”

The cause of the ruin of trade and industry was misrule. The Karwar factors write (Nov. 1684): “This Government is eager and hungry after present interest, which suits ill with the rules of saving so much recommended to us [by the Directors at Home.] ...With the Rajah down to the Plowman the infection of *peshkashing* is so prevalent that nothing can be well done without it, or withstand it.” Bombay writes on 2nd April 1685: “The weavers that came from Thanah and Chaul was about a twelve month since when the latter [town] was besieged by Shambhuji; and since there is come none... There was in number about 600 families [of weavers],—400 for want of encouragement did forsake this place in Keigwin's time, 150 of the remainder are dead; so that they are now about 50 [families.]”

Near Karwar the ways were molested by Dalvi Desai, one of Shambhuji's revolted vassals. [O.M. 118, Bombay to Surat, 18 July, 1685.] In January next the evil was aggravated. “Karwar factory is under a great deal of trouble, [and the inland] parts under sufficient unhappiness and misery from the

continually (*sic*) robberies etc. committed not only by the Rajah's own people in power, that in all places press severely on those that are under their government to supply the Rajah's wants, and fill their own pockets,—but likewise from considerable persons who have revolted against Shambhuji Rajah and are grown so strong ... that in his dominions there is little or no safety, and at best a great deal of hazard: trade in general obstructed." [O.C. 5461.]

Shambhuji's absorption in pleasure and his failure to show himself to the public by appearing against the rebels at the head of his army, confirmed the popular belief that he was dead. The fall of such a king could not be long delayed, when an enemy like Aurangzib became free from other works.

§ 6. *Capture and execution of Shambhuji.*

After the conspiracies against Shambhuji in June 1680 and October 1681 had been crushed, there was a fresh plot in October 1684, in consequence of which he threw Manaji Moré, Gangadhar and Vasudev Pandit, and Sahuji Somnath into prison, where they remained confined till his death. Things then continued quiet at his Court for four years. But in October 1688, the Shirké family again rose against him; they attacked Kavi-kalash and drove him into Khelna for refuge. Shambhuji marched from

Raigarh to the rescue of his favourite, defeated and routed the rebels at Sangameshwar, and then went to Khelna. He arrested Prahlad Niraji and many other ministers and leading people on suspicion of complicity in the late rising, and after provisioning Khelna fort, started with Kavi-kalash for returning to his capital. On the way he arrived at Sangameshwar, 22 miles n. e. of Ratnagiri city, and the sacred junction of the Alak-nanda and Varuna rivers, where Kavi-kalash had laid out fine gardens and built nicely-decorated mansions for his master. Here, after sending his army and family back to Raigarh, Shambhuji plunged into drinking and merry-making, with a small escort and in utter carelessness. All vigilance was abandoned, as he believed the place to be impenetrable to Mughal arms.

Shaikh Nizam, "chief among the servants of Qutb Shah," had been induced to desert to the Mughals during the siege of Golkonda (28th May, 1687.) His pre-eminent position and ability had been recognized by the Emperor immediately creating him a *6-hazari* with the title of Muqarrab Khan and a cash reward of one lakh of Rupees, and giving high commands to his relatives, so that the *mansabs* held by this family totalled 25,000 men. (*M.A.* 296, 320.) This able and active general had been detached to lay siege to Panhala (1688). He sent

out clever spies to get news about Shambhuji's whereabouts and movements.

Muqarrab Khan, on hearing of Shambhuji's unguarded life of debauchery at Sangameshwar, lost no time. Taking with himself only 2,000 picked troopers and 1,000 infantry, he made a forced march from his camp at Kolhapur. Very great hardship was undergone in crossing the jungles, broken ground and lofty passes of the Western Ghats, at such a rapid pace. At every stage he had to leave many stragglers behind. But with his officers and some 300 troopers he arrived at Sangameshwar "with the speed of lightning and wind," covering the intervening 90 miles in two or three days. Shambhuji had been warned of the approach of an enemy force, but had rebuked his spies for their pains, saying, "You careless fellows, you are mad. Can any Mughal troops reach here?"* (M.A. 321.)

When the invaders entered the town, Kavikalash offered them battle. [M.A.] He was wounded by an arrow in his right hand, and being unable to fight, dismounted. The Maratha force that had been hurriedly armed and assembled, being

* K. K., ii. 385, adds that he ordered the tongues of his spies to be cut out, (evidently a graphic touch from Khafi Khan's imagination.) Chitnis (ii. 18) says that the Mughal general (miscalled Elchi Beg) marched unopposed by pretending that he was an ambassador charged with proposals of peace.

now without a leader, broke and fled. Shambhuji and his minister then hid themselves in a hole in the floor of the latter's house. The Mughal general who had learnt of the hiding-place from his spies, without caring to pursue the fugitive army, surrounded Kavi-kalash's house. His son Ikhlas Khan with a party of brave men entered the room by the narrow steps, dragged the Rajah and his minister out of the hole by their long hair, and took them to the general on his elephant outside.* Twenty-five of Shambhuji's chief followers with their wives and daughters were taken prisoner at this place. Shambhuji was placed behind Muqarrab Khan on his elephant, and the other captives, heavily chained, on elephants, horses and camels and removed under strong guard with every precaution against escape or rescue, (1st February 1689.) (*M.A.* 320-22; *K.K.* ii. 386; *J.S.* for date.)

The news of the capture soon reached the imperial camp at Akluj and caused a wild outburst of rejoicing in all parts of the imperial dominions. The Muslims in particular were exultant; a great terror had been lifted from their hearts. The

* According to Khafi Khan, Shambhuji had rapidly shaved off his hair and beard, smeared himself with ashes and put on the disguise of a *sannyasi*, but he was recognized by the necklace of pearls he wore under his dress and the gold rings round the fetlocks of his horse. I have followed the account of the official history (*M.A.*) based on contemporary records.

to report such a speech, sent only a hint about its nature to the Emperor.

The Maratha Rajah had sinned beyond hope of pardon. That very night his eyes were blinded and next day the tongue of Kavi-kalash was cut out. (*M. A.* 323.) The Muhammadan theologians pronounced a decree that Shambhuji should be put to death on account of his having "slain captured and dishonoured Muslims and plundered the cities of Islam." The Emperor, seeing no chance of getting anything out of Shambhuji, consented to his death. After undergoing a fortnight of torture and insult, the captives were removed with the imperial camp to Koregaon, on the bank of the Bhima, 12 m. n. e. of Puna, (on 3rd March), and there they were put to a cruel and painful death on 11th March, their limbs being hacked off one by one, (*M. A.* 325; *Ish.* 156 *b*) and their flesh thrown to the dogs. (*Storia*, ii. 311.) Their severed heads were stuffed with straw and exhibited in all the chief cities of the Deccan to the accompaniment of drum and trumpet. (*K. K.* ii. 389; *Ish.* 156 *b*.)

The captor of Shambhuji was rewarded with the title of Khan-i-Zaman Bahadur Fath Jang, a cash gift of Rs. 50,000, a suit of royal robes, horses, elephants, jewelled arms, and promotion to the rank of a 7-hazari. His son Ikhlās Khan was created a

5-hazari and Khan-i-Alam. All other officers of the expedition were promoted. (M.A. 324.)

§ 7. *The war in 1689; capture of Raigarh and Shambhuji's entire family.*

When the campaigning season opened in November 1688, Firuz Jang was appointed against Shambhuji; but he was detained at Bijapur by the trouble in his eyes which ended, after a prolonged illness, in total blindness. Prince Azam was then given this task, about the middle of December. (M.A. 319.) He marched to the North Puna district and encamped near Chakan for some time (M.A. 326.) While the Mughal siege of Panhala was going on in a slack and slow manner, Shambhuji was captured (Feb. 1689.) After this event many of the Maratha forts quickly fell into the hands of the imperialists. But their enterprise was turned into a labour of Sisypheus by the escape of Rajaram.

This Prince had been kept by Shambhuji in prison. After the downfall of the latter, he was crowned (8th Feb.) by the Maratha ministers in Raigarh, as Shambhuji's son Shahu (afterwards Shivaji II.) was too young to be the head of a State engaged in a life and death struggle with an enemy like Aurangzib. Soon afterwards an imperial army under Itiqad Khan laid siege to the Maratha capital, but Rajaram escaped from it (5th April) in the

guise of a *yogi*. (*Post*, Ch. 50 § 2.) Sayyid Abdullah Khan (of Barha), the new subahdar of Bijapur, who was then besieging two forts in Bijapuri Karnatak, tried to intercept the fugitive. His spies reported that Rajaram with 300 of his high officers had entered the kingdom of Bednur. The Sayyid sent his son Hasan Ali Khan thither with his Van, while he brought up the rear by forced marches. In three days the enemy were overtaken "near the forts of Subhangarh and Jara* on the bank of the Tungabhadra." The Marathas who had taken refuge in an island, were attacked at night, surrounded and overpowered, after a bloody fight. Many were put to the sword, and a hundred of their chiefs,—including Hindu Rao, Ankoji "brother of Shambha" [? Shanta Ghorparé], Baharji and Mania Ghoreparé—were made prisoner. But Rajaram contrived to escape with his bare life while his comrades were carrying on the fight.

For some time he hid himself in the territory of the Rani of Bednur (now the Shimoga district of Mysore.) But a Mughal force under Jan Nisar Khan having invaded her country to punish her for harbouring Rajaram, she let him escape to Jinji (1st Nov.) in Madras, and then made her peace with the

* *Jara* may be a copyist's error for *Hirra*, a place in the Bellary district due east of Bankapur, but some distance across and east of the Tungabhadra. Neither Subhangarh nor Jara is found in the maps.

Emperor by paying a small fine. The Maratha captives were confined in the citadel of Bijapur, but in a short time Hindu Rao, Baharji, and some twenty other chiefs escaped from the stronghold,—a feat “which was impossible except with the connivance of their guards.” (*M.A.*, 329.) At this the Emperor put the remaining 80 prisoners to death and removed Abdullah from the *subahdar*-ship of Bijapur.

As early as December 1688, Itiqad Khan (a son of the prime minister Asad Khan) had been deputed to lay siege to Raigarh. After a long struggle he captured the fort* on 19th October 1689, and seized in it Shivaji's surviving widows, and Shambhuji's and Rajaram's wives, daughters and sons, including Shahu, a boy of seven. The captives were brought to the imperial camp at Koregaon on 23rd November. The ladies were lodged in separate tents with every respect and privacy. Shahu was given the rank of a *7-hazari* and the title of Rajah,

* Manucci (ii. 312) tells the absurd story that Yesu Bai surrendered Raigarh and 22 forts to the Mughals in order to vent her spite at Rajaram being crowned instead of her own son, and that she was afterwards poisoned with her sons by the Maratha garrison of Panhala. Chitnis (ii. 22) and Ishwardas (153 b) both state what is more probable, that Yesu Bai and her counsellors felt that after the death of Shambhuji and the flight of Rajaram and many captains from the country, further resistance to the Mughals was hopeless and that the peaceful surrender of Raigarh was likely to serve Shahu's interests best.

but kept a prisoner near the imperial tent, while his brothers Madan Singh and Adhu (? Madhu) Singh were permitted to live with their mothers and grandmothers, with proper allowances and establishments of officers. (M.A. 331-332.)

Thus, by the end of the year 1689, Aurangzib was the unrivalled lord paramount of Northern India and the Deccan alike. Adil Shah, Qutb Shah, and Rajah Shambhuji had all fallen and their dominions had been annexed to his empire.

"All seemed to have been gained by Aurangzib now; but in reality all was lost. It was the beginning of his end. The saddest and most hopeless chapter of his life now opened. The Mughal empire had become too large to be ruled by one man or from one centre...His enemies rose on all sides; he could defeat but not crush them for ever. Lawlessness reigned in many parts of Northern and Central India. The administration grew slack and corrupt. The endless war in the Deccan exhausted his treasury. Napoleon I. used to say, 'It was the Spanish ulcer which ruined me.' The Deccan ulcer ruined Aurangzib." (*My Studies in Mughal India*, 50.)

APPENDIX

Ishwardas Nagar's Narrative of Events, 1685-'90.

[The correct dates are given within square brackets.]

Capitulation of Golkonda [21 Sep. 1687.]

Siege of Bijapur—surrender of Sikandar Adil Shah, [12 Sep. 1686.] Marriage of Bidar Bakht to the daughter of Mukhtar Khan [21 Nov. 1686.] Turgal captured by Qasim Kh. and Ibrahimgarh by Firuz Jang [Jan. 1687.]

Emperor goes to Kulbarga [Dec. 1686 and again on 25 Feb. 1688] and thence to the tank of Kamtan, [7 Feb. 1688.]

Despatch from Ruhullah Khan: "When the Khan had gone to the further side of the Krishna, Anand Rao, a general of Shambhu, had entered the imperial dominion to collect chauth, but was defeated and dispersed by a force under Khanahzad Kh. detached by Ruhullah."

Emperor goes towards Bidar, [Jan. 1688.]

Azam, in hunting Akbar, reaches Kandapur; Akbar flees to the neighbourhood of Salhir, while Azam arrives near Ahivantgarh and bars the road. Akbar next goes to Mahuli, and thence to Kalian-Bhivandi (where he halts for 2 or 3 days), and then reaches the environs of Panhala, where a severe battle is fought with the imperialists after which Akbar retires to the hills again.

Emperor enters Bidar, [Dec. 1686 and again on 7 Feb. 1688.]

Mughals capture fort of Sangola, [May 1687.] Zinat-un-nisa writes to Akbar to come back and receive the Emperor's pardon; Akbar replies agreeing. But one month afterwards, spies bring the news that Akbar has gone to Shambhuji, made war preparations in fort Mahuli, then advanced to Shahpur, 20 *kos* from the ocean, and wished to pass by way of Jawhar, 5 *kos* from the imperial frontier, leaving Daman on his right (or left) hand.

A despatch from Qasim Kh. "The imperialists have captured 20 forts belonging to Bijapur."

Emperor sends Qalich Khan with a large army to chastise the

enemy [*i.e.*, Marathas] who making Mahuli their base used to attack the imperialists and seize the parganahs of Bijapur. Severe battle, many slain on both sides. Battle renewed next day. Emperor, on hearing of it, sends up reinforcements under Bahramand Khan and Firuz Jang. Battle for two days more. Rustam Khan wounded, his elephant killed. Enemy repulsed.

Habibullah, *qiladar* of Shahpur, made captive and his fort seized by Shambhuji's men.

Akbar, under the guidance of Khande, the brother of Tukaram Trimbak, zamindar of Jawhar, arrives near the Feringi [Portuguese] frontier and wishes to march to Hindustan. Azam sent to bar his path.

Nur Muhammad, *thanahdar* of Sangola, made prisoner by the Marathas.

Shah Alam's misconduct—is imprisoned, [21 Feb. 1687.]

Ramsej conquered by the imperialists.

Neknam Khan, *qiladar* of Mulhir, induces Krishnaji, the Maratha *qiladar* of Salhir, to sell the fort to the imperialists. [May, 1687.]

Battle with the Marathas, 4 *kos* from the imperial camp—Kishore Singh Hada, Muhakam Singh, Ram Singh, Harnath Singh and many other Rajputs slain. Firuz Jang brings up reinforcements and repulses the enemy.

News that Durgadas had embarked Akbar in a ship and had himself returned to Rajputana, (Badhnaur and Ratlam). Azam captures fort Harichandan, belonging to Shambhuji. News, Akbar arrived at Masqat. (Feb. 1687.)

Bogus Akbar set up by Gangaram, rebel, in Kalpi. Mujahid Khan conquers fort Udgir from Abdul Aziz's followers. Mugarab Khan captures forts Kularas and Nalgonda in the Karnatak.

News from Bijapur, "Rahim-dad, a servant of Shambhu, arrived near Panchamgarh and began to oppress and conquer; was defeated and captured by Ihtisham Kh. and Naroji Raghu, after 2000 men had been slain on the two sides together."

Mughals capture Karnul, Audhla and Thikir (? Thanknir.) Akbar at Masqat and lastly at the Persian Court. [Jan. 1688.]

Emperor revisits Bijapur [15 March 1688], removes water-scarcity there. Adoni captured [6 Aug. 1688] also Sanchuli and Harkumar close to Adoni.

Six months' campaign against Rani of Bednur, who at last submits. Prince Azam conquers Belgaum [text reads Banglur] from Sayyid Muhammad, after $3\frac{1}{2}$ months of campaigning. [May, 1688.]

Rising of Raja Ram Jat near Agra—he plunders the tomb of Akbar at Sikandra—is killed [4 July 1688.]

Rising of Gopal Singh Gaur, grandson of Pahar Singh Gaur, near Gwalior.

Fort Trimbak captured by Mutamad Kh.

Shah Alam's ladies removed to Delhi, [June 1689.]

Marathas defeat and capture Khidmat-talah Kh., thanahdar of Pain-ghat.

The brothers of Hambir Rao set out with Shambhuji's captain to plunder imperial territory,—severe battle with Itiqad Kh. near Malkapur, heavy slaughter on both sides—Marathas flee towards Nasik, abandoning the booty they had brought away from other places.

Sayyid Abdullah Kh. arrives near Rahiri (Raigarh) intending to besiege it. Madhaji the son of Shambhuji makes a wax model of the fort assisted by the son of Kavi-kalash. Siege postponed by order.

Shambhuji's qiladar of Panhala sells it to the Mughals.

Khan-i-Zaman Fath Jang Kh. fights an obstinate battle with the Marathas near Kolhapur—is severely wounded with his son—Emperor sends Dr. Sebastian to treat him.

Near Satara, Rustam Khan [Sharza] Bijapuri is defeated and captured by Santa Ghorpare, Jadon Phadke [? Dhana Jadav], and Manaji Moré—his family carried off into Satara fort by Hambir Rao. [May 1690.]

Rupa Bhonslé wounds Siddi Abdul Qadir, when travelling from his fief Lakhsir, [? Lakshmishwar.]

Turkish envoy arrives [July—Sep. 1690.] Emperor at Bijapur, Muhammadi Raj dies [Nov. 1688.]

Son born to Kam Baksh and Manoharpuri Mahal, [17 May 1684?]

Firuz Jang loses his eye-sight [Dec. 1688.]

Shambhuji and Hambir raid Berar, Khandesh and Baglana repeatedly.

Emperor marches from Bijapur [14 Dec. 1688] towards Junnar to extirpate Shambhuji.

Firuz Jang appointed to capture Raigarh.

Azam and Zulfiqar Kh. ordered to invade Maharashtra.

Death of Siddi Masaud.

Shambhuji captured [February 1689] and beheaded [11 March.]

Janoji [=Changoji] and Keshoji [=Yesaji], two generals of Shambhuji, place the Rajah's family in Raigarh and defend the fort. Zulfiqar Kh. captures forts Mahab (?) and Sadad (?)—is sent against Raigarh, long fight, Hambir Rao opposes with a large army, is defeated—Raigarh blockaded, capitulates, [19 Oct. 1689.]

Bahramand Kh. captures fort Premgarh after a siege of 2 months and 20 days.

Emperor captures Satara from Krishnaji, the brother of Hambir Rao, [Satara was captured on 21 Apr. 1700 from Subhanji.] [*Satara* in Ishwardas is a mistake for *Salhir*.]

Emperor sends Rajah Kishore Singh to capture Raigarh where Rajaram had taken shelter. But at night Rajaram escapes with Hambir Rao and other generals, and the Mughals capture Raigarh. Sayyid Abdullah pursues Rajaram into Bednur, but the latter escapes, while Rupa Bhonslé and 70 other officers are captured. Bednur invaded by the Mughals. Rani of Bednur agrees to pay a fine.

Maratha Navy, 1684-1688,

(in continuation of Ch. 44 § 14.)

The only record of Shambhuji's navy during this period is one of piracy, to which the crew were driven by their arrears of pay,—varied by attacks on petty cargo-boats belonging to Portuguese subjects. For fear of the Siddi, they seem to have carefully kept away from the northern seas (near Bombay) and confined themselves to the south (Kanara.)

On 10th March 1684 Shambhuji's "armada" brought into Karwar several rice-boats belonging to the Portuguese which they had made prize of. About 13th March, a year later, 5 or 6 of his *ghurabs*

and *gallivats*, stationed at Rajapur, visited Karwar. They used to "go out one day and come in the next, . *robbing and plundering* both at sea and shore what they can catch, *having*, it is reported, *little else to live upon* "

An Englishman named Robert Johnson, who had rebelled against the Company's authorities in India, got a commission from Shambhaji to serve him as his "general at sea" for 600 pagodas per annum as salary and 25 pagodas per mensem as diet money, binding himself to bring 30 more Europeans to the Rajah's service. They engaged to come up with a fleet to the mouth of the Tapti river (near which Surat stands), rob, destroy or capture the Mughal and Siddi junks there or "where they could meet with them in this piratical manner." But he was arrested by the President and Council of Surat in September 1684 and deported to England. [Orme MSS 126, Surat to Calicut, 16 Oct 1684.]

About 2nd April 1685 two ships and 3 or 4 more *ghurabs* of his armada entered Karwar harbour, having taken several vessels belonging to the Karnatak people (i.e., Kanarese) and Portuguese, and some also that belong to *their own country people*. It was reported that they were going again to the southward to rob some place or other in Kanara, so that the Rani [of Sunda] sent down 1000 soldiers to Murjan to be ready to repel the raiders. Some three weeks afterwards, they took two vessels out of the Murjan river, a large and a small *ghurab*, belonging to the Portuguese and laden with plank &c. (Karwar to Surat in *FR* Surat 109.)

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